Well, ComNavOps would like to offer a new saying, ‘data is
the enemy of action’. In our modern
military we are almost paralyzed by our desire for data at the expense of
effective action. Rather than act in a
timely and effective manner – but with a chance of error – we hesitate and wait
and gather more data. All the while, our
opportunity for effective action slips away.
No one is suggesting that we run off half-cocked, like
lunatics, based on nothing but rumors and guesses. Intel is necessary and good. However, when our desire for perfect data
prevents effective action, we’ve gone too far.
Think about it. What
kind of war fighting systems are we focused on today? It’s all about data. Perfect data.
Perfect battlefield knowledge.
Total awareness. That’s what
we’re pursuing.
What are we leaving out?
What are we forgetting? Firepower
and action! It does no good to have
perfect data after the opportunity to act has passed.
Why are we so focused on data? Well, it has to do with our zero-defect mentality. Our military leaders are so scared of being
wrong and making a mistake that can cost them their command and career that
they’d rather not act and, instead, wait for more data than to take a chance on
being wrong.
We need to lose our zero-defect mentality and embrace
mistakes as the price of learning and the price of boldness. In other words, we need to start developing
and embracing a war mentality.
Did you run your ship aground? Okay, that’s unfortunate but are you an
otherwise good officer? Yes? Then learn a lesson and get back out there! No penalty.
After your tenth grounding then, sure, we should probably check you for
competency but in the meantime, learn and act boldly.
Data is the enemy of action!
Peace time military.
ReplyDeleteIt breeds low-risk type senior leadership who excel at politics and consensus building.
"Peace time military."
DeleteYou raise a fascinating thought. If a peacetime military is a problem, does a small peacetime military mean a smaller problem and a big peacetime military mean a big problem? If so, that suggests that a significantly smaller peacetime military is more desirable since it represents a significantly smaller problem. What do you think? Is there some validity to that line of thought?
If the problem is high level decision making, the numbers of junior officers and enlisted shouldn't impact that problem one way or another. If it low risk thinking at low levels the junior manning may come into play. Of course risk adverse behavior at the tactical level can be driven from above. The reverse is rarely true.
Delete"If so, that suggests that a significantly smaller peacetime military is more desirable since it represents a significantly smaller problem. What do you think? Is there some validity to that line of thought?"
DeleteWell, it used to be that way, after all.
The problem is that nowadays it takes a lot more time and effort to build up a large military for when you really need one, just giving a bunch of peasants swords (or rifles) isn't going to be enough anymore.
It's the price of complexity and technology.
"It's the price of complexity and technology."
DeleteBut … if the price is an ineffective military, what have we gained?
What's the solution? What should we do?
We've been at war for almost 20 years straight. We've taken thousands of casualties, lost vehicles,aircraft, and at least one naval vessel to the Iranian navy...
DeleteHow are we still stupider then the American military was on Saturday, 06Dec1941?
"We've been at war for almost 20 years straight."
DeleteNo. No, we haven't. We've had 100% aerial dominance, 100% surveillance dominance, overwhelming numerical superiority, total firepower dominance, rules of engagement that are intended to prevent collateral damage rather than destroy the enemy, and have engaged at the squad level rather than the division or corps level. That's not war, that's live fire exercises against an almost helpless foe whose only successes come from our own stupidity. For example, IEDs … why are we driving on roads where IEDs are planted when every military vehicle we have is intended for off-road capability? We could have avoided almost every IED but we stupidly insist on driving on roads in predictable patterns.
If anyone thinks what we've been engaged in is war then it just proves what I've constantly said: that we've forgotten what war is.
"does a small peacetime military mean a smaller problem and a big peacetime military mean a big problem?"
DeleteThat's a really thought provoking idea.
When I was a young man I was an army officer and helicopter pilot in an air cavalry unit.
An observation I had then was that by the time an officer reached a rank where they could make changes, they had been 'assimilated' (it was the 90's, the Borg and all that) into the army's culture and way of thinking.
And what culture is that?
It's the culture of high efficiency ratings. It's the culture of checking blocks and getting promoted.
It's the culture of not rocking the boat.
The peace time army rewards a no risk leadership style, and I'm sure the navy is the same.
Conversely, combat appears to reward a style of leadership that embraces a certain amount of risk...not stupid risk, but bold action that accepts a certain amount of it.
Even our politicians are risk averse, which is unfortunate.
Failure is the basis of learning through experience. And we weed out those that have made mistakes. Those might be the people that are best suited for the job.
Similarly, when a peace time military goes into combat, the officer-politicians are unsuccessful and the officer-leaders rise to the occasion.
Off the top of my head I think about the Union army in 1861/2/3, the French in WWI, and our own military in WWII as historical examples.
As I walk through this, I don't know that having a small peace time military would necessarily alleviate the problem.
On one hand it would reduce the number of politicians that end up at the higher ranks by reducing the overall number of high ranked officers.
