Looking
at a map, China Vietnam Laos Myanmar Thailand Cambodia Indochina ). In the paranoid
Chinese world view where everyone is potentially out to get them, these flanks are
vulnerabilities and must be secured. Further, seizing Indochina solidifies
their hold on vast sections of ocean and major shipping lanes in addition to
resources.
Note: I use the term "semi-exposed
flanks". By this, I meant that the flanks are not under Chinese control
but neither are they active threats - kind of like Mexico and Canada are
semi-exposed flanks of the US - not controlled but not a threat (at least, not
militarily). For the US China
The
Philippines America
Much,
much further in the future, China India Russia Middle East but those are a step too
far for the moderate to near future.
Having
some idea what China America
Taiwan
Korea Korea
Indochina is questionable. Would we care
enough to commit to another Indochina war? I
don't know but I suspect not.
These,
then, are the possible areas where the US might engage in land combat during a
war with China and, as such, are the areas where should be planning for
operations and determining what force structure and size we need to be
successful.
More
importantly, we need to determine what naval and air forces we need since any China China
For
example, for an air war conducted over vast distances, if not intercontinental
distances, we need long range, penetrating bombers and lots of them. What do we have? We have around 18-19 functional B-2s. The proposed B-21 program is a step in the
right direction but whether we can build the aircraft in useful quantities
remains to be seen. The Air Force
“envisions” 175-200 bombers but the Air Force “envisioned 132 B-2s and we wound
up with only 21 so …
We
can go on and analyze what else we need but that’s not the point of this
post. Moving on …
This
also demonstrates the need for a Pacific NATO-ish alliance. Unfortunately, unlike NATO where several
countries had credible, if small, militaries, there are only two such countries
in the Pacific region: South Korea Japan Australia China India Pacific rim territory, would make a
great addition for a Pacific NATO, having a credible military. Unfortunately, the US India US
The
main benefit to forming a Pacific NATO would not be the very small military
force that most of countries could contribute but, instead, would be the basing
opportunities they would, presumably, offer for the U.S.
Someday,
someone will write about the future U.S.-Chinese war and state that the
objectives and needs were evident in hindsight but no one could have foreseen
them at the time. Well, this is the time
and hindsight is not required. China
Seeing as Japan is well within mainland China's short and meduim missile range and lacks significant, mobile offensive platforms, their long term and probably short term support, will be of limited value.
ReplyDeleteOh I don't know about that. Japan has lots of scattered air bases, 160 or so F-15s, a couple dozen F-35s with, supposedly, 100 or so additional on order, and a good collection of EW, AEW, and tanker aircraft. The Navy has 30-40 modern destroyers, around 20 SSKs, and a good collection of support ships (MCM, tankers, supply, patrol, etc. I don't know their ground combat and anti-air forces but I assume they're equally as good as their air and naval forces.
DeleteGiven that China would be simultaneously fighting Taiwan, Japan, and the US, I'd say Japan would be a pretty serious problem for China given their proximity.
I assume Japan's military infrastructure is well documented by Chinese intelligence, thus will be priorities for missile and airstrikes. I also doubt those facilities are sufficiently hardened to withstand prolonged bombardment.
DeleteDoing a quick count, the JDF has 8 airbases, most of which have USAF squadrons based there as well, so the likelyhood of them being targeted is high.
As to the JDF fleet, they only have 4 naval bases, with yokosuka naval base the largest and home port of the USS Reagan...
I have no idea on the missile reserves of either the JDAF or JDMSF, but I assume they have similar inventory issues that we have.
As you said, Taiwan will probably not last long, and Japan, for all intents and purposes, is our closet and our most developed military staging area for a counterattack, in facilities and inventory.
From a PLA standpoint, I doubt they see japan and the USA as separate entities...
You seem to have the impression that China has an unlimited supply of missiles, aircraft, and ships! Any one of the three, Taiwan/Japan/US, would be a major military undertaking by itself. To believe that China has the capacity to simultaneously take on all three in prolonged combat is to ascribe an immense capacity to China for which there is no evidence.
DeleteRemember, the entire time China is launching missiles at whatever targets they choose, they will be receiving incoming missiles from Taiwan/Japan/US - missiles which will greatly reduce China's ability and capacity to sustain combat. If you believe that a barrage of Chinese missiles can cause the type of damage that you seem to imagine, then you have to also believe that missiles attacking China will also cause considerable damage. It has to work both ways!
No, I don't have that impression lol. China, however, dose have a numerical advantage in land based ballistic missiles, in addition to whatever they have for their naval and air contingents.
DeleteSo, until naval reinforcements arrive, the forces in theater are "exposed" to the brunt at whatever the Chinese have available. The main airbases at Taiwan, while heavily fortified, there's only two.
If the Airbases in japan could be significantly hardened and additional counter-missile batteries brought in, those bases could remain viable after a first strike.
A first strike which given the estimates of Chinese short-range ballistic missile numbers alone, is bound to massive and prolonged.
There used to be a Asian NATO, it was called SEATO, don't know what happened to it though. Do need to bring something like that back though.
ReplyDeleteSEATO dissolved itself, shutting down in June 1977. It was mostly composed of countries outside the region, and never really got going.
DeleteSeeing the recent developments in the Phillipines, I see Chinese prewar overtures towards separating the US from as many allies and basing as possible. While the historical and ethnic animosity between Japan is still prevalent, I'd expect the Chinese to try and separate the US and Japan, at least to a level that keeps Japan out of a shooting war, limiting our basing and offensive options politically and effectively pushing us further east.
ReplyDelete"The Air Force “envisions” 175-200 bombers but the Air Force “envisioned 132 B-2s and we wound up with only 21 so …"
ReplyDeleteThe end of the Cold War ended many big defense programs. The Seawolf class, once envisioned as a class of 29 ships was later cut to 12, with only three built. Sounds like what happened with the Zumwalts.
But, at $500+ million per copy and other competing programs, I can't imagine the Air Force would be able to build more than 50 to 60 aircraft.
These might add to the debate:
ReplyDeletehttp://cimsec.org/changing-interpretations-japans-pacific-war-naval-demise/34733
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/chinas-blue-water-navy-strategy-and-its-implications
I recall one JMSDF admiral describing the PRC strategy as following that of the Imperial Japanese strategy - think "expanding rings."
I believe that the fall of Taiwan is not a foregone conclusion - a PRC invasion could easily fail, leading to a huge collapse. The PRC has been cautious with good reason.
GAB
Australia will never ally with Japan. There is too much risk of Japan starting a war.
ReplyDeleteIn the last 10 years Australia has totally restructured the Army to medium armoured expeditionary (including amphibious) force.
Also reequipping is well underway. Our tail (tens of thousands of trucks) is mostly armoured (and new). Our combat vehicles reequipment, that includes establishing production lines, is tripling the weight of our army vehicles. There is also a big investment in heavy and medium combat engineering vehicles.
Having not needed air defence in the past we are now investing a lot of money to medium and long range expeditionary air defence network. Also land based antiship missiles.
Our Navy will formidable in 15 years. We are buying in frigate and submarine design skills. So instead of buying cheap subs we are spending 80 billion dollars on them instead. Also the Navy is tripling is displacement weight.
Last week the Minister for Defence announced a 1 billion dollar upgrade to Tindal (300km away, so out of fallout range, of Darwin) for more fuel and runway upgrades so American bombers can use it.
The massive spending on Airpower will result in Australian becoming the first 5th generation only airforce.
Our first combat plane designed in 70 years here in half built.
A debate here is will the US sell us B21 with some here advocating we should buy your B1. We would have bombers but they aren't normally available to buy.
Under the 5 power defence agreement Australia, Britain, New Zealand guarantee the security of Malaysia and Singapore. We all keep tripwire forces in Malaysia.
I'll also add we need to watch Indonesia. We have fought 1 war with them protecting Malaysia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia%E2%80%93Malaysia_confrontation#Commonwealth_order_of_battle) and almost went to war over East Timor (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Force_East_Timor).
DeleteAlso we don't allow disorder in the South Pacific or external power bases. See Solomon Islands https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Assistance_Mission_to_Solomon_Islands and Bougainville (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_Monitoring_Group).
Our think tanks think you'll pull out. See articles today and last week https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/re-examining-the-australia-us-alliance-part-1-diverging-strategic-interests/ and https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/re-examining-the-australia-us-alliance-part-2-the-menzies-and-macarthur-models/.
