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Wednesday, March 27, 2019

Open Post

It's been while since the last open post so let's do it again.  This is your chance to offer a comment on whatever interests you.

Got a suggestion for a post topic?

Want to talk about something that's been neglected?

Want to tell me what you'd like more (or less) of?

Want to tell me how you'd make the blog better?

Want to give a shout out to your favorite foreign ship design?

Got a rant you want to get off your chest?

Have at it!

120 comments:

  1. Dakota Wood did an article recently on Real Clear Defense. Premise was that USMC has strayed from its amphibious roots. And that this capability will be sorely needed if we get in a hot war in the Pacific with China. Since this is a Navy + USMC problem, what thinks you ?

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    1. "what thinks you ?"

      What thinks I? Thinks I that Mr. Wood simply said all the same things we've discussed in these pages for years. I read the summary and skimmed the rest of the report (it's LONG!) so perhaps I've missed a key point somewhere but the report was mostly a history and description of the Marines - nice but only serves as background. He correctly identifies (as we did long ago) that the Marines have forgotten what their primary mission is. His recommendations to fix it are fine, as far as they go.

      My criticism of the report is that it fails to acknowledge any specifics. He talks about the generic nature of amphibious combat but fails to incorporate the specifics of, say, the Pacific theatre and China. Had he done so, he'd conclude that there is little use for the Marines in that case. We've discussed this, here.

      He also fails to recognize that the Marine's primary mission should be port seizure rather than over-the-beach assault.

      So, he has half the problem correct (the loss of focus) but fails to identify the primary mission and, because of that failure, does not offer any recommendations to accomplish that mission. In short, lots of words and not much value.

      More importantly, what do you think of it?

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  2. Update on Truman, are carriers any longer relevant.

    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dunford yesterday told the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2020 budget plan the decision to retire Truman early was based on money saved would be used to develop maritime strike capabilities in the mid-twenties. Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said though if program was not successful and there is no draw down in capacity until the mid-2020s "so it's not like this is an irreversible decision" to retire Truman.

    Questioned whether the Pentagon could meet its requirements to have two carriers continuously operating and three ready to deploy in a surge capacity with a nine-carrier force, General replied "Congressman, it would be difficult to do that". That could be interpreted as Navy need twelve nuclear carriers to be able to have max of five/40% operational at any one time.

    My analysis is that neither the F-18 or F-35 has the capability to carry a 7,000/8,000lb Mach 5+ hypersonic strike weapon with a low yield nuclear warhead and able to launch it at the necessary Mach ~2 speed required, both F-18 and F-35 are only max Mach 1.6 a/c, expect that's the reason why Pentagon is procuring the 4th generation Mach 2.2 F-15 for USAF, even though it was reported the USAF did not want new F-15s, just more F-35s. The Russians are using the Mach 3 MiG 31K as launch platform for the hypersonic Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile.

    A possible alternative for F-18/F-35 would be to develop a larger heavier more powerful booster to get the hypersonic boost glide attack missile up to speed, presume the extra weight made it a no go.

    CNO you have often highlighted the limited capabilities of the F-18/F-35 to previous generation carrier a/c, limiting carriers strike capabilities, Navy would need to resume build of F-14 which highly unlikely. So are carriers no longer worth the multi $Bs if not equipped with capable aircraft as they have limited attack options if they have to stand off 1,000 miles to survive against a peer enemy eg China.

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    1. "So are carriers no longer worth the multi $Bs if not equipped with capable aircraft as they have limited attack options if they have to stand off 1,000 miles to survive against a peer enemy eg China."

      Attack aircraft are simply not the best choice anymore for strike warfare - cruise missiles are. Thus, the carrier exists to establish local pockets of air superiority to enable missile strikes. The modern carrier is all about air superiority with a secondary strike role for lower threat strikes. My ideal air wing would have 4 squadrons of 12 air superiority fighters and 2 squadrons of strike aircraft. That's 72 aircraft. Throw in 4 E-2, 8 EA-18G, 10 ASW (S-3), 4 SigInt (ES-3A) and you've got a useful air wing.

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    2. "Attack aircraft are simply not the best choice anymore for strike warfare - cruise missiles are.". If so (I believe so) than we are in a world of hurt. All of our cruise missiles are slow, small, dated, or a combo of all the above. Affordability is based entirely on vulnerable GPS guidance vs more expensive guidance.

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    3. I've read, and like, your plan for CVN's providing pockets of air superiority.

      One thing I'd be curious about, and if you've covered it I apologize, is what, if any, future AEW might have.

      The E2D is an amazing bird, but with new long range missiles designed to get at AEW planes, I wonder if AEW is a thing of the past. They have to radiate to be effective, and to radiate seems to invite getting shot down.

      If CVN's don't have AEW or airborne control, how does that affect the CVN's ability to do air superiority?

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    4. "If so (I believe so) than we are in a world of hurt. "

      You got it! We desperately need a stealthy, survivable, capable, high speed, Tomahawk replacement - among other new weapons.

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    5. "ARW... long range missiles"

      This relates to that discussion of AirSea battle I mentioned. AEW, B-52, and even B2 require or greatly benefit from proximity to a fleet performing AAW - using both CV fighters and ship-based SAMs. This is a major function - on the same level as performing strikes - of the entire SAG or CVBG, not just the CV.

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    6. Meant "AEW... long range missiles". Android has no appreciation for military acronyms.

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    7. "If CVN's don't have AEW or airborne control,"

      Great question. Several answer paths:

      -Develop tactics for evading, decoying, intercepting, jamming, long range missiles.

      -Develop specific decoys targeted just for those missiles and have supporting aircraft positioned to deploy the decoys along the incoming missile flight path as opposed to decoys like flares which are deployed seconds before impact. This provides time and multiple opportunities to decoy the missile.

      -Emphasize passive monitoring more. Think ES-3A Shadow on steroids. This would require much more computing but we have that today. Recall all the descriptions about multi-static / backscatter radar being able to detect stealth aircraft? This would be the passive version of that. It just requires lots of computing power which, again, we have.

      -If you believe the F-35 program, they don't need an E-2 because they'll see everything and nothing will see them!

      -Develop much faster AEW aircraft. Incoming missile? Shut down and depart the missile's field of vision until it's gone. Combine this with multiple E-2s trading off the active control as they periodically need to shut down and dodge and you can still maintain continuous control.