But on the other hand it would reduce the 'bench-strength' of the officer corps and limit the pool of potential combat leaders.
The right answer, I suppose, is to attempt to build a fighting force during peace time.
Maybe the Navy should try that.
"But … if the price is an ineffective military, what have we gained?
DeleteWhat's the solution? What should we do?"
One could write a book on this, as the scope of the issue is immense.
First, there is a need to think about how one plans to do war and go from there, not the other way around.
Are armies of millions and navies of thousands still a necessity, for example?
From those answers strategy and doctrine should flow (adding technology for technology's sake doesn't count).
Let's say we decide that yes, there is a need for large armies in warfare, then the solution can be:
a) Keep a Large Standing Army so soldiers can learn how to use complex tech during peacetime.
b) Be ready to get lots of civilians into the armed forces when needs arise, with little time to train them.
c) Ditch the human component and try to develop a robotic army with actually useful autonomous AI.
As you can surely realize, each of these choices has its own pros and cons, not to mention massive social and political implications, though, while "let's just wing it" is simpler.
"On one hand it would reduce the number of politicians that end up at the higher ranks by reducing the overall number of high ranked officers.
DeleteBut on the other hand it would reduce the 'bench-strength' of the officer corps and limit the pool of potential combat leaders."
Having a smaller problem (less risk-averse officers) to begin with might be desirable. When a war comes, the warrior officers would have to come from the civilian pool, of course.
"the solution can be:"
DeleteYou've offered a, b, and c. Which do you suggest is the proper course of action?
As mentioned, that's a political decision: actually available options would go through D, E, F and all the way to the end of the alphabet (at least).
DeleteSince we can't write an essay here, let's agree to the previous post's premise (need for large armies in war), and limit ourselves to the aforementioned choices, just to see how each one has both advantages and drawback.
A) It's essentially what the US is doing right now, and everyone can see its problems.
Historically, one does not keep a large army in peacetime (it's expensive and it'll rot anyway), but large declining empires might have to do it because of frequent trouble in border provinces and there's no other real choice.
B) This is the typical choice through history, as well as my preferred course of action.
Keep a smaller number of "special forces" while at peace and use civilian manpower for war: it was done because it worked.
However, modern/future warfare might very well have a level of complexity beyond what can be faced by just armed civilians: technologies that requires lots of time to master abound, and in war training time is scarce.
Furthermore, there is the uniquely modern problem of having such huge swaths of the military age population that is either unfit or unwilling to serve, if not both.
(I'm ignoring the whole "women in combat" thing on purpose because any nation who sends large numbers women into actual war is either ruled by madmen or already defeated so there's no point in discussing much.)
C) This is not actually possible yet, but IT and his children are perhaps America's best industries, and the military has all the cash it needs for a "Manhattan Project" on robotic soldiers if the political will is there.
Upsides involve extreme expendability and just solving the manpower issue forever.
Downsides, besides having the population accept an army of literal killer robots, are hacking and bugs.
Still, we might go that way in the future.
"B) This is the typical choice through history, as well as my preferred course of action."
DeleteThe corollary to this is simplicity. If we can resist the temptation to develop exquisitely advanced technology and, instead, stick to more basic technologies, we'd have a better chance of being able to train civilians to quickly use military technology. An example is Aegis. Even with full time, large naval forces and personnel we wound up with badly degraded Aegis systems, fleet wide, and I don't think we've corrected it yet. What if we had stuck with mechanical, rotating SPS-48/49 radars that could actually be maintained at optimum performance versus exquisite Aegis systems that can't be? Those mechanical, rotating systems that everyone mocks might actually be better performers!
"solving the manpower issue forever."
I do not see this as an upside. Historically, our government has functioned best when large numbers of Congressmen and Presidents have been former combat vets. With a nod to Starship Troopers, I think it is important to have the citizenry have a personal stake in our country's defense. I think the Israelis have it right, with mandatory service for all.
There is a sort of urban legend in the intel community, that unlike many urban legends may actually be true, that the Russian doctrine teaches that the hardest enemy to fight is the Americans. The Brits and other Europeans, and the Japanese, do what's in their manuals, so you know what they are going to do. But Americans bring so many civilians in who don't know much about doctrine but know they want to win the war and get back home, so you don't have any idea what they are going to do.
Delete"The corollary to this is simplicity."
DeleteThis is a correct observation, as there is plenty of pointless/harmful complexity that could and should be ditched with the only result of improving things.
However, there is a growing amount of needed complexity that can not actually be eliminated without reducing combat power.
For example, as recently as WWII one could just toss a farm guy with little experience in a Grumman Hellcat with little issues, and the plane itself was easy to take care of.
Today's stealth fighters are the opposite.
"I do not see this as an upside."
Neither do I, but we don't make those kinds of decisions, politicians will.
And they will find it temptingly attractive for obvious reasons, I fear.
