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Friday, May 10, 2019

Lasers In Combat

One of the topic suggestions from the recent open post was for a discussion of the future of rail guns and lasers so, here it is.  We’ll look at lasers in this post and then rail guns in a second post.

There are many articles and papers about the technology of lasers and you can read those on your own.  There are also numerous articles about laser power improvements and the latest thickness of steel that some new laser burned through.  You can also read all the Navy’s glowing, raving PR announcements about lasers.  What you can’t readily find is any analysis of the real world combat applicability of lasers.  It’s pointless to develop a laser with a city block of dedicated power generating equipment that can burn through two feet of steel in only ten minutes because none of that is applicable in a real world combat situation.  We’ll focus on the real world considerations.

Practical lasers already exist – practical in the sense that the laser and its associated power supply can be fitted on a ship and will produce a coherent beam that can, under the right conditions, produce a destructive effect.  However, the ‘right conditions’ generally preclude any real world usefulness.  We’ll take a look at those ‘right conditions’ and see what they are and how they impact the future of lasers as shipboard weapons.


Dwell Time

Barring development of the far, far future (in a galaxy far, far away) Star Wars type lasers that instantaneously disintegrate whatever they touch, lasers in our lifetime will be limited to prolonged contact types.  That means just what it says – that in order to produce a destructive effect the laser will have to maintain contact with the target for an extended period (dwell time) and, what’s more, that contact will have to be on the same pinpoint spot to allow the laser enough time to ‘burn through’.  Even ‘burning through’ the initial material of the target may only be the first step in destruction of the target.  For example, a laser hitting a missile will have to burn through the outer shell of the missile, which will have no effect whatsoever on the missile, to reach the inner works of the missile that can, in turn, be burned to, hopefully, produce the desired destructive effect on the missile.

Of course, for a smaller, more fragile target, like a small quadcopter or UAV, the outer contact may be sufficient on its own to destroy the target by, for example, shearing off a fin/wing or destroying a propeller hub.

The developmental goal in laser development will be to produce effects with less and less contact time (more powerful lasers), ultimately moving towards the Star Wars instantaneous disintegration.

Dwell time is a function of the system’s fire control.  Whatever fire control aiming system we’re using has to be fine enough to maintain laser dwell for the required burn through time.  Consider what that means, today.  A laser fire control would have to be able to maintain contact on the exact same spot of, say, a missile while it moves at Mach speed and jinks in terminal approach while the laser firing platform (our ship, presumably) also moves, maneuvers, rolls, and pitches.  That is some exquisitely fine fire control and nothing like that is even remotely possible today. 

Yes, we have stabilized fire control but that’s exceedingly crude by comparison.  Motors are used to move the firing weapon (guns, currently) in train and elevation to stay on target.  Consider what that means, however.  It means staying close enough on the target to achieve, at best, a 10% hit rate somewhere on or near the target.  Do you grasp how far that is from maintaining a pinpoint lock on a target when both the firing platform and the target are moving fast and maneuvering violently?  You’ve seen videos of Navy tests where a laser slowly destroyed a small boat motor or a UAV but have you seen a video of a speeding, maneuvering shipboard laser destroying a fast, violently maneuvering target?  Of course you haven’t because it can’t be done!

The real world consequence of extended dwell time is extended engagement time.  If we have a battery of shipboard lasers defending against an incoming volley of anti-ship missiles and each individual missile engagement requires a dwell time of, say, 30 seconds, to make up a number, you can readily see that, given the Mach speeds of the incoming missiles and the resulting minute or so engagement window (we’ve run through the arithmetic on this in previous posts or you can run through it yourself), we’ll only be able to engage a few missiles before the remainder reach us.  In comparison, bullets (CIWS) or defensive missiles (SeaRAM or ESSM) can be fired at numerous targets simultaneously (well, nearly so for the purposes of this discussion) and a hit will produce an instantaneous kill.

In order to be effective in real combat in the AAW role, a laser system has to produce a kill in about 10 seconds or less.  Any more than that and you simply can’t engage enough targets to mount an effective defense. 

