As you watch the video, note the total absence of anything
resembling realism. Note the troops lounging on the landing craft. Note the guys (beachmasters?) on the beach
waiting for landing craft and standing upright, out in the open. Note the troops slowly filing out of the
landing craft. Note the troops
meandering their way up the beach after they get out of the surf. Note the way all the troops and vehicles
congregate to a single point (does that seem like something you’d do in
combat?). Do you see any troops bent over, sprinting for cover?
As you watch, ask yourself, does this look even remotely
like a real amphibious assault?
Where’s the OpFor?
Where’s some smoke to add confusion?
Where’s the explosions (the Chinese do it)? Where’s the aerial support? Where’s the beach obstacles that any enemy
would surely place there?
What did this exercise practice? What combat scenario did this exercise
prepare these forces for?
I’m not picking on Australia. It just happened to be their video. The US does this, too. We’re kidding ourselves if we think we’re
getting anything out this kind of exercise.
What a waste.
Here's the link in case you can't see the video:
Australian Troops Conduct Beach Landing (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SheHMI0Cowo&t=388s)
Here's the link in case you can't see the video:
Australian Troops Conduct Beach Landing (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SheHMI0Cowo&t=388s)
Much as I hate to disagree, I'm going to say no, the US doesn't do this, too. I don't think we do anything even that close to realistic. Given our current theory of assaulting from a stand-off position 25-50 miles offshore, it not even sure how we could do a realistic training exercise.
ReplyDeletehttps://youtu.be/efydTlfjQgk
ReplyDeleteThere's an example of the combat training.
That example is slightly better but still far from realistic. Regardless, it's not Navy/Marine training which is our concern in this blog.
DeleteThere are marines in that video. And it's fairly realistic. Not sure how much more realiatic you want it to be? That's a lot like combat.
DeleteAgain, land combat is generally outside the scope of this blog. That said, a good exercise would have a robust OpFor with aerial support, obstacles and fortifications, simulated mines, electronic countermeasures, artillery support, and armor. The exercise, in general, should have as much confusion as possible inserted such as lost GPS, disrupted comms, intentional incorrect messages and reports, smoke, etc.
DeleteIf you want to see a much more realistic exercise, look photos of Chinese exercises.
Talisman Sabre has most of those things to varying degrees
DeleteWith respect, you're vastly overestimating the combat training that the Chinese army preforms.
DeleteTalisman Sabre has disrupted comms, jamming, smoke, confusion (there are no constraints on the tactical flexibility given to OPFOR, the assaulting troops are not told how OPFOR will respond) , significant OPFOR, lots of armoured vehicles, artillery exercise, live fire, simulated explosions and mines and has an entire fortified urban combat training facility the size of a small town.
As someone who filled the role of OPFOR we gave it to the lansing force - we had some extremely successful ambushes and counter attacks that stunted the entire MEU's advance.
We don't mess around.
Is it perfect? Could it be more realiatic? Sure.
But as far as training goes it's very close to actual combat.
Jon, I'll say it one last time, I'm concerned with the Navy and the Marines as regards amphibious assaults. Land combat is not my interest or concern. With that clearly stated, I'll repeat, the landing portion of the exercise was a joke. None of the realism you claim was present. Perhaps, after lunch and photo ops, the guys got together and had a good land combat training session. If so, I can find little evidence of it but I also don't care as it's out of my sphere of interest.
DeleteI'm documenting and illustrating the lack of realism in Navy/Marine amphibious assaults.
"As someone who filled the role of OPFOR we gave it to the lansing force - we had some extremely successful ambushes and counter attacks "
Really? So, as we would expect a peer enemy like China to do, you applied minefields, used combat engineering to create defenses, tank traps, and obstacles? You called in artillery barrages? You had massive close air support? You used drones for recon? You had massive armor support from tanks and IFVs? You likely had numerical superiority? You had heavy mortar support? You had simulated cruise and ballistic missile support? If you had all that then you did, indeed, have the basis for a realistic exercise.
However, I don't know but I strongly suspect that had almost none of that. I suspect you had a company or less of troops, no air support, no armor, no supporting fires - in short, nothing but a very few infantry. Your comment kind of says it - a few ambushes - not exactly a peer OpFor. It would be nice if you could tell me I'm wrong. Can you?
