What? Did the Ford
not have previous timelines? Is that
what the problem has been, no timeline?
That’s all it will take to get the Ford operational? Just a timeline? Why didn’t anyone think of that before? That’s brilliant!
Oh wait … Didn’t the last SecNav set a timeline for getting
the Ford’s elevators working? Yeah, yeah
he did – and it didn’t happen. So, Mr.
Modly, why will your timeline work when none of the previous timelines
have?
The answer is it won’t.
Or, maybe it will. The point is
that simply declaring a timeline won’t change a thing and won’t make the Ford
operational. If the Ford happens to meet
your timeline (history suggests it won’t) it won’t be because you had a
timeline, it will be because enough time has passed and enough money has been
spent that it eventually just happened.
Publicly declaring a timeline is just a publicity stunt and
one that is likely to backfire – just ask your predecessor!
Speaking of timelines,
Vice Adm.
Thomas Moore, head of Naval Sea Systems Command, conceded
during the hearing that Ford was supposed to deploy in 2018, but the sea
service is now working to go to sea by 2024. (1)
So much for timelines, I guess.
Modly
told Defense News this week that he thinks the Ford’s failure to deploy until
2024 “is not acceptable.” (1)
Not acceptable … and yet he’s accepting it. Has he fired anyone? If not – and he hasn’t – then he’s finding it
perfectly acceptable. You’re a
hypocrite, Mr. Modly.
Wait, though, there’s more.
Not only did Mr. Modly establish a timeline but just to be absolutely
sure the timeline is met, he appointed some more Admirals to oversee the
project.
To
meet his deadlines, Modly pointed to a series of “concrete steps” the sea service
has taken, including moving Rear Adm. James Downey — the head of the Program Executive Office Aircraft Carriers
— to Newport News permanently “so that he can be the accountable party.”
Norfolk-based
Fleet Forces Command also has assigned a two-star to “make sure we’re headed in
the right direction,” Modly said. (1)
Wow! Not just one,
but two! Two Admirals! That should cut the timeline in half, shouldn’t
it? Wait, though … why do you need more
Admirals overseeing this? I thought the
timeline guaranteed the desired result, by itself? Well, we’ll just ignore that and move on …
If all it takes is having Admirals to oversee the project, did
we not have Admirals overseeing this project from Day 1? Since they failed disastrously, why haven’t
they been fired? Where’s the
accountability, Mr. Modly? Or, are you
accepting the unacceptable?
Just out of curiosity, Mr. Modly, you’ve put this RAdm.
Downey in charge to be the ‘accountable party’.
What are you going to do if he fails and Ford doesn’t meet your
timeline? Are you going to fire him or just
give him a promotion like the other Admirals who have overseen this project?
Mr. Modly, your predecessor declared himself ‘accountable’
and shook the President’s hand as a guarantee.
When he failed to meet his timeline and promise, he accepted his
accountability and … … … well, he did nothing.
So much for accountability.
Well, since ComNavOps is ridiculing the Acting SecNav’s timeline,
is there anything that would have any positive effect? Honestly, at this point … no. Ford will be ready when it’s ready and there’s
nothing anyone can do to speed the process along.
However, there is something concrete and effective that
could be done with the Ford, today, that would greatly benefit all future Navy
acquisition programs and that is to apply some accountability with serious
consequences.
How about starting with firing every Admiral associated with
the project from its inception? Do that
and maybe the next Admiral that gets put in charge of some future project will
say, ‘Hey, stop! You’re not going to
include non-existent technology in my project.
The last guy who accepted that got fired. I’m not going to allow that’.
Let’s take it a step further. Let’s court-martial every Admiral associated
with the project and take away their pensions.
That ought to motivate some future Admirals to not accept unrealistic
projects.
Until you apply true accountability – which means, serious
consequences for failure – this cycle of failed programs (LCS, Zumalt, Ford,
etc.) will continue endlessly. The fact
that you didn’t mention any consequences for failure in your public
pronouncements about timelines and Admirals tells me that you aren’t serious
and are perfectly happy to accept the unacceptable. In other words, Mr. Modly, you’re just like
every one of your predecessors.