One way to compensate for longer dwell time is to increase the number of defensive lasers.  We’ve noted that the number of close range SeaRAM and CIWS systems on modern ships is far too few for an effective defense and the same situation would apply to lasers.


Lethality

Let’s now turn our attention to lethality.  We’ve already noted that laser lethality requires dwell time.  Assuming we’ve achieved that, we now need lethality.  For a conventional explosive shell, lethality is high.  An explosion taking place in or near the target is very likely to damage or destroy something critical to the target and produce the effect of destroying it.  For a laser, however, it is quite possible that the focused beam, being relatively quite narrow and having no explosive effect, may damage or destroy something that is not critical to the target or not critical in a relevant time frame.  For example, a laser may burn through the exposed motor shell on a small swarm boat only to hit and damage an exhaust port underneath which is not critical to the engine’s continued performance, at least for the time needed for the boat to complete its attack.  Or, a laser may burn through the shell of a missile only to hit an empty fuel tank or an ECM component, neither of which would stop the missile.  Consider the case of a laser used against a ship and imagine a narrow beam passing through the ship on a straight line.  With no explosive effect, the odds of the beam hitting a component that would destroy or mission kill the ship is near zero.

One conclusion from this analysis is that lasers will work best when the target is most densely packed with critical components.  Thus, quadcopters, UAVs, and missiles would be more susceptible to laser effects while large aircraft and tanks would be less susceptible and ships would be nearly invulnerable.  This suggests the target classes we should be developing lasers for.


Power

Lasers require a great deal of power although I would imagine that the power can, and is, supplied in pulses (a capacitor like function).  Thus, it’s not necessary to provide continuous power but only pulses of power.  I’m way out of my field here so feel free to correct me if I’m wrong.  This is interesting and has implications for power management and power system architecture but is only marginally relevant to this discussion.  What is relevant is the need for power, however it is supplied.  If the power is disrupted the laser is rendered inoperative.  Power represents a single point of failure for a ship’s entire battery of lasers.  Lose power and you lose all the lasers.  Of course, this applies to conventional guns as well.  Ideally, what you’d like to see is a local power system that can continue to operate if the main power is disrupted.  To an extent, conventional gun systems of WWII had this capability with local fire control and, for smaller guns, local manual train and elevation.  For lasers, the analogous local capability would be a battery or capacitor backup that could supply power for at least enough shots to continue the immediate engagement before ultimately failing.


Countermeasures

As with all weapons throughout history, the implementation of laser weapons will be immediately followed by the implementation of countermeasures.  If the countermeasures turn out to be cheaper than the weapon, then the weapon is on the wrong side of the cost curve and will be at least an economic failure, if not a practical failure.  Early anti-ship missiles were expensive and the early countermeasures, such as chaff and flares, were very cheap.  Eventually, the curve flipped and now we see that anti-ship missiles are far cheaper than the defensive Aegis/Standard weapon.  So goes the perpetual back and forth of weapons and countermeasures development.

Lasers of the foreseeable future are susceptible to countermeasures.  Noting the requirement for significant dwell time, simple countermeasures could include ablative coatings, reflective coatings, ‘rolling’ to prevent extended contact (rolling airframe missile?), multi-shelled sacrificial layers, jinking, sea skimming to reduce the engagement window (lasers are, of course, line of sight and the engagement range against a sea skimming target is around 15 miles or so), stealth to deny fire control solutions, and many other possibilities that I’m sure I haven’t thought of.  The takeaway from that list is that most of the possible countermeasures would be very cheap to implement relative to the cost of the laser – in fact, some already exist.

Thus, for the foreseeable future, lasers appear to be on the wrong side of the cost curve.


Applicability Summary

So, where does this analysis leave us?  It appears that, in order to produce destructive effects, lasers will require small, slow targets so as to maximize the chance of achieving sufficient dwell time.  This suggests that the applicable target set will be drones, UAVs, and small boats.  The challenge, even for this target set, is fire control.  Laser development would do well to go on hiatus and instead focus (a laser joke there - sorry) on fire control.  To put it simply, the key to effective lasers is dwell time and the key to dwell time is fire control.  This also suggests that the most effective lasers will be land based which eliminates one half of the movement issue.