      -Use smaller unmanned UAVs far out in front (as opposed to E-2s that hang back and are offset) to provide AEW. This does not address the control issue but does satisfy the early warning.

      In other words, there are likely several avenues we need to pursue to assure AEW and control in the face of very long range missile threats.

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  3. "What if" on Japan invasion of Hawaii in 1941. I rather like the analysis and the comments that follow.

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    1. I'll seriously consider it. The challenge is to produce something that is just paragraphs long rather than a book.

      What aspect of it would you focus on?

      What would you see as the initial scenario? Invade after sinking battleships? US never forward deployed? Something else?

      How would you see it playing out?

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    2. The invasion itself and the US response to it. If troops and transportation used for the Philippines were instead used for a December 8th invasion. I do believe there was a division earmarked for the Singaporean campaign that weren't used as well, so around 50k troops and around 200 tanks. I look forward to see what you come up with.

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    3. "My analysis is that neither the F-18 or F-35 has the capability to carry a 7,000/8,000lb Mach 5+ hypersonic strike weapon with a low yield nuclear warhead and able to launch it at the necessary Mach ~2 speed required, both F-18 and F-35 are only max Mach 1.6 a/c, expect that's the reason why Pentagon is procuring the 4th generation Mach 2.2 F-15 for USAF, even though it was reported the USAF did not want new F-15s, just more F-35s."

      Why the heck do we need fighters to be able to launch hypersonic nuclear weapons?

      This is not a capability anyone is calling for.

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    4. ""What if" on Japan invasion of Hawaii in 1941."

      The more I think about it, the better I like it. It's a great idea. I've started on it. It will take some time because I've got to think through the sequence of events and do some research but it will come. Have patience!

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  4. Drones are among the only—forgive the word—transformational tech touted that isn’t a steaming hot mess entirely. However the USN is a bit all over the place on what roles to use them in. I’ve seen you comment before on drones before but just as you have your ideal fleet structure, i’d Love to see a deep dive from you on it, give your “drone fleet” and where they should go.

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    1. This is an open-ended topic that depends entirely on what non-existent capabilities one wants to imagine the drones having.

      As the technology currently stands, the only effective use for drones is surveillance.

      As you imagine future capabilities, the uses increase to unlimited levels. Self-aware, self-directing, co-operative drone swarms relentlessly hunting down enemies, drones with lasers, drones that can convert from flying to swimming, etc.

      You see how there is no answer without putting bounds on the non-existent technology? Whatever bounds you choose are purely arbitrary so the exercise is almost meaningless.

      It may sound like I'm ducking the issue but it's too open-ended. You tell me … what level of capability should we imagine future drones to have? If you can answer than then we can construct a drone fleet and concept of operations for them.

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  5. How about a discussion of a topic you reference a lot, Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Broader, what should our grand strategy and priorities be? From that, how do we derive the appropriate CONOPS?

    I think we've had pretty much a reactionary strategy since the end of the Cold War--playing whack-a-mole around the world, and because we really don't know what we are doing, we don't do a great job of figuring out the manpower, resources, equipment, strategy, and tactics that we need to do not.

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    1. You understand, of course, that CONOPS refers to an individual platform. Thus, there are (or should be) as many CONOPS as there are platforms - that's quite a number! Also, there may be more than one CONOPS for a platform depending on who the enemy is. The CONOPS for, say, a destroyer might be different when engaged in a Chinese war than in a Russian war.

      As you know, military strategy derives from a geopolitical strategy which we have only in the broadest, vaguest sense. It would require a book length discussion to detail a global geopolitical strategy and the derived military strategy and, ultimately, individual CONOPS!

      You are absolutely correct that our 'strategy' is purely reactionary when it isn't just simple appeasement and even the appeasement is less a strategy than just the complete absence of any plan so it appears like appeasement (the Chinese annexation of the South China Sea, for example).

      So, I'm quite open to this but it's got to be narrowed down quite a bit to fit in a post! What fairly specific aspects would you like to see explored? Alternatively, perhaps you'd care to author a guest post on the subject?

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  6. How about :

    - Non-nuclear EMP weapons, use and defence against.
    - the threat of container-launched weaponry from civilian ships
    - an analysis of weapons being used by likely opponents that we don't use as they are deemed 'uncivilized'.
    - offensive mining & how the US could deniably deploy mines in key strategic choke points
    - tactical nuclear weapons at sea.

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    1. Those are some good ideas. Perhaps a general post on unconventional threats/weapons? I'll give this some serious thought. Thanks for the idea!

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    2. Regarding container-launched weaponry, this saw a short bit of discussion. The conclusion seems to be that it's a one-off. Once a Russian or Chinese merchant ship is used as a military asset, it's open season on said ships (if it wasn't already). If it's already open season... they're more target than threat - CNOps has pointed out the variety of flaws with trying to make "modular" weapons that can be installed on otherwise non-combat ships in discussions about the LCS and/or LHA.

      The question of deniably deploying mines (or anything else) is interesting, but it gets at something I think is even more interesting: who cares? Our enemies will assume it's us even if it's "plausibly deniable", and our allies are supposed to be our allies, they should be right alongside us laying mines.

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    3. "deniably deploying mines"

      This is only an issue during peacetime. During war, your enemy can safely assume it was you and you really don't care what they think. During peacetime, it's very hard to imagine a scenario in which the US would employ mines, thereby requiring deniability.

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    4. @Darth Anubis: UN conventions and the internationally accepted laws of war require you, as the mining party, to declare the minefields you have sowed.

      However, they don't require you to actually have gone out and mined those waterways...

      A fear the USN has had is that a belligerent would go "Hi I have mined the entire strait of hormuz" and seed just enough mines to keep people honest, requiring the USN to do their due dilligence and sweep the strait of mines, and keep that waterway closed. Take Desert Storm; minesweeping ops were only completed months after the ground war ended, and that was for a relatively small mined area.

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  7. Kind of meta, but I think a monthly or bi-monthly open post might do a lot of good if that interests you, CNOps. You've got a pretty large and engaged group of readers and contributors here that would gladly suggest topics (or particular articles) for discussion more regularly, and I think most of them are hesitant to get off topic on other posts.

    A on a less meta note, I'd suggest two topics, one on tactics and the other on strategy:

    Tactically, we've discussed AirSea Battle and its replacement doctrines generally, but I'd like to see a wargame scenario examining how Navy and Air Force capabilities would complement each other in one (or more) of a couple of likely crises. A regime change operation in Iran or NK, or a fight over the SCS. Something that would require us to bring a large fraction of our forces to bear, but limited enough that we don't have to start with a major review of our allies' capabilities like a Taiwan invasion would. A discussion of the relevant CONOPs would help inform future discussions about the design of various classes of warship.