"Australia will never ally with Japan."
DeleteSo, does that mean Australia will sit out a war between China and US/Japan? If so, why would the US want to 'invest' in Australia if we can't count on support during a war?
"Australia, Britain, New Zealand guarantee the security of Malaysia and Singapore."
Would Australia really go to war with China to protect Malaysia or Singapore?
"Our think tanks think you'll pull out."
The US sees Australia courting China, to some extent, leasing/selling port rights, encouraging trade with China, etc. This makes the US nervous and uncertain that Australia will be a reliable ally in a war with China (recall your statement about not joining Japan). Thus, thinking the US will pull out runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
I've suggested before that Australia needs to think deeply about what side they want to be on when the inevitable US-China conflict occurs. The US is slowly (painfully slowly) coming to the realization that China is already at war with us by engaging in extensive cyber attacks, massive currency manipulation, unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft, illegal expansion, military harassment, etc. Australia seems to be trying to walk the tightrope of neutrality and that rarely works. Something to think about.
Japan may declare war on either China or South Korea. They may also be a future enemy of Australia. I doubt the US would raise a finger if Japan goes to war over a fishing boat.
DeleteThey are also our second most important trading partner.
World war is one thing but spats between countries that hate each other is another.
That why there is no NATO in asia. Every country has an individual alliance with America.
America in East Timor put tripwire forces into Dili harbour - not Japan or South Korea.
The 5 power defence pact ( UK , Australia, NZ , Malaysia, Singapore) is a non binding agreement. There is no guarantee to act only to 'consult'
DeleteIt was from 1971 when the threat was Indonesia, and the Dominos of North Vietnam.
It still exists on paper only as Singapore has peer equivalent forces to Australia, Indonesian threat has gone away and Vietnam is more like its neighbors who are concerned about China
https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/the-future-of-the-five-power-defense-arrangements/
Its the poster child for the type of agreement that CNO would call practically worthless
The real reason we have to guarantee Malaysia's and Singapore's defence is due to geography it has to be defended as a whole. But they don't trust each other. So the three western powers are in charge of the IADS.
DeleteIn todays newspaper the head of ASIO is giving an update on our security against terrorist (Islamic and neo Nazi) and unnamed state actors.
We have introduced 19 pieces of legislation to defend our country from another state power. See https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/sleeper-agent-operated-in-australia-for-years-before-asio-caught-him-20200224-p543ug.html
As a result of our actions against Huwai and Chinese influence we've been in the diplomatic dog house for three years.
Rank Country/District Total Trade
Delete1 China 174.714
2 Japan 68.608
3 United States 66.490
4 South Korea 38.766
5 United Kingdom 27.462
6 New Zealand 26.810
7 India 25.690
8 Singapore 24.693
9 Thailand 21.805
10 Germany 20.599
Total all countries [2] 735.484
China is 23% of our trade. We can probably live without IPhones. They cannot live easily without our coal, iron ore, and LNG.
As you can see Japan, South Korea, and the US are of equal importance to us.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_largest_trading_partners_of_Australia
"when the inevitable US-China conflict occurs." Is this similar to the inevitable war against the Soviet Union - that never happened (and looked very inevitable).
DeleteAre the Chinese paranoid? Were the Soviets paranoid? How many times have they each been invaded? It would seem that paranoid is appropriate when so many of their populations have been killed by invaders (I am reasonably aware of how many of their own they killed).
Always try to fight a war on someone else's territory - basic really (as are - never march on Moscow, never rely on the air force and make the other bastard die for his country).
The USA sees a challenge as the world authority, it is uncomfortable to be in that situation (the British Empire was similar but not quite as much a world authority as the USA undoubtably has been).
Sooner or later China will start to create distractions for it's population as Hitler and Galtieri did, but are the western governments doing the same?
" Is this similar to the inevitable war against the Soviet Union - that never happened"
DeleteI don't know why you believe war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. I certainly didn't think so. Most people considered it possible but unlikely.
There are some key differences between Soviet Union/Russia and China. The SU/R was never particularly expansionistic beyond their initial region. China, in contrast, has made claims on the entire E/S China Seas, surrounding countries, and out to the second island chain.
SU/R was certainly opportunistic in its efforts to oppose the US and made use of proxy wars but showed no particular inclination to occupy any of those territories.
Even the Russian annexation of Crimea, while illegal and an act of war, was for a very specific strategic reason rather than just a simple land grab. I have no fears, whatsoever, about a war with Russia. It will not happen unless both sides just idiotically stumble into it. China, however, is on a collision course with the US, by their own admission.
Having consolidated their annexation of the South China Sea, China is now laying the groundwork for expansion and eventual annexation of the second island chain out to, and including, Hawaii. They are also laying the foundation for annexing Vietnam, Philippines, and other surrounding countries. War is inevitable.
"Always try to fight a war on someone else's territory"
Look both ways before you cross the street. What are we doing, exchanging blindingly obvious snippets of common sense?
"The USA sees a challenge as the world authority, it is uncomfortable to be in that situation"
No. The US does not care about being challenged as a 'world authority' (whatever that means). A benign peer would be welcomed. What the US is 'uncomfortable' with is a peer that is inherently evil, has demonstrated an illegal expansionist tendency, uses military force to back up illegal trespass into foreign territory, practices illegal international trade, copyright, and intellectual property theft, engages in cyber crime against US govt and industry, engages in illegal currency manipulation, etc. The US would welcome a benign peer that wanted to contribute to the global good. The US resists an evil dictatorship.
To even remotely suggest a comparison between Nazi Germany and the US is obscene. Do not do so again.
"To even remotely suggest a comparison between Nazi Germany and the US is obscene. Do not do so again."
DeleteWhere on Earth did you dig that up? At no point have I ever considered that, I have re-read my post and I cannot find any inclination that way.
I compared the US to the British Empire in a round-about way.
I drink occasionally - what is your excuse?
"Sooner or later China will start to create distractions for it's population as Hitler and Galtieri did, but are the western governments doing the same?"
DeleteCNO, have you read "Destined for War - Can America and China escape Thucydides Trap?" by Graham Allison.
DeleteIt covers this subject from a very interesting historical perspective.
G. Allison was an adviser to Reagan, Clinton and Obama. Has a very interesting perspective.
Was close friends with Lee Kuan Yew and Gen. Petraeus among others.
Worth a read if you're interested in this topic.
"Worth a read if you're interested in this topic."
DeleteI am interested but I have a backlog of three lifetimes of reading! What's your analysis of the writing?
It's a book about the structural stress that occurs when a rising power challenges a ruling one.
DeleteG. Allison details 16 historical examples, beginning with the Peloponnesian War. Of the 16 cited examples, 12 resulted in war, 4 did not.
Thucydides identified two key drivers of this dynamic: the rising power’s growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and demand for greater say and sway, on the one hand, and the fear, insecurity, and determination to defend the status quo this engenders in the established power, on the other.
In the case about which he wrote in the fifth century B.C., Athens had emerged over a half century as a steeple of civilization, yielding advances in philosophy, history, drama, architecture, democracy, and naval prowess. This shocked Sparta, which for a century had been the leading land power on the Peloponnese peninsula. As Thucydides saw it, Athens’s position was understandable. As its clout grew, so too did its self-confidence, its consciousness of past injustices, its sensitivity to instances of disrespect, and its insistence that previous arrangements be revised to reflect new realities of power. It was also natural, Thucydides explained, that Sparta interpreted the Athenian posture as unreasonable, ungrateful, and threatening to the system it had established—and within which Athens had flourished.
Sound familiar?
Thucydides chronicled objective changes in relative power, but he also focused on perceptions of change among the leaders of Athens and Sparta—and how this led each to strengthen alliances with other states in the hopes of counterbalancing the other. But entanglement runs both ways. (It was for this reason that George Washington famously cautioned America to beware of “entangling alliances.”) When conflict broke out between the second-tier city-states of Corinth and Corcyra (now Corfu), Sparta felt it necessary to come to Corinth’s defense, which left Athens little choice but to back its ally. The Peloponnesian War followed. When it ended 30 years later, Sparta was the nominal victor. But both states lay in ruin, leaving Greece vulnerable to the Persians.
Having said that, there are examples where states avoided conflict.
G. Allison explains how powers have kept the peace in the past. He also suggests ways that the US and China might do so in today's world.
On that second point, it's important to understand that the rise of a 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.3 billion people is not a problem to be fixed. It is a reality that will have to be managed over a generation. It will mean radical changes in attitudes and actions, by leaders and publics alike.