With sufficient fire control, there is no reason why lasers can’t be quite effective for the small, slow target set.  Interestingly, the anticipated target set suggests that the most useful application for lasers will be on land as anti-drone weapons.  That being the case, the development trend should be towards smaller lasers that can be vehicle mounted.  For ships, I would see lasers being mounted on smaller ships like Cyclones, LCS, and, possibly, the new frigate for use as anti-small boat and anti-drone weapons.  I don’t see the benefit of lasers with the noted target set on larger ships since they shouldn’t encounter those types of targets.



Disclaimer:  This is, by its nature, a highly technical topic in its underlying foundation and I am not a laser expert, by any means.  Some of my assumptions about the technology may not be completely correct and I welcome any discussion that can correct and enhance our grasp of the topic.  What I will not welcome is ‘gotcha’ type comments, even if correct.  This is an attempt at a discussion, not a contest to see who can score the most points.

36 comments:

  1. How vulnerable are the seekers used in AShM to lasers ?

    I would guess that the best chance of defeating an incoming missile would be to destroy the seeker. It can't be hidden behind very thick materials and small damage might be enough to render it unusable.

    If the missile stays on a "straight" course after the seeker is defeated, you then might to able to either use a "long burn" with a laser weapon or a conventional CIWS to destroy the missile.
    If after the seeker is destroyed the missile goes off on some "wild" turns it quite likely won't be able to hit you.


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    1. Seekers are armoured to move at high supersonic speeds through atmosphere, so they aren't soft.

      And at those speeds and ranges, even blind, it's going to hit you, a ship simply can't dodge quickly enough to move a meaningful distance out of the way.

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    2. "armoured to move... through atmosphere"

      As CNOps said, this is a highly technical topic (War is, these days), but we can all agree that the aeroshells ("armor") around sensors are largely transparent to the frequency-range of electromagnetic energy that said sensors detect.

      Radomes usually aren't clear in the visible spectrum, but they're pretty clear in the RF spectrum. FLIR cameras are shielded by a material that is largely transparent in the visible spectrum and highly transparent in the selected portion of the IR spectrum. Et cetera. Ad infinitum. Sensors can't sense through armor that protects them from what they sense; that's a shutter, and closing it is a mission kill on the sensor.

      The dwell time to burnout a sensor for an extended period or permanently is quite short using a laser in the correct frequency range - arguing/describing this fact is a whole different thread in this topic. If you're using a 30 kW laser or better like LAWS, it is under 200 milliseconds for the most sensitive RF-band sensors (the magic lightweight, high performance AESA radars of the world and their close cousins, but not the fat ground-based surveillance radars) and still just a few seconds for relatively rugged visible-light sensors.

      Now, as far as the utility of burning out sensors; yeah, dodging is a big part of your goal. There's other benefits like causing sea-skimming missiles to hit the waves if you burn out the radar altimeter, but you'd really like to dodge too if possible. So... is it possible?

      Assuming the missile is aimed perfectly at 15 miles out because it wasn't maneuvering to avoid kinetic-kill defensive fires (ESSM et al.), wasn't trying to vector to attack the ship from a particular axis, and wasn't trying to mask its target if approaching a group, then you actually have to maneuver. Otherwise it's likely to miss by a mile, but we're assuming it is perfectly aimed, so...

      For a mach 2 sea-skimming missile engaged at 15 miles, you have 35 seconds from the start of the engagement before impact. You can detected the missile further out, so you've already queued up a shot and you're burning out the sensor in the first 5 seconds (aiming plus dwell time), and you start maneuvering immediately. You then maneuver for 30 seconds in which the missile makes no course adjustments. In 30 seconds a Burke at 30 kts moves 540 meters; it is 154m long. The missile is on an intercept, so you have to accelerate, not just move. Even so, at most intercept geometries Burke could get out of the way if AEGIS were tied directly to the rudder/shaft. I don't think it is, but that's an engineering oversight, not an impossible physical challenge. Of course, this hypothetical missile is dead to kinetic defensive fires once it's blind so dodging is moot, but it would be a nice capability to have if we ever send ships into artillery range again.