Really? So, as we would expect a peer enemy like China to do, you applied minefields? Yes, there were simulated minefields.
DeleteUsed combat engineering to create defenses, tank traps, and obstacles? Yes, absolutely, we had combat engineers create a variety of defensive positions, including tank traps, various obstacles, trenches, masked firing positions etc.
You called in artillery barrages? Yes, we simulated artillery support. Obviously we can't call in actual arty during a training exercise.
You had massive close air support? The landing force had established air superiority failry early on, though we were able to coordinate some limited (again obviously simulated) air support. The exercise starts with an air battle.
You used drones for recon? Of course we use drones for recon - we're a first world army.
You had massive armor support from tanks and IFVs? We had hundreds of armoured vehicles, including M1s, ASLAVS, M113s and Bushmaster PMVs.
You likely had numerical superiority? Numerically there was sometimes parity, sometime localised superiority and sometimes we were outnumbered - the exercise involves dozens of contacts and engagements, from large scale brigade sized manoeuvres right down to platoon level ambushes and contacts.
You had heavy mortar support? Mortar support is a massive part of our doctrine - yes we use mortars heavily, more heavily in my observation then the US guys did. It's a big part of our doctrine (which is different to US doctrine).
You had simulated cruise and ballistic missile support? Yes of course we did - it's an all arms exercise. It would make zero sense to have destroyers, cruisers, squadrons of F-18s and F-35s and not have simulated missile strikes.
We're professionals mate.
We don't operate in specific battalion or company elements for the most part. Australian Army doctrine emphasises tactical felxibility - we fgorm battle groups composed of composite elements.
The exercise involved an OPFOR of approx. brigade sized battle group. Elements of several battalions including armour (M1s), armoured cav (ASLAVS), Infantry (two RAR battalions were involved as well as a battalion of the Army Reserve), arty (battalion and brigade level), anti-air battalion elements, combat engineers, elements from 3 different aviation regiments flying Tiger attacks helicopters, Chinooks, Blackhawks, MH90s...
From memory we had most of the 3rd Brigade RAR, elements of 7th Brigade, 16th Aviation Brigade and 6th Combat Support Brigade. In fact we would have had well over a brigade sized force involved.
An ambush doesn't mean 10 guys hiding behind a bush mate - we hit them everything I've listed above.
ctd.
Part of the issue here is doctrinal though - We don't use US tactics. We focus on manoeuvre, ambush and surprise. We don't have the firepower of the US military and never will - we've never fought the way the US does.
DeleteYou guys have been proponents of overwhelming firepower for 70 years - it's so embedded in your doctrine I think sometimes you guys think it's not the only way to fight. It's not how most militaries fight or have fought historically.
If you look at WW2 as an example, the Wermacht never emphasised that - they emphasised strategic and tactical flexibility, the element of surprise, the ability to manoeuvre, the ability to sow confusion amongst your enemy.
We mirror that approach to warfare more than the US doctrine of established localised superiority and then bringing overwhelming firepower to bare.
It's horses for courses. Your doctrine is an indulgence we could never afford. You guys fight what the Germans called a rich man's war.
And fair enough, it works most of the time. But it's not the only successful approach to combat.
To your point about the amphibious landing - you have some rightful critique - part of the issue is where we conduct the exercise and consequent government interference. This year was probably the tamest version of the amphib landing - no smoke, no live fire, no explosions, no underwater demo, no obstacles.
I take that criticism on the chin - we've been a little bit hamstrung by local politics - the locals don't like us blowing up their little slice of paradise. We do the best we can.
Would love to expand on that in another way though - there's an element of doctrine here too, and it has significant historical precedent.
As OPFOR we actually don't want to confront the US on the point of landing. Just as the Japanese altered their tactics during the Pacific War, our doctrine doesn't emphasise meeting the landing on the sand.
In fact most amphibious landing in WW2 (with obvious exceptions like Tarawa) were not met on the sand. The defences are deeper. Draw the assaulting force off the beach and ambush them in better terrain outside direct gunnery range or at least further away from it. Draw out their supply line. Force them to manoeuvre into appropriate defensive terrain by channeling their advance with flanking attacks.