(1)Navy Times website, “Timeline set to get troubled flattop
Ford to sea”, Geoff
Ziezulewicz and David Larter, Defense News, 8-Jan-2020,
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/01/08/timeline-set-to-get-troubled-flattop-ford-to-sea/
I really don't get the Pentagon. I worked with to many NIH funded scientists (and married to a USDA one). They just can't mail it in like this. If you don't produce the results either expected of you or that you dictated as a regular part of a long term project - you will get canned or with NIH funding see you chances of renewing drop like a stone.
ReplyDeleteYour lab techs might survive as a university or government low level employee, but heads do effectively roll.
I'm wondering about that 1 week shake down we had at the end of last year. Its been pretty much radio silence since they've been back. If everything was even okish, forget great, you know USN would be screaming the good news....instead....we are getting a timeline. My gut feeling is it didnt go down well. Or same problems still haven't been fixed or new problems emerged. 2024 more and more sounds realistic.
ReplyDeleteHave they done the shock testing they were hoping to avoid yet?
ReplyDeleteNot yet although it's still scheduled, as far as I know.
Delete"Let’s court-martial every Admiral associated with the project and take away their pensions."
ReplyDeleteGreat idea that just might get to the heart of the problem! (But, unfortunately, a great idea that will never happen...true accountability being nowhere to be found in the U.S., as you have superbly documented here on nearly a daily basis.)
We have way too many admirals anyway. Here's a link to an interesting article that looks at the explosion in the number of admirals that was been non-intuitively concurrent with the drastic decline in the number of ships in both the British and U.S navies...
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/does-us-navy-have-too-many-admirals-89416
I wish we had a whistleblower inside this program, I bet we haven't heard half the problems on board.
ReplyDeleteSo new Navy plan is to have 1 Admiral supervise the 3 Admirals that currently supervise the 1 engineer and 2 techs that are fixing the elevators.
ReplyDeleteSomeday I'll learn Powerpoint so I can join the Navy and become an Admiral.
And we make fun of the communists....
DeleteUntil people start getting fired, there is no accountability. I think we should fire every person who signed off on any part of Ford, Zumwalt, or LCS. That would create a pretty significant attrition of admirals, which is badly needed. We don't have more admirals than ships (depending on how you count ships) but the number is way closer than it should be.
ReplyDeleteKath, good points. When NIH and USDA can give the Navy lessons in accountability, we have a severe problem.
I have several thoughts about things we can do.
1) I'm not sure we can actually prevent retired officers from going to work for defense contractors (I see some constitutional issues, plus there is some benefit to keeping the expertise around), but I could see saying that if you go to work for a defense contractor, your retirement is suspended for the duration of that employment.
2) I think we could borrow from the Brits and separate line officers into deck and engineering. Basically, engineering officers run the ship and deck officers fight the ship. Deck officers go through all the training and certification to be merchant marine deck officers. The Brits' knowledge of the rules of the road puts ours to shame. Only deck officers would have command at sea. Senior billets for engineering types would include command of shore bases and major maintenance facilities. For new ship design, the deck community would define capabilities needed, and the engineering community would determine how best to provide it. I think this would bring more relevant expertise to bear.
3) Try as much as possible to "fly before you buy." I know that a prototype ship is a hugely expensive proposition, but surely there was some way to know better about the Ford's sever problems before committing to buy three of them. Same with Zumwalt and LCS. Don't commit to long buys of anything until the first one works. Basically, no unproved technology except in trial ships/airplanes/tanks/etc.
4) Try more design to cost. There is one way to build an ASW frigate for $500 million. Set that as the turnkey price, figure out what you can get for that, and don't go making a bunch of change orders to drive up costs. If you find a better way to do something, implement that in subsequent members of the class, and upgrade the first ones at midlife. If you set a price and nothing at that price can meet your needs, then rethink either CONOPS or price limit.
"I'm not sure we can actually prevent retired officers from going to work for defense contractors (I see some constitutional issues,"
DeleteWell, non-compete clauses are a common part of industry employment contracts so I don't see why something similar couldn't be done.