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    3. "I would guess that the best chance of defeating an incoming missile would be to destroy the seeker."

      There's nothing wrong with that statement, per se, however it ignores the larger issue which is defeating not just a single missile but an attack 'wave' of missiles. No enemy is going to launch a single missile - they'll launch salvoes of as many as they can. So, the issue is not how can we defeat one missile but, rather, how can we defeat many missiles in the allotted engagement window?

      Given that the engagement window is around 30 seconds and assuming we have multiple missiles arriving nearly simultaneously, can we defeat such a salvo? This is where dwell time becomes the ultimate factor. Sure, we can probably 'blind' a missile's sensor but how long will it take? If it's 0.1 seconds, we're in decent shape. If it's 5 seconds or longer, we're going to have leakers! Of course, absent an actual test, we just don't know. We need to shoot some LRASM/NSM missiles at a laser unit and see what happens.

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    4. "in the first 5 seconds (aiming plus dwell time), and you start maneuvering immediately. "

      This is somewhat analogous to the anti-radiation (HARM) type missiles that have a target location memory capability in case the target stops emitting. The missile will continue to the target's location regardless. I would assume that a anti-ship missile would have a last-predicted-location function for this exact purpose. If the missile loses target lock it would proceed to the last predicted (target movement accounted for) target location.

      Of course, the target could simply assume another course/speed to ruin the predicted location but that assumes perfect timing - you blind the missile at 5 seconds (how do you know you blinded it by the way?) and begin a radical course/speed change at 5.01 seconds. That seems way beyond our current ability. Heck, it would take thirty seconds to report that the target was blinded, relay that information to the helm/Captain, decide on a new course, verbally issue the order, have the order executed. Of course, as you note, you could tie Aegis into helm but that raises its own problems. Do we really want individual ships racing off on their own random courses? If not, then we have to tie Aegis/helm into some kind of group-wide navigation control to ensure we don't evade a missile only to collide with another ship!

      Also, if we instantly change course we run the risk of masking our defensive laser(s) to the (presumably) remaining missiles of the salvo since no enemy is going to fire just one missile.

      As I asked earlier, how do we know we successfully blinded the missile in 0.1 sec or 5 seconds or whatever? In other words, how do we know we can safely switch targets? Even if successful, the missile will keep coming and give no indication that it has been blinded. If we switch targets too soon, we allow an undamaged missile to get through. If we wait too long, we allow the other missiles to get through. How do we know when we can switch targets?

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    5. I'm glad you appreciated this concept enough to reply, I think it's worth doing for a variety of reasons.

      "Heck, it would take thirty seconds to report that the target was blinded, relay that information to the helm/Captain, decide on a new course, verbally issue the order, have the order executed."

      Excessively long OODA loops are a serious problem in a variety of tactical situations. It's one that we usually just accept when it comes to course changes because it's as old as sailing, but it can be solved by tying AEGIS to the helm (and the laser, and maybe a few other things).

      "that raises its own problems. Do we really want individual ships racing off on their own random courses?"

      A legitimate issue which is solved by:

      "we have to tie Aegis/helm into some kind of group-wide navigation control"

      Doesn't sound too hard, and even if it does run into other ships *occasionally*, we're not any worse off (sad, nervous laughter)... which leaves the final issue that:

      "if we instantly change course we run the risk of masking [a variety of defensive systems] to the (presumably) remaining missiles"

      This is a BIG problem with *not* having AEGIS steer the ship. People aren't able to process the firing arcs of all of the ship's defensive weapons, the relevant data on incoming threats, the ship's position, etc., and integrate that into a model of permissible and non-permissible maneuvers. Computers (in this case AEGIS') can, and they can do it in a fraction of a second *if* they're tied into all of the relevant sensors and weapons and they've already been programmed with the appropriate ship data and algorithms to apply to those resources.