That's the approach we usually take. It's also a more common approach historically, then the Tarawa tactic of pouring everything onto the beachhead and trying to crush the landing in the first couple hours.
Happy to have a further discussion about countering amphibious landings if you have the time. It's not all like Dog Green at Omaha - in fact I'd argue that's less common than most amphib landings. Even at D-Day, most parts of the beaches landing met quite light opposition. The real heavy fighting occurred inland, where the Panzer divisions lurked.
I'm totally unfamiliar with Australian training so I'll take your word for what you describe. I will also note that level of training far surpasses anything I've heard about. It also does nothing to address the point about UNITED STATES Navy and Marine training which doesn't even remotely approach that level. We don't assemble that type of Blue force in an exercise let alone the OpFor. So, my hat's off to Australia but it's irrelevant as regards US training.
Delete"Happy to have a further discussion about countering amphibious landings if you have the time."
The Japanese initially attempted to defend islands at the shore but, as the US developed their amphib assault doctrine, specifically, the use of massive pre-assault bombardment, they quickly learned that they couldn't survive that kind of firepower if they stayed at the beach. They learned to move inland, to hide, and to wait. Thus, their latter defense philosophy wasn't a preferred choice, it was a necessity forced on them by the success of the US doctrine.
Normandy was a fascinating study in confusion on the part of the defenders. The German command was fragmented with Rommel wanting to defend at the beach and (I forget his name) wanting to defend inland. The result was a mixed response and a compromise in many ways. The German tank units were held in rear positions for a counterattack but that never materialized in any effective way.
Thus, the historical trend that you cite, of defending inland, has typically not been due to a preferred defensive philosophy as much as a necessity brought about by inadequate resources or capabilities. A good historical example of defending at the beach is Normandy-Omaha. The defense was overcome only due to pure, overwhelming numbers that the US poured into the fight. The defense was actually quite effective. Ditto Tarawa. If Australia's philosophy is to defend inland as the PREFERRED doctrine then that is different from much of history in that it's a freely chosen approach versus a forced option. Though, even at that, from what you say, it seems that the Australian approach is somewhat determined less by choice and more by recognition of a lack of assets. Nothing wrong with that - you fight the way you can best utilize your available assets.
My point is that the inland defense is not necessarily an inherently superior approach, as you seem to be suggesting, but more of a resource limitation reality.
The larger issue in countering amphibious assaults is that it's easier to counter the assault BEFORE IT STARTS - sink the sea base ships, sink the very few amphib ships, and the assault never starts. The place to defend is 100+ miles out at sea!
Inland defence is driven by necessity. For us as OPFOR during Talisman Sabre, for the Germans at Anzio, for the Japanese throughout the second half of the Pacific war etc.
DeleteThe reality is that if you expend all your forces engaging the enemy at the point of landing and fail, you've blown your bolt. It's also almost impossible to determine where to dispose your forces.
To your larger point, I cannot think, off the top of my head, of a modern amphibious assault that was successfully stymied offshore through naval or air assault. That isn't to see it hasn't been tried - the Phillipines campaign (Savao Strait), Guadalacanal, even the Falklands are all examples of attempts, some closer to success than others.
If you go back far enough, I guess you could point at the Spanish Armada.
Ultimately though, most (the vast majority) of amphib landings are only attempted when local naval and air superiority is likely, if not guaranteed.
Certainly D-Day would never have occurred if the naval approaches and airspace above the landings were anticipated to be heavily contested.
Throughout most of history a fleet in being has been more than sufficient to dissuade even the attempt of a serious amphibious assault.
Napoleon never tried to invade the UK for the same reason that Hitler didn't - couldn't risk it with the Royal Navy around.
To examine the exceptions - even the most contested amphib operation of the Pacific War (Guadalcanal), was predicated on the US belief that even if the Japanese military launched everything at them, they would overwhelm the Japanese based on massive superiority in men, ships and aircraft and the ability to replace and repair damaged ships and equipment. Incidentally, even at Guadalcanal the landings were completely unopposed.
Which brings me to one other point - most amphibious operations are intended to, and often successfully achieve local tactical surprise.
As a defender it's almost impossible to determine the point of attack of an amphib operation. There's usually too many beaches to defend and not enough troops.