"there is some benefit to keeping the expertise around"
You had to be laughing when you typed that! If these clowns had any expertise, I wouldn't be writing this blog. Do we really want to keep around people who have demonstrated and appalling lack of judgement and expertise while they served?
"Try more design to cost."
ABSOLUTELY NOT. This is foolish in the extreme. You design to combat requirements. Cost can be a distant tertiary consideration, at most. Now, that doesn't mean you don't apply fiscal discipline - you do! But you never, ever, design a ship to a cost target. You design to combat requirements.
If you lay out ONLY the minimum combat requirements to meet the job, and use only existing technology, the costs will take care of themselves.
The royal navy has similar problems to the US navy. The type 45 frigates turn themselves off in hot weather. They made the mistake of installing a highly innovative propulsion system that uses a intercooler as well as a recuperator on their gas turbines. In hot weather such as the Persian gulf power output drops and the ship losses electrical power in order to prevent catastrophic electrical failure.
DeleteThe Royal Navy has the best antiaircraft system in the world called 'Sea Viper'. The only problem is that it has never been tested properly.
Part of the problem is that the leaders making decisions will often go for locally owned industry (pork barreling) rather than the best available product. Just look at the AMDR (SPY-6) decision making to see what I mean.
One thing that I will say however is that the Queen Elizabeth class carriers have elevators that actually work, The Fords do not. Why?
I am not convinced the weapons elevators on the Ford can actually be fixed. It gets back to the primary design of magnetic elevators. Magnetic fields are used to lift the elevator. This works well in a rigid system not exposed to movement. This is because of the extremely fine tolerance between the permanent magnet and its electromagnetic rail. Lets say the tolerance is 1mm. Increasing the tolerance as a result of movement to 2mm reduces the force to one quarter of its previous level. Increasing the tolerance to 3mm reduces the force by a factor of 9.
DeleteThis system works well if there is no movement in the structure. We all know however that that ships move, twist etc. How can the elevators possibly work if the structure is continually moving. I think they need to cut the losses and go back to chains and electric motors as they do on the Queen Elizabeth class carriers.
The idea that it will take another 4 years to fix the problem is just a silly joke. How could they possibly know that they will be able to fix the problem at all.
They built one Enterprise before they built the Nimitz class. In doing so only one technology was changed. They built only one USS Nautilus. In doing so one technology was changed.
DeleteThe problem is that going from steam to electrical in aircraft carriers involved changing everything. Every technology therefore had to change, there was no other option. It was an enormous gamble. They went to Los Vegas and lost. The philosophy has to change.
The problem is that the Navy puts all their eggs in one basket. The project is to build 10 ships over 50 years. They therefore think that they need to produce technology that will be up to date in 20-30 years time.
This strategy is part of the problem. Instead of a continuous improvement philosophy, they try and do everything in the project at once.
The problem with the Nimitz is that they had insufficient electrical power to bring in new weapons systems and radars. The new reactors are smaller and produce much more power. The first ship should have been a Nimitz class with the new reactor and a New upgraded Radar that utilised the extra power. The next ship should of been installed a small number of different electrical elevators and a solitary EM catapult for testing etc etc.
If you look at Japanese Submarine development and the Oyashio/Soryu class, this model of continuous development is how they modernise. Smaller numbers of different classes of submarine. The next iteration will have Lithium Ion batteries and essentially will be able to travel submerged and quietly of thousands of Nautical miles. Continuous development is the model the USN needs to change to. No more than two Nimitz class carriers should of been identical.
The same philosophy goes with the Burkes. The improvement in radar technology has been rapid. The current deployed later model Burkes should already have a new AESA radar in place of the SPY-1D radar. The SPY-1D is 15 years out of date.
"I'm not sure we can actually prevent retired officers from going to work for defense contractors (I see some constitutional issues,"
DeleteThey are part of the retired reserve and receive a nice monthly paycheck for that, so yes, employment restrictions can be imposed. But they should be allowed to resign and do whatever they want, forgoing retirement pay for life. That would solve much of the problem, but the kickbacks are so large some would resign!