Israel's model, for example, is an incredibly hard sell politically outside of a garrison state surrounded by enemies (which is what Israel is).
Furthermore, should one day non-human soldiers ever become superior to their counterpart, well...
"there is a growing amount of needed complexity that can not actually be eliminated without reducing combat power."
DeleteYes and no. Yes, there is a need for more complex FUNCTIONALITY but, no, there is no mandatory need for more complex technology. For example, the F-35 ALIS do-everything logistics program was an UNNECESSARILY complex way to provide an improvement in logistical functionality. We could have provided simpler ways to meet the logistic functionality.
A more common civilian example is a smart phone or Microsoft Word. Each provides ten thousand functions of which the average user uses ten basic ones. The rest is unnecessary complexity.
Modern radars attempt to provide exquisite levels of imaging when only a basic 'there's something there that shouldn't be' is all that's really needed.
Modern ship propulsion plants are another example. We try to combine diesel/hybrid/electrical/turbine/warp drive with combining gears that are too complex to operate or maintain and the result is that our exquisite propulsion systems fail continuously whereas a simple, inefficient, single power source would perform much more reliably and be much easier to maintain and repair.
Yes, the tradeoff is a few points of efficiency for greatly enhanced reliability and maintainability. For combat assets, reliability and maintainability are far more important than a slight improvement in fuel efficiency or whatever it is that you're trying to improve.
Chester Nimitz ran a ship aground as a junior officer. How would we have fared in WWII if he had not been around?
ReplyDeleteThe GWOT war on terror where a troop in contact is a rare event made everyone used to Battalion and Regimental leadership watching everything on aviation feeds in the COC and require after actions with data that are war games repeatedly.
ReplyDeleteI expect an initially large COC growth in an actual kinetic war to keep track of this data, but my bet is that we will quickly eliminate the reporting requirements as they become overwhelming and “forceful” and “decisive” will once again be important leadership adjectives.
“forceful” and “decisive” will once again be important leadership adjectives"
DeleteSo, you anticipate a repeat of WWII where we had to fire a lot of leaders until we began to find true warrior leaders?
If that's the case and you can anticipate that, isn't there anything we can do to short circuit the process?
If we know that our leaders are going to be so bad, why do we have them? Wouldn't it be easier to just bring in brand new leaders during a war? Wouldn't it be easier to train people with the right warrior mentality how to be warriors than to try to teach trained leaders who aren't naturally warriors how to be real warriors?
What we need more than anything is an adjustment to the promotion process to promote aggressive risk takers faster and force out many officers faster (or retain those non-aggressive officers without promotion)
Delete"What we need more than anything is an adjustment to the promotion process..."
DeleteAbsolutely. We need to promote warriors instead of paper-shufflers. Unfortunately, it's the paper-shufflers who are on top right now. Just look at the last few CNOs. Who is the last true warrior to be CNO? They've held some pretty impressive-sounding staff positions, but who among them has actually been involved in winning a war?
"who among them has actually been involved in winning a war?"
DeleteThere's been no naval wars so, obviously, there's been no officers who have seen combat. Since we can't select based on combat, the next best thing is to select based on demonstrated tactical expertise in realistic exercises. However, since we don't do realistic exercises, there's no opportunity for officers to demonstrate their capability.
You see where this is going, right?
Lacking realistic naval exercises, the next best thing to select on is general, aggressive behavior like outspoken critical views, bar fights, public disagreements with superiors, and so on. Of course, those are exactly the behaviors that get one fired for 'loss of confidence'.
So, what does that leave us? Pathetic milquetoasts who abhor risk.
Anyone with an ounce of fighting spirit probably gets frustrated and leaves the Navy pretty quickly!
Why would you join the Navy if you wanted to fight ?
DeleteIf you wanted a combat command, the service choices are obvious. Elite Forces disease is full swing, SpecWar has been vacuuming up the go getters for 19 years.
Our current group of senior officers have combat experience against ISIS and the Taliban. The enemy was rarely above squad size or had weapons bigger than RPGs; civilian casualties or IEDs were bigger threats than any opposing force.
ReplyDeleteThis experience creates habits and easy success reinforces these habits and expectations that will not work against a more kinetic opponent who can combine arms like China, Russia, N Korean...
We need to speed up our promotions and promote the aggressive meat eaters faster even if they don’t have combat experience. Delegate as much as possible to the lowest level by replacing officers with SNCOs or junior NCOs at decision points.
Most of the aggressive junior officers get out since they expected an aggressive environment but were frustrated by the bureaucracy.
The coming budget crunch may force an adjustment in force size.
“The coming budget crunch may force an adjustment in force size.’
DeleteMuch of this I’ve posted before, so apologize for the repeat, but I think it is worth considering.
Edward Luttwak has written that the way to have a large, capable military at a relatively low cost is to keep a large portion of it at a reduced state of readiness. Israel, Switzerland, and Sweden all maintain military forces that can punch more than their weight by keeping a large portion in reserve forces.