    Strategically, I’d like to see a post examining and/or critiquing US grand strategy and/or our broad methods of achieving it. Based on statements from DoD and political figures, I presume that our grand strategy is effectively hegemony, referred to more often as “maintaining the status quo” and “sole superpower” status. A critique of the strategy itself shouldn’t be “hegemony is morally/ethically/politically wrong”, but more along the lines of “is hegemony a realistic goal for the USA in the 21st century with our allies support? Is it realistic without it?”. A discussion of our broad methods would begin with a description of the different tactics available to achieve victory in a Total War (which hegemony requires, even if the Total War progresses at a very low tempo as it is today). Do we aim to achieve a decisive military victory in the near future by investing in deep strike counterforce capabilities? Do we focus on defensive capabilities and deployments to economically maintain deterrence while we recapitalize our economy as a whole, or our armed forces in particular? Do we move to a wartime industrial economy, or continue to employ an unsustainable fraction of our population in the service sector, providing peacetime luxuries? Do we engage in low tempo open hostilities such as submarine warfare and blockades to stifle our foes’ economies? Or do we forgo the benefits of limited war and a wartime economy in the hopes that our enemies will underestimate our capabilities? Overall, I think hegemony is a realistic goal with our allies (maybe with a few more, if China finds some), but I think our methods for achieving it have left a lot to be desired. A discussion of grand strategy would also help inform best practices in warship acquisition, if not also design.

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    1. Yes, a global strategy discussion has been requested by a few people. The challenge is that to do it justice would require a book length discussion! Simplify it and people start jumping on all the simplifications and shortcuts. I'll have to see if I can figure out a reasonable way of breaking it into bite size chunks.

      The other danger in such a discussion is that it would likely devolve into purely political arguments. For example, if I were to say that our geopolitical strategy towards China should be total containment leading, ultimately, to 'shrinking' them back to a minimal territory and influence, I'd instantly get a wild, impassioned blizzard of pro-Chinese (to various degrees) rants. Thus, the analysis of the links between a political and military strategy would be lost in favor of purely political arguments. This is not a political blog and, at the moment, I don't want it to be. Thus, I'm at a loss as to how to broach the geopolitical strategy issue without descending into pure politics. Any thoughts?

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    2. "the challenge... book length"

      There are good shortcuts for this, like referencing existing DoD documents and/or reviews of US grand strategy instead of working nearly from scratch. This can be done without (over)simplifications in a longer than average - but not book-length - post. You seem to avoid paywalled sources (bless you), but some really great academic works on US grand strategy are free, and others are worth every penny. If you keep mostly avoiding paywalls, the only downside to greater reliance on sources is that it requires some more outside reading to fully understand the post.

      "politics"

      Like I said, "hegemony is bad" isn't an acceptable contribution. You have the power to moderate that, and the invest people with the authority to help on that front. Maybe critiquing US grand strategy necessarily leads to a bad place - it is a fundamentally political topic - but critiquing how we accomplish the apparent consensus strategy doesn't have to.

      That suggests a reasonable way to break things up as well. You could turn it into a recurring Grand Strategy series where you ask "Given the US desire to maintain sole superpower status and/or re-establish it shortly after China achieves strategic parity, will strategy X be effective at achieving this Grand Strategy" where "X" is a bite-sized topic like the decision to engage in low-end open hostilities (blockades, occasionally shelling one of the SCS bases, etc.) or not. We've dealt with a lot of those topics before in their own right, but tying it back to "how does this help us achieve our ultimate goal?" opens up a whole different type of discussion.

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    3. When and if you plan on writing such a post in the immediate, I'm happy to suggest some articles and DoD docs. Just let me know it's getting up on your priority list in a comment.

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    4. "critiquing how we accomplish the apparent consensus strategy doesn't have to."

      You've given me an idea, here, which is almost the same as what you suggest. In fact, maybe it is but just with different wording.

      Rather than throw out a specific geopolitical strategy like 'squash China like a bug' which, no matter what the strategy is, will just trigger a bunch of political posturing for or against, I could offer a more general 'principles of assembling a geopolitical strategy'. A specific strategy is not presented, just the underlying considerations that ought to go into formulating one.

      What do you think? Would that be worthwhile?

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    5. "principles of assembling a geopolitical strategy"

      This is a great place to start if you're going to discuss what Grand Strategy we have adopted, and how it serves our interests. That is not what I suggested, but I think it is certainly worthwhile in its own right (in its own post) and as a precursor to a discussion of what I suggested.

      What I envisioned is that, after briefly describing our apparent grand strategy and accepting it (or after another post in which we discuss what Grand Strategy would best suit our interests), we would analyze different sub-strategies and tactics. Simultaneously discussing which grand strategy to use and how best to implement it is far too broad, as you noted.

      For instance, if we accept hegemony as our grand strategy, do we seek to maintain it by focusing on recapitalizing our economy and industrial complex, or do we need to impose costs through blockades and/or attrition, or is that still insufficient given the economies of our allies and adversaries, requiring us to seek a decisive victory in the near future?

      This kind of discussion would be predicated on an understanding and acceptance of what we mean by hegemony. Questions like whether this includes current levels of intervention in the Middle east (it certainly implies maintaining the *ability* to do so), whether we can afford to do so, and the level/type of contributions we demand from our allies towards this strategy must be described and accepted first - whether as a given or as a result of a previous discussion such as the one you describe in the last comment.

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    6. Hmm … I see, I think, what you're driving at but I note that your comment alone is almost a blog post length and that's without any actual discussion of the topic!

      Do I understand you correctly that you're suggesting setting forth a Grand Strategy in a post and then subsequent discussions would be about implementation? If so, how do I, as the post author, choose a Grand Strategy? Or, if I'm not the one to choose it, who is? Or, do you envision a series of posts each dedicated to a different Grand Strategy?

      I can see a Grand Strategy as being almost a dedicated blog of its own and, indeed, there are geopolitical blogs out there that, presumably, talk about this subject.

      I like this subject and I'm going to keep chewing on how to present it. Feel free to give me more thoughts on implementation since I'm floundering a bit.