This is a big part of defence in depth considerations, holding back a mobile reserve and responding to the aggressor with manoeuvre warfare rather than lining up everything you have at every landing point you can think of.
It's the reality when you put yourselves in the position of defender.
"The reality is that if you expend all your forces engaging the enemy at the point of landing and fail, you've blown your bolt."
DeleteDoes it really matter where you lose? If you lose inland versus at the beach, you still lose. Logically, the most effective defense would be at the beach when the attacker is bunched up and susceptible to large casualties per weapon expended and while the attacker has only partial strength ashore (you have the advantage of local numerical superiority. Once the attacker has their full strength ashore, your job is many times harder.
Of course, that assumes you can reasonably predict the attacker's point of attack (which history suggests you can) and that the attacker does not have overwhelming firepower that can be applied to the shore (naval gun support) as was done in the later Pacific assaults.
The historical reality is that once the attacker gets solidly ashore, the defender has lost. Again, this dictates that the best defense is applied far out at sea by sinking the sea base and transports.
If you have enough strength to defeat an attacker inland, then you have enough strength to defeat them at the beach and you'll more favorable conditions (with the caveats mentioned). If you can't defeat them at the beach then all you're doing by engaging inland is delaying your own inevitable defeat.
Can you think of any amphibious assault that was defeated inland? There might be an example but I can't think of one off the top of my head. On the other hand, every assault I can think of that got firmly ashore defeated the defenders.
History and logic says inland defense is an inherently losing proposition.
"As a defender it's almost impossible to determine the point of attack of an amphib operation. "
This is almost categorically false. Both sides see the same strategic imperatives and, thus, can predict the very few logical locations for an assault. The Germans, for example, knew pretty much where the Allied assault would come and even pretty close to when. The Japanese knew where the Americans would assault.
Off the top of my head, succesful inland defences of amphibious invasions would include Gallipolli and Milne Bay.
DeleteThe allied assault beaches were a massive source of debate in the Wermacht and no agreement was reached. It's not always clear.
Milne Bay is probably a decent example. Gallipoli is not really an example of defeating an amphibious assault. The campaign lasted a year and the actual landings were completely successful. The subsequent year was a land campaign with offensives and counter-offensives. It would be as if the Allies landed in Normandy, pushed across Europe, but couldn't quite capture Germany. That would be a failed land campaign, not an inland assault defense.
DeleteFor sake of discussion, let's say that both examples were valid. That's two out of the many dozens of amphibious assaults conducted in the world wars, Korea, etc. It seems clear that inland defense is not the preferred approach although it may be the approach of necessity. Simple logic dictates defending when the attackers are at their most vulnerable like when they're crammed together in landing craft, have no artillery support, have little cover and no fortifications, have no room to maneuver, and are subject to pre-defined killing zones. And, again, the best defense is to sink the transports!
"The allied assault beaches were a massive source of debate in the Wermacht and no agreement was reached."
DeleteNo, the Germans knew the assault would come at one of two locations. Yes, there was a difference of opinion about which of those two but it was only two choices. That allowed both locations to be defended. Witness the extensive defenses and fortifications at Normandy. The Germans were clearly not fooled about the location to any great extent.
"I cannot think, off the top of my head, of a modern amphibious assault that was successfully stymied offshore through naval or air assault."
DeleteThe first Japanese assault on Wake Island in WWII was repulsed before the landing could even be initiated when the defenders used six 5" guns to sink two of the assault fleet destroyers. The Japanese assault fleet was stopped at sea and retreated.
Unfortunately, a few weeks later, the Japanese returned with a reinforced fleet and successfully assaulted and seized Wake.
"This is a big part of defence in depth considerations, holding back a mobile reserve and responding to the aggressor with manoeuvre warfare"
DeleteJon, the US military publishes doctrinal manuals on a variety of topics such as amphibious assaults. Does Australia have any such publicly available doctrinal manual on inland defense? I'd love to see the official writing, if it's available.
Also, you obviously believe in the inland defense and the topic would make a good blog post. Do you have any interest in guest authoring such a post?
Hey, sorry mate, been busy with work, haven't had a chance to reply.
DeleteThere's some publically available information.