DeleteThe most relevant cases where two powers have avoided war are the competition between Britain and the US in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union.
What is stark though, is that in both cases, despite the resulting peace, one of the two powers still ended up ceding hegemonic power to the other, whether they liked it or not.
Britain accepted the reality of the Monroe Doctrine and slowly faded into the role of a medium power, more or less subordinate to the US alliance system.
The Soviet Union doesn't exist anymore and the Russia of today is no more than a regional power.
The way out of the Thucydides Trap, in Allison’s view, is constant communication and a willingness to think very big in terms of accommodation. Americans should be prepared for a transition to a world in which China is not merely welcomed into the club of major powers, but is accepted as an architect of whatever world order is going to emerge. That level of accommodation is hard to imagine in today's world. China will not accept US hegemony like Great Britain did. Which is precisely the reason to worry that we might be falling into the trap.
And to be clear, it is a trap that should be avoided. Not least because China and the US are nuclear powers. Also because China is a far more dynamic and powerful rival than the Soviet Union ever was, with a vastly larger industrial base and population. A war between the US and China could be on a scale we have not seen since WW2. She is much more of a threat to US power than either the Axis was.
It's an ominous thought.
There's one aspect you didn't touch on and it's a absolutely vital one and that is the relative moral systems of the two contending parties.
DeleteTo use the England-US example, both countries shared essentially the same moral values so neither was, at its core, terrified or repulsed by the other. Their differences were differences of political opinion and objectives.
In contrast, the rise of Nazi Germany to challenge Europe (was that one of the examples?) was the rise of an inherently evil entity with which no sane person would even want to try to make accommodation.
China - and this is my opinion, now, backed by a lot of China's actions - is also an inherently evil entity, if perhaps just a tiny step below Nazi Germany. That being the case, I see no possibility or desirability to come to an accommodation. There exists the remote possibility that China might modify its behavior sufficiently to contemplate allowing its continued existence but I see no signs of that, at the moment, and, in fact, I see signs that the movement towards further evil is accelerating (the recent self-coronation of Xi as dictator for life is an example of the movement towards an even closer copy of a Nazi Germany type entity).
Did the book address the moral aspect?
"It's an ominous thought."
The only thought more ominous is the thought that we might, out of cowardice, accept the existence of pure evil as Chamberlain attempted to do with Nazi Germany.
"There's one aspect you didn't touch on and it's a absolutely vital one and that is the relative moral systems of the two contending parties."
DeleteYes, extensively. Not just in terms of morality, but generally in terms of shared culture, systems, language, political approach etc.
The copy of the book I have is about 300 pages long, so you'll forgive me for leaving some stuff out.
To touch on that point though, it's not actually 100% clear that it's the dominant factor.
Britain did indeed have a close cultural affinity with America — but it’s worth noting that, at the start of the 20th century, Anglo-German cultural affinity was arguably just as strong.
The Kaiser once told Teddy Roosevelt in 1910 that war between Germany and Britain was simply unthinkable, because “I was brought up in England, very largely; I feel myself partly an Englishman. Next to Germany I care more for England than for any other country.” And then said: “I adore England!”
That did nothing to prevent WW1.
The Spartans and Athenians did have some important political and cultural differences too, oligarchy vs democracy for example. They shared a host of affinities though such as language, cultural history, ethnicity etc. They still went to war.
The Dutch and British of the mid-17th century also had many links. They still went to war. There's many similar examples.
There's also inverse examples, the most obvious of which is the Cold War.
The Soviet system was just as (probably more) brutal and evil from an American or Western perspective. The Soviets had little in common with the United States.
Open war was still avoided. So it's not the be all an end all.
In any event, no similar tie to that which existed between Britain and the US is likely to smooth understanding between America and China.
In terms of your final point - Churchill, the great opponent of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement (indeed, the man who popularised the concept) also said this:
"Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.”
His point was that opposition had it's place, but so did accomodation, as long as it was done from a position of strength.
It's worth noting that this view essentially guided JFK through the Cuban Missile Crisis and (narrowly) avoided a global thermonuclear war. JFK was student of history. He read Thucydides, Churchill and had just finished Barbara Tuchman's seminal work "The Guns of August". Worth considering.
Perhaps a better predictor of war is a two-fold assessment of 1. similarity or disparity of geopolitical objectives and 2. military strength?
DeleteFor example, England and the US geopolitical objectives did not greatly overlap or clash and this provided much room for accommodation.
In contrast, Nazi Germany's objectives overlapped/clashed with everyone else and war was inevitable.
The Soviet Union and the US objectives overlapped/clashed.
China's objectives overlap/clash with everyone.
The second part, military strength, determines whether either country can act on its objectives. For example, to make up a non-existent example, Mexico may have different objectives than the US but they don't have the military strength to act on them. The Allies had the strength to act against Nazi Germany. Neither the US nor Soviet Union had enough of a military advantage to act directly (though they fought in every conceivable manner short of direct conflict!). China and the US lack the overwhelming strength to act although an alliance of the US, Japan, and others would have the combined strength.
Just thinking out loud.
Certainly those are major factors.
DeleteMilitary strength, differing strategic or regional objectives, economic competition, trade breakdown (Japan's decision to declare war in '41 was driven in large part by desperation in the face of the US oil embargo), cultural affinity or cultural alienation, political differences, philosophical differences, war as a means of achieving political unity (Bismark essentially goaded France into war in the 1870s as a means of achieving German political unity), entangling alliances with smaller bellicose powers (WW1, the Peloponnesian War), all these factors, and more are cited as contributing factors to varying degrees in all the wars driven by the systemic instability caused when one hegemonic power is challenged by a rising power.
I think what Allison (and Thucydides) asks us to consider though is that:
1. At least some, possibly all of these factors will inevitably come into play when a rising power challenges the sole hegemony of an established power
2. The differing factor in the times when war was avoided came down to something harder to quantify, something which is too often ignored in historical or political study, despite the fact that it is ever present and massively influence - and that's what might be loosely defined as the 'human factor'. It's something that doesn't lend itself to analytics or statistical analysis but which is crucial to understanding why wars break out or why they are avoided.
It's a concept that is a huger factor in economics as well, by the by, and which economists have been struggling to quantify ever since the Great Depression. It's what drives Bear and Bull markets, is one of the main contributors to economic downturn or upswing, and is what FDR was referencing when he said "All we have to fear, is fear itself".
Essentially Thucydides' warning was that people (political and military leaders, public opinion) drive countries into wars.
When war has been avoided in great power competition it's primarily because the leaders of the respective powers worked extremely hard to avoid giving into the the rising power’s growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and demand for greater say and sway, on the one hand, and the fear, insecurity, and determination to defend the status quo this engenders in the established power, on the other.
To revisit my earlier example, JFK was fully aware of this trap when he confronted the Cuban Missile Crisis. He knew full well how easily events could sweep leaders and publics along into war.
He understood Churchill's injunction too, that appeasement only encouraged war if it came from a position of weakness. But he was determined to do everything he could not to make the same mistakes that the leaders of Europe had in August 1914.
He was bellicose publicly with the Soviets. He instituted aggressive containment measures and ratcheted up pressure on Soviet leadership.
On the other hand he was careful to offer accomodation via secure, private channels and to give Khrushchev a way out of the crisis that would not be humiliating for him politically and in terms of public opinion in the Soviet Union.
It's a very difficult balance he struck, but he did it. And he did so with Thucydides, Churchill and Tuchman ringing in his ears.
"he was determined to do everything he could not to make the same mistakes that the leaders of Europe had in August 1914."
DeleteHmm … maybe. Another factor in the successful avoidance of war is simply whether both sides WANT to avoid war. Hitler not only didn't want to avoid war, he actively embraced it. Only total allied capitulation would have avoided war.
In your 'go to' example of JFK, neither side wanted war. Had either side wanted war, it would likely had been a different outcome. JFK's best efforts would have failed had the Soviet Union wanted war.
In the current situation with China, China is happy to accomplish their goals without fighting but that's only going to continue as long as the West continues its policy of complete and total appeasement. If/when the West has had enough (and Trump has taken the first baby steps along the path with his trade confrontation) then the likelihood of war will depend on whether either side wants war or not. At the moment, China is not actively seeking war but neither are they showing any great reluctance to engage in it. They seem to be just a hair short of embracing war with the US. This strongly suggests that war is somewhere between likely and inevitable.