      Sure, people can turn a Burke so that its rear-mounted CIWS (for example) can shoot once a single missile is approaching CIWS range if it was coming from the ship's 12 o'clock where the CIWS is masked, but they can't radically *maneuver* the ship to any effect while giving any serious consideration to engagement windows and approach vectors for multiple (dozens of) targets. Computers can.

      The same goes for every process where the OODA loop is limiting and the "orient" step isn't facile. Humans don't even really out-perform computers on target identification these days, but I guess it's fine to leave them in the loop for that purpose if it's required by international and/or US law. The main problems that can't be engineered/programmed away are the financial costs of designing a high quality digital system to do this and the negative impact it would have on human seamanship, the latter of which the Navy can ill-afford regardless of budget.

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    6. "how do we know we successfully blinded the missile?"

      This was included in my comment originally, but edited out to save text. The remnant of that paragraph is here:

      "You then maneuver for 30 seconds in which the missile makes no course adjustments"

      If it does make *appropriate* course adjustments, you know it's not blind. AEGIS can figure this out almost instantly, especially if it plotted the maneuver and was anticipating the missile's course adjustment. If the missile does so at 5.3 seconds in response to your maneuver started at 0 seconds, then you're still lined up on it and it's far enough away to service again. If it does so between 6-10 seconds, you might have another shot with the same laser, you might have another available laser, or all of your lasers might be busy engaging other targets and you'll have a leaker. If it does so at 10 seconds or later then you've definitely got a leaker. When you have a leaker it isn't the end of your warship; ESSM, seaRAM and CIWS just have a job to do when you'd rather that they didn't. The question isn't whether you'll have leakers, it's whether a (missile defense) laser can defeat a useful number of missiles without an excessive footprint on an AAW ship; i.e. whether or not it's an improvement over more ESSMs/SMs. Similarly, if it's necessary to counter cheap drones so you're not shooting ESSMs at them, its footprint is justified and any anti-missile capability is a plus. I believe the latter to be true, while the former also likely is because VLS have a finite rate of fire that can be challenged in saturation attacks, and lasers can work in parallel with other defensive fires.

      Notably, if you're maneuvering hard and it's a fast missile (with the deadly short engagement window we're assuming), there's also a physical cutoff to how late it can make a course adjustment. Given some data on the wing loading of a representative missile, the maximum aerodynamic acceleration and the resulting turning circle can be calculated for fun and profit, revealing that cutoff. When the target is a warship, this distance is uncomfortably close because the ship only barely maneuvers enough to avoid a blinded missile on a semi-ballistic path. However, aircraft get a lot more leniency, and missiles designed to target stealth aircraft will have some pretty powerful (read: delicate) EO/IR sensors to fry.

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    7. I have no problem, whatsoever, with the concept of Aegis being tied into helm control. Of course, at that point, one should go whole hog and have Aegis run all aspects of combat (see, "Soft Kill CEC" .

      I also note that the Navy has demonstrated an extreme reluctance, both institutionally and individually, to turn control over to computers. The pilots uniformly refuse to conduct hands off carrier landings despite having the computer control capability to do so. The Navy refuses to allow Aegis to operate in auto mode (witness the Vincennes incident or the more recent Burke/Yemen incidents). Turning the entire ship's combat over to Aegis might be more than the Navy can accept regardless of how logical and beneficial it might be!

      I also suspect you're underestimating the difficult in determining whether an incoming missile has been killed. Most missiles, today, employ a series of violent, radical terminal maneuvers in the terminal phase. Thus, trying to determine whether the missile's sensors have been blinded by noting its path may not be productive or predictive until too late. A terminal 'jink' might well appear to be taking the missile off course when, in reality, it is just making a programmed maneuver that will, eventually (in seconds!) bring it back to the target. How to distinguish between a planned 'jink' and a lost lock would seem to be a challenge given the short engagement window.