CBO’s force structure analysis at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51535 shows Navy and Marine Corps personnel (combined) as being:
Combat: Active 210,000, Selected Reserve (SelRes) 34,000, Total 244,000
Combat Support: Active 93,000, SelRes 25,000, Total 118,000
Admin/Overhead: Active 202,000, SelRes 38,000, Total 240,000
Totals: Active 505,000, SelRes 97,000, Total 602,000
Suppose we cut the Admin/Overhead active component in half, and split the numbers 1/3 to Combat, 1/6 to Combat Support, and 1/2 to net reduction in active duty numbers, and double the SelRes. We would end up with:
Combat: Active 244,000, SelRes 68,000, Total 312,000
Combat Support: Active 110,000, SelRes 50,000, Total 160,000
Admin/Overhead: Active 101,000, SelRes 76,000, Total 177,000
Totals: Active 455,000, SelRes 194,000, Total 649,000
On active duty, we've identified 34,000 more Combat and 17,000 more Combat Support personnel. If the Navy/Marine split is 22,000/12,000 for additional Combat and 11,000/6,000 for Combat Support, we’ve found 22,000 more sailors that the Navy can use. That’s 3 times the 7,300 that the Navy says it needs, per https://www.navytimes.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/11/us-navy-looks-to-hire-thousands-more-sailors-as-service-finds-itself-9000-sailors-short-at-sea/. That’s also getting rid of the excess admirals and staffs that ComNavOps has noted, and a significant reduction in the number of other non-operational personnel, both military and civilian (latter not reflected in these numbers).
As for the increase in reserves, we pay reservists 60 days a year, versus 365 for active duty. That would suggest that a reservist costs 1/6 what an active duty sailor costs, but in reality some admin costs eat into those savings and it's probably between 1/5 and 1/4. So the current structure calls for 505,000 active duty headcount and 97,000 SelRes (equivalent to roughly 22,000 full time equivalents, FTEs), or about 527,000 FTEs. My revised model calls for 455,000 active and 194,000 SelRes (44,000 FTE) or a total of 499,000 FTE’s. That’s a 5% reduction in personnel cost, with a 15% increase in active duty Combat and Combat Support personnel, and an 8% increase in potential end strength.
Look at it another way. Consulting firm McKinsey did an analysis of OECD (developed countries) total military expenditures at https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/public%20sector/pdfs/mck%20on%20govt/defense/mog_benchmarking_v9.ashx. The average OECD country spends 26% of its defense budget on Combat, 11% on Combat Support, and 63% on Admin/Other. That’s bad enough, but for the USA is 16% Combat, 7% Combat Support, and 77% Admin/Other. Out of a $700B defense budget, that’s $112B for combat, $49B for combat support, and $539B for Admin/Other. If we increased Combat and Combat Support by 25% each, and reduced Admin/Other by 25%, that would mean $140B for Combat, $61B for Combat Support, and $404B for Admin/Other, or $605B total, a savings of $95B. That’s a 14% reduction in the DOD budget with theoretically a 25% increase in fighting power. Overall expenditures would be roughly 22% Combat, 11% Combat Support, and 67% Admin/Other.
These changes would represent a turn toward action and away from Of course, nothing like this is likely to occur, because it’s those bloated admin types who decide where to cut, and they aren’t going to get rid of their gravy train.
"suggest that a reservist costs 1/6 what an active duty sailor costs, but in reality some admin costs eat into those savings and it's probably between 1/5 and 1/4."
DeleteI think you mean to imply that the reservist saves less than the 1/6 that is implied by the simple arithmetic. If so, that would mean that the savings are 1/7 or 1/8 instead of 1/4 or 1/5.
This comment has been removed by the author.
DeleteMy bigger issue is probably how much manpower and expense go to admin/overhead activities instead of combat and combat support.
Delete
DeleteActually the simple arithmetic would be that the reservist costs 1/6, since you pay him/her for 60 days, and saves 5/6, since you don't pay him/her for 300 out of 365 days. But admin costs associated with the reserve program knock that down to a savings of between 3/4 and 4/5, so a cost of 1/5 to 1/4. If we went to more of a reserve model, we could probably get the cost down closer to 1/6 by eliminating some admin that is currently needed. Of course, there would also be a push to get reserves training more combat oriented.
Not to dispute the potential long term monetary savings realized by a shift to larger reserve/smaller active components, but...
DeleteHolding Israel, Sweden, or Switzerland up as conceptual exemplars ignores their unique geography & geopolitical postures:
1. All three of them field militaries devoted almost without exception to territorial defense of the motherland. They are not expeditionary forces. Hence, in Israeli or Swedish naval terms, no actual requirement for global blue water fleet capabilities. In Switzerland's case... no naval capability at all.