You could read about various army doctrine here:
https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/publications/doctrine-army-doctrine
Of course, like any military, a lot of what we do is more institutional memory than textbook instruction.
We've got a lot of guys with a lot combat experience and a long history of being involved in all kinds of conflicts. Some of that stuff makes it's way into the textbooks, some doesn't - either way we remember it.
In terms of what we're calling inland defence - to be clear it's simply a matter of practicality. Ideally you would dissuade any attempt at an amphibious assault by controlling your naval approaches and deterring the attempt.
If you think about it, large scale amphibious assaults are actually quite rare in the history of warfare. They are extremely difficult logistical challenges and have a great deal of risk associated with them.
Generally speaking they are usually attempted only when a number of other pieces are in place - usually that means localised naval superiority, air superiority and the ability to pour in reinforcements and supplies at significant pace and scale.
When that hasn't been the case, at Dieppe for example, the results are usually disastrous. In fact Dieppe was technically intended as a raid, reminiscent of the British raids on French ports during the Seven Years War. But it was a disaster, for a lot of reasons not least of which was the inability to maintain air superiority and the small scale of the attacking forces who were easily dealt with. By the by, it's the only major amphibious assault of WW2 by the allies that was really stopped on the sand - and it wasn't even a real invasion, simply a raid as described above.
On the idea of a blog, let me get back to you mate, bit busy at the moment - I'm travelling for a week overseas so don't have time. Maybe when i get back. Would have to dust off my textbooks from college.
"Some of that stuff makes it's way into the textbooks, some doesn't - either way we remember it."
DeleteBoy, it would be nice if that were true! In the US Navy/Marines, we mastered amphibious assaults in WWII. Unfortunately, over the many years since, we've completely forgotten what we once knew to the point of having our Marine Generals state for the record that we're in the process of 're-learning' amphibious assaults. The Marines entire reason for existing, and they forgot it!
So, yes, institutional memory can survive for a while but it always dies out unless emphatically reinforced - hence, my call for large scale, realistic exercises to try and retain the memory.
Perhaps Australia is better at retaining institutional memory than the US and, if so, good for you! We are particularly bad at it. Part of the problem is that we seem to have an arrogance towards history. We know better than the lessons of history. Our thinking is new and fresh whereas history's lessons are old and useless. Idiotic, but that's how we seem to think. You're familiar with Kipling's "The Gods of the Copybook Headings"? That's us - throwing history away and then, inevitably, regretting it when it's too late.
I think partly that loss of institutional memory is a consequence of scale - the Australian army is well trained and has a lot of combat history, but is very small compared to the US Army, and even the US Marine Corps.
DeleteWe don't have the same attrition or turnover.
It's easier to retain and disseminate knowledge on a smaller scale.
We only have three regular combat brigades (mechanised), alongside two support brigades (they focus on logistics, anti-air and a host of other things) and one aviation brigade.
We then have 6 reserve brigades and some other units (SAS, commandos, regional recon units in the far north of the country known as NORFORCE, and an amphibious task force which really amounts to a single reinforced battalion).
We can be a lot pickier about recruitment because we don't need the masses that the US military does. Our regular army brigades are full of veterans, a lot of combat experience. Our turnover and attrition is smaller. The smaller the force, the more you can focus on the quality of the training.
And then, because of our doctrine, we demand different things from our soldiers.
The doctrine of overwhelming firepower is a two edged blade in my experience. It means you don't have to focus on manoeuvre or tactical flexibility in the same way - there's a bit of a cult of technology in the US military that I've noticed. They want to solve everything by bringing in overwhelming fire support, whether that's air support, artillery or whatever.
When you don't have that luxury you have to be more clever.
I don't mean that as disrespect by the way. I was proud to serve with the US military. We knew that when we were bashing the enemy in one valley, the yanks were doing the same thing the next valley over. Can't say that about every military we've worked with.
I take Australia at their word, they have no capability to execute an opposed landing, so the exercise is realistic.
ReplyDeleteOnly unopposed landings will be executed.
The entire Australian Navy has less NGFS capability than 4 Fletchers.
I'm unconcerned with what Australia does or does not want to train for. I used that video just because it was available and so nicely illustrated the kind of worthless training we do.