"I am not convinced the weapons elevators on the Ford can actually be fixed."
DeleteWhile I understand the basic idea in the electromagnetic concept, I have no experience with the specific engineering of the mechanisms such as tolerances. If tolerances are that critical (and several other articles have also stated that they are), I know from experience that tolerances tend to loosen (worsen) over time as wear/tear and repeated use cycles plus thermal expansion/contraction all work their evil effects! Throw in the added element of structural flexing and twisting from riding constantly moving seas and I've got strong doubts that the elevator mechanism can be kept in tolerance over the long haul even if they can be made to work on day one.
I have these same doubts about the EMALS which also seems to require some pretty precise alignment of the sequential elements.
Time will tell.
"The Royal Navy has the best antiaircraft system in the world called 'Sea Viper'."
DeleteOkay, interesting claim.
"The only problem is that it has never been tested properly."
Um, if it's never been tested properly, how do we know it's the best antiaircraft system in the world?
Please understand, I have no idea whether it's good, bad, or indifferent but without realistic tests any claims are just speculation. I'm not saying your claim is wrong - it's just unsupported if it hasn't been realistically tested. To be fair, the same applies to the USN's Aegis system which the Navy adamantly refuses to realistically test.
So, if it hasn't been tested properly, what do you base your claim on?
I am being sarcastic. I am making the point that such claims are made without evidence. I am pointing out that the Royal Navy has similar issues to the USN.
DeleteAhh, okay. I missed it. My apologies.
Delete"Do we really want to keep around people who have demonstrated and appalling lack of judgement and expertise while they served?"
ReplyDeleteI think a lot of that appalling lack of judgement has been because they knew where they were going next. Put some limits on that and you might get better judgement out of them while active.
"If you lay out ONLY the minimum combat requirements to meet the job, and use only existing technology, the costs will take care of themselves."
I think we are using design to cost differently. I probably should have said build to cost. Define the combat requirements, cost it out using existing, proved technology, and then build to that cost. I'm letting combat requirements define cost, instead of vice versa, but once you have it designed and costed, then build it to that cost. Don't allow 4700 change orders, and don't allow scope creep.
"I think a lot of that appalling lack of judgement has been because they knew where they were going next."
DeleteThat may be some part of the weapons acquisition problems but these people have been involved in way more bad judgements than just that. These are the people who have given us deferred maintenance, hollow forces, no readiness, loss of surge capability, waivers on training, reduced manning, early retirements of perfectly usable ships, a carrier with no drydock that can accommodate it, and so on. I could list the problems endlessly but you know them as well as I do.
This isn't a case of slanting some acquisition decisions so as to help their retirement prospects, this is wholesale bad decision making on a scale that defies belief. These people aren't making bad decisions about acquisition but good decisions everywhere else. They're making bad decisions about everything.
I mean, think about it … anyone whose judgement is so bad that they can rationalize an acquisition decision that they know is bad just to they can secure some retirement prospects is not going to miraculously have good judgement about everything else - they're going to exhibit uniformly bad judgement. I don't want their 'expertise' around, at all.
Ask yourself ' how did these people get to the position that they are the decision makers'
DeleteI have my thoughts. There has been a great move to employ people with high emotional intelligence at the expense of people whom are clever in other ways. As a result we are being swamped with what I regard as 'used car salesman' rather than truly competent people. When the truly competent people see that they are being overlooked for 'show ponys', they then leave the organisation depriving it of the talent they really need. It is happening in all industries, not just the military.
(Don McCollor) ...a quote from Admiral Rickover "When the men in Russia foul up, they are dismissed, sometimes losing their necks. But we protect those who fail and press them to the government bosom". ...Please Admiral, rise up from the grave and smite these infidels....
ReplyDeleteAmid Criticism, US Navy Confident in New Arresting Gear System for Next Carrier
ReplyDeleteJanuary 5, 2015
Capt. Stephen Tedford, program manager for the Navy’s Aircraft Launch, Recovery and Equipment Office, said in a December interview.
But, he said, the GAO’s claim of four and a half years of AAG delays is not accurate.