So, one-sided 'balance' is doomed to failure.
What do you think?
Jon, Can you elaborate more on this,
Delete" When war has been avoided in great power competition it's primarily because the leaders of the respective powers worked extremely hard to avoid giving into the the rising power’s growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and demand for greater say and sway, on the one hand, and the fear, insecurity, and determination to defend the status quo this engenders in the established power, on the other."
Do you mean, if China and the US were to avoid war, Beijing shouldn't behave as if the rest of world should take its pragmatic rise as matter of course; and on the other hand, Washington should't be so fearful of co-existence of a functioning alternative system ?
I don't wanna put words in your mouth, but that's how I read your paragraph.
I have to point out one fact. Hitler did not want, nor did he expect an invasion of Poland in 1939 to lead to war with France and England.
DeleteHe described the leaders of England and France (when talking to Ribbentrop and Keitel) as "worms" who would never have the spine to stand up to him over the fate of a small Eastern European power.
This was specifically because of Chamberlain's failed policy of appeasement. Hence Churchill's injunction that accomodation may only be offered from a position of strength and with the implied threat of force behind it if it is rejected.
In fact, Hitler didn't ever want to go to with war Britain at all, ever. As late as early 1941 he still believed that Britain could be persuaded to accept an honorable peace. In his twisted racial hierarchy, he saw them as Aryan brothers whose Empire brought stability to peoples who he saw as lesser. Many German's shared this view.
While he did want wart with France in due time and the Soviet Union as his great overall objective (for lebensraum and to drive back what he saw as the great evil of a Jewish Marxist conspiracy), he did not think Germany would be ready till at least '41 or '42.
It is fair to say of course, that Hitler was not acting in good faith (a gross understatement), and that he is the last person you would want in power of a major power if your goal was world peace.
Putting all that aside, it is absolutely imperative that both sides seek peace and that both sides learn to accomodate the other to a greater or lesser extent.
It cannot simply be the US seeking to accomodate China. In that respect you're 100% correct.
There is some room for optimism though. The dominant forces within the Chinese oligarchy (for that is what China is, a totalitarian oligarchy, which only plays lip service for the most part to communist, marxist ideology) are actually reasonably pragmatic in their approach.
They follow a long tradition of pragmatic, oligarchic governments throughout much of Chinese history.
China hasn't actually been in an open military conflict for almost 50 years. Even then, that was a fairly brief foray, limited in scope, in which they attempted to stamp their authority on their Vietnamese neighbours. and which ended in a stalemate.
Beyond that, they have instead perfected a system of primarily economic, political and cultural offensives against their neighbours and in their region. They are attempting to get what they want (hegemonic supremacy in North-East Asia primarily) without the need for war.
This should not be unfamiliar to a student of US history - the US is also a rational, pragmatic power which seeks always to exert influence first through economic, political or cultural means before it resorts to force. Not sure if you're aware, but President Xi has repeatedly referred to the Monroe Doctrine as a blueprint for how China should seek to establish influence over her region.
That isn't to say that the US and China are the same of course, morally or in terms of how they are perceived by their neighbours or the wider international community.
It is merely to point out that neither the US or China currently is seeking war. Both sides are rational actors, with conflicting objectives.
That shouldn't be cause for complacency though - the same could be said for many powers that ended up going to war despite their original intentions.
"Do you mean, if China and the US were to avoid war, Beijing shouldn't behave as if the rest of world should take its pragmatic rise as matter of course; and on the other hand, Washington should't be so fearful of co-existence of a functioning alternative system ?"
DeleteBasically, from a historical perspective, yes.
China should not be surprised that people find her rise shocking, confronting and potentially dangerous. The US should not be surprised that China sees her growing power and influence as justification for having the right to alter the current global system to her benefit to some degree.
The real problem will be that events can easily sweep states into conflict. It will be a massive challenge to avoid that conflict. Both sides need to accept that or we may be doomed to watch history repeat itself.
"It is merely to point out that neither the US or China currently is seeking war."
DeleteWhile that is indisputably true for the US, I think you're missing the Chinese position by a good bit. While China may not be actively seeking war, neither are they actively avoiding it. Rather, they seem to hold a position of pushing hard and accepting war if it comes as a result of that push. Consider, China is actively engaged in massive cyber attacks on the US, systematic intellectual property theft, they have seized at least two US military platforms that I'm aware of, have illegally seized and developed artificial islands, have ignored UNCLOS tribunal rulings that they are signatory to, have publicly stated that the US must leave the S/E China Seas, have vastly overclaimed their EEZ and ADIZ zones, have … well, I could go on all night but you get the idea. Those actions may be a bit short of actively seeking war but they certainly reveal no particular fear or avoidance of the possibility of escalation to war. In other words, while they may not be planning the first strike (a Pearl Harbor) in the immediate future, they seem perfect content to accept war if it happens. That's a big difference from not actively seeking war and the implication that not actively seeking war means that they are actively seeking peace. I do not see any evidence that they are actively seeking peace - nearly the opposite!
So, as you assess China and the likelihood of war, be sure that your assessment of not actively seeking war does not misdirect you into thinking that they are actively seeking peace. The one does not necessarily imply the other. China is walking as close to actively seeking war as you can get without actually doing so and is as far from actively seeking peace as you can get.
"The US should not be surprised that China sees her growing power and influence as justification for having the right to alter the current global system to her benefit to some degree."
DeleteNow, the philosophical challenge for you is to reconcile your thoughts on the US-China war possibility with the Nazi Germany scenario. Presumably, you believe that war with Germany was not only inevitable but desirable from the Allied perspective in that it eliminated a very great evil from the world. That being the case, and with the obvious parallels between Nazi Germany's rise and China's rise, how/when can know that the time has come to go to war with China to eliminate the existence of a very great evil from the world. In other words, had you been there during the rise of Germany, without the benefit of hindsight, would your philosophy be arguing for accommodation and acceptance of Germany or would it have a switch point beyond which you would call for war? If so, what is that switch point and how would you recognize it?
If the philosophy you seem to be promoting is logical and sound, it should apply to all similar situations, right? So, can you see your philosophy applying successfully to the rising Germany of the 1930's? If not, that suggests that the philosophy has a flaw that needs to be corrected or adjusted.
Fascinating discussion.
Churchill certainly thought that WW2 not only could have been avoided but should have been.
DeleteI've got to go do some work but I'll come back later and expand on the point.
On WW2 - Churchill both during the 1930s as it was happening, and for many years during and after the war (most notably in his 6 volume history of the war), outlined numerous occaisons and opportunities im which he felt that the Western powers could and should have put a stop to both Nazism and the rising militancy of Hitler.
DeleteHe believed World War II should have been called “the Unnecessary War.”
During the 1930s, the West had numerous chances to take decisive action against Hitler. They did not. Poor Western leadership allowed the Nazi menace to grow to monstrous proportions. This catastrophic failure in leadership offers important lessons for decision-makers today.
Churchill used his gravitas and position post WW2 to push this lesson. It was in 1950 that he made his statements about accomodation from strength to preserve the peace.
It was this philosophy, hard won from the horrors of the 30s and 40s that guided leaders through the Cold War.
It was partly this lesson that inspired JFK's approach.
To assume that WW2 was inevitable is to misread history in the view of Churchill and Allison. I believe Thucydides would agree.
Hitler himself said as much after the Rhineland Crisis (as just one example). If France and Britain had simply acted then, if the US had deigned to involve herself then or at any other time during the lead up to war, Germsny would have had virtually no ability to resist.
In fact it was the failure of the Western powers to act on the Rhineland that convinced the German General Staff that there was no hope of support to overthrow Hitler.
More broadly I don't see China as equivalent to Nazi Germany.
I think it's something of a lazy analogy. Japan in the 1930s maybe. Germany in the leadup to WW1 perhaps.
"numerous occaisons and opportunities im which he felt that the Western powers could and should have put a stop to both Nazism and the rising militancy of Hitler."
DeleteThere is a world of difference between preventing the rise of an evil at an early stage [your philosophy seems to be the opposite, calling for accommodation rather than resistance] and deciding how (war/no war) to deal with it after it's established.
I see an exact parallel between the rise of Nazi Germany and China, today. Historians will someday look back and note the many opportunities we had to stop the rise of China. For example, we could have stepped in and prevented the establishment of the many illegal artificial islands. There have been many other opportunities, as well, and history will judge us harshly, after the war.