2. All three nations fund, equip, and deploy their forces to defend from interior lines. Meaning that their reserves can quickly assume defensive posture along their own borders and coastal waters. Not a one of them is designed to kick in the doors of any distant nation, other than along their own frontiers. Penny packet contributions to western Combined expeditionary efforts aside, they are, by nature, Homeland DEFENSIVE constructs.
3. All three are neutral states. Two (Sweden & Switzerland) by formal choice. No significant alliances with any likely coalitions against any likely adversaries. Switzerland has no potential enemies, Sweden only one.
The third (Israel) is a de facto neutral state in the sense that it has negligible alliances with only a few regional neighbors... and only one potential large military benefactor (the USA). Israel can't practically contribute major combat power to any out-of-sector coalition conflict short of an existential WWIII. The propaganda fallout for contributing to any other out of sector adventures is geopolitically unpalatable. Hence, their navy is built for really only three tasks: Nuclear deterrence, operations in home waters, and neutralization of purely Arab afloat combatants.
Israel exists as a permanently militarily surrounded modern version of Outremer (the Crusader States) of 900 years ago. As the neighborhood heavyweight champ, it only needs force enough to hold its own against well understood and nearly adjacent military competitors. Needful of only a modest naval fleet. Because their likely enemies possess only modest naval capability (Egypt aside).
Meanwhile, back in the Carthaginian Empire (er... the USA), we require globe straddling blue water fleets in order to enforce economic/military dominance across our vital trade arteries. With a growing Roman (Chinese) fleet dead set on contesting the status quo.
Not sure that shrinking the active fleet and retreating to reserve secured home waters is the correct recipe for our particular situation. As much as any nation that has ever existed, we are (by accident of continental geography) an historically fated maritime power. Looking at things in any other way is delusional. Surprisingly, China actually isn't. But they've decided to contest the maritime supremacy arrangement. One of these days, they are going to bring it. If our Navy shrinks... they just might bring it the same way that Japan did.
Not really looking at the Israeli, Swiss, or Swedish model, at least not for the Navy. I'm just saying that there probably are places to save some money by converting active slots to reserve slots.
DeleteRemember, I started out hacking admin/overhead slots in half, and admin/overhead costs by 25% (those costs include a lot of things that don't go up or down directly with headcount). As a result, I freed up 34,000 more active combat personnel, and 17,000 more combat support personnel for Navy/USMC combined. So there would be no. need to shrink the fleet. I'm growing the fleet and drinking the staffs, and using reservists to fill some wartime needs.
"Holding Israel, Sweden, or Switzerland up as conceptual exemplars ignores their unique geography & geopolitical postures:"
DeleteExcellent point.
"Holding Israel, Sweden, or Switzerland up as conceptual exemplars ignores their unique geography & geopolitical postures:"
DeleteWe can't go as far as Israel, Sweden, or Switzerland, obviously. But if we are successful in getting some of our "world policeman" duties passed off to others, so we can cut down on deployments, we obviously need a surge capacity. And many of those extraneous staff positions, if they are to be continued at all, could be passed off to reservists at a fraction of the cost. Some may have a need in wartime only, such as some of the MIDEASTFOR positions that were manned by reservists during Desert Storm.
I've actually thought about putting ships on a 10-year rotation. I tried to explain here once before but apparently did more to confuse the issue than anything else, but I'm going to try again.
Years 1-3 in a reserve status, 1/2 crew active, 1/2 reserve. Do local training ops, perhaps serve as opposition forces for fleet training exercises. Toward end of year 3, start working up to full active crew.
Years 4-6 in home fleet status, complete workup to full active crew early in year 4, intensify training to prepare for deployment, work up to blue and gold crews toward end of year 6.
Years 7-9, deployment status, with blue and gold crews while actually deployed to minimize strain on sailors. Deployments could be round the world, for west coast ship, say 6-8 months in WestPac, then 6-8 months in Indian Ocean, then 6-8 months in Med/Europe, with crew rotations and short maintenance availability at midpoint of of each phase.
Year 10, major maintenance in shipyards with skeleton crews. Royal Navy actually decommissions ships in this phase. In second cycle, do years 20 and 21 back to back, to give time to refuel carriers and allow significant upgrades to keep all ships current, almost like a FRAM program.
So working off a 40-year life, employment would be
Years 1-3, 11-13, 22-24, and 32-34 in reserve training and local ops status
Years 4-6, 14-6, 25-27, and 35-37, home fleet training and short ops status
Years 7-9, 17-19, 28-30, and 38-40, deployed
Years 10, 20-21, and 31, major maintenance
For each 3 ships, you would need 3-1/2 regular crews and 1/2 reserve crew. I would get a bunch of those people by moving admin/overhead personnel back to the fleet. In a crisis you could surge fairly quickly by upgrading the home fleet ships to deployed and the reserve ships to home fleet and surge reserve.