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    7. "setting forth a Grand Strategy in a post"

      What I originally called for is to just accept that the US grand strategy is hegemony, aka maintaining sole superpower status, and yes, then discuss possible implementations as their own posts. Your second comment suggested starting from principles of assembling a grand strategy, then maybe selecting a strategy as one post. I like that as its own post. If you're going to do it at all, it should come before what I suggested.

      However, like you said, starting all the way from there will require 2-3 more posts and turn this into somewhat of a geopolitical blog. I didn't suggest this to do so, and a more limited discussion of how to achieve hegemony (one post covering several options, then we accept one), the navy's strategic role in that (one dedicated post), and the tactics that could achieve the Navy's specific aims (one post per tactic, maybe start with one building/reviewing the list) could then inform the kind of discussion that we more typically have here. That's still broad enough that it requires several posts, but I think the tactical discussions at the end in particular are worthwhile to understand some strategically useful missions the Navy could perform that aren't "squash the PLAN like a bug"... not that that isn't desirable.

      "blog post length"

      A previous comment noted that you can skip a lot of background with some "required reading" given in citations. You could get a lot of content in a short length if it is all analysis, and no review of the citations. My comments have described the scope (in some detail, with examples!) of several posts worth of Grand Strategy, sub-strategy, and tactics. The breakdown into individual posts should yield reasonable post lengths. The question is whether the series overall is worth your time. If not, you've got a willing contributor.

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    8. "The question is whether the series overall is worth your time. If not, you've got a willing contributor."

      I very much like the subject. In addition to the question of breakdown, which we've kicked around, here's some additional concerns I have:

      1. Every time I've even tiptoed near political topics, the discussion inevitably degenerates into 'I'm right and you're wrong' comments being thrown back and forth with little or no rational analysis or logic applied. Such is the nature of modern political discussions, I'm afraid. There are two solutions. One is to eliminate comments for that topic but that kind of defeats the purpose of a blog post. The other is to moderate the comments prior to publishing and impose a higher standard. I would have no problem with the later but it would anger readers which, again, is counterproductive, to a degree.

      2. Choosing only a single grand strategy is, inherently, limiting. For instance, my grand strategy for the US would not be 'sole superpower'. It would be more along the lines of responsible world community. If a responsible country, such as the UK, wanted to become a superpower, that would be fine. China, on the other hand, is irresponsible and I'd want to prevent that. So, choosing only one grand strategy is limiting. That's not necessarily a problem but it is limiting.

      I've already started a post on foundational principles of a grand strategy. That would, as you say, appear first. What comes second is the still uncertain part.

      The alternative approach is for a guest author, such as yourself, if you had sufficient interest, to put forth their own grand strategy and implications for people to digest and discuss. This has the advantage of taking it out of the realm of me 'imposing' my view on readership (as I normally do!) and, instead, simply presenting a guest author's view - one among, potentially, many.

      What do you think of any of these thoughts?

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    9. (1 of 2)

      "1. Every time... two solutions... to a degree"

      Certainly the latter. The first option does not avoid angering the readers and eliminates any chance at productive comments, and not moderating at all just ensures they anger each other more than is worthwhile. I understand your desire to maintain readership. If I had my own blog, it would be on my mind as well. That said, you're not in a position to be dictated to by "the ratings"; as I understand it, you've made this blog so you have somewhere to discuss these topics with competent and interested people, not to make money or entertain people. If you do cover (and promote discussion of) the political dimensions of this topic, I'd point out that explicit guidelines can go a long way. Most reasonable people will try to follow them, and will be a lot more understanding if a comment that is clearly pushing the guidelines gets moderated.

      "2. choosing only a single strategy... but it is limiting"

      Covering multiple grand strategies is more content. There will be some overlap in which sub-strategies and tactics are effective in achieving one grand strategy or another (collective security and hegemony look mostly similar, with some key differences), but doing justice to multiple grand strategies - even if pursued in parallel - will require significantly more work.

      As I mentioned, I think the "payoff" from this series - the part that is most valuable to our more typical discussions - is in understanding how certain sub-strategies and tactics help achieve the USA's Grand Strategy, and how the USN will be expected to figure into that. We only get that payoff if we're confident that we've identified the correct Grand Strategy(ies) and the optimal sub-strategies and tactics for achieving it.

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    10. (2 of 2)

      "responsible world community"

      That sounds a lot like Posen's "liberal hegemony", the fusion of primacy and collective security. Basically, "USA + Allies = hegemon" instead of "USA = hegemon":

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_strategy#Today

      Especially if you define "responsible country" as "US ally" in the same way that we define "rogue state" as "non-US-ally attempting to disrupt the USA's primacy in their region". Not that there's anything wrong with that, it's just a statement that we effectively treat our allies as part of the USA, and non allies as part of the USSR (or CIS, or whatever they're calling it these days). The one problem I have with this is that - if we place comparable value on our allies' population as our own - it renders us unable to fight conventional (never mind nuclear) strategic wars in Europe and the Western Pacific without suffering unacceptable losses to our (Allies') population centers. If your definition of "responsible country" isn't limited to US allies, I'm pretty confident that it isn't representative of current or recent US grand strategy, and I don't necessarily think it's wise.

      "guest author"

      I am certainly interested - and I'd be honored - but I would want to do it right and that would take time. Personally, I'm a proponent of a limited period of Selective Engagement and/or Restraint *for the purpose of* recapitalizing our (and our allies') economy, followed by a return to Primacy/Hegemony. However, that is a *massive* shift from what I perceive as the current US Grand Strategy (as a cursory glance at the US economy will show), and a description of how to go about it and its likely results would be more speculation than analysis. If I author a post on this topic, I would probably argue the Grand Strategic justification(s) for a surprise escalation to step 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, or 43 on Kahn's Escalation Ladder:

      https://wiki.baloogancampaign.com/index.php/Kahn%27s_Escalation_Ladder

      Forgive the dual wiki links. The first is nicely written, and the second is one of the only places to find that document, and has the best description of the steps on the ladder.

      I would likely - among other things - analyze this scenario and ask "is this a victory or a defeat for the USA?":

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jY7R3vIJyJU&list=PLgRuKky0mojYm-eIPVoJdRPEXHccOiGDL

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    11. Sent an email, signed as Luke.

      Regarding that youtube video. It's only worth the 2.5 hours to watch if you (and whoever reads this) enjoy wargames and aren't familiar with CMANO. I'm going to summarize it below for anyone who doesn't fit that bill.