“We have had delays on the advanced arresting gear, that is a true statement,” Tedford said. “We are continuing to work through those delays, and I believe we are still in support of ship delivery in 2016.”
That is the point. We are not intentionally doing reliability testing, which would be part of the envelope — repetitive, the same test point over and over and over again — to build reliability. That actually is in the next phase of the test program that kicks off later this year.”
Tedford admits challenges remain, but he declared confidence.
“Both of these systems work,” he said. “EMALS is on a great trajectory right now, and advanced arresting gear is on a similar vector.
“We are very excited,” he added.
http://hrana.org/news/2015/01/amid-criticism-us-navy-confident-in-new-arresting-gear-system-for-next-carrier/
FIVE YEARS LATER HE'S IN CHARGE OF MORE!
Rear Admiral Stephen R. Tedford
United States Navy
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force
His acquisition tours include Deputy Program Manager with PMA 251 for the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) system; followed by command of PMA 251 as the Program Manager; and as Vice Commander of Naval Air Systems Command.
In August 2019, he assumed his current position as Commander, Operational Test & Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) in Norfolk, Virginia.
https://www.public.navy.mil/cotf/Pages/commander.aspx
NOT FIRED, BUT PROMOTED, TWICE!
I should add that the USS Ford has not launched any aircraft in almost two years. It never launched fully loaded aircraft(with fuel and bombs) because of unexplained restrictions. The last test if failed every 74 launches. We are told all was fixed in 2019 pierside with a software update. Still no launches to date.
DeleteMeanwhile, another Ford was delivered recently, and two more began construction two years ago.
"NOT FIRED, BUT PROMOTED, TWICE!"
DeleteVery good example of what's wrong with the Navy as regards accountability. Nicely documented.
Has anyone noticed the error in the article. He discusses a total of 2 plus 5 elevators. There used to be eleven. Am I missing something or have 4 elevators miraculously disappeared.
ReplyDeleteI noticed that but I didn't interpret it as someone trying to give a strict accounting of the numbers. Supposedly, two elevators work now (maybe two others?) so I interpreted that as saying that 7 more elevators need to be finished.
DeleteYou know a more logical approach to the Ford might have to recognize the risk in in a technowonder, and lay down the next ship as minimally tweeked Nimitz. When its problems started showing up than you would have no need to resort to making stuff up, outright lie, or ignore contractor concerns. With reliable known and less expensive CV building in the pipeline you could honestly work to get the next gen tech CV in ready condition but also accept it might have been a step to far.
ReplyDeleteUSN probably should have bit at reactivating the Kitty Hawk when they had the chance. If the process cost any like SEP it had in current dollars that at minimum 2 billion, so lets 3-4 billion. A new Nimitz should cost the same as the last one so seeming two CVs for the price of the Ford which I don't believe the navy numbers for anyway.
The new line is lessons learned from the Ford are helping the Kennedy...
https://wtkr.com/2019/11/06/navy-lessons-from-ford-are-making-kennedy-construction-faster-and-more-efficient/
But quotes like this one do not inspire confidence:
"We’ve made production changes in how we produce the doors in the elevators and we’ve built a digital twin of the elevator to prove out those changes," he elaborated.
Given the scale of the problem I rather think an actual mechanical real twin would be more appropriate. One that be subject shock and water etc.
The little that is published about civilian EM elevators pretty mention how tight tolerances have to be for it to work....considering all the difficulty to get them to work properly docked or gently moving around, no wonder USN is in no hurry to shock test FORD. After the last shake down week, did all the elevators that worked, still work after 1 week at sea? Hope so....that would really be bad if you cant keep them working once you are underway. Wonder how well they work after a few months at sea?
ReplyDeleteThere's a lot we could have done in hindsight to avoid this mess. Still wonder why all this new tech was put inside FORD when it was clear most of it wasnt ready, USN was cheap and didnt want to bother with more testing. So many other ways to sturdy this tech for prime time than dumping it all on 1 ship. To late now. Sad part is it's pretty obvious USN hasn't learned anything from LCS, FORD, ZUMWALT.