With a 350 ship fleet, that would mean 35 ships in yards for major maintenance/upgrades, 105 ships deployed, 105 ships in home fleet, and 105 ships in reserve.
One quick point. That 105 ships deployed number is actually ships deployable. With a 2-year deployment cycle like I outlined, that would mean about 2/3 actually deployed at any time, or 70. The Navy home page shows 69 ships deployed underway today, and 105 total ships underway. That's about the number that this approach would achieve, or it could be reduced as we pass some policeman duties off to allies.
DeleteDeployed time for personnel would be about 6-8 months per trip, with 3 trips over 36 months. Time in between active crew status would be available for individual and team training, which could be conducted on a much more intensive basis than now.
"Not sure that shrinking the active fleet and retreating to reserve secured home waters is the correct recipe for our particular situation."
DeleteJust to be clear, I'm not talking about shrinking the fleet or retreating to home waters. For one thing, we can't really get rid of many, if any, of our overseas commitments until we find someone to take them on. I would like to see us partner with other allies to get them to take on some things in their areas.
I'm actually talking about growing the fleet substantially beyond current numbers, or even the 355-ship fleet that the navy is proposing. I'd like to see a 400-, 500-, or even 600-ship Navy. But in an era when funds are going to be constrained by the political process, we cannot do that with the current cost structure. I think we need to do some creative things. So my way to get there would include:
1) Reviving Elmo Zumwalt’s high/low mix approach to ship and aircraft procurement. We don’t need every carrier to be a Ford (probably better off if none were) or every surface combatant to be a Burke. For the $15B cost of a Ford, we could build another Nimitz or a RAND CVN-LX ($9B) plus a smaller carrier, maybe a version of the RN Queen Elizabeth with waist cats, traps, and an angled deck (£7B for two, probably $5B-6B for one) or ComNavOps’s Midway variant. And we could convert the LHAs/LHDs to some interim version for less than that. Speaking of the LHAs/LHDs, for less than the cost of a new LHA/LHMD ($3.4B) plus a San Antonio LPD ($1.7B), we can build an amphibious squadron that we can actually risk bringing in close enough to shore to do a real amphibious assault—a smaller LHA/LHD like the Spanish Juan Carlos ($1.7B), an LPH like the French Mistral ($600MM), a cheaper LPD/LSD like the British Albion ($600MM), a real LST like the Brit Round Table or Turkish Bayraktar ($500MM), an LPA/LKA ($500MM), and a land attack frigate to provide fire support ($500MM). Burkes are probably up to about $2.8B apiece for the Flight IIIs. For the cost of two Flight IIIs ($5.6B) you could build one Flight III, one mini-Burke ($1.2B) and three ASW frigates ($500MM each).
2) Coming up with a manpower cost alternative. Using reserves would let us increase our projected end strength by around 50,000, and cutting staffs and other admin/overhead costs and moving personnel to the fleet would give us another 20,000 sailors and 10,000 combat support personnel, while reducing the total active duty rolls by 50,000. We get more people for less money, and more of the people we get are actually doing combat-related jobs.
So what I am actually trying to do is build a bigger, more versatile, and more capable fleet for less money, the opposite of “shrinking the active fleet and retreating to reserve secured home waters.”
With that, I think we’ve gotten far enough afield from data versus action, which was the subject of this thread. I apologize for my role in hijacking.
Broken OODA loop. Lots of OO without the DA.
ReplyDeleteObserve, Orient, Decide, Act.
I like that. Nice way of expressing it!
DeleteIt's kind of more like OO, then OO again, to make sure you got it right the first time. Meantime, the bad guys act and you're done.
DeletePerspective:
ReplyDelete19 years of war on terror = 6000 deaths; morning at Iwo Jima or a day at Gettysburg caused almost as many dead.
1/3 of the deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan were non-combat or vehicle accidents. Most combat deaths were from IEDs.
Whereas hesitation on the beach at Iwo Jima cost lives, hesitating around suspected IEDs saves lives rewarding a safety culture that prefers to weigh down grunts with anti IED equipment.
"hesitation on the beach at Iwo Jima cost lives, hesitating around suspected IEDs saves lives rewarding a safety culture that prefers to weigh down grunts with anti IED equipment."
DeleteThe obvious, common sense solution to IEDs was two-fold:
1. DON'T DRIVE ON THE ROADS!
2. Declare the roads you want to use and Kill anyone who approaches the roads.
Being road\vic bound is based off inability and\or lack of fortitude to tell joes they don't need 100+ pounds of crap for a foot patrol.
Delete"What if" strikes down all when considering your career.
No U.S. Commander will equip a light patrol to chase insurgents with a AK and 3 mags up a mountain. No we have to be prepared to fight the Somme every time we go out.
Risk aversion to bad OERs.
"Whereas hesitation on the beach at Iwo Jima cost lives, hesitating around suspected IEDs saves lives rewarding a safety culture that prefers to weigh down grunts with anti IED equipment."