It's Churchill's philosophy.
DeleteAccomodation from a position of strength. That means setting very strict limits, establishing hard lines and sticking to them. It requires military and political strength.
Without that it's appeasement.
There have been missed opportunities for sure, that I agree with.
Australia has been lobbying the White House to take a much firmer line with China for 15 years because of this.
The perception in Australian policy circles is that the US has been so distracted by their wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan that they've dropped the ball in the Pacific.
There's a lot of ground to make up.
The US needs to make it very clear to China what they are willing to go to war over, and she needs to invest in the ability to do so.
On the other hand there will need to be concessions made.
No rising power of the magnitude abd power of China will simply accept a subordinate role in the global system.
"The perception in Australian policy circles is that the US has been so distracted by their wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan that they've dropped the ball in the Pacific."
DeleteThat the US had dropped the ball on China is without question. I would suggest that it's less about being distracted by the Middle East, though there may an element of truth to that, and more about trying to avoid antagonizing such a major economic partner. We are belatedly and every so slowly beginning to acknowledge that the negative associated with China outweighs the positive and we are, again, slowly, beginning to act.
"No rising power of the magnitude abd power of China will simply accept a subordinate role in the global system."
No reason they should have to IF THEY WOULD CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND NORMS. Given the potential trade benefits, the US would welcome a LAW ABIDING China with open arms. This is the point the China either fails to recognize (seems unlikely) or chooses to ignore because they have larger goals like global conquest (seems more likely).
Australia has followed the US to every single major war she has fought in the last 100 years.
ReplyDeleteThere is zero chance that Australia would renege on it's commitment to the US.
The US Alliance is the underpinning of every single plank of her security and foreign policy.
Our military has been in virtual lockstep with the US for decades. We have had US forces based in the country since the outbreak of the Cold War.
Our entire military strategy is formulated with the prospect of a war with China to help defend US interests (which every single Prime Minister since Curtin in 1942 has regarded as OUR interests).
To suggest that Australia would abandon the US at her time of need is absurd.
Japan is a different country and subject. Would Australia automatically go to war to defend Japan? No.
Would Australia automatically go to war to defend the US. Yes, without a shadow of a doubt.
And just as an aside, Australia has the 13th largest defence budget in the world, which is significant given our population. We spend aprox. 2% of GDP as per US requests and our annual budget is growing exponentially. That is specifically so we can offer support to the US in the event of a war with China.
Again, it is literally the main focus of every Australian defence White Paper for more than a decade. Every Australian PM since WW2 has repeatedly reiterated our unequivocal support of the US.
Not sure how closely you follow Asia-Pacific politics, but it was Australia that pushed the Obama White House to preform a a Pivot to Asia (though the effect was negligible, much to our frustration). It was Australia that asked for the US to begin to forward base US forces in Darwin. It was Australia that urged the US and our other 5 eyes partners to ban Huwai from our 5G networks and we were the first to enact legislation to do so.
To Australia the rise of China is arguably even more of an existential threat than it is to the US.
To doubt our commitment is really strange.
"To doubt our commitment is really strange."
DeleteI have to stress that I have very limited exposure to Australian internal politics, however, what little I read/see is somewhat ambiguous concerning China. You've given China some pretty extensive port control. Your PM has made statements about the importance of trade with China and your reluctance to jeopardize that. China is investing heavily in Australian agriculture. And so on. It appears that Australia is trying to walk the line between the US and China.
Now, don't get me wrong. The US is also overwhelmingly guilty of trading with China and allowing Chinese investment in the US but we're beginning to recognize the error in that and sloooowly beginning to correct it.
There was literally one commercial port which was leased to a chinese company by a state government. The Federal government then responded with legislation making any such sale in future illegal. It was an embarrassing episode which highlighted how China was taking advantage of Australia's traditionally free market approach to foreign investment and it provoked a major response from the Aus Federal govt.
DeleteChinese investment in general has also been severly curtailed through a series of laws passed by succesive governments in the years since.
Australian law is actually now much more restrictive of foreign investment from companies owned or operated on behalf of governments (any government but specifically in response to China which creates shell companies as fronts for the CPP), then US federal law.
Again, we have actually been repeatedly urging the US to get tougher on China for the better part of 15 years.
Relations between China and Australia are at their lowest ebb in living memory.
Beyond that to understand Australian foreign policy you need to understand that our alliance with the US is regarded as the beadrock of everything.
We trade with China but they are not our friend. In fact they are our biggest existential threat.
You can just go read our last defense white paper which is focussed on the potential of a conflict with China.
That's why we are buying hundreds of F-35s, Superhornets, Aegis destroyers, Apaches, an entire fleet of Lynx AFVs to requip our army as entirely mechanised, medium, short range and long range AA missile and radar systems and $80 billion of submarines in the next 10 years.
You know the irony of all this is that some commentators in Australian politics have questioned US commitment, to us and to the region.
DeleteWe need the umbrella of US security garuntees far more than the US needs us and that's been the situation since 1941.
We worry about US flakiness in the region.
Luckily in 1941 Admiral King refused to endorse the initial proposal of the Joint Chiefs to essentially take the back foot and abandon Australia to her fate. Admiral King is one of the best friends we've ever had, and not many people know about it.
Ironically, it infuriated Churchill. Lucky that FDR was a navy man and took King's advice.
Well, Jon, I sincerely hope that your view is the correct interpretation of the beliefs and vision that Australia has. As I said, I don't follow Australian politics that closely. I wish the PM's public statements were a bit more definitive about China. Well, we'll see how it plays out.
DeleteHere is an article published today by our prime strategic think tank. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-to-pause-production-of-australias-triton-drones/
DeleteWe have spent big on the Triton program so we can patrol millions of square kilometres. The article starts "Can we trust America?". Although if the worst occurs it would only be a blip.
The magazine cited in above article above has as it contents https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/
•Michael Wesley calls for an alliance makeover as China’s ambition puts US–Australian ties under strain.
•Felicity Ruby delves into the uses and consequences of America’s intelligence and surveillance facilities in Australia.
•Brendan Taylor explores how the United States can strengthen its position in a contested Asia.
•Kelly Magsamen reports from America on how it can preserve and enhance its role as a great power.
The Australian think tanks are totally correct. There is no way the USA electorate is going to swallow 50K+ casualties and the very real possibility of losing a couple west coast cities. It's pure fantasy that 2020 USA would waste blood and treasure over, say, Taiwan. For What? Fallout of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is trillions worth of capital flight and jobs relocating back to USA. That is to say, a net positive in the long run.
DeleteOur real strategic and economic interests in controlling the Asian straights is so weak that fighting is implausible. It's not a big problem if China has them. They will mismanage the situation so badly that it only helps USA.
I gradually see less and less the path to an US-China war here.
ReplyDelete1. As China keeps its economic rise (and letting its $$ does the heavy lifting), it's logical China will avoid war by not starting one, and prevent others from starting one.
2. China's remaining unresolved territorial dispute are section of India-China border, SCS, and Taiwan. I don't see India and China go to blow over border issue, testified by resolution of Doklam incidents several years ago (both sides recognize the cost will outweigh its worth by magnitudes). SCS is part fait accomplie and part international chess, the likelihood of war there is low as long as China is on the ball. That leaves Taiwan. My take: China eventually will prep an invasion force so overwhelming that it can succeed without attacking US and Japanese territories such as Guam and Okinawa; the reason, to give a way out for Japan (maybe US even) not to get involved. But again, the goal of such force is not starting a unification war, but as a deterrence (along with economic tools) to gradually wear out Taiwan's resolve.
3. As for the rest of Westpac nations (specifically, US allies), China will be transactional in execution by offering trade and non-interference of sovereignty. Both sides (i.e. China to Japan, China to Australia, or China to SK) will find out and recognize where the bottom lines are.
4. We don't go to a shooting war (not against near peer anyway) over "cyber attacks, massive currency manipulation, unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft, illegal expansion, military harassment, etc". China has to pull a PH or 911 to have one.
The flaw in your reasoning is that you believe that China will stop with what it has. China has already begun laying claims to Japanese territories and the second island chain. They make no effort to hide their desire for global domination. They're going to continue annexing territory, by whatever means necessary, until someone (that would be the US) decides to stand up to them and then war will occur. It's inevitable.
Delete" China has already begun laying claims to Japanese territories and the second island chain."