DeleteFor example, take a look at the Bold Alligator 2017 Marine assault exercise video. About as unrealistic as you can get!
DeleteThe big problem with unopposed landings is simple. In the real world you can't count on them being or staying unopposed.
DeleteWhat's being trained is getting the bodies into the boats and onto the beaches. Which for a force just starting to get back into the amphibious game is an important step. It is a PR video mind you.
ReplyDeleteI think the lack of any sense of urgency or realization that they need to get the hell off the beach as fast as humanly possible is probably even worse than no training at all, this just instills bad habits that this "assault" is what should be expected and how it proceeds....I'm almost wondering why bother? AS CNO suggested, I just YOU TUBED Bold Alligator 2017 and I can't say USMC hitting the beach at Camp Lejeune was really anymore "realistic" than this Aussie video.
ReplyDeleteHow realistic is it for Aussies or USMC to "start" fighting only after they have hit the beach and moved away to the combat zone?!?
" this just instills bad habits"
DeleteYou got it! Train like you fight, fight like you train? Bad habits, indeed! If this is how we're going to fight then we're going to lose and lose badly.
As a second comment after reading what John just said:"...It is a PR video mind you." This made me wonder, maybe we are looking at this the wrong way, maybe SO MUCH INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE as been lost that leadership really doesn't know what "hitting the beach" is anymore. Has anyone currently high up inside USMC/USN done a real hardcore assault with OPFOR, confusion, lose of SA, lose of leaders and hardware,etc?!?
ReplyDeleteIf and I'm assuming the last "hard" and "realistic" assault exercises where in the 1980s during the Cold War, nobody around today in DoD has much and/or any practical experience on what really should be practiced....
The assault has OPFOR. The landing units were ambushed about two clicks off the beach in the first version of Talisman Sabre I partook in. They copped a pasting too.
DeleteThe PRC stuff is mostly for show. They have a very effective public affairs / information ops campaign.
ReplyDeleteThe USN/USMC conducts fairly realisting amphibious exercises. Unlike the PRC, they don't tend to advertise them.
The Chinese blogs (if you're commenting on this, I take it you follow them fairly closely, right?) document pretty frequent and realistic exercises. It doesn't matter if they're done for PR purposes or not if they're realistic.
DeleteCan you point me to any USN/USMC realistic amphibious assault exercise? I follow them closely and I haven't seen one.
Chinese army doctrine and capability has significant gaps and issues.
DeleteDon't take it from me - Read up on the Chinese militaries critique of itself.
Are you familiar with the Two Incompatibles (liǎnggè bùxiāng shìyìng)? It's now called the Two Inabilities (liǎnggè nénglì bùgòu) but it's basically the same thing - they have serious lack of faith in the officer cadre's tactical ability or understanding of modern war, and they emphasis the fact that many of their combat elements still lack modern training, equipment or understanding of modern warfare.
The Chinese love slogans.
Other things worth reading about are the Two Big Gaps (liǎnggè chājù hěn dà), the Three Whethers (sāngè néngbùnéng), the Five Incompatibles (sāngè néngbùnéng) and the Five Incapables (wǔgè bùhuì).
These are all extensive, long running critiques and doubts about their abilities.
Fundamentally they have huge numbers of troops without modern equipment or training, an officer cadre that hasn't been trained how to fight a modern war and which emphasises the political more than the tactical or strategic, their doctrine inherently lacks tactical flexibility or localised autonomy, while they have developed high end weapons, their soldiers lack the training in many cases to use them effectively, they have no actual combat experience since 1973 when they fought a brief and largely unsuccessful war against Vietnam, their training is still focused on a style of industrialised warfare that doesn't account for "informatized and digitized equipment"... I could go on and on.
This isn't to say that anyone should underestimate China's capabilities.
Quantity has a quality all it's own after all.
But their training and methods are archaic. That;'s according to them, not us.
Just an FYI - all branches of the military fall under the 'Chinese Army' 0 these critiques apply as much (sometimes more) to naval and aviation elements as they do to the land element.
DeleteMaybe we need to build the amphibious assault equivalent of the National Training Center. Pick a low/no-population island somewhere with a decent set of beaches, add practice mines and obstacles, mix in an OPFOR, and then run battalion/brigade sized assault exercises.