ReplyDeleteAnd maybe--just maybe--that's an environment in which we should never have allowed ourselves to get trapped. American lives and limbs must not be sacrificed unless the upside is significant. And I don't see that upside in the Mideast, particularly since our intense focus on that area has given China unfettered freedom to take over the South China Sea and make huge inroads in South Asia and Africa, and now starting on South America.
We need to pull our heads out and start focusing on what's really important to us. Mideast oil is important to China, not us.
General comments:
ReplyDeleteYes, military leaderships wants all this fancy eye watering technology but let's face it, we all know this is being pushed hard by industry. All these programs of data gathering cost billions upon billions and it punches all the big power point words: AI, super computers, networks, unmanned, space,etc...and it all costs a fortune to buy and mega profits for industry! I'm sure USA needs some of it now but do we really need 2050 technology in 2020?!?
ANON brought up "small military" and my first thought was German army after 1918. They were defeated and limited to 100k soldiers and virtually all heavy weapons and new tech was forbidden. I'm not saying we should do something similar BUT I like some of the things the German had to do by necessity, this rejoins one of my pet peeves about US military, not that they only are too big BUT HAVE TOO MUCH MONEY!!! Get rid of all the old timers, slash commands and staffing, reduce manning, think creative and promote the creative people, give young people responsibility and let them figure it out,stop giving DOD a black check!, etc...plus Germany was big on train, train and train some more. As usually you will find in history, LOSING sharpens the mind, Germany really had no other choice because the old methods just wouldn't work, they didn't have the money or manpower, there was plenty of new tech on the horizon like the tank, radar, aviation,etc they had to be creative and SNEAKY to develop these weapons, also they didn't get ALL STUCK UP on not having quite what they needed to practice, they used what they had to train and develop organizations and methods, operations,etc...Germany didn't start with even the PANZER I and II, their first maneuvers were with cars and trucks, even bikes that had a vague shape of a tank! They worked out a CONOPS and bought some tanks, practiced some more, did some refining and bought some more tanks more adapted to the requirements and did over and over....wow, what a idea!
USA is buying all this data gathering "stuff" but are we so sure we need it, do we know how to use it, who is going to use it, where are going to use it, does it have to be so exquisite, maybe we can make do with 10% or 25% precision but nope, lets spend billions to get to 90% or 100% precision, why? Is it necessary? Maybe it's better to have less precision on the target but it's right now, do we need more time to get 50% or 90% precision or reliability of the data? I'm hoping they ran some scenarios or war games? LOL! to find out what exactly they need but we all know they probably didn't or just did there usual predetermined end result which is buying the most expensive solution....
Last, this is all being developed to fight China or Russia, ok, lets say that the valid reason BUT once again, what usually happens with our fancy gear? We will end up spending billions to develop data gathering capability unheard off, spend billions to develop hyper-sonic missile to hit the target 1000 miles away in a matter of minutes....and we will use it on a couple of goat herders driving a beat up Toyota Tacoma with a 50cal in the back. Good job DoD bankrupting the country better than all USA enemies put together, they couldn't have done it with out you!
It isn't a quest for data.
ReplyDeleteIt is a quest for totalitarian micromanagement of the in-contact commanders and trigger pullers.
That's part of it, certainly, but I think it's a bit too simplistic to say that's the entire problem. The US military has, for whatever reasons, decided that data can compensate for lack of firepower. I think they've been seduced by the lure of a 'third offset' that they [mistakenly] believe will provide a significant and enduring advantage.
DeleteI don't care how much data you have, at some point you have to put "warheads on foreheads" or you're wasting your time.
DeleteYour "Data is the enemy of action" sounds no different than "Paralysis by analysis." The constant analysis or overthinking of a situation which prevents decision making and forward progress.
ReplyDeleteWhat are cadets and midshipment being taught about risk management in their training? Because that's where the war mentality should start. With further training and mentoring in the field.
This is what the Australian Prime Minister wrote in his memoirs recently published as to why Australia stays 20 km from the Chinese Islands.
ReplyDelete_"The People’s Liberation Army Navy knows that if it conflicts with a US ship, it runs the risk of rapid escalation into full-blown conflict. But an Australian ship is a different proposition altogether. If one of our ships were to be rammed and disabled within the 12-mile limit by a Chinese vessel, we don’t have the capacity to escalate. If the Americans backed us in, then the Chinese would back off. But if Washington hesitated or, for whatever reasons, decided not to or was unable immediately to intervene, then China would have achieved an enormous propaganda win, exposing the USA as a paper tiger not to be relied on by its allies. My judgement was that given the volatile geopolitical climate at the time, especially between the USA and China, it wasn’t a risk worth taking."_
And after their threats to us several weeks ago https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-could-lose-billions-from-chinese-government-boycott-threat-20200427-p54nmh.html they have decided to punish our barley exporters.