      Related question: Is our fire control precise enough to track and maintain the precision application of a laser during a missile's terminal maneuvers? I suspect not but I don't know.

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  2. I think for now, if there really is a desire for lasers, the only reasonable use would be anti drone.

    Loitering drones could pose a safety hazard, remember the recent Gatwick shutdown or the ongoing one in Germany, or just a nuisance.
    A missile or gun could be expensive, or messy, or dangerous, a laser should be able to pop it with limited risk.

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  3. Kind of ironic and interesting to note that after decades of research, billions and billions of dollars spent on R&D on something so "sci-fish" and all the papers on how lasers will kill everything on-sight including ICBMs.....it's first practical kinetic application in military use will be to shot down a $100 to $1000 drone.....

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  4. Lasers "These are weapon systems of the future and always will be"

    Any particles in the air reflect, scatter, and distort laser beams, even on clear days due to thermal blooming, turbulence, and molecular/aerosol absorption and scattering causing wavefront distortion due to laser beam spreading that will limit the amount of energy that can be bought to bear on target.

    Lasers don't work in rain, fog, clouds, and haze since beam energy is so quickly lost.

    The maritime environment is challenging for high energy-lasers due to atmospheric high water vapor, the ship will be moving as will the missile due normal atmospheric turbulence, will need a very sophisticated expensive high definition fire control system, the high definition radar wave bands are also degraded by adverse atmospheric conditions, rain etc

    Lasers are LOS and short range as the beams spread, spot size is a function of beam divergence and the distance from the laser to the target, if 0.25 milliradian accuracy at 1 km gives 0.25 meters at 5 km beam would spread to 1.25 meters and at 10 km the beam would be 2.5 meters so will need expensive laser emitters for best narrow beams and high power, MWs?, to work at the longer ranges, so laser will emitting high IR and EM radiation unless expensive shielding in place.

    Lasers will work well in space as no atmosphere, problem will generating the be the power required.

    Ref. g2mil com and USN Lab Plasma Physics Division - Atmospheric Propagation of High-Energy Laser Beams

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  5. Agree, I think lasers will work on fixed land bases to protect from mortar attacks and drones, bases in Iraq or Afghanistan or future military bases probably will have lasers one day. Would you stop a suicide truck with a laser, probably not, you probably won't have the power/dwell time to make it happen but small drones and shells, yeah, I could see it working.

    On ships, I think we still need a lot of progress to make it work against ASMs which seems to be the most useful application BUT probably also the hardest to achieve.....

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  6. This is the next great threat to the Fleet.

    It is a sexy promising technology that has improved over the past 40 years to being actually useable in the confined situation that COMNAVOPS described. That is a fragile target requiring little dwell time, no extensive or radical maneuvering that defeats the shipboard tracking capability, and the ability hit only the critical components of the target.

    Now some Admiral (or Admirals) or Congressperson, or Defense Contractor will sell it as the great savior for the Navy (even better all services) and siphon off a ton of money from the rest of the Fleet activities.

    All on a technology that has no CONOPS or Operation Testing.

    Remember DDG-1000? How much O&M could the $24B we spent have purchased? How about the Ford Class? How much could just the $14B bought? Or how about 3 more Nimitz Class ships.

    All new technology has to be tested out before committing huge amounts of money to it. Porotype one and test it out in a realistic operational environment.

    I fear for the Navy. Rushing into this technology will reduce us to 100 ships in no time.

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  7. The navy explicitly intends to use lasers in the anti drone role. The claim is a reduced cost per shot fired. Lasers cost less than heat seeking missiles but they aren't free. The ship generates electricity by burning diesel fuel (usually) and it takes a lot to power a laser.

    The cheaper way to beat a quadcopter or small uav is with your own quadcopter. That costs less per shot than the laser even if you are only ramming the hostile uav. Most of the crew already knows how to use it, too.

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    1. "they aren't free. The ship generates electricity by …"

      You make a great point. If we have to buy and install extra turbines/diesels/whatever in order to generate the power to operate lasers then we need to include that in our cost per shot calculation.