DeleteSenkakus is an old issue with both sides well worn to the playbook (similar to Dakdo dispute between Japan and SK of same magnitude). I'm not aware of Chinese claim on 2nd island chain, or elsewhere beyond what I mentioned. If your war scenario predicates on China grabbing other sovereign's territories- let me ask you, how you gonna get Japan or Australia to join up if China leaves their territories be?
"I'm not aware of Chinese claim on 2nd island chain"
DeleteIf that's true then you're not informed and I'm wasting my time discussing China with you. Do a Google search on the subject of Chinese claims on the second island chain and you'll find plenty of material. Here's a snippet from one article:
"In an article in the Want China Times that appeared on June 27, 2013, Admiral Liu Huaqing, the mastermind of China’s modern naval strategy, was quoted as saying in 1982 that it would be necessary for China to control the First and Second Island Chains by 2010 and 2020, respectively."
If you want to be taken seriously in this, you need to get up to speed. I'll leave it at that until you do.
CNO, I have to beg to differ. When I googled "china, 2nd island chain, territorial claim", I couldn't find anything relevant. The only thing I can remotely imagine would be PLAN vying/paying for basing right in the Philippines, Indonesia, or one of these Micronesia island nations. But that's not same as sovereign infringement.
DeleteWell, you're either not trying or you don't know how to search. I'm not going to do your research for you but I'll give another tidbit:
Delete"On November 29, it was revealed that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in a question and answer session at a speech she gave in Washington, that when the US had consulted with China about the past problems of territoriality in the South China Sea, the Chinese side had said that they could also ‘insist on (territorial rights to) Hawai’i’. …
It was also confirmed that Admiral Keating was made commander of the United States Pacific Command, it was suggested by officials of the Chinese navy that the US navy could administer the area East of Hawai’i, while the Chinese navy could administer the West."
If you refuse to even acknowledge the existence of such claims, your credibility is suspect.
@ComNavOps: Am interested in reading up on your cited articles. Would be grateful if you could link them, so as to be sure that we're looking at the same articles.
Delete@Wild Goose,
DeleteI googled "china, clinton, keating, hawaii", about 3rd reference down. Given the context of the article, it seems the exchange (between SecState Clinton and Adm. Keating, and the Chinese) was more of verbal jousting than policy statement, and more to do with China's defense of its SCS gambit than 2nd island chain design.
China's not going to keep on its economic rise. China basically ran out of fumes ten years ago and has been blowing up the biggest debt bubble in human history recently. They're going to have a hard crash about now, and then who knows what will happen. But the first step sure as hell isn't going to be "conquer most of Asia while we're flat broke and in domestic political turmoil".
DeleteGreat China content as always, CNO. Taiwan is the stopper in the bottle that prevents China from easily debouching into the Pacific and is doubtless the primary center of gravity.
ReplyDeleteWhile there appears to be little open-source literature that goes into deep technical depth fn the Chinese requirements for successful invasion and seizure of Taiwan, I am willing to believe that such a seizure must come by sea, and cannot be accomplished only by land.
In that case, the Chinese amphibious fleet must be able to cross the 100 miles of the Strait and land against the Taiwanese shore. Unless they pull that off, the war is a loser for them.
I imagine that in addition to Taiwanese anti-surface naval capabilities, U.S. and Japanese submarines would be eager, able, and willing to strike at a Chinese invasion fleet, and that if the U.S. is going to use its handful of B-2s on anything, this would be the target.
The political question of the U.S. and Japanese government's willingness to kill thousands of Chinese sailors, soldiers, and marines seems more uncertain than the military capacity to accomplish such a mission.
Best thing I found on a Google search was a dated RAND study:
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1217/MR1217.sum.pdf
"the Chinese amphibious fleet must be able to cross the 100 miles of the Strait and land against the Taiwanese shore."
DeleteThis sounds a lot like the Allied crossing of the English Channel to conduct the Normandy invasion. You might want to give some thought to what occurred then and, just as importantly, what might have occurred. For example, either side could lay mines to seal the Taiwan Strait. What impact would that have on submarine ops? China could, and undoubtedly would, use subs to seal both ends of the strait. And so on. So, give the operational aspects some thought and let me know what you think about the feasibility and methodology of an assault.
Read "The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia" by Ian Easton.
DeleteIt's excellent.
CNO, thank you for the response! I found a Naval War College paper on Mine Warfare in China's Near Seas:
Deletehttps://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1429&context=nwc-review
"We think that China would rely heavily on offensive mining in any Taiwan scenario...The
obvious means of employing mines are through submarines and surface ships. Use
of civilian assets should not be discounted. But we also see signs of Chinese recognition of the fact that aircraft offer the best means of quickly laying mines in significant quantity. These aircraft would be useless, however, without air superiority."
"Another senior U.S. Navy MIW official interviewed for this article was unequivocal in his assessment that the Chinese could “seriously hamper an adversary’s ability to enter the First Island Chain. That’s a fairly significant advantage to them in a ‘Taiwan Strait’ scenario-particularly if they executed this before the ‘kinetic’ phase of a conflict. The open-source Chinese literature also indicates they are concerned about Guam
and its strategic importance as a base for USAF strategic bombers and Navy attack submarines. Apra outer harbor is very narrow; outside the harbor entrance it gets deep quickly. We need to be concerned about the Chinese Navy’s
ability to place covertly small numbers of advanced mines in strategic locations, like the Apra channel, even if it does no more than slow down our ability to carry out
time-phased operations."
From that first link I shared higher up:
"Analytically, an invasion campaign can be divided into
four segments:
• In the first phase, the two sides would fight for air
superiority.
• The second phase, which could begin simultaneously
with the first, would be a struggle for maritime
control of the strait.
• Followup air strikes would focus on “softening up”
the island’s defenses.
• The fourth phase would involve actual landing
operations and could include amphibious landings,
paratroop assaults, and heliborne attacks."
Lastly, per Wikipedia, PLAN has the following amphibious shipping, including what is currently under construction:
2 LHD, 8 LPD, 32 LST, and 31 LSM. What would we estimate the ground force that could be embarked on such a fleet?
Actual thoughts on feasibility and methodology to follow tomorrow.
"China would rely heavily on offensive mining"
DeleteYou've done a nice job of describing some of the challenges and actions, as other people see them developing. I'm interested in your thoughts and analysis which you seem to indicate you'll provide in a follow up note. I look forward to it!
"What would we estimate the ground force that could be embarked on such a fleet?"
You're missing a major source of additional troop transport for China. Every merchant ship they build is, by govt edict, built with rapid conversion features to military use built in. China would have ?hundreds? of additional transport/cargo ships to call on. We did exactly the same thing in WWII when we converted scores and scores of commercial ships to military transport use. Many of our attack transports were converted merchant ships. Disturbingly, we have no such reservoir of merchant ships to call on today and none have been pre-configured for military conversion and use as China has done. You have to give China credit for being a LOT smarter and more pragmatic about some of this stuff than we are.
I look forward to some follow up analysis from you!
Bottom Line Up Front: A successful Taiwanese amphibious invasion from China would benefit from a singular focus on Taiwan and needs to happen as soon as possible in the war, but first requires the establishment of air superiority.
DeleteCNO, you are absolutely correct to call out China's hundreds of additional merchant ships for their usefulness in a Taiwanese invasion. The sources called them out and emphasized that these ships would be highly vulnerable to air attack, emphasizing the requirement for China to achieve air superiority prior to launching the invasion fleet. Aircraft are also the best method for cutting off the Strait from the north and south. Airmobile and Air Assault attacks concurrent with the amphibious landing would greatly complicate Taiwanese defenses. Chinese air superiorty will be a necessary pre-condition for invasion success.
Against only Taiwan, China could acheive air superiority with its ballistic missiles and fighter aircraft. I do not know if any Taiwanese mobile radar and SAMs could either survive or be hidden during the initial onslaught and attempt to come into play during Chinese attempts at mining or combat airdrops.
I assume that surface maritime superiority will be almost instantly and totally acheived by China. Mines will keep surface combatants from entering the Strait, and offensive missiles will sink anything on the surface. Taiwan's stealth missile boats will likely get a few hits in, and cause some damage, but be completely destroyed themselves.
Assuming a 20 knot speed of the invasion fleet, the Chinese invasion fleet will have about a 5-10 hour window of greatest vulnerability. Ground-based missiles and any remaining strike aircraft would attempt to sink as much of the Chinese fleet as possible. A 40% destruction of the Chinese fleet is the minimum requirement to strongly threaten the success of the landing. The rates of weapons expenditure, destruction of military units, and death will be record-setting.
