MDBs used coastal artillery guns and anti-aircraft guns to
carry out their mission. From Wikipedia, a MDB 1939 table of
organization and equipment (TOE) included: (2)
- HQ Company
- Service battery - Six platoons, each with a searchlight and aircraft sound locator
- Coast Defense Group - Three batteries, each with two Mark 15 5"/51 caliber guns
- Antiaircraft Group - Four AAA gun batteries, each with four mobile 3-inch M3 guns; two AAA machine gun companies, each with 24 Browning M2 water-cooled .50-caliber machine guns on AA mounts; two beach protection machine gun companies, each with 24 Browning M1917A1 water-cooled .30-caliber machine guns
Does any of this sound familiar? Substitute missiles for artillery and you
have, almost exactly, Commandant Berger’s island-based sea control units.
So, how did these MDBs fare in combat? The short answer is that none succeeded. Every island the Japanese attacked to start
WWII, they successfully seized. The only
notable, momentary, success occurred at Wake Island where the 1st
MDB with 399 personnel (compare this to the Commandant’s vision of platoon size
units) used six 5” guns to repel the first Japanese assault which consisted of
2 light cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 450 troops – a remarkably small assault
force. The Marine’s coastal artillery guns
sank one destroyer. F4F Wildcat aircraft
sank another destroyer and the Japanese retreated. Two weeks later, the Japanese returned with a
heavier force and seized the island in just over one day.
At Guadalcanal, the MDB went ashore but did little.
[3rd] Marine Defense Battalion protected the beaches within the Guadalcanal perimeter, but did little more than fend
off infiltrators, since the main Japanese counterlandings were all away from
the perimeter and unopposed. (4)
And so it went.
As WWII progressed, MDBs were assigned to bases across the
Pacific where most languished and did nothing.
The majority of MDBs were eventually reclassified as anti-aircraft units
when it became apparent that the Japanese were no longer capable of conducting
assaults or naval attacks.
A summary of the MDBs and their WWII service can be found in
the links below (2, 3).
So, recognizing the marked similarity between the MDBs and
the Commandant’s sea control units, what lessons and conclusions can we draw
from the WWII MDBs?
 |
| Marine Defense Battalion 5" Gun |
Success and Size. The MDBs had almost no success and the
primary reason was that they were too small to accomplish anything. An MDB consisted of the equipment listed
above and a total of three or four hundred rifle troops. The Commandant’s small sea control platoon
size units are even smaller – much, much smaller. The envisioned Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)
would have a troop capacity of around 75.
That’s simply far too small to survive any type of attack. The only hope the sea control units have of
success lies in somehow being able to magically remain undetected while
launching missiles or being able to instantaneously relocate to a new, hidden
location, while, again, remaining undetected.
This seems decidedly unlikely.
Forward Basing. A key difference between the MDBs and the sea
control units is that the MDBs were deployed to islands and bases in waters
that we controlled whereas the sea control units are envisioned to deploy to
secret, hidden bases deep inside enemy waters.
As we’ve repeatedly pointed out, no one has yet explained how a
painfully slow, non-stealthy, short ranged LAW will be able to penetrate deep
inside enemy waters while remaining undetected.
It is worth noting that the MDB forward basing concept proved to be
worthless with the MDBs either failing when exposed to enemy attack or sitting
idle on islands that the enemy couldn’t reach because they were in waters under
our control.
Secrecy. The MDBs were not secret, hidden units. Their existence and presence was well known
to the enemy. Operating units with large
artillery guns in secret was not a reality then nor is our fantasy of secretly
operating units with multiple, large missile launching vehicles a reality now.
Resupply. At the outset of WWII, the MDBs that faced
Japanese attack were fatally crippled by an inability to obtain resupply. Wake Island was a notable example of this. Notably, this resupply failure was in waters
that we nominally controlled. Again,
this should tell us something about our ability to resupply sea control units
operating from islands deep inside enemy waters – it isn’t going to
happen. The fantasy that we can resupply
and support units inside enemy waters is just that: pure fantasy.
To believe that slow, non-stealthy, supply ships will sail deep into
enemy waters, undetected, is delusional in the extreme.
Conclusion. The lessons of the MDBs are screaming at us
and yet we’re ignoring them. The
effectiveness and survival of the sea control units depends on a ridiculous
degree of fantasy-level stealth (from non-stealthy ships and equipment !) that
didn’t exist in WWII and doesn’t exist today.
Despite these lessons, we’re converting the entire Marine Corps to this
nonsensical mission and abandoning every other worthwhile combat
capability. Somewhere, a Chinese general
is smiling as he crosses the USMC off his list of threats.
(1)Wikipedia, “Marine Defense Battalions”, retrieved
12-May-2020,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_defense_battalions
Also it worth noting that Guadalcanal also shows the the problem even stealth resupply if you have it. No matter that Japan had super efficient and fast DDs for night runs and large subs able to carry cargo. Collectively they could not keep the Japanese side equipped and manned vs the attrition they were facing when japan lost local sea control (in the bit where is was changing hands). Japan probably should have written off The garrison on day one and not been sucked to a attrition battle. I am afraid that's what this ideal by USMC will result in trying to desperately save a force that can't really be saved with what supply runs by what the converted Ohio class subs?
ReplyDeleteReally excellent point and illustration of the historical example!