      Scenario: Baloogan attempts a nuclear counterforce salvo on all of China's second strike nuclear forces using a reasonable fraction of the USN and USAF's forces, modeling most of the Chinese defenses that could actually affect his strike. Aside from a single YAL-1 flying over Japan, all of his forces are realistic. The strike itself is comprised of (in chronological order) B2-launched gravity bombs, B-52-launched cruise missiles, and Ohio-launched SLBMs.

      Timeline: The first component achieves total surprise, and quickly triggers the second component which arrives before low-alert nuclear forces have launched. Baloogan makes forgiving assumptions about China's general nuclear readiness; they declare war on the USA within 4 minutes of the first B2 strike and fire high alert forces less than a minute later. A comment points out how very generous this is in part 5. The SLBM salvo is unrealistically unable to target the high- or low-alert nuclear forces because it *is* realistically delayed; it is launched targeting radars, air bases, naval bases, and cities at about the same time as China launches their retaliatory strike. This is where the tactics and results of this scenario start to get progressively unrealistic and pessimistic.

      Outcome: Baloogan then models US BMD efforts against a slightly degraded retaliatory salvo against its regional bases and allies, and a highly degraded salvo against CONUS. Critically, despite the recursively botched job on the strike and the BMD modeling, CONUS completely shrugs off the retaliatory strike. Japan and many of our regional bases suffer considerable damage. The scenario underestimated PLA defenses in several ways, but it also underestimated US command capabilities and available forces in many more significant ways, partly by simple misplay on Baloogan's part. And... we still... won?

      Japan clearly didn't. China clearly didn't. But, did the USA?

      That's the question that choosing between hegemony and liberal hegemony asks. It is both a critical moral question and a critical operational question. If this scenario is realistic, hegemony says strategic victory is realistic, whereas liberal hegemony sets a much higher - possibly unattainable - bar for strategic victory. I think that's a fundamentally hairy thing to argue in a post, which is another part of why I recommended assuming one or the other.

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  8. I would like to touch on Cyber warfare, not from the tech side but on the perspective of manning the rush to being competitive in cyber warfare.

    The Brits have a program called TechVets where they train UK veterans in cybersecurity for free. I would love the see the Navy do something similar but on a more planned an extensive basis. Recent vets, especially wounded vets, could be actively recruited and trained. Instead of being placed as a civilian employee or placed in an enlisted slot that will top out quickly, we could create a special corps of Warrant Officers with a special career track. As veterans-- especially those who’ve seen combat-- they already understand the military life, how to work in military/combat environment, and can appreciate serving their country better than a guy hired out college for a lower than prevalent (for tech) wage by a military contractor.

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    1. That's an excellent idea. The only flaw in it is that cyber, like any other skill, requires an inherent aptitude to be very, very good at it which is what this level of cyber warfare requires. Only a relative few have that degree of inherent aptitude. Trying to train people without that aptitude will produce mostly moderately skilled people. Whether that's of use in the cyber warfare arena, I don't know. Maybe there is a place for that level of skill. There's a reason why the stereotype of a hacker is a young person - they've been raised on digital technology and have the combination of aptitude and experience/exposure to excel at it.

      Still, the idea is well worth exploring.

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    2. A surprising amount of bad guy hackers are "script kiddies" meaning they know how to use password crackers, vulnerability checkers, spoofing software, etc. but don't even know rudimentary programming. Similarly while Aegis is an incredibly sophisticated system but you don't have to know how to program the software on it to fire an SM-3 to take down a plane. So think of Cyber warfare in the same vein as existing Navy equipment. Some use systems, some understand systems and the navy has both kinds of personnel. Those who show aptitude for higher level work may get assigned to working with decryption software for enemy server farms that requires more undrestanding while the "script kiddie" level can use software that is sophisticated internally (like Spy-1, Aegis, or ECM pods) but has an interface that those of a moderate skill level you can use.
      (I removed the other post due to numerous typing errors--iPhones are not conducive to good writing).

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    3. Makes sense. I know very little about our cyber activities. Where are we getting our personnel now?

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    4. From what I can tell studying things online, we seem all over the place. I have seen it debated online a lot about how the Navy should go about it whether as officers, enlisted, civilian government employees, etc. A lot of it is being done with contractors (surprise). The Navy is also currently pushing officer tracks like the Computer Warfare Engineering officer, and enlisted positions such as Cyber Security Specialist. They have also stood up a new USNR Cyber unit, so it makes you wonder if they are going to focus on Reserves for Cyber or merely supplementing.
      I have seen that they have problems with the officer track because a butter bar with a degree in computer systems engineering isn’t going to make nearly what they would make on the outside, and many colleges with the best programs are none too military friendly. At least with pilots, while they might make more on the outside with an aeronautical degree, in the Navy they get to learn to fly jets which is always a good recruiting method. While the enlisted positions have a good description, it also looks like nearly the same description of the officer career tracks. Speaking as someone not currently in the military, let alone cyber warfare, I can’t speak for those in the positons, but I what I see looks like a lot of redundancy.

      Which is why I was thinking about the veterans as WO’s. If they were prior enlisted (or current enlisted in an equivalent position) there would be the incentive of coming back in with new training, better pay but more independence and a separate, more open career track. And those with combat sustained disabilities that might hinder them both inside and outside the military could find a new lease on life as these positions wouldn’t have the physical requirements.

      Ironically the Navy used to lead at this stuff. The TOR browser that people now use to access the so-called Dark Web was developed by the Navy as means for intelligence officers and covert SEAL units to communicate over the web from unfriendly nations. And at least one Burke class destroyer is actually named after a leader in computing, the Hopper. Named after Admiral Grace Hopper a pioneer in computers.

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    5. One of the problems in cyberwarfare is that each service is creating its own cyber units, to varying degrees. While this makes the cyber effort somewhat service specific and, therefore, more useful, it also leads to enormous duplication of effort. On the other hand, overarching, joint units tend to get bogged down in bureaucracy and fail to specifically support the individual services. So, no easy solution.