So the Gerald R. Ford that was commissioned in 2017 is going to take 7 years before it can have it's operational deployment?
ReplyDeleteWhat about the John F. Kennedy? is that also going to be a floating paper weight after it's commissioning or have they changed things to fix the problems of the Ford?
WIKI: "Construction began on 11 August 2005, when Northrop Grumman held a ceremonial steel cut for a 15-ton plate that forms part of a side shell unit of the carrier.[13] The keel of Gerald R. Ford was laid down on 13 November 2009.[2] She was christened on 9 November 2013.[5] Gerald R. Ford entered the fleet replacing the decommissioned USS Enterprise (CVN-65), which ended her 51 years of active service in December 2012.[14][15] Originally scheduled for delivery in 2015,[16] Gerald R. Ford was delivered to the Navy on 31 May 2017[6] and formally commissioned by President Donald Trump on 22 July 2017."
DeleteOfficially (LOL) she should be ready for her first deployment in late 2021/2022. I have some doubts on that date....I posted a few months ago the dates for the USS Enterprise which was the first nuclear carrier and had some other new systems onboard, KEEL LAYING in 1958, first deployment for CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS in Oct 1962. She then went to MED in 1963/64 and later Vietnam in 1965, she wasn't pampered! Let's say 5 years of construction and 2 years of design, that would be 7 years total and she was ready to go to war. Compare that to FORD.....pathetic.
I have been looking into the Ford debacle to see who mad the decision to introduce all the new technologies at once (this is the real issue). It appears as though the Navy wanted to introduce only incremental change to the new carrier. In 2003 they were forced to make a technological leap by the senior members of the Bush administration DOD. ?Donald Rumsfeld, Gordon England. Gordon England had been a senior executive of General Dynamics. His motto was to make a technological leap forward. We all blame the navy leadership when it was the Bush administration who caused the problems we see now.(article Association of Naval aviators).
DeleteIn terms of the debacle since its launch, it appears that the Navy was pushing Huntington/Ingalls as the prime contractor to fix the problems. In October 2019 the navy took over the prime contracter, letting HII off the hook. Why? I suspect HII has run out of money. HII is now the subcontractor on the project. I suspect the timeline has now occurred as the Navy has only just taken over.
You are correct that the Bush administration did push for technological advancements. However, the Navy was a very willing participant. They not only did not object but enthusiastically hopped on board. Had they simply presented realistic cost and schedule estimates, backed up by the evidence of the overwhelming difficulties associated with every historical technology 'leap' ever conducted, the leap ahead Ford concept would have died an immediate death. Instead, the Navy not only happily went along but enthusiastically propagated the hype and added to it with ludicrous claims about sortie rates and what not.
DeleteSo, the Navy does not get let off the hook. They are responsible for this debacle. They also had numerous chances to take off ramps at various points. They could have abandoned the EMALS and AAG when it became obvious that they were not ready for operational use. They could have halted the Ford class at one carrier when it became obvious, years ago, that the Ford was not a mature design. Instead, they immediately contracted for more ships. They could have abandoned the weapon elevators. And so on.
The Navy does not get off the hook.
So we currently plan to build 10 of these monstrosities? From what I can see, we have ordered 5 of which one is Ford, JFK is fitting out, Enterprise is under construction, and the other two haven't started yet. So, make Ford and JFK the test vehicles until everything works, stop work on Enterprise, redesign it and complete it as an upgraded Nimitz, and build the other two to upgraded Nimitz standard. That's not cheap, but it's cheaper than pouring $15B into something that won't work.
ReplyDeleteI'll give you 50/50 odds wheter all the handy dandy gadgets will ever work. If they still don't work, then build more upgraded Nimitzes or build the RAND CVN-LX with hybrid nuke/gas-electric propulsion. There is absolutely zero reason to spend $!5B a pop for ships on which nothing works. This simply the Zumwalts disaster raised to a higher order of magnitude.
Dumb question. Could you build an upgraded Nimitz with the new reactors? Would they work with the old cats if you redid the piping properly?
