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Friday, August 9, 2019

Chinese Type 05 Amphibious Assault Family

We’ve frequently noted that the US amphibious doctrine cannot be executed for a variety of reasons.  It’s pure fantasy.  China, on the other hand, is building a very capable and credible amphibious assault capability and is seemingly leaping right over the obstacles that have plagued the US. 

One example of a problem that has stymied the US is as basic as amphibious vehicles themselves.  Sure, we have the AAV/ACV but it’s a landing craft that, once landed, becomes a poor man’s Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) of sorts.  It has no significant firepower and little armor.  It’s not a combat vehicle by any stretch of the imagination.

The Marines played around with a high speed Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) for many years before finally admitting failure and cancelling the program.

We’re left, currently, with an AAV which is slow, has no significant firepower, is limited to a few miles of effective swimming range, and lacks significant armor.

Leaping right over these problems, the Chinese have developed and are fielding a family of amphibious vehicles that put what we have to shame.  The vehicle family is the Type 05 which is made up of multiple, specialized variants all based on the common Type 05 chassis. 

Characteristics common to all the variants include:

  • Planing hull powered by two water jets
  • Diesel engine with 1475 hp water / 550 hp land
  • 15 kts (28 km/h) water / 40 mph (65 km/h) land
  • Hydraulic actuated, hinged bow plane that deploys out from the vehicle to create a low drag, hydrodynamic effect for high speed; steering is accomplished via water jets and transom flaps
  • Standard hull armor provides (1):
  • protection at the front against 12.7 mm AP round up to 100 m
  • protection at the sides against 7.62 mm AP rounds
  • protection at the rear against 7.62 mm AP rounds

Production began in 2006.  Production numbers are difficult to come by but estimates suggest 200+ vehicles deliver as of 2016.  The breakdown of variant types is unknown.

Let’s take a bit closer look at the major variants.


ZBD-05 Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle

This is essentially an amphibious Bradley and gives the Chinese the ability to land a mechanized, semi-armored infantry force with mobility and serious firepower and anti-tank capability.

  • Front engine,  rear passenger compartment
  • 30 mm turret;  300 rds/min
  • HJ-73C Anti-tank guided missile launcher; 2x single rail launchers each side of the turret
  • 7.62 mm co-axial gun
  • Crew of 3
  • 7-8 troops (reports vary with some suggesting a carrying capacity of 10 troops)
  • 2x 4-barrel smoke grenade launchers
  • Rear troop door
  • 58,422 lb (26,500 kg)
  • Rated for Sea State 4 (2)

ZBD-05 Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle


ZTD-05 Amphibious Tank

This gives China an initial assault wave, heavy firepower vehicle that is very similar in concept to the US WWII LVT(A)-4 amphibious tank.  The US found this type of vehicle to be absolutely essential for amphibious assaults and I see no reason why the requirement has changed today.  In fact, given the absence of naval gun support, an initial wave heavy firepower vehicle is even more essential.

  • Front engine,  rear passenger compartment
  • 105 mm low recoil, stabilized, rifled gun
  • armour piercing fin stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS)
  • high explosive (HE)
  • high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds
  • 105mm laser beam riding anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM); indigenous version of the Russian 9M117 Bastion anti-tank missile
  • Capable of firing at sea
  • 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun mounted on the turret
  • 7.62 mm co-axial machine gun
  • 2x 4-barrel smoke grenade launchers
  • Turret face armored against 25 mm (3)
  • Crew of 4
ZTD-05 Amphibious Tank



ZTD-05 Amphibious Tank


Type 05 Command Vehicle

Type 05 Recovery Vehicle



Summary

Consider what this family of amphibious vehicles gives China.  It provides a complete package of amphibious capabilities ranging from heavy firepower (105 mm tank gun) to lethal mechanized infantry (IFV with 30 mm and anti-tank missiles) and including command and control and vehicle recovery – all able to swim ashore IN THE INITIAL WAVE.  The US Marines have nothing comparable although they have publicly expressed a desire for a 30 mm turreted variant of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) as well as command and control and recovery variants.  At the moment, however, the Marines have only the old AAV while China is building and deploying the entire family of vehicles.  Perhaps it's time to start copying Chinese assets like they've been copying so many of ours?




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(1)Defense Updates blog, “Chinese Amphibious Type 05 / ZBD05 / ZTD05 Family of IFV / AAV”, 8-Jan-2013,
https://defenseupdates.blogspot.com/2013/01/chinese-amphibious-type-05-zbd05-ztd05.html



53 comments:

  1. Totally agree with you, we need to develop an amphibious family of vehicles along the ASCOD/CV90 line. The armament is already well developed. 30/40mm cannon for IFV, 105/120 gun for tank variant and 120 NEMO for fire support. Add spike ATGM and LAHAT for gun launched missles and you got a potent kick in the door force. Both vehicle lines have command and recovery variants as well as engineer vehicles as well. An amphib. engineer breaching vehicle with on board MICLIC would be handy in the initial assault wave.

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    1. Add a little to your comment SRB, the M2 Bradley turret still is designed to be water resistant, even thou the M2 lost the amphibious capability.

      Essentially, all that needs to be designed is the hull to fit the amphibious role and a M2 turret dropped on it.

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    2. "M2 turret dropped on it."

      I'm not a land combat person but the trend is towards larger caliber guns. The Bradly uses a 25mm gun which is now considered a bit light. Still, it would be better than the nothing we have now. Of course, it might well be possible to add a bigger gun.

      The larger point that I think you're making is that we can quickly produce a decent amphibious IFV with existing equipment and a straightforward hull and you're right. This kind of basic improvement, as opposed to our constant desire for leap-ahead tech, is sadly and unwisely neglected by the US military.

      Good comment.

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    3. While the main weapon is the 25mm, there has been programs to upgrade it to 30/40/50mm, with minimal modifications required. The 25mm is duel fed, meaning alot of the space is taken up by two feed chutes, two ammo bins, two ejection ports, and a large feeder mechanism.

      The main reason these upgrades haven't been done is mostly financial in nature. The weapon system diagrams I've seen are simple enlarged version of the 25mm system.

      For larger then 50mm thou, the mantle would need redesign along with a change in ammo storage and a way to eject the shells out the narrow opening meant for that in the design, not to mention a new FCS.

      But all the work for the 30/40/50mm is already done.

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    4. Bradley's often fire two types of rounds, an armor piercing round and a high-explosive incendiary round. A duel feed system allows the Bradley to engage a target with the appropriate type of round.

      A larger gun with an airburst round would allow the Bradley to engage troops hiding behind terrain or inside buildings, possibly even helicopters and drones.

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    5. Upgunning the Bradley from 25mm has been talked about from time to time, but the big killer of all the upgunning is the cost effectiveness. Going to 30mm gets you a better gun and round, but it's not as big as the increase from 105mm to 120mm tank gun. There were proposals to put a 40mm gun into the bradley turret, but space and weight means that you give up the TOW missiles, which are what the Brads mainly use to kill tanks.

      30mm seems to be the sweet spot between lethality, rate of fire and ammunition capacity - at least, looking at how pretty much most new IFV designs are going to 30mm cannon. Wwe'll probably see a 30mm gun on the Bradley successor, not the Bradley itself.

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    6. @Wild Goose

      In regards to losing the TOW, no. None of the gun upgrades for the Bradley called for the removal of the TOW. Its design and its placement of the launcher and FCS modules won't be impacted by a larger gun.

      On a side note, the TOW system is incompatible with a amphibious landing due the command wire being affected by water.

      There has been a talk of replacing it with two duel launchers of Javelins on both sides of the turret, but I haven't seen or heard of actual testing.

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  2. Looks from the drawings that there is an drop-down hull platform at the rear too. You would need/get a lot of hull area to allow planing on such a heavy, narrow vehicle.

    Looks like an ideal application for CODOG, although linking the two drive systems might be too complex. A 1500HP class turbine for the water jets, and a ~600HP conventional diesel to power the tracks. Same fuel source.

    A tanker version would also be worth looking at. If you are doing a long run using nearly 1500HP on the water you are going to be sucking fuel like crazy, so the logistics will be "interesting".

    This would not be too complex to develop. A lot of the requirement could be met with COTS components.

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  3. As usual, China didn't go crazy, looked at requirements and probably got something 80% of the solution in service NOW. Instead, USMC went for the EFV, spent billions and almost a decade and got nothing to show for it....now we're the ones trying to play catch up. Just ridiculous....

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  4. Some armor is better than no armor, but it's worth keeping in mind that in order to get this speed and capability, the Type 05 family has had to sacrifice protection. The turret faces might be able to take 25mm rounds at 1,000 meters (of unknown type, mind, we don't even know if that's actual DU APDS or plain HE the Chinese were testing it against), but once the opposing IFVs get closer, or go for side shots, well. Protection against RPG is also questionable, given the aluminium construction and lack of ERA or RPG cage, and note that none of the sources said anything about protection against artillery splinters. They're definitely not going to be able to tank multiple ATGM hits from infantry ATGMs like Spike or Javelin, let alone vehicle ATGM like TOW, Hellfire or Kornet.

    These vehicles are basically meant to counter the percentage threat of enemy infantry. 105mm no longer cuts it as a credible antitank weapon against any of the big players' tanks, even with APFSDS, but it's more than adequete for throwing HE into infantry bunkers. They're trading protection for speed and firepower, and arguably that can work for China because it's not like they're expecting to use these AFVs against the US Army, with the Abrams horde and Javelin ATGMs issued on the squad level: the use case of these vics is going to be agaist Third World nations that don't enjoy the US Army's lavish level of firepower.

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    1. I don't think that China would use them to fight directly US forces but to disembark, put aside light opposition and drive forward until stiff resistance is met.

      That is to occupy a beachhead or a port to allow disembarking the big boys.

      JM

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    2. That's basically my point: what they have here is fine for a lightly opposed beach, but as soon as they run into opposition heavier than sandbagged bunkered MGs these AFVs are going to be in trouble, because they're not as tough as Bradleys, Strykers, BMP-3Ms or T-15s.

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    3. "it's worth keeping in mind that in order to get this speed and capability, the Type 05 family has had to sacrifice protection."

      You're stating the obvious and repeating post material. You're also wrong about what the tradeoffs were. The tradeoff was not armor for speed and capability, it was armor for swimming.

      You're also incorrect about the function of these vehicles. Their function is not to go toe-to-toe with other armored vehicles, it's to provide infantry support and to apply firepower to fortifications and obstacles. Read up on the WWII LVT(A)-4 and you'll see the function.

      Don't state the obvious, add something original.

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    4. "That is to occupy a beachhead or a port to allow disembarking the big boys."

      You've got it! This is what the Marines with their nearly unarmed AAV lack.

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    5. "I'm just elaborating further about the limitations it has"

      No, you're stating the blindingly obvious and, worse, you're directly comparing tanks and land IFVs to an amphibious vehicle. They aren't comparable because they have different functions. You might as well compare a jeep to a tank since they have different functions as well.

      Don't write just to write - offer something analytical and noteworthy.

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    6. "The ZTD-05 is basically"

      Again, you just repeated stuff that's common knowledge. Perhaps you should reread the Comments Policy page where I note that a prerequisite for this blog is a fundamental understanding of naval issues. Your attempt to provide basic knowledge to readers is not needed.

      "I'm not really convinced that these vehicles are for port seizures. Rather, it makes more sense to me that they're for Chinese posturing"

      Now that's an original thought, if likely incorrect, as it does not jibe with the Chinese effort to build a truly formidable amphibious fleet. Nonetheless, it's an original thought. Feel free to assemble a logical argument to support the statement, offer some evidence to back it up, and if you can do that, you'll have a worthwhile comment to offer.

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    7. They are also likely to be very vulnerable to mines, and even IEDs. There are good reasons that the USMC required an MRAP-style V-shaped-hull for ACV Phase 1, even though it likely comes at the expense of hydrodynamic performance. A couple mines in the sandbars and the beach will turn these into floating obstacles for the rest of the assault force.

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  5. I would start by assuming that the Marines would not be fighting a tank battle as they land on the beach. If that were the scenario, I think you have to chalk that landing up as a loss.

    With that assumption, I would think that the Marines could continue to use their current AAV. I noticed that they have been provided with a cupola that appears to house a Mk19 40mm grenade launcher and a coaxial machine gun.

    Since the goal is to increase the firepower of the assault landing, I think that I would replace that cupola with the M168 gun from the M163 Vulcan Air Defense System.

    The M168 is the vehicle mounted version of the Vulcan 20mm rotary cannon that has been used in aircraft for years.
    That weapon would give serious firepower to the assault troops. The trade off in weight of shell would be offset by the enormous volume of fire.

    A concern would be quickly using up the supply of ammo, but the AAV is a large vehicle and I'm sure it could accommodate increased ammunition storage for the primary weapon.

    I would have as a secondary weapon a mix of .50 cal machine guns and Mk19 grenade launchers on a pintle mount.

    To support the initial assault I would prioritize getting some kind of armor ashore as quickly as possible in some kid of LCAC type of landing craft.

    I don't feel that the Marines' LAV-25's have enough firepower to provide the punch that they need. The Army has experimented with a 105mm cannon on a Stryker vehicle. The Stryker is similar to the LAV, but larger. Even with that added size the Stryker is swamped by the 105mm gun so I don't think it would be an LAV option.

    Getting Abrams tanks on shore would be a priority but I don't think I'd want to risk them that early in the assault.

    An option could be a light tank, of which neither the Marines nor Army currently utilize.
    There are about 47 bazillion options out there of light tanks being developed by other countries and their defense industries so one could be adopted by the Marines if they found an option they liked.

    The point is to always have more firepower at the point of attack than the other guy.

    The vulcan guns on the AAV's and getting 105mm direct fire guns onshore as quickly as possible would be helpful in achieving local fire superiority until the Marines can get their (future) Abrams tanks into the fight.

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    1. The Vulcan is both overkill and underkill. Nothing on land needs to be serviced with the tremendous ROF of the Vulcan, and 20mm isn't really cutting it anymore - if you look at everyone's new IFV designs, they're going to 30mm or 40mm. The only new design with a 25mm gun is Singapore's Hunter NGAFV, and that's mainly because they want to maintain ammunition commonality with their existing stockpile of 25mmm that they use in the Bionix IFV. The problem with running a Vulcan is also in the ammmo carrying and reload - the more rounds you carry, the less room you have in the troop compartmment, and you can't exactly quickly reload a vulcan drum.

      Meanwhile, the 25mm Bushmaster and the 30mm Bushmaster II, being chainguns, are loaded by belts in ammo cans. It's a much faster reload, with more powerful ammmunition.

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    2. "I would start by assuming that the Marines would not be fighting a tank battle as they land on the beach. If that were the scenario, I think you have to chalk that landing up as a loss."

      First, let me say that you offered a very good overall comment! Now, to specifics …

      You're quite right about it being very unlikely to encounter enemy tanks on the beach. For starters, such tanks would be more or less exposed and vulnerable to whatever naval gunfire or aviation support we could muster so no enemy commander would expose them that way. Tanks would likely be kept as a mobile reserve/counterattack force as the Germans attempted to do at Normandy.

      "With that assumption, I would think that the Marines could continue to use their current AAV."

      I think you may be wrong about this. While there likely wouldn't be tanks at the beach, a defended beach would certainly have fortifications (bunkers, 'pillboxes', tank/vehicle traps, obstacles, etc.), infantry strongholds, etc. which would require significantly more firepower than small caliber machine guns. This is what the Marines found in their early Pacific landings. They found a need for firepower to overcome these kinds of fortifications, obstacles, and strongpoints.

      "A concern would be quickly using up the supply of ammo, but the AAV is a large vehicle and I'm sure it could accommodate increased ammunition storage for the primary weapon."

      It sounds like you're describing a specialized 'weapons AAV', a sort of land 'gunship'. If so, that's a good idea! Toss a little extra frontal armor on and you've got something useful. Good thought!

      "prioritize getting some kind of armor ashore as quickly as possible in some kid of LCAC type of landing craft."

      This is the sticking point, isn't it? The LCAC, itself, is rated by the Navy/Marines as non-survivable in a contested landing. So, what LCAC-type landing craft do you see? A new design, maybe? It's easy to say, let's get armor ashore but it's not so easy to actually pick a means to do so! So, what are you thinking, here? Where/how do we find this suitable landing craft?

      "Getting Abrams tanks on shore would be a priority but I don't think I'd want to risk them that early in the assault."

      This borders on a pet peeve of mine - risk! Both the military and civilian observers have become so risk averse that we refuse to use equipment for the very tasks they were designed for! An Abrams tanks is MOST USEFUL at the start of an assault. Of course we'll lose a lot of them! That's what war is but we'll gain the objective. I'm not advocating attrition style warfare but we have to recognize that attrition IS part of war and a certain amount is not only inevitable but acceptable. If we've built our equipment too expensive to risk then we've gone down the wrong design path. If tanks can help in the initial assault then get 'em in there and accept the losses! If we can't accept the losses then we developed the wrong equipment.

      "The point is to always have more firepower at the point of attack than the other guy."

      You go it! If you could sum up all military thought into one sentence, that would be it. Unfortunately, far too many people, military professionals included, don't grasp that simple concept. You have my vote for supreme military commander!

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    3. "Nothing on land needs to be serviced with the tremendous ROF of the Vulcan"

      Fortifications? Gun emplacements? Troop concentrations? Buildings? IFVs? APCs? 'Jeeps'? Artillery? The potential target list is endless!

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    4. "Fortifications? Gun emplacements? Troop concentrations? Buildings? IFVs? APCs? 'Jeeps'? Artillery? The potential target list is endless!"

      @ComNavOps: You misunderstand my point, which is that the tremendous rate of fire of the M61 is overkill on the targets you'd service with autocannon. You don't need the massive 40-round burst of a 6-barreled Vulcan when 5-round burst from a single-barreled autocannon is good enough, and if it doesn't die to that 5-round burst, you either continue firing until it does, or you're shooting at something that needs servicing with ATGM or calling in an assault gun (bunker) or your own tanks (enemy tanks).


      To elaborate further, recall that the M61 is a fighter gun, and the fighter is making a quick pass with extremely short time on target - therefore, to increase the probability of a hit, you've got a high rate of fire - 6000 rounds per minute - to dump as many rounds as possible on the target.

      In contrast, if you're a ground vehicle engaging those sorts of targets, you don't need that extremely high ROF because 1) your window of engagemment is longer vs a fighter making a gun run, 2) you need to preserve your ammo more because it takes longer for you to drive to a field rearmament point vs an aircraft flying back to an airbase/carrier, 3) autocannon rounds on soft targets are devastating enough that the high burst of a Vulcan wastes ammo on killed targets. Singapore Army Bionix doctrine is for the gunner to engage targets with 5-round bursts in order to limit overkilling, because most of your target list above, particularly trucks and other softskin vics that make up the enemy's logistics train, are going to be dead as soon as they eat 25mm DU. (Source is another Singaporean friend, who was a Bionix driver when he was in.)

      Even with a burst controller, if you're doing 40-round bursts on a jeep, that's pretty overkill; the jeep's dead with the first few rounds, the rest of those 40 rounds are just wastefully striking a killed target. 2-round and 3-round burst controllers are a thing, but then if you were gonna do that, then that negates the whole point of carrying 6 barrels of rotary cannon, and you might as well go back to a single barrel gun. The M61 has been around since before Vietnam - if it was really useful for ground combat, surely it'd have seen more applications than just the Vulcan Air Defense System, which was an M113 APC carrying an M61 for use as a short range AA gun. (In some ways, a precursor of sorts to C-RAM...)

      The other reason the relatively lower rate of fire isn't much of a drawback is doctrinal. IFV autocannons are used in the same was as infantry MGs; regardless of whether it's a 5.56mmm LMG, a 7.62mm GPMG or a 12.7mm HMG, the usage is all the same: the gunner fires a short burst, pauses to let the barrel cool, and resumes engaging the target, until the spotter/vehicle commander calls a new target, which the gunner then lays the gun onto, and resumes the cycle once again (i.e. Burst, pause, burst, pause, burst, pause, lay gun to new target, burst, pause, etc etc). Outside of final protective fires*, machineguns and autocannons aren't supposed to be magdumping at the enemy. And well, there's the ATGMs - the American way is to just fire TOW at any strongpointed buildings where the defenders are proving too hard to suppress, or otherwise call in an assault gun or an MBT to fire 120mm HE into the bunker. The Russian way, with the BMP-3M and the BMD-4, is to have a combo 30mm/100mmm turret, so that the IFVs have some heavier HE firepower of their own (and the 100mm gun can also fire GLATGM in case of enemmy tank).


      *Trivia note: CIWS and C-RAM's engagement profiles (both of which use the M61 as their gun) are basically analogous to final protective fires.

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    5. @ Wild Goose:
      Your point about the Vulcan reload is valid, but the other points are not so obvious as you seem to think.
      As an army guy, maybe I don't understand the usage of the AAV.
      It appears to me to be a way to get Marines onto the beach, protected from small arms and shrapnel, and then seize the immediate beachhead.

      The current version lacks firepower to achieve fire superiority on the beach. The Vulcan gun provides that, but it's not supposed to be ripping off 500 round bursts. It fires bursts of 10, 30, 60, or 100 rounds.
      The purpose is to suppress enemy positions, and it would do that very well.

      In regards to the size of the round, ask yourself why armies are upsizing?

      Bunkers aren't getting bigger, sandbags aren't getting thicker...it's armor on vehicles that is increasing.

      The AAV doesn't seem to be well-suited to fighting enemy armor and it also doesn't have the characteristics to be used as an infantry fighting vehicle.
      So why does it need a heavier round to assault and secure a beach?

      It needs to get ashore and suppress and destroy enemy gun emplacements, fighting positions, and infantry. The 20mm round is sufficient to engage light vehicles.

      If the AAV needs to engage heavier armor it's going to get shot to pieces anyway, regardless of the size of it's own rounds.

      If the AAV is expected to function as an IFV, then a completely new vehicle appears to be needed.

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    6. " the tremendous rate of fire of the M61 is overkill"

      To the guy on the ground, there's no such thing as overkill! Various 'gatling guns' have been mounted on several helos and aircraft whose ONLY targets are ground targets. They seem to find a high rate of fire quite useful and effective!

      The ability to lay down high volume, high rate of fire suppressive fire is immensely valuable.

      The ability to apply high rates of fire to some resistant targets is immensely useful.

      The concept of a dedicated gatling gun AAV is intriguing and I would venture to say that every Marine in an assualt would love to have such a weapon vehicle backing them up since we have no other comparable weapon that can be landed in the initial assault wave.

      Your vision of parsimonious use of ammo is wonderful … in peacetime. In actual combat, accuracy drops to near zero and volume of fire becomes paramount. Look at the history of ammo usage in combat. It always exceeds pre-war estimates by an order of magnitude, at least.

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    7. You should be able to put an autocannon on an AAV but not in the cupola. The gunner can barely fit in because the .50's handles are literally inches from his chest.

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    8. @That army guy


      I'm guessing you're not a mech inf guy?


      "As an army guy, maybe I don't understand the usage of the AAV."

      It's a battle taxi. It's basically filling the same role as the M113 did for the Army, back in vietnam. That's basically the role, as I see it. It was never intended to achieve fire superiority, it was never intended to clear the beach - I think the USMC always assumed either the Navy's fighters or the LHD's Cobras would do that, which I think might be a tad optimistic.


      "The current version lacks firepower to achieve fire superiority on the beach. The Vulcan gun provides that, but it's not supposed to be ripping off 500 round bursts. It fires bursts of 10, 30, 60, or 100 rounds.
      The purpose is to suppress enemy positions, and it would do that very well."

      "It needs to get ashore and suppress and destroy enemy gun emplacements, fighting positions, and infantry. The 20mm round is sufficient to engage light vehicles."

      Sure but then you gotta ask yourself, how much ammo are you carrying? Assuming similar ammo load to the Bradley M3, 1500 rounds (which is achieved by not carrying any troops) that gives you 25 60-round bursts, 15x 100-round bursts. And if you're doing a 10 round burst, you don't need really need a gatling for that, do you? A single-barrel gun could do that just as well, allowing you to save on weight.


      "In regards to the size of the round, ask yourself why armies are upsizing?

      Bunkers aren't getting bigger, sandbags aren't getting thicker...it's armor on vehicles that is increasing.

      The AAV doesn't seem to be well-suited to fighting enemy armor and it also doesn't have the characteristics to be used as an infantry fighting vehicle.
      So why does it need a heavier round to assault and secure a beach?"

      I mean, sandbags _can_ get thicker, it's called putting extra layers? But the reason to go to 30mm is twofold, IMO: one is, as you said, better effectiveness against IFVs and APCs, many of which have addon armor kits for greater protection, or are already being designed to be protected against 20mm - 30mm. The other thing is because the larger 30mm HE round has more explosive filler than the 20mm HE, which means greater effectiveness on softskin vics, on suppressing infantry, and that's before we get into fun stuff like the HE-frag rounds the Russians have (the russians love their HE-frag...)

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    9. This isn't mech infantry, this is a beach assault. (And I was a cavalryman, which incidentally included graduating from the SPLC at Fort Knox.)

      The AAV needs armament to secure the beach along with, IMO, a 105mm armed light tank. Other vehicles like Abrams tanks and actual IFV's (the LAV-25 is the Marines' choice) are what they need to carry the fight beyond the beaches.

      The Vulcan gun is an unconventional idea I thought of as a way to address the firepower problem.

      There are pros and cons for choice of weaponry, but your arguments are just inside-the-box, mechanized infantry thinking.

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    10. @ComNavOps:

      ""To the guy on the ground, there's no such thing as overkill! Various 'gatling guns' have been mounted on several helos and aircraft whose ONLY targets are ground targets. They seem to find a high rate of fire quite useful and effective!"

      As I said earlier, it's because aircraft have a shorter window of engagement on a target. An A-10 flying at 300 knots is going to overfly his target in seconds. A stationary IFV has an exponentially longer engagement window. Also, if you look at helicopter gunships, the trend in dedicated modern gunships has moved away from gatling guns towards single-barrel autocannons - only the Cobra still uses a 3-barrel 20mm gatling, and even then it still fires in short bursts.


      "The ability to lay down high volume, high rate of fire suppressive fire is immensely valuable.

      "The ability to apply high rates of fire to some resistant targets is immensely useful."

      "Your vision of parsimonious use of ammo is wonderful … in peacetime. In actual combat, accuracy drops to near zero and volume of fire becomes paramount. Look at the history of ammo usage in combat. It always exceeds pre-war estimates by an order of magnitude, at least."


      As the Eagle Went Over the Mountain noted, the enemy is not suppressed by noise, he's suppressed by accurate fire coming his way, forcing him down. You can suppress a guy just as well with 5-well placed high explosive rounds vs 50 smaller rounds. Also, I mean. The Bushmaster II 30mm does 100 rounds per minute, the Bushmaster 25mm does 200 rp. That's not exactly a slow rate of fire. (And then we've got the Russian 2A42, their standard 30mm gun, which does 200-300 rpm low and 550 rpm in high...) And c'mon. I said above: you fire short bursts, repeatedly.

      You're misunderstanding me again. I'm not talking about saving budget by saving ammo, I'm talking about the very real problem that in combat, if you're not careful with your ammo usage, you're going to run dry before you can get to your next resupply. Remember, you've got to _drive_ on land, through terrain that's been chewed up by fighting, and you can't take a direct route back.* Consider the Abrams - it carries some 10,000 rounds of 7.62mm, Abrams running dry on GPMG ammo was no unheard of in Iraq, because of the amount of fighting going on.

      VOlume of fire is one thing, but with autocannons you can get by with less volume of fire because your rounds are bigger than 20mm, and so you can do things with them, like HE-frag rounds:

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UolMYY7QaA (note that the rate of fire isn't exactly slow by any means)

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOBTaA_QCg8 (skip to 1:37 for BMPT firing 30mm AP and 30mm HE)

      (mind you the BMPT has its tremendous rate of fire because it's got two guns that fire alternatingly)


      I'd argue that if you really wanted to dump a lot of rounds on target, rather than a 20mm gatling you might want to make like the BMPT or the T-15 and carry two 30mm guns instead. *shrug* That makes somewhat more sense, but you're still not going to be dumping long sustained bursts into a building.




      *Side note: This is why there's a fair amount of skepticism among the SAF's mech infantry people on the Hunter NGAFV - it's only got the 250 rounds of ready ammo for the 25mm and that's IT, no spare ammo carried onboard, and the expectation is that it will always be able to meet up with ammo resupply units in the field. My Bionix buddy opined that Hunter crews were going to immediately start looking for unoffical ways of carrying more ammo, because "holy fuck walau eh 250 rounds only sia, MINDEF siao isit?"

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    11. @that army guy:

      "The AAV needs armament to secure the beach along with, IMO, a 105mm armed light tank. Other vehicles like Abrams tanks and actual IFV's (the LAV-25 is the Marines' choice) are what they need to carry the fight beyond the beaches.

      "The Vulcan gun is an unconventional idea I thought of as a way to address the firepower problem."

      "There are pros and cons for choice of weaponry, but your arguments are just inside-the-box, mechanized infantry thinking."


      I mean, don't get me wrong, I like the Vulcan - I just don't think 20mm'll cut it anymore, and I think the high burst rate is too much solution to the problem. If you really need the faster ROF though, like I said to ComNavOps, maybe make like the russians and put two 30mm guns in the turret. But I mean,. that's why there's talk of a 105mm assault gun, no? If 30mm won't suppress that fortification, then it's not gonna matter whether you put 5 rounds in it or 50 - call in your assault gun, feed it 105mm HE, and be done with it! Which, implicitly, seemms to be the thinking behind having the PLAN Marines having ZBD and the ZTD: an IFV supported by an assault gun.

      I actually agree that a 105mmm assault gun could be useful in the beach assault role, a few people were discussing the idea of the USMC getting Centauro 105 as an off the shell assault gun to quickly get in service, in the comments to this blogpost from last year ( https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/10/marines-and-armor.html ).

      The elephant in the room problem is that the Marines have only so much space inside the LPD and LHD, and only so many landing craft, and that imposes hard limits on what they can bring to the fight (and that's before we get into the unsurvivability of LCAC...)

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    12. Question for you:

      Do you see the AAV fighting inland as an IFV?

      That seems to be what you're talking about.

      I don't see that.

      I see the AAV simply achieving the beach and unloading its load of infantry, and suppressing the immediate threats to support them as they move forward initially.

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    13. "suppressed by accurate fire"

      You just made my argument! In real combat, accuracy is very poor. What makes up for lack of accuracy is volume of fire. With enough rounds of poorly accurate fire, some are, statistically, certain to be on target. Firing just a couple of rounds of some larger, single barrel gun means that, likely, none will be on target. This is exactly why machine guns are so potent - individual round accuracy is terrible but the volume of fire ensures that enough will hit the target to be effective.

      You seem to have some unrealistic expectation that a vehicle in combat will sit, motionless, firing carefully aimed, single shots. That's ridiculous! A vehicle that is not moving is dead. Vehicles will be constantly moving and firing on the run. Accuracy will suffer. Throw in countermeasures, adrenaline, panic, and other factors and accuracy will suffer even more. Volume of fire is the cure!

      To return to the premise, a gatling gun equipped AAV would have its entire internal volume devoted to ammo storage and would be a great aid in overcoming fortifications and strongpoints on the beach. It is NOT tasked with anti-armor combat.

      "Assuming similar ammo load to the Bradley M3, 1500 rounds"

      Poor assumption. The Vulcan uses smaller 20 mm rounds so can store more in the same space. Also, the M3 internal volume is consumed by additional TOW rounds, scout sensors and computers, plus a crew of 3+2. In contrast, a stripped down, dedicated gatling gun AAV ought to be able to store multiple thousands of rounds of 20 mm. Again, a very effective suppressive fire platform which would be quite useful in clearing a beach!

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    14. @that army guy:

      "I see the AAV simply achieving the beach and unloading its load of infantry, and suppressing the immediate threats to support them as they move forward initially."

      I mean, that's basically the IFV mission, isn't it? It's just that we're keeping this notional AAV variant wholly focused on the beach.

      I'm just not convinced that the M61 Vulcan is the right weapon for the job. If you're only expecting the defenses to be sandbagged bunkers and infantry trenches, do you really need a Vulcan? A .50 cal Ma Deuce and a 40mm Mk19 might be mech infantry orthodoxy, but it works well enough on crunchies - .50cal to keep their heads down, 40mm to indirect fire them from behind their sandbags or inside their trenches. To me, if you're going to go to an autocannon, then you might as well up it to a larger caliber that gives you more options. Believe in the power of fused 30mm HEI-frag! XP

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    15. @ComNavOps:


      "With enough rounds of poorly accurate fire, some are, statistically, certain to be on target. Firing just a couple of rounds of some larger, single barrel gun means that, likely, none will be on target. This is exactly why machine guns are so potent - individual round accuracy is terrible but the volume of fire ensures that enough will hit the target to be effective."

      Sure, but that doesn't mean a gunner, whether he be infantry or vehicle-mounted, fires off a whole 100-round belt from the GPMG. He fires multiple bursts in sucession. Remember, you don't just have to manage your ammo, but also your barrel heat.

      Anyway looking over the rest of your comments, it sounds a lot like what you're wanting is basically an American, swimming take on the Russian BMPT, a video link of I repost here:

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOBTaA_QCg8

      The CONOPS for the BMPT is that it's meant to escort tanks in urban environs and defeat bunkered infantry and strongpoints - sounds a lot similar to what you're wanting, doesn't it? Anyway the key point is about 1:37 of the link, where the BMPT does a bit of live fire with AP and HEI-frag. This is why I argue that if you're going to make a Autocannon Beach Assault Vehicle (ABAV), I'd spec it like the BMPT: double 30mm autocannon in the turret, loaded with HEI frag. At the low rate of fire, the BMPT's guns do 300 rpm, at the high ROF they do 500-800 rpm. That's faster than .50 cal HMG, and on par with full auto assault rifles and 7.62mm GPMG, and 30mm HEI-frag is a helluva lot more power than 7.62mm ball. I repost the vid links again:

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UolMYY7QaA (American 30mm HEI-frag with smart fuse for airbursting fun)

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOBTaA_QCg8 (skip to 1:37, Russian 30mm HEI-frag with impact nose fuse)

      Add a coax GPMG or two to the turret (because why not, a GPMG is always useful), maybe give it a pintle mount for a 40mm AGL if you want a little more indirect fire options. Then it's just a matter of mating the turret to a hull that swims fast enough and bob's your uncle.

      Delete
  6. When you have an amphibious tank moving through water, then the wave induced movement of the vehicle can make if very difficult, or downright impossible, to use the main gun to fire anti-tank APFS rounds with any meaningful precision, even with the best gun stabilization in place.

    One interesting feature of the guided anti-tank missile used by the Type 05 tank is that its in-flight guidance is practically independent from the tank's movement, so you can fire it from water with almost the same precision as when fired on ground.

    I am not aware of any other amphibious tank in service today which could fire anti-tank guided missiles while still in the water.

    It means that the Type 05 tank is probably the only vehicle in service today which can engage enemy armor in any meaningful way before reaching the landing site.

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    1. Way I see it, to effectively employ the laser-guided GLATGM, you're going to need an offboard sensor to paint the target. The simplest way of achieving this would be to have special forces hit the landing point, marking defender bunkers and painting them for the ZTDs on the way in.

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    2. "It means that the Type 05 tank is probably the only vehicle in service today which can engage enemy armor in any meaningful way before reaching the landing site."

      I think it would be very unlikely that an enemy would have its armor 'visible' to amphibious tanks in the sea. They would be exposed and subject to whatever naval gunfire and air support we could muster. Enemy armor would be reserved for mobile defense and counterattacks. So, I don't think the ability to fire precision rounds or anti-tank missiles while swimming in to the beach is an issue. What the amphibious tank can accomplish by firing its gun from the sea is simple suppressive fire.

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    3. "The simplest way of achieving this would be to have special forces hit the landing point, marking defender bunkers and painting them for the ZTDs on the way in."

      We'll have to remember to send a thank you note to the enemy for allowing these magical special forces to land, unhindered, and find and designate all the enemy bunkers, again unhindered. Seems odd that a heavily defended beach would allow these ghosts to do that but, hey, that's modern military thinking - everything we do will work and the enemy won't attempt to interfere, at all!

      Back to reality ...

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    4. Historically, Navy Combat Demolition Units (NDCU) conducted reconnaissance of the landing sites at Normandy in the weeks leading up to the invasion. And, were among the first troops ashore to eliminate obstacles. Later organized into Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT), they participated in many amphibious landings in the Pacific.

      How well that can be done today, I don't know.

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    5. "How well that can be done today, I don't know."

      With proximity sensors, night vision, IR scanners, radar, etc., I'm guessing not well!

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    6. "We'll have to remember to send a thank you note to the enemy for allowing these magical special forces to land, unhindered, and find and designate all the enemy bunkers, again unhindered. Seems odd that a heavily defended beach would allow these ghosts to do that but, hey, that's modern military thinking - everything we do will work and the enemy won't attempt to interfere, at all!"

      "With proximity sensors, night vision, IR scanners, radar, etc., I'm guessing not well!"


      Well, this is part of why I say China's amphibious force is aimed at punching down at nations weaker than it is, like Africa and other Third World nations. Chinese naval divers are going to have a much easier time hitting the beaches of nations who can't afford to have all those toys above. :p

      But all that being said, there are ways for infantry to hide from the sensors you mentioned above. And a man with a laser designator is pretty damn low signature on the modern battlefield, especially when all he's doing is shining a laser at a target - and laser warning systems haven't exactly heavily proliferated throughout the world.

      That said, another option, which I think is just as likely (if not more), is China will fly drones over the landing zone and use them to designate the targets. Undoubtedly the UAVs will take losses, but if the objective is something China wants bad enough, it'll accept those lost UAVs as the cost of doing business.

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    7. "Chinese naval divers are going to have a much easier time hitting the beaches of nations who can't afford to have all those toys above."

      What country can't afford those kinds of simple 'toys'?

      "there are ways for infantry to hide from the sensors you mentioned above."

      You've been watching Mission Impossible movies.

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    8. "What country can't afford those kinds of simple 'toys'? "

      Again, I point to Africa and the Third World, and even SEA. These nations aren't like the US, where every man has nightvision and every squad has a 12x thermal sight, because they're carrying the Javelin CLU and a couple of tubes.

      The issue is that these countries can't afford enough of these so-called simple toys to adequetely protect their beaches. Outside of singapore, I'm pretty sure none of the ASEAN countries can do that - I know Malaysia sure as hell can't. See below! (I used to live in Lahad Datu, incidentally.)

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Lahad_Datu_standoff


      "You've been watching Mission Impossible movies."


      Nah, just talking to my singapore buddies and listening to the shenanigans they got up to during reservist. It basically boils down to breaking line of sight, additionally camoing yourself with foliage (Singapore's pretty big on that), digging 1 man shellscrapes to get down in the ground, wearing fatigues that are non-IR reflective - and, most importantly, going up against people who are not on the ball.

      Which again comes back to what I was saying about the PLAN MC being meant for punching down at China's vassals or Africa.

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    9. To be fair, a lot of what my buddies was talking about is more SEA-specific, because here in SEA there's a lot of beach that feeds into jungle, and jungle fighting is a very big thing here. The dense foliage and wildlife of the jungle does a lot to limit the effectiveness of sensors.

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  7. It seems to me that the primary problem is the current CONOPS that has big, expensive LHA/LHDs and LPDs standing 25-50 miles offshore and launching the assault from there. The only viable ship-to-shore connectors from that range are helos (the V-22 is as much helo as it is viable).

    The Chinese amphibious vehicles appear to be a robust and comprehensive set, clearly worth copying as you suggest. But none of them are going to be of any use swimming in from 25-50 miles offshore.

    So it seems to me that step one is committing to an old-fashioned amphib squadron of smaller and cheaper and more varied ships--a smaller LPA/LPD like the Spanish/Australian Juan Carlos/Canberra, an LPH like the French Mistral, a cheaper LPD/LSD like the Royal Navy Albion, an LST with a real LST bow (which limits you to 18 knots, but the difference between 18 or 20 is not as great as the difference between having something useful when you get there or not), and your LPA or an LPA/LKA hybrid with lots of troops, some heavy cargo, and big boats to haul them.

    Step two is committing to risk bringing these smaller and cheaper and more versatile units in close enough to the shore to mount a useful assault. That requires supporting them with substantially more gunfire than the Navy can currently muster, which is why I support a return of the battleships with 16-inc guns, and multi-purpose cruiser with 8-inch guns, and a smaller and cheaper shore attack frigate that can come in close and bring at least 5 inch guns and surface-to-surface missiles to bear.

    Step three is development and employment of precisely the kinds of vehicles that China now has. Of course, when it comes to military procurement, an elephant is a mouse designed by committee, and that's the last thing we need. We could probably do a reasonable job by simply reverse engineering what China has, as best we can from pictures and available data. Get something done and get it to the fleet.

    Another vehicle I would look at is the French EDA-R/L-CAT family, which can operate from LHA/LHDs or the Mistrals or LPD/LSDs.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "the current CONOPS that has big, expensive LHA/LHDs and LPDs standing 25-50 miles offshore and launching the assault from there. …

      The Chinese amphibious vehicles appear to be a robust and comprehensive set, clearly worth copying as you suggest. But none of them are going to be of any use swimming in from 25-50 miles offshore."

      You've hit the heart of the matter. As best I can tell, the Chinese have no intention of standing off 25-50+ miles to start an amphibious assault. All their exercises show their amphib ships standing well inside the horizon so that their amphibious tanks and IFVs can make the resulting short swim. Of course, to be fair, our few, meager amphib exercises also have the host ship very close to shore which raises the question, why are we practicing something that doesn't match our doctrine? But, I digress …

      As you say, we need to bring the assault point in closer and bring back heavy naval gun support.

      Good comment!

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  8. "why are we practicing something that doesn't match our doctrine?"

    Maybe because we know our doctrine won't work?

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  9. You can realistically get 25 knots or better out of a light tank as discussed. The add-ons to achieve more planing hull surface area will really help a lot.

    In a reasonable sea state you could probably hang offshore just beyond the visual horizon and still have less than a one hour trip ashore. I get the impression the Chinese tank and AAV will both tolerate around a sea state 4-5 or so, but I would expect a more comfortable ride for the occupants from the Chinese Type-05.

    BTW, I've seen differing numbers in speed in the water for the Type-05. I expect with a planing hull shape 15 knots is way too slow, and the numbers north of 25 knots are probably more accurate. I also have questions about how its powered. A diesel powering two water jets with a variable rating of 1475/550 hp feels unlikely. More likely would be two small turbines for the water-jets and a diesel driving the tracks??

    There is going to be a hard stop on how much weight you can carry. Packing this thing full of ammo is just going to make it sink. Meta-center is going to be important in any amphib so how much weight you put up high in the hull counts. Your fuel load is going to be as big a factor as your ammo load while you're in the water. The fuel burn is going to be horrendous until you've landed. So logistics are going to be critical, and probably very early in the landing before things are organized.

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  10. Re: Fuel consumption. A decent turbine in the 750 HP class is going to burn something like 0.6 lb/hp/hr, so 1500 HP will cost you around 115 gal/hour in the water.

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  11. As you've written many times here before: CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS. In what sorts of engagements would we be using these new landing craft? What are the capabilities of our likely adversaries? How close to the shore do we anticipate being able to disembark?

    These vehicles seem unambiguously better than AAVs, but they don't seem *better enough* to make an opposed landing against a capable adversary plausible. They still require disembarking too close to shore, they still require relatively specific terrain to land on, and they still don't have sufficient armor to be survivable against modern anti-vehicle weaponry that would be deployed by any near-peer military.

    Given all of the above - what additional capability would the Navy & Marine Corps gain by procuring vehicles like this?

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    1. "These vehicles seem unambiguously better than AAVs, but they don't seem *better enough* to make an opposed landing against a capable adversary plausible."

      Spot on! Improved AAVs, alone, do not make an amphibious assault a viable proposition. We need large caliber naval gun fire and LOTS of it. We need completely revised doctrine. We need mobile, vehicle-mounted C-RAM and AAW in the initial assault wave. We need rapid combat mine clearance capability. And the list goes on.

      What you've stepped into, here, is the disconnect between reality and Marine Corps operational claims. They claim to be able to execute an opposed landing. I think there's no realistic need for such and I'm absolutely certain that we can't do it given our current capabilities. So, why do I even discuss things like amphibious tanks or improved AAVs when they can't make the overall amphibious assault viable? I do so because the Marines claim the capability. If they claim it, I'll discuss it - generally to point out the flaws and unrealistic nature of the claim. I'd prefer not to discuss it because I see no need and no capability but they make the claim so here we are …

      "what additional capability would the Navy & Marine Corps gain by procuring vehicles like this?"

      What do we gain by procuring the ACV, a slightly improved AAV? We gain an incremental capability that gains us nothing in the larger context of opposed assaults. Same with an improved AAV.

      There's nothing wrong with discussing incremental improvements while recognizing that they don't 'crack the code' on the overall assault deficiency.

      Did that make sense?

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    2. It makes sense, but an "amphibious IFV" program should probably be the last piece of that equation. The other elements you mention (naval guns, vehicle-mounted CIWS, better mine clearance capability, etc.) would all deliver incremental improvements to capability in many other contexts, even if we still don't have the full suite of capabilities we need for an opposed amphibious assault. By contrast, a fancy new swimming IFV delivers basically no value unless we already have all the other components for that assault.

      So I think we're in violent agreement here - unless the Marine Corps is planning to completely overhaul their amphibious assault doctrine (which they've shown no interest in doing), then buying these would be basically useless. They should really fix their doctrine, though!

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    3. "then buying these would be basically useless."

      You're not wrong!

      Delete
  12. I kinda think we are at the point where the marines need to decide if they want to be a Armored Land force or a Light Armored/Air Assault force.

    Seems like either we can afford to build a Marine corps with vessels and vehicles designed to take and hold shore installations and area's with a powerful but limited air corps.
    Or we can build what is in effect a small army that can operate out of boats BUT they can't safely get those boats ashore...

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