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    6. Definitely no easy solution. One thing that we might discuss is what should the Navy specifically focus on. The official statements from the Navy sound like the ones from the Air Force, which sounds like the ones from DOD, which sounds like rehashed versions of the ones from DHS. The Cyber Command joint whatever can focus on “the big picture”. What should the Navy focus on?
      Should we focus on protecting commercial maritime? The largest cyber-attack in history took down entire ports in 2017 and cost more than 10 billion in damages to Maersk and other companies. And that was actually just collateral damage as the starting point of the attack was banks in the Ukraine. (Excellent article in Sept issue of Wired magazine). If commercial ports can have systems wiped out by hackers that could be a major problem for naval resupply. Commercial ships have even been hijacked by hackers who put ransomware their navigation systems while a ship was nearing hazards.
      Perhaps they should trying to block the Chinese from stealing from Naval contractors (which was a front page Wall street Journal article). Should the USN do their own cryptographic work on breaking enemy codes or leave that to the NSA? A perspective from a purely naval perspective might help at least the USN get it’s cyber priorities straight.

      With regard to unified cyber warfare, I'm not a big fan of the huge joint commands because they often turn into their own branch as the Spec Ops has basically become. Thus our SEALs who might want to focus on something, oh let's say NAVAL, like mining ships, shore recon or other things frogmen should do. Instead they humping mountains in Afganistan and many of them are barely in the water.

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    7. The Navy should be concerned with cyber as it directly affects the Navy's ships, aircraft. A DoD level cyber organization can deal with military facilities and supporting industries. To do otherwise is to invite seriously wasteful overlap, duplication, and dilution of effort.

      The problem with asking the Navy to be cyber-responsible for their own bases and facilities is, where do you draw the line? Should they also be cyber-responsible for, say, suppliers to provide food, parts, transportation, etc. that a base depends on? Should they be cyber-responsible for the defense industry suppliers that build Navy ships and weapons? Should they be cyber-responsible for the suppliers (sub contractors) who supply the defense industry? How about the sub-subcontractors? Where does the chain of responsibility end? If the Air Force and Navy both use a common supplier do they each impose their own cyber-responsibility in a duplication of effort?

      The only reasonable approach is to let the services be responsible for their direct assets and let a DoD level group handle the rest. There will always be some degree of duplication and overlap but that's the best that can be done.

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  9. I like the idea of the drone discussion.

    Some possible parameters could be no BVR networking available. Full autonomy and/or a visual range network only.
    Some level of self-learning, and sensor fusion to be able to handle a decent sized sphere of battlespace using passive sensors only while utilizing the advantages of a non-colloidal (G tolerance for example).

    Conventional weapons only, in the sense of non-nuclear weapons that are likely available in the near term.

    This brings up reusable vs one-time (because range), and whether you could deploy such a thing from a carrier.

    I would also love to see a discussion on BVR data networking and the likelihood of it surviving more than a short time in a peer war. That same track leads to carriers being/not being vulnerable to space-based ISR.

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    1. Space assets have been around now for decades BUT with Russia and especially China gearing up in space in the coming decades, what will be the impact on USN? Is there something we are missing, something new on the horizon or business as usual?

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    2. There are a number of answers that jump out.

      Detection of assets like nuclear submarines and carriers becomes easier as ISR tools like neutrino detectors become more accurate and compact.

      National Technical Means are serverely limited in availability and duration over target.

      ASAT technology is getting steadily better. Its much easier to hit something with a known orbit. ICBMs or IRBMs are another thing completely. ABM technology is still very iffy however. I believe there was a dual-launch Ground-Based Midcourse Defense test this week. Its been ten years in the making.

      https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/27144/two-interceptors-launched-from-california-to-swat-icbm-in-most-ambitious-missile-defense-test-yet

      Some excellent comments on BMD generally follow this article.

      https://www.technologyreview.com/s/541146/map-of-the-worlds-neutrinos-exposes-nuclear-activity-wherever-its-happening/

      If you want to find a Nuke, look for its Neutrinos.

      http://scholar.google.ca/scholar_url?url=https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a434352.pdf&hl=en&sa=X&scisig=AAGBfm2B01X1StgYuFO7MdA7vFEQkFZcMw&nossl=1&oi=scholarr

      Very good paper on near-space and the challenges and opportunities. I suspect this is where the big developments are going to happen. Puts control of major ISR assets back in the hands of theater commanders at a more reasonable cost.

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    3. The world's most sophisticated neutrino detector is newly built in China.

      From their website:"JUNO is going to improve the precision of Δm221, Δm232 and sin2θ12 to be better than 1%. Considering the precision of sin2θ13 can be measured to ~4% by Daya Bay, the unitarity of the neutrino mixing matrix can be probed to 1% level. Besides, JUNO has other scientific possibilities such as supernova neutrinos, geo-neutrinos, solar neutrinos, atmospheric neutrinos, and exotic searches."

      I would define looking for aircraft carriers and submarines as an exotic search. Remember that neutrinos pass straight through the earth without interaction in most cases, so a big neutrino detector can track in a complete sphere. Pretty certainly not tracking grade guidance, but maybe enough to tell you where to start looking with more local assets.

      I think the days of the carrier being effectively invulnerable are fast coming to an end. I suspect we may see the nuclear submarine headed down the same road. AIP anyone?

      There has been a lot of discussion about the Chinese ballistic missile threat against ships being overstated. Personally, I believe if they don't have the ability today it coming very quickly. We tend to underestimate the rate of Chinese progress at our peril. The reality is they are number one in the world in a decent number of technology areas and still seem to be accelerating fast. I suspect there are very good reasons to be wary of the Chinese A2\AD zone way beyond the traditional naval/air power viewpoint.

      When they can achieve pinpoint delivery of ballistic missiles, any potential A2/AD zone just got a lot bigger in the event of hostilities.

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    4. Neutrino detection is fascinating. Thanks for the links. However, the technology is still so far from any practical tactical application that it belongs in the 'far future', nearly scifi realm.

      To the best of my very limited knowledge, there is no such thing as a detector that can determine range and bearing. As I understand it, simply interpreting the raw data of neutrino detection to even verify a particle detection event is a complicated, time consuming process.

      The world map that was presented in one of the articles appears to have been laboriously assembled from years worth of data and likely required months/years to assemble - not exactly tactical speed! By the time the analysis were performed (setting aside issues of range and bearing) the sub would be long gone from the detection location.

      Hey, it's easy to criticize emerging technologies and my purpose is simply to point out the far, far distant time frame for producing anything worthwhile from this technology. That said, it's fascinating and well worth investing in R&D.

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    5. I believe you're right on range and bearing. I expect that eventually you may get bearing, and you are always going to need triangulation to get range.

      I see this more like MAD in some ways. It can tell you something is out there, but you're going to have to put some effort into finding out where.