The next up is defensive mining by Taiwan. Those capabilities are currently limited, but new minelayers, ground-based launchers, and mine designs are expected by 2025. We'll see. There are only certain good spots for an invasion fleet to land.
Finally, the Taiwanese will be compelled to meet the Chinese at the beach with all the firepower that can be mustered. I'm estimating that China could bring about 1-2 divisions worth of troops, weapons, and vehicles at once. Should we assume larger numbers? The more destruction of Taiwanese capabilities, and command and control, prior to the landings, the more effective they will be.
If China believes that the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the other Pacific states would stay out of the fighting in such a scenario, then China could avoid diluting its forces. Every missile fired against U.S./Japan bases is one less to suppress Taiwan, every bomber raid outside of Taiwan uses aircraft that could instead lay mines and block off the Strait, and so it goes. A broader war only makes the correlation of forces worse for China.
DeleteI think that politics decide this. If the U.S., far ahead of time, decides that it will protect Taiwan, then certain options open up. China's amphibious fleet could be mined in harbor right before it launches. The new anti-ship Tomahawk could be used to strike a Chinese invasion fleet as it crosses the Strait from destroyers and cruisers outside the First Island Chain. Bomber and strike fighter raids with LRASM would also be possible. Assuming that U.S. and Japanese submarines could either penetrate minefields laid to guard north-south entrances to the Strait or be in those waters before mining operations, they would pose a strong threat to a Chinese amphibious fleet.
The same risk of dilution would still apply to U.S. and allied forces. Combat power not directed at a Chinese invasion fleet could ultimately ended up being regretted.
Agreements (and practing!) on interoperability and notably the sharing of targeting data between the Taiwanese and U.S./allied forces appears critical to maximizing the amount of time that Taiwan could hold out and delay an invasion fleet from launching. That would be a big step up from our current, more uncertain posture towards Taiwan.
You've done a nice job of laying out the options and possibilities.
DeleteOne interesting aspect that you briefly touched on is channel crossing time which, assuming that was the first (or co-first) action of the war, would also be the war-initiation warning time. Realistically, no one could spot the start of a cross-channel assault in the first minute. That begs the question, how soon could we spot it? 10 minutes? An hour? Five hours?
And then, having spotted movement, how long would it take us to react? We'd have to pass the info to various command elements including the President. They'd have to discuss it, come to some decision (you know how long it takes to do something like that!), issue orders, reissue sub-orders all along the chain of command, get the actual assets activated, and, eventually launch missiles/aircraft/whatever. How long do you think that process would take? It's not as if someone would be sitting with their finger hovering over a launch button waiting for the first twitch of data signal to instantly launch. Is it possible that the entire process of detection, discussion, and issuance of orders could take longer than it would take the assault fleet to cross the channel? If so, much of your counter-assault scenario and actions would never have a chance of happening. Consider, for example, how difficult it is to communicate with submerged subs. How would you get orders to them to commence operations in time to be useful?
Another interesting aspect that you touch on is communications - you referred to it as 'sharing of targeting data' - which, assuredly, the Chinese would attempt to prevent with massive electronic warfare (jamming, disruption, physical destruction of comm facilities, ?EMP pulse?, etc.). Even if we could respond in time, we might not have actionable targeting data although the constricted nature of the channel suggests that we could fire blind and have a decent chance of finding targets.
You can see, I hope, that actual war operations planning is an immensely difficult and complex undertaking with many, many factors and contingencies that have to be taken into account and allowed for. So many people want to casually say, 'well, we'll launch missiles and that will stop the enemy' when the reality is that there are a host of factors that will impact that casual 'launch' and make it far more problematic than casual commenters believe.
Nice work.
I would hope that Taiwanese/US intelligence would notice the massing of hundreds and hundreds of merchant ships, all of China's amphibs, and the dozens of escorts that would be required for a succesful assault on Taiwan before hand.
DeleteWithout a doubt the massing would be observed but I'm referring to the actual initiation of the assault. We [presumably] won't attack just because they mass assets. The Soviet Union used to do that all the time and Russia still masses units along borders and we don't preemptively attack.
DeleteChina won't attack unless two things happened,
Delete1. US initiates a kinetic strike
2. Taiwan's President decides to strike a match between on-the-brink US and China to leverage American response.
But I doubt China would even step that close to the precipice to risk an 'accidental discharge' regardless who lit the match. China's demonstration of its 'invasion force' would be obvious, open and expounded thru indirect means (e.g. continue modernization of its industries and armed forces)
"China won't attack unless two things happened,"
DeleteGiven all the illegal militaristic things China has done in the region in recent times, your statement lacks credibility.
China has flatly stated that they will invade Taiwan under various circumstances related to Taiwan asserting its independence.
China has threatened military action against the US for a host of reasons.
Again, your statement lacks credibility in the face of much evidence to the contrary.
If you repeat something long enough, people begin to believe it. Perhaps China should consider whether by constantly threatening invasions and military action the rest of the world is beginning to believe them and are treating them as the threat they, themselves, claim to be rather than the peaceful, friendly world neighbor they want to world to believe them to be?
China is creating their own problems and they have no one but themselves to blame.
A tiny bug called COVID-19 laid up China for little over a month, and world's market crashed as result, and China could very well loses up to 6-8% of its GDP this year. Now, imagine what a US-China war could do to China, not one year, not 5 or 10, but for a whole generation, and if we slip into nukes, maybe forever. So, that's war & its aftermath reality staring at China. There is not going to be war if China can help it.
Delete(btw, do you trust what China says? If you don't, then why do you take China's word regarding Taiwan on face value?)
"There is not going to be war if China can help it."
DeleteThen maybe you should be posting on Xi's blog, reminding him to obey international treaties and laws and stop threatening everyone, and quite violating other country's territorial waters. You know, basic civil behavior. That kind of basic adherence to the rule of law might go a long way toward 'helping it'. Seriously, you're preaching to the wrong blog. You need to preach to China.
"why do you take China's word regarding Taiwan"
Because they say it endlessly. At some point you have to take a threat seriously. Besides, we can afford to ignore China's labor statistics if we don't believe them but we can't afford not to believe their threats of war. I may not believe that you played in a world famous rock band but I'll take you at face value when you say you're going to murder me! Again, perhaps you should be pointing out to China how their threats are perceived?
My guess is Beijing reads your blog, seriously. Beside, I tried to get on sina once, I ended up persona non grata.
Delete"I tried to get on sina once, "
DeleteLet me ask you a serious question for your contemplation. No need to answer if you'd rather not. Your position is that China has no desire for a war and is, largely, a peaceful, moderately good neighbor just trying to take its place in the region - if I read you correctly. Feel free to correct me if I've misinterpreted.
Regardless, given your personal view of China, have any of China's actions over the last decade or so surprised you? For instance, their seizure and construction of artificial islands and then militarizing or their flat out refusal to accept the UNCLOS tribunal ruling or their repeated entry into other country's territorial waters or their systematic theft of intellectual property? I'm not trying to bash you with a litany of China's more questionable actions and force you to defend them, I'm asking whether their actions are generally fitting with your view of China? There seems like a potential disconnect between your view and their actions. Just curious.
" China has no desire for a war"
DeleteI can't mind read CCP, but that should be obvious to them- with so much to lose and nil to gain; not so much a desire, but a calculation.
" a peaceful, moderately good neighbor just trying to take its place in the region "
I wouldn't use the word peaceful, but 'peace-able' or anything other than violence as tool to achieve its goal. There is a word in CCP's lexicon, 斗争 (pronounce: Dòuzhēng) with English translation of 'struggle', it literally means 'fight/compete to get ahead', which best describe CCP's hereditary DNA. Couple that with 'size, quantity & quality' of China itself, it's unrealistic for China just to remain one of pre-rise status quo neighbors on the block.
" have any of China's actions over the last decade or so surprised you? "
1. Not acts per se, but how consequential (i.e. expansion of its reach and influence) and inconsequential (i.e. complete lack of violence & bloodshed) they calibrate their expansion without outright opposition from the taken.
2. How integrated 'China' is woven into American capitalism fiber. For example, we all know the challenge of 'Huawei and 5G', it never occurred to me that DoD, in order to keep viable US chip companies, have come to defend Huawei (as revenue source of these companies).