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    2. This brings back the true advance of the Zumwalt was an electric grid capable of providing enough energy for railgun and laser use. Of course without production examples its unknown how adaptable the Burkes are to carry a laser defense suite

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  8. While missiles and drones are obvious targets, lasers could also be used to defeat small boats. And, maybe even land based targets, though that requires the ship come close to the shore. Just to throw this out, but could a laser defeat a shallow running torpedo?

    And, as with computers and everything else electronic, I'm confident lasers will become more powerful using less energy and able to fire more rapidly. Meaning they would eventually be used on smaller vessels.

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    1. Comnavops nailed it good. Lasers won't have much effect against a small boats, especially non-suicide boats.Theres plenty of empty space where a laser could zip right through. You could shoot holes through a boat with a 22 all day long and not hit anything vital. You can do the same with a laser

      Water diffuses and propagates light like crazy. That torpedo is swimming in armor.

      You are dealing with physics and chemistry mostly. You can't cheat the laws of thermodynamics or energy conservation. No circuit card can change the nature of the atmosphere of the way light waves moving through it. Electronics have very little to do with the raw power or capability of a laser beam.

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  9. Lasers as a weapon are limited.

    What is never discussed is the usefulness as a possible communication tool. Radio signals go in multiple directions and even when focused tightly will be detectable. A laser can can be an LOS signal that only goes to a single destination.
    So within a task force ships could communicate without data leaking into the atmosphere.
    Or a drone could relay info to a single ship only.
    If the Navy is serious about distributed weapons engagement, instead of radio that can be intercepted ( or copied and used by the enemy) you could have an direct link out to the horizon.

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    1. Radio signals can be directional

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    2. Not to the degree of a laser.
      And there are always harmonic signals that can be detected.
      One drawback of EMALs is that even though a launcher not a com device it still gives off electromagnetic signals
      Low powered signal lasers (compared to laser weapons whose power requirements are higher) have a small signature.

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    3. I am not up on laser communications. What little I've encountered has noted a high failure rate - failure meaning loss of data packets. The overall beam may be 100% consistently on target but if only one in a thousand (or hundred thousand or whatever) data bits gets lost due to atmospheric effects, the system has failed. Of course, there are means of error checking and resending lost bits/packets.

      I also know that the error/loss rate increases with distance. So, while a laser may have an unlimited (well, the curvature of the earth) distance, the acceptable error rate distance is hugely shorted. The las time I ever looked into this the acceptable comm distance was something like 500 meters - shockingly short for an infinite distance laser!

      Maybe laser commms have improved since I last looked? Please update us if you have more recent information.

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    4. Range is still a challenge although we are looking at 3 km now. Data transfer rates of 10 gigabits in the field (and 30 gigabits in a lab) at competitive loss rates is becoming standard. But much of the testing is with commercial rather than military strength lasers in a commercial telecom setting. The commercial side isn’t concerned with range as their customers are urban.

      Not advocating jumping all in on some concurrent laser com boondoggle ala emal but rather that this is a better place for research money than a laser cannon that can take down very small drones. Wit even a 1km range, you could set up a secure network within carrier group that relays ship to ship.
      The Chinese have bought/stolen enough tech to make them competitive with sigint/ECM detection and interception with conventional coms.

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    5. "Wit even a 1km range, you could set up a secure network within carrier group that relays ship to ship."

      Just a reminder … A carrier group in combat mode would be spread across a 20-50 mile diameter circular area. The common picture of a carrier a couple of escorts sailing a hundred yards apart is purely a photo op. In combat, the escorts sail 20-50 miles out from the carrier to intercept subs, aircraft, or missiles far from the carrier.

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    6. You can extend the range of laser comms using repeater stations; a friend of mine is working on that. His company picked up a research contract from DARPA to work into that; they showed off a promising proof of contract scale model to DARPA, and are now working on making it a practical, viable thing for combat use.

      He spoke only in generalities to me, what with NDAs and all, but the impression he gave me was that while it's a perfectly viable idea in the lab, getting to real world application is going to take time and effort, so they have to start working on it now, or else it'd never get done.

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  10. Was the comment on the open post particularly interested in lasers as offensive kinetic weapons?

    I'll admit, that is sexier than frying some electronics. Given my name, you can guess that I'd build the Death Star (sans vulnerable exhaust port) if it was an option, alas...

    Death Stars, turbolasers, and other ablative military applications for lasers are a fantasy - except in the limited use cases that CNOps has described fairly thoroughly. The described applications are the most demanding tasks that we can give lasers currently, but I'm doubtful that they're as useful as blinding those targets in a fraction of the time and blinding any other sensors in LOS that we disapprove of. Current laser weapon systems aren't up to the task across the (frequency) range of threat sensors, but this isn't a big physical or technological problem, it's an acquisition problem.

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  11. Adaptive optics in the beam director compensate for atmospheric effects and higher laser powers, say 300 kilowatts and up might be a viable though imperfect defense against missiles, especially if you are blinding/destroying the seeker. In CSBA articles, a dwell time of six seconds per missile defeat was assumed and a six second dwell time for High Power Microwaves, another DEW option.

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    1. With even a six second dwell time you can easily see the problem with a salvo attack which has a total engagement window of around 30 sec. We could only engage a couple of targets before the remainder get too close to defeat.

      Also, remember that only around 10 sec or so of the 30 sec window are actually useful. After that, the missile is so close that even if we can blind/disable it, it will continue ballistically and hit us.

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  12. More worrying in the short term is the use of lasers to blind personnel. Imagine a fishing boat passing close to a US vessel in the SCS randomly targeting US personnel on deck...

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  13. Yep, I imagine Iranians might carry a couple large mirrors aboard boats to reflect laser light back at a ship, blinding several sailors.

    "What you can’t readily find is any analysis of the real world combat applicability of lasers."

    Here is a great overview of laser problems from an expert:

    https://thebulletin.org/2015/05/navys-new-laser-weapon-hype-or-reality/

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  14. I honestly think the real reason they are pushing and talking about lasers and railguns is that if they don't no one is going to research them over here.

    We seem to have gotten to this idea of picking One idea and going with that at all cost. LCS, JSF, ETC

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    1. You raise a great point. Our research does tend to by myopic. DARPA researches a great many things but few are combat useful. No one is conducting any great amount of research into better cluster munitions, better artillery, better mines, etc. In other words, we tend to research far future technology at the expense of near term firepower and lethality. China and Russia, in particular, seem much more focused on near term firepower.

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    2. Agreed. While delving into far-future weapons has its place, it seems as if a deliberate effort to go through our weapons inventory and asking "how can we make a 10/25/50% improvement" in range, lethality, accuracy etc might be a better and more attainable use of the cubic dollars spent in the research department...

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  15. It also appears that lasers leave a plasma trail in their wake when fired in atmosphere - ie a giant finger pointing back to the origin.

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    1. Electrolasers are a subset of lasers, not a property of lasers. When you shine a red laser on the ground, you don't see a plasma trail - though you might see the beam diffracting off of particulates in the air. That latter effect could realistically reveal a ship's location with some laser designs, but this is a defensive weapon that won't be used until there's a kinetic or sensor threat - meaning you're already spotted and shot at or you're about to be.

      At sufficiently ludicrous power levels, a great variety of laser frequencies can produce plasma trails, but the frequency of light in electrolasers is typically fine-tuned to maximize absorption by air, ideally while minimizing absorption by the plasma it generates. Pulsed electrolasers of this type are valid military tools despite the fact that they are "Rather Observable" to fairly casual observers, again because these are defensive weapons and you presume that targets you have LoS on (those that you can fire a laser at) have spotted you.

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  16. Apparently the US Navy conducted another successful test of a laser weapon against a drone target on May 16, 2020. I don't know if this is enough to be considered a new development, but it's clear that the US Navy is still looking into laser weapons.

    https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/22/asia/us-navy-lwsd-laser-intl-hnk-scli/index.html

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