      Seems to me the pace of change is accelerating fast in the tech world. I'm working with things now that seemed like science fiction just a few years ago.

      I'm not at all sure western military planners are keeping up. That paper on near space is an excellent example. They are having a heck of a time getting the military on board with the idea of a small, stealty, inexpensive, highly capable ISR platform that can loiter on the edge of space for months at a time an "stare!!" at a battlespace.

      There is nothing like that available today. Space-based is too expensive and can't loiter, because orbital mechanics. Air breathers don't have the loiter time and aren't survivable in a peer war.

      The raw science to make this work today is already out there. Putting it together is just fiddly bits with a bit of money to glue it all together. :)

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  10. Great stuff from everyone. The topic of WW2 Normandy, German attacking UK (Sea Lion), ops in Pacific (island hoping) were all great posts in the past few weeks, especially the Pearl Harbor and reaction of US and really put a twist into something that 100s of books have been written about! I can't wait to see more development of those topics.

    My thought for a topic is a bit of a derivative: we always hear how history repeats itself, we should learn from the past,etc,etc....but is that true for every historical battle/war? What are the lessons that we should be learning and which ones should we discard? My example would be China and SSC islands...we usually go back to USN/USMC ops in WW2 but are ALL those lessons applicable today? Japan of 1939/45 economy, military, relations with USA are not even close to China in 2019....how much and how many past lessons apply today? Are we applying lessons to detriment of better ones? Are we married to old ideas like carriers?

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    1. You're correct that not every lesson from history is appropriate for today. For example, one of the possible lessons from the Civil War was that we need more men to march straight toward the enemy in order to overwhelm them. On the other hand, the converse of that lesson would be that marching straight at the enemy is incredibly stupid.

      This also illustrates that one can draw multiple lessons from the same event and that not all lessons are 'good'. The challenge for the historian is to determine the correct lesson.

      So, what lessons from history do you think are not applicable today?

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  11. Outside of the acquisition procress (and it artificially high price because of it), what do you think of the raising of precision and firepower of the m27 program? In other word outside the corruption, making every rifleman a DM and LMG (by current standards). I know the "forgotten weapons"/"inrange tv" on youtube are quite fan of it, I wonder if you are critical of it.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQWx9myZ47E

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    1. I haven't used it and it's a land weapon (on a naval blog!) so I really have no opinion. I note that it seems to represent a decrease in volume of fire in exchange for the ability to act as a single shot rifle. This is symptomatic of the modern military - trying to make every platform and piece of equipment do the job of every other. This rarely (never) works out well because the multi-function item is always a compromise of the individual items. That said, I have no detailed knowledge of this gun so I, again, I have no opinion.

      I wonder if this is also symptomatic of the military's trend towards less firepower. We've become so peacetime conscious of collateral damage that we've dumbed down weapons and significantly reduced our firepower. Again, just speculation on my part.

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    2. It is actually an increase in firepower. It is basically a m16 modified to be able to sustain full automatic fire longer. It is also able to do quite precise shooting (not sniper level, just designated marksmen level). The trade off is more expensive (and the stupid procurement program make it crazy expensive when it should just be more expensive) and few pounds more. The former is the sign of corrupt and in need of reform procurement system. The latter is a debate between the extra firepower and weight.

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    3. The M27 is intended to replace the M249 machine gun. In that comparison it apparently suffers a bit in volume of fire. The Wiki article on the M27 documents the shortcomings and strengths. I don't know whether the Marines intend the M27 to replace the M16/4 as well.

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    4. There has been plan to replace the m16 with the m27, but nothing came so far. As a replacement for the m249, I would not be a fan at all.

      https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/marines-want-m27-automatic-rifle-replace-m16-congress-and-army-aren%E2%80%99t-so-sure-27912

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  12. Actually, that could be a post. Why are we constantly downgrading firepower? Even as your last post on LST, why can't we produce a number of SIMPLE weapons systems? Why do we constantly load everything up with everything under sun? Not saying we should only do simple BUT for some weapon systems like an LST, their strength is their simplicity.

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    1. I have harped on our lack of focus (almost abandonment) on firepower. Instead, we're in a headlong pursuit of data, networking, sensor fusion, etc. There comes a point where simple, devastating area bombardment doesn't really require all that high tech digital stuff. The Russians understand that principle with their emphasis on artillery.

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  13. I wonder about more discussion on naval posture in general. It appears we always talk about a naval force poised to “win wars”. I am not sure in today’s environment that is the best application, or maybe just the way we are doing it. It suggests a reactive posture (after all, we aren’t going to start any wars), which in and of itself is not so bad but when combined with the fact that in reality, our fleet is a smaller version of such a war-winning fleet, as it is optimized more for efficiency, not effectiveness, is perplexing. It seems it is designed to be able to do many different ops, (just not the most important ones).
    What if we took the approach of structuring into deterrence and maneuver forces? That is, deploy a fleet consisting of regionalized “Deterrence” Forces in each region of interest and “Maneuver” Forces not tied to a particular region. Deterrence forces would be designed to deny & punish. That is, interdict aggression, impose costs, and provide staying power until offensive capacity is depleted. At which point we would have the maneuver forces (with higher capacity offensive capabilities) come in to reinforce and sustain combat operations. It seems more in tune with the type of scenarios that occur currently. Is it even possible with our current inventory? What platforms would make up these forces? Is there a different/better approach? Or is the one today the right one? I don’t know hence the suggestion as a topic.

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    1. "structuring into deterrence and maneuver forces? "

      We already have that, to a large extent. The Marines and some Army rapid response forces are the deterrent and crisis response forces while the Army with its armored forces is the 'maneuver' force that follows on, if needed.

      The Combatant Commander structure is also intended as a deterrent 'force'. Each regional commander requests the forces he believes are needed to deter war within his region. That's the theory - the practice is quite a bit different.

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  14. Last year the Marines decided that the optimal squad size is 12. The new amphibs (ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2) carry crew plus 9 and 17 respectively. Why don't they carry a full squad? If your optimal squad size is 12, wouldn't you design the amphib to carry that?

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    1. Yes, you would think that a combat vehicle would be sized to carry whole multiples of squads. That said, the squad appears to be a nebulous number with add-ons frequently being attached so up to 17 might often be a 'squad'. Still, it does seem a mismatch and I've never heard a good explanation or justification for it.