This is exactly why I have been posting about building firm alliances throughout the first island chain. If Australia doubts our commitment at this point, then there is zero reason for anyone else there to believe us.
DeleteShut down sacrificing lives and limbs in the Mideast for no tangible objective, and focus on putting a stop to China's SCS expansion. We can get Singapore, Malaysia, and India (and I really don't understand why we haven't done way more to build a relationship there), along with Australia, through a relationship with the British Commonwealth. Get Indonesia (and I really don't understand why we haven't done way more to build a relationship there, either) and we have pretty much gained control over China's essential oil supply chain. Philippines may be harder, because of Duterte, but I think he can be bribed. With efforts to move manufacturing out of China in the wake of CV-19, we have a great big carrot to use, and right now is the time to use it. Bring the essential stuff, and the stuff that requires great worker skill sets (those are pretty much the same) back to the US. But move the cheap consumer goods to any country that aligns with us. We're talking potentially 10% of GDP to most of those countries, and that should be enough to buy a lot of loyalty.
We could've had the makings of an alliance with the TPP, but it was thrown out without a replacement.
DeleteThe TPP had some flaws, but those could have been fixed and it was a useful framework. As of now, China is not in the TPP either, so there is still time to do something.
DeleteA big problem we have in negotiating trade deals is that we have a number of self-imposed restrictions and limitations that keep us negotiating from a position of weakness. Not to get political, but a national consumption tax would put us in a stronger position to negotiate some trade deals.
That's interesting. I can see generic value in having a VAT with progressive reimbursement, but never thought of it from a trade deal standpoint.
DeleteThe trade impacts are twofold. One, you get to charge it on all imports. Just like a tariff, except it doesn't count as a tariff for WTO purposes. Two, you get to rebate it on exports. So when you export something, you figure how much VAT you have embedded in all your costs, and you get those refunded. Every other country does it, and it's international law that it works that way.
DeleteYep, thanks for the summary. I just read up on it.
DeleteThe TPP exists, just without the US. Normally countries like Indonesia and Singapore balance great powers. However China is now claiming small islands they own and they are all getting antsi (like ants in your pants).
ReplyDeleteCheap consumer goods are going to places like Vietnam at the moment.
Today China banned beef imports from 4 large abattoirs. They are making good on their promise. Last year while we burned they held up Australian coal outside their ports. Each ship for a month or so at $15,000 per day.
"The TPP exists, just without the US. "
DeleteAnd that's exactly the problem. We ceded influence and the opportunity to foster partnerships in the region.
An ex Vietnamese official is advocating that ASEAN go to a 2/3rd majority rather than 100% requirement to counter China. See https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/its-time-for-vietnam-and-asean-to-challenge-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/
DeleteBTW at the moment the punishment is for calling for an international inquiry into Sars-Cov-2 and its spread. Hoping China will ban wet markets.
ReplyDeleteChina is seeing our calls not as a public health issue but being interpreted as supporting re-election campaigns in the US. That is NOT what we are doing.
Regarding the data aspect, I'd like to throw in a bit of useful knowledge from the field of organisational theory; the knowledge-chain.
ReplyDeleteData consists of single data points. When you combine different data points, you get information. When you combine different sets of information, you gain knowledge. When you put newfound knowledge into practice (by combining it with other knowledge), that leads to innovation.
So you can measure the outside temperature numerous times, that only gives you data that consists solely of various degrees of temperature. When you add a second set of data points, namely the time of day when you made each of the measurements, you have information. You'll see for example that it'll be warmer during the day than during the night. Add other information, for example woollen socks keep your feet warmer than cotton ones, and you gain knowledge. In this case that would be that in order to help you stay warm, you'd better put on the woollen socks when it gets dark. Innovation happens when you apply this knowledge elsewhere, like to your hands. They tend to get cold too, so you wrap them in woollen 'socks', and you use your knitting knowledge to make them fit your hands better. And that's how mittens were invented. ;-)
When acquiring data in the military, I believe it is crucial to keep this chain in the back of you mind. Gathering data by itself is pointless. Having only information is only marginally better. Once you have knowledge, things start to get interesting. The real deal for the military is the 'innovation', which for them, are the actions they can take in response to newfound knowledge. To refer to my above example, you can theorise that mittens will keep will your hands warm, but if you can't knit or have wool, it's moot.
So data acquisition in the military is the start of a complicated chain where different sets of data, information, and knowledge (often collected by different agencies and departments spread out over time and geography) need to be correctly combined, in a timely manner, to come to actionable knowledge.
There are many, many, moving parts there and many people involved, all of whom can contaminate the process at any point, especially if preconceived notions that contradict new data/information/knowledge are imposed upon observations.
I don't really have a solution at hand myself, I'd just wanted to point out that people tend to think about 'data' far too easily and all too often confuse data, information and knowledge with each other.
R.