DeleteProbably could but my guess very very unlikely that USN would do at this time. You would end up with remaining Nimitzs,1 unique class Ford, 1 upgraded Nimitz and what ever emerges afterwards....that's a mess. At this point, which USN did with LSCs really, just stick to the program and pray to all known gods they figure Ford out or at least JFK....and keep it like that.
DeleteThere was so many ways to avoid this but USN pretty much picked the WORSE WAY! They could have done more ground testing of all the systems, put them on the retired Enterprise or decommissioned CVN and just gutted it and used that as a test bed, like you mentioned, an upgraded spiral Nimitz program (which I vaguely remember was suggested at the time but considered too expensive!) or difficult since we really only have one very constrained builder, maybe OK Ford build as a prototype and while Ford working out all the kinks, build the last Nimitz class in the meantime. Only once Ford was figured out and known upgrades necessary, then order the new series, not sure if last option was every contemplated or feasible but just about anything else would have been better than USN decisions!!!
"I'll give you 50/50 odds wheter all the handy dandy gadgets will ever work."
DeleteThat's not really the issue. Even assuming everything works perfectly, the real issue is that we've leapfrogged from the $4B-$8B Nimitz class, straight into a $15B Ford class. We simply can't afford them regardless of whether they work.
Compounding the problem is that we're only going to get half the value because the air wing is half the size of the original Nimitzes. Double the cost and half the value.
We've also priced ourselves out of the combat risk business by building carriers we can't afford to lose.
The Ford class price tag is why we don't have money for larger air wings, more subs, logistic ships, minesweepers, etc. The Ford class is, literally, eating the budget of the rest of the Navy. Toss in the Comlumbia price tag and the Navy is collapsing. We're down to 9 air wings and the Navy has floated disbanding one of those!
So, whether the gadgets work is almost irrelevant. It's the cost!
I think as I said above the Ford as a tech trial would be no shame and perhaps worth it if everything came together. But it was too much too soon and somebody at the navy should have been willing to resign over it vs it and some modest incremental Nimitz designs.
DeleteI would be willing to be happy with a one off attempt at a modern US version Kirov but with 8" guns. But not start building 2 or 3 before the first proved itself (although I think conventional power and ditch the ASW ability its not going to be hunting subs. In all honesty if its a maintaining the infrastructure/industrial base thing than just bloody pay the workers to do nothing for a whilebut not move on rather than build 3 white elephants.
"if its a maintaining the infrastructure/industrial base thing than just bloody pay the workers to do nothing for a while"
DeleteThat would keep them paid but they need to work to keep their skills sharp. Designers have to design, welders have to weld, etc. Hey, I get what you're saying about not making a bad situation worse and I agree.
You are right that was a bit of rant.
DeleteBut I think we do need to accept that when we are spending on a standing military it is spending on not just stuff but the people who make the stuff and the people who run the stuff. To often politicians get fixated on numbers of just the stuff. I really don't care for the accounting magic that says hey if we pick the one 'right' thing and make dozens of them it will cheap. That's for MBAs making widgets. I would be happy to pay for more of one or two prototypes to see what works, or more maintenance and refurbishment to things that are working. Either should help keep the industrial base intact. Theoretically that makes the logistigs more expensive but I think I might rather pay for 3 new FF(x) now to see which one we will be paying for for the next 20 if one is really good in real tests.
I rather think we would be far better off today if the Pentagon had given Lockheed the win on the F-35 for just the A/C and given Boeing the consolation prize of its B version. I suspect we might be more comfortable now with two 5th generation fighters in production and neither needing to be all things
After reading about problems with the elevators, its easy to understand the problem with EMALS. It sounds simple to input the aircraft weight and the system provides the exact electrical power needed to properly launch an aircraft, and this works at land bases where the rails never move.
ReplyDeleteThe problem with the elevators and EMALS is that a moving carrier moves. It twists and rolls and bends every so slightly and so do the electromagnetic rails. But just a .5mm shift reduces the launch output and up to 3mm eliminates it. There is no way to know the precise alignment of the rails for each launch since they constantly flex. There is also the huge maintenance issue of electrical cables exposed just below the deck, but it seems the only way the Ford can reliably launch aircraft is in dry dock.