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    2. The Marines are reducing their squads from 13 to 12, so your original question still applies. A Marine Infantry Company typically consists of 3 infantry platoons, a weapons platoon, and a headquarters platoon and totals about 180 strong. A Marine Infantry can be transported ashore with a platoon of 12 AAVs (only the Marines would call 12 vehicles a platoon). The extra seating allows each vehicle to carry the remaining elements of the company plus attached personnel like corpsemen and forward observers.

      The Army has the opposite problem as their Bradley IFVs cannot carry a full 9-man squad. In this case, the dismount element (3 x 9-man squads) are spread among the 4 IFVs in the platoon.

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    3. So a rifle platoon would land in 3 ACV 1.2, one 12 man squad per vehicle, and each vehicle would also carry 5 other non squad personnel. AAV same concept but is 13 plus 4. I need to dig, but did the study that said 12 is best also want to increase the tag alongs? I.e, did they address optimal AAV replacement capacity?
      I know ComNavOps likes equipment to flow from doctrine, but I question if the 17 number on ACV 1.2 is doctrine or tradition driven.

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    4. "ComNavOps likes equipment to flow from doctrine,"

      Right!

      I strongly suspect that the ACV started from a fixed size and then designed around that instead of defining the tactical need (number of troops) and designing around that which would be the proper approach. But … I don't know for sure.

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  15. Okay. My suggestion is an Aegis battleship. I know you prefer single-purpose designs, but consider:

    1 Chuck Myers, while working on reactivating the Iowas, determined that removing the rear turret would provide room for 320 mk 41 VLS cells.

    2 The Navy claims the AN/SPY-6 needs a 6.1 meter radar dish to be effective as a ballistic missile defense, but the Arleigh Burkes are limited to 4.3 meter radars.

    So, propose an Iowa-type fast battleship, with 2 triple 16" guns, 10 8" guns (because 5" are obsolete, being "dual purpose", but ineffective at both purposes), and 320 mk 41 cells.

    The most frequent argument against battleships is the short range of their weapons. But cruise missiles out range carrier-launched aircraft. And the Aegis system and heavy armor are complementary. They both enhance the ships survivability. And because it's providing missile defence for the entire fleet, it's important to place Aegis on the least vulnerable ship. The number of VLS cells may seem excessive, but it allows you to a variety of (short range, long range, anti-air, anti-ship, etc.)

    An Aegis battleship would be simultaneously: The most effective air and missile defence system of any navy; it could sink any surface warship stupid enough to attack it; all while providing better shore bombardment and gunfire support than the rest of the Navy, combined.

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    1. "Refurbishing BB's."

      I believe that the Navy has permanently retired the BB's, with no further possibility of bringing them back. The power plants would have to be replaced etc. etc. etc.

      A light Cruiser of about 14-15,000 tons built on a tri-miran(sp?) hull could accommodate the big antennae plus an abundance of power plants for additional energy weapons. Also, the Navy wanted "Flag accommodations" on the next gen DD, it would seem more desirable to have 16 CCG's than 65+ DD's with staterooms that will rarely be used.

      Trying to put 8" guns on an Aegis/ ABM platform is one too many primary missions. Anti-ship missiles are the better way to sink warships. A dedicated heavy Cruiser is the appropriate way to conduct shore bombardment, AND provide the core for an offensive surface element for the fleet.

      If each CCG has 144 VLS having 10 at sea provides 1,400 VLS, the equivalant of 4 BB's meaning at least 5 BB's will be required to have 4 at sea. Lastly, having only 4 ABM capable ships means our enemy has a new primary target, and the loss of a single BB becomes disaster. Please remember that damaging the Antennae is enough to mission kill the ship.

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    2. Interesting idea on using a heavy CC for shore bombardment and a CG for the ABM role. I think there are scenarios where BBs are superior all-around for shore bombardment (w/ or w/o VLS), based on prior discussions here. However, your point about mission killing an Aegis BB is spot on. To add to that, the 320 VLS metric is based on putting them all in one spot. That's a big weak link in the BB's otherwise exceptional armor, and a very scary way to store missiles, especially when this ship is expected to use its guns. A clean design BB with up to 200 peripheral VLS and/or larger ASM silos could make sense as an attack platform, but the point still stands about the radar being a relatively easy mission kill. CNOps discussed a retractable, armored suite of radars - this could make a clean Aegis BB design viable, but I still agree that a CG is more optimal.

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    3. The major conceptual problem with this Aegis battleship is cost. A battleship of any flavor would be expensive … very expensive. Adding Aegis, two or three hundred VLS, extra power generation systems, additional cooling systems, an expansive air combat control suite and facilities for AAW command and control, extra manning and berthing, etc. will simply make a very, very expensive ship even more expensive and ensure that we only build a couple (witness the Zumwalt drop from 32 to 3 as costs rose!).

      Further, the higher the cost of the ship, the more risk averse we'll be about using it in combat for fear of losing it. That's one of the major problems with the Fords. I can't see anyone committing a $15B Ford to combat (which, of course, raises the question, 'why have it?').

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    4. "Please remember that damaging the Antennae is enough to mission kill the ship."

      Not in modern naval warfare. All ships are networked locally via cooperative engagement. A ship that loses sensors can use the sensor data from another ship. I don't believe that a region-wide computing network will work in an ECM environment but a local, ship-to-ship cooperative engagement type network should work acceptable well.

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    5. If you believe wikipedia, the reason why the Aegis system wasn't ever installed aboard Iowa-class BBs was because the overpressure from the 16-inch guns would knock the electronics out of alignment.

      Of course, if you believe certain other sources, there's talk about saboted scramjet rounds fired out of 16-inch guns that might just be able to intercept ballistic missiles too.

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  16. CNO;

    Could we have an article on near future ships. Possibly including key designs such as stealth, power plants, weapons and electronics? What should the Navy build in the near future?

    I know we have had posts on several ships like the stealth Corvette, how about 1 that brings them all together?

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    1. If you haven't yet, take a look at the Fleet Structure page at the top of the blog. It lays out the types of ships and weapon/sensor fits for each, at least briefly. I will be doing additional, dedicated posts of a few of those types, in the future. For example, my version/vision of a destroyer (nothing like a Burke!) will get an eventual post.

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  17. What would you say our chances of getting a decent S-3 equivalent capability any time soon.

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  18. It would definitely be expensive, but it fills two roles (ballistic missile defense and shore bombardment) that currently unfilled. Besides that, it could