" I'm asking whether their actions are generally fitting with your view of China? There seems like a potential disconnect between your view and their actions. "
I don't defend China, I evaluate it from my vantage point: with traditional (non-mainland) Chinese upbringings (up to mid teens) and 40 years in the state. I'm aware I have my own blinkers, but I believe they are less than mono-culture mainland Chinese and Americans. This is what I see:
1. China/CCP are still (honestly in their mind) justifying their rise (and realpolitik) as matter of course and ask the rest of world for accommodation (i.e. win-win).
2. The west has gone from amused (how can authoritarianism ever work) to unease (CCP hasn't failed) to fear (Chinese system is out to replace liberal democracy).
The disconnect I see is not between my Chinese view and their acts, but belated (or maybe even unaware) realization on China's part (due to its insular politics and civilization) that the west they are dealing with is gradually becoming unsure of themselves. It takes two level heads, not one overly optimistic and the other pessimistic, to resolve issues (and I'm even addressing communication issues of different cultures.)
CNO, you can interpret my take two ways: China is 2nd coming Nazis (with that filter, and what comes out of it, I have no idea). Or, put aside your moral and legal framework a bit, and see it from realpolitik (or reflect on how the US came about). I'm not justifying what China does, just interpreting what I see.
Tim, I have to question one of your statements.
Delete"How integrated 'China' is woven into American capitalism fiber. For example, we all know the challenge of 'Huawei and 5G', it never occurred to me that DoD, in order to keep viable US chip companies, have come to defend Huawei (as revenue source of these companies)."
Do you really believe that the 5g issue is solely a conspiracy to maintain American tech companies financial position?
That's naive in my view.
It's incorrect to presume that the source of manufacture for hardware involved in 5G networks is a major economic factor (It would still be domestic tech companies rolling out the infrastructure and reaping most of the profit).
The issue is largely driven by a desire to provide some small relief for overwhelmed intelligence agencies like the NSA and ASIO attempting to prevent or discourage Chinese access to communications.
5G does introduce some new risks for states. As the technology reaches maturity, more and more services and activities will depend on mobile internet connections and the provision of real-time data. These would potentially be subject to sabotage in times of war or acute strategic crisis.
It's true that China can already access most 5 eyes communications regardless of whether its companies have the primary contract for any particular portion of the country’s network equipment. Cyber espionage is best managed through good cyber-security practice, such as encryption; the risk of sabotage, however, is much harder to mitigate. The biggest technical concern for US/Australia was, it seems likely, the fear of Chinese control of the basic infrastructure.
"unrealistic for China just to remain one of pre-rise status quo neighbors on the block."
DeleteBut not unrealistic to expect China to abide by the international rule of law as they rise. That's what has other countries worried - their blatant disregard for the world's law.
"put aside your moral and legal framework a bit, and see it from realpolitik "
DeleteYou seem to suggest that you have a more objective view as an outsider to both countries. Perhaps true. On the other hand, being an outsider, you may lack an understanding of either country! Perhaps true.
Here's an interesting thought experiment for you. Turn the various incidents around and see what your reaction would be. Suppose the US began initiating massive cyberattacks and intellectual theft against China, began building artificial islands in the South China Sea (which is international water, after all), seized a Chinese drone while it was in operation, forced down a Chinese aircraft and kept it, inserted spy ships into Chinese naval exercises, engaged in currency manipulation intended to weaken the Chinese economy, mandated that all Chinese companies in the US be half owned by the US (or whatever the exact terms the Chinese have imposed on the US are, but in reverse), threatened to invade China if China even mentions Taiwan, etc. What would be your reaction to the US doing all that - all things that the Chinese have actually done? I strongly suspect you'd condemn the US, and rightly so. If you would, then you have a bias in your views. If not, then you simply have a 'might makes right' view, in essence, not far removed from anarchy. Just give it some thought. What if the actions were reversed?
"just interpreting what I see."
DeleteI, too, interpret what I see and my interpretation is that we're witnessing the rise of a very evil government bent on global conquest. I find the parallel with Nazi Germany to be frightening.
Regarding 5G, this is what I understand,
Delete1. The US high tech companies have stripped all of its non-core components to maximize their core know-how (thus profit). That's why we see Apple outsources its mfg to Foxconn and Qualcomm (core chip company for 5G) to TSMC (which btw, mfg 70% of all US chips). 60% of Qualcomm's revenue is from the greater China area.
2. 5G is all about lots of information and data. China has large and dense population, and the government owns the data; therefore 5G thrives there. For example (if I step in CCP's shoe): this Covid-19 episode, to bypass entrenched human nature/error (be it structural or whatever), if all hospital data and people's movement can be real time collect/monitored by AI, China and the rest of world might of dodge this one. This could never be implemented in a free society with privacy concern.
3. The US military holds a chunk of frequency spectrum that overlaps with 5G's. To design around that for US commercial 5G application would be uniquely expensive for wide area coverage and only applicable here (i.e. non-standard for the rest of the world).
4. US military is betting its future on 'networked warfare' which would required a lot of 'Qualcomm et al' chips, but not enough to upkeep Qualcomm's stock price.
4. With regarding to security concern, I think Chinese espionage-via-telecom can be checked, since UK and Germany separately risked open break with the US to include Huawei's participation (however limited might be.) Of course, they did so to protect their trades with China. But given our own DoD's action, their decisions are understandable.
I think 2 & 3 are reasons why we don't have 5G end-to-end telecommunication equipment company in the US.
CNO, I didn't tell you why I got banned.
DeleteBesides being a Chinese, I also told them I'm a gun owning Christian who values freedom and right (i.e. 1A and 2A)
I also told them China can't afford to-war, neither the big one (US-China) or the small ones (China against natives), cuz they will lose their B&R investment and oversea Chinese, and end up like us, forever inextricable marred (kinda imply their expensive armament can't really be used.)
In retrospect, I kinda poked their bubble in a fundamental way (which I should't of done, cuz I'd like to stay engaged.)
" I'd like to stay engaged"
DeleteWell, here's another thought experiment for you. What China is doing now isn't working in regards to its reputation in the world. China, by their actions, are provoking fear which is self-defeating as it galvanizes other countries to resist rather than cooperate. Assuming you agree with that, what are some substantive actions you think China could/should take that would produce positive results for them without antagonizing the rest of the world?
Separate, though related, thought: China claims to not want war and yet their actions have them firmly on a path to war with the US. It's almost a self-fulfilling prophecy. If China really doesn't want war then they need to recognize the impact their actions are having and significantly alter their behavior. Just something to think about.
If and when China realize it's no longer the aggrieved party of past wrong, but the key to a future stable world, and that any opposition from outside is born out of fear and not of malice, and when China reaches a certain geopolitical comfort level-then it should change. I couldn't offer more specificity because I can't see that far.
Deletesorry, instead of "by land" in the second paragraph, I meant "by air"
ReplyDeleteNot the first time Chinese laze our troops...https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-destroyer-targeted-us-navy-aircraft-with-weapons-grade-laser-2020-2
ReplyDeleteIs the US ever going to respond overtly to this? I always hear we respond in some kind of covert way??? (I have my doubts) but at some point, we have to do something overt when we push back.....
I made a comment that I couldn't find asserting that China wouldn't attack because of economic integration, I meant to add a caveat later to it. I'll post it here.
ReplyDeleteChina is obviously aggressive, I meant that they'd rely on isolating Taiwan diplomatically while also establishing clearer superiority in military terms until it's possible to force integration by coercion and diplomatic isolation or to attack without external forces. They'll of course continue playing chicken with our navy during this. Attacking now, without a clear victory, would just be very damaging in the short term without long term benefit.
"rely on isolating Taiwan diplomatically while also establishing clearer superiority in military terms until it's possible to force integration"
DeleteThat's one possible route to annexing Taiwan and it's the most likely since the US seems determined to appease China rather than confront.
The other possible route is a war with the US that breaks out somewhere else, whether intentionally or not. In that case, China would have no choice but to initiate an invasion of Taiwan because they couldn't afford to leave Taiwan as an operating base for the US (assuming Taiwan would side with the US). It is likely that this scenario would be the result of an unintentional war because China is far too smart and, thus far, far too successful in their current empire building to want to start a war with the US. However, China is also arrogant in the extreme and this could easily lead to an unintentional war.
Russia's main strategic fear in the East is China taking Siberia. It is sparsely populated and rich in land & minerals. Plenty of space for China's enormous population to settle.
ReplyDeleteRussia would be a great partner to have for a "Pacific NATO".