DeleteTo go on - I agree the seems well nonsensical. The sad thing is there is some rational thinking in there. Nice to have real AA and Anti surface missile capacity on hand if you end up on a beachhead the USN has to run. But this assumes you also have manpower and tanks and artillery to dig and hold one.
ReplyDelete"Nice to have real AA and Anti surface missile capacity on hand if you end up on a beachhead"
DeleteYou've identified one of the major shortcomings with the Marine amphibious assault. They have no significant mobile, amphibious anti-air or C-RAM capability. If they're serious about amphibious assault - and I don't think they are - then they desperately need to add this capability.
Even for the Commandant's fantasy vision of platoon size units doing sea control, you need some kind of mobile anti-air capability for self-defense.
So what would you suggest instead of MDBs? A couple of Battleship Battle Groups (BBBGs) running around with air cover established from airbases on the larger islands? Something else? I'd like to know what you think would work in this situation.
ReplyDeleteYou ask a great question. To an extent, I've answered the question throughout this entire blog. However, the summarized answer begins with the most basic question: why would we want to occupy/control any of these islands? This gets back to having an overall strategy. With the strategy I have in mind, there is no need to occupy these islands. It is sufficient to simply deny their use to the enemy and that can be accomplished by fairly minimal Tomahawk strikes since the islands are small, fixed, open, vulnerable, and indefensible. Their only value to China lies in their peacetime, territorial expansion efforts. Their extreme vulnerability precludes any useful wartime military use.
DeleteThat said, I see no need for MDBs, the Commandant's sea control units, or anything similar since I have no desire to occupy/control the islands.
Did that answer the question?
The whole "small-sized units in a peer war" concept is stupid.
ReplyDeleteIf a few dozen men can be so effective in a war against China, then the Chinese are so inferior to the Marines Supermen they're not a concern.
If they can't, these are suicidal units that won't accomplish anything.
One of the main stumbling blocks that no one has addressed is targeting. Setting aside all the issues with how the unit gets in place and operates without being detected, the fact is that the anti-ship missiles still have to have targeting data. How does a small land unit acquire targets hundreds of miles out to sea? Any land based radar (which would broadcast their position!) would only have a 15 mile radar horizon. That's not exactly sea control! They could operate UAVs but that, too, would seem to be a dead giveaway of their location. Won't China notice UAVs flying around in their air space? We certainly would! I'm waiting for the Commandant to address the targeting issue.
DeleteSea control from a fixed location gives the enemy a fixed location to attack. Targeting works both ways! Why make it easy for the enemy and choose to be a fixed target? Once the Marines are located simple GPS targeting is all that is needed. Multiple missiles from hundreds of miles away will be able to blanket any small island the Marines call a base. This is really a dumb idea that the Commandant has put forward.
Delete"This is really a dumb idea that the Commandant has put forward."
DeleteWhich only makes one wonder how unrealistic and 'dumb' the wargames were that he claims to be basing his concept on?
This is not a defense of the EABO but...
ReplyDeleteAfter the Japanese initial advance the MDB were a resounding success. They prevented enemy forces from taking out our advanced and large forward bases on the cheap. Till the end the Japanese had ships with the range to reach the bases but having to worry about not only Navy but also the defense battalions was too much. If the Japanese had massed their forces they may have been able to damage or worse our base forces. However this would have been at the cost of being penned between naval forces and the local defenses in a similar situation to Midway. Their success was in what didn't happen.
"They prevented enemy forces from taking out our advanced and large forward bases on the cheap."
DeleteThat's an appealing notion that is unsupported by any evidence, to the best of my knowledge. The Japanese never tried to retake an island that we seized. The notion that the presence of an MDB prevented that, when MDBs didn't prevent a single island seizure to start the war, is just wishful thinking.
What you're proposing is, essentially, a negative. Nothing happened and you're attributing that nothing to the MDBs. You could just as easily attribute it to the fact that we built Quonset huts on the islands or that there were jeeps on the islands. Since nothing happened, no one can prove otherwise.
I'm sorry but unless you have some documentation showing that the Japanese planned an island re-seizure but decided not to due to the presence of an MDB, you're just engaging in pure speculation.
"having to worry about not only Navy but also the defense battalions was too much."
Again, one could just as logically say that having to worry about not only the Navy but the mosquitos on the islands were too much. I think it was the Navy, not the mosquitos or the MDBs that dissuaded the Japanese - if they ever even contemplated such a venture.
Your proposition may be appealing but it's not true - or, at least, totally unsupported by any evidence that I'm aware of.
Marine Defense Battalions were a great idea. They were not designed to repel major landings, but air and naval bases needed security to defend against air and commando attacks. The same is true today. The main bases we have in the Far East have billions of dollars in aircraft and ships sitting idle at each one. We can't allow teams of commandos to land by sub, fishing boats or small aircraft to destroy them. As you've noted, we have lots of Marines and no real mission for them nowadays. Of course most Marine Generals hate the dull yet vital idea of focusing on the Corps' legally mandated mission of protecting advance naval bases.
ReplyDelete"bases needed security"
DeleteAbsolutely, but that's not the point of the post nor is that the purpose of the Commandant's sea control units.
"protecting advance naval bases."
That, again, is not the purpose of the Commandant's sea control units, as pointed out in the post.