ReplyDeleteHow bout lease Iwo Jima? It's not being used for much, and I hear it can be a fairly difficult assault target.
You've got the right idea! However, it can't be so isolated that the OpFor has no air power. You want the assault force to have to defend against enemy air.
DeleteAnother aspect to an amphibious assault exercise is the sea side of things. Let's practice defending the amphibs from subs, missiles, mines, and aircraft - you know, attacks against us like an enemy would do.
Iwo Jima has an airfield, but probably not level infrastructure for what you want.
DeleteThere may need to be compromises for this. Finding a suitable location with US air bases nearby, but also remote and depopulated enough that it can be readily acquired for this purpose may be challenging.
Perhaps one of the uninhabited Marianas Islands. OPFOR could fly from Guam.
There might be suitable areas in Florida's Keys? There are also some unpopulated or very sparsely populated islands off the east coast mid-Atlantic and southern states and off the Carolinas. Long ago, some of them were were used as pirate strongholds! Might be suitable.
DeleteThe point is, if we look hard enough, I'm sure there are some suitable locations and likely in or near CONUS.
They have to be big enough to accommodate at least brigade-sized assaults and defenses. Not sure you'll find one large enough near CONUS.
DeleteI could be wrong.
There may be some value in choosing a Pacific island, considering the greater likelihood of assault operations there. The volcanic terrain, coral reefs, and flora are different from islands around CONUS, posing different operational challenges.
Well, the Aluetian Islands should fit the bill.
DeleteNavassa island.
ReplyDeleteAmphibious landings are inherently dangerous. You start dropping full crewed AAV's/LVTP-7's off the back of LHA's, AKA's, ATK's a few miles offshore in even glass sea on an administrative run(without any combat simulation or speed) you run the risk of losing 24 sailors/Marines. Imagine how many flag officers could go down over one training accident like that?
ReplyDeleteThere are other reasons , dropping equipment in saltwater/sand , demands a ton of maintenance/parts/replacement post op , leading to high costs though defense contractors.
I was on ATK in MSPRON-3 for a Fleet-ex off Australia in the 90's , we put 1 LCM(3 contractors to run it) in the water one day, probably off that same beach, That was it
The cost of losing a battle or war because you didn't want to risk training is far greater than the cost of casualties or budget in training. I would remind you of the infamous US WWII torpedo example.
DeleteThat is very true. Hard training is necessary. However with hard training , training accidents occur. Few people understand we won the Cold War by being a well-trained force the USSR had little hope of beating . Even fewer people know that we (U S Army) were losing near 1000 troops a year just training (1989 figure IIRC and the last half of the 1980's it was 700-800 yr. we won that war . Now we are fighting and losing multiple wars and the training and battle causalities don't often come close to those figures most years.
DeleteHowever as I mentioned , losing troops now in just normal non-combat ops is a career killer, witness the Fitz and McCain incidents. almost every training accident leads to a who lot of red-tape, lawsuits, court-materials / masts/ write ups. Besides the other high materials costs.for training. There are simply too many disincentives to the brass, who want "new stuff" , don't want to take care of the old working stuff, and the only training they are occupied with is cover their ass - EO/ and sexual assault classes. God knows , sending sending people to play war in the sand and the sea and the air is simply too dangerous to their world.
Sorry to be cynical about the sate of affairs , I believe as you do. I lived it on a tank in the Army , when training was real , and people got hurt and killed, and I watched the Wall fall on terminal leave in Germany, got a piece too. Felt like "Victory' and it was.
Coorection "training and battle deaths" now, not casualties. we do have many WIA's now in counterinsurgency warfare, due to the nature of it, the use of body armor, and better med care
DeleteYou've laid it out. We need to do the hard training and accept the inevitable deaths (while doing what we reasonably can to minimize them). If you're going to fight your aircraft at treetop level then you need to train at treetop level and that means planes will crash. Fight like train, train like you fight.
DeleteIf you want to understand the foundations of traditional German army excellence read the chapter on training chronicling the 1st person experiences of conscripts during WWII in Frontsoldaten by Stephen G. Fritz. How hard was the training? killing off one or two conscripts out of a training company each cycle was considered regreteble, but the cost of doing business...
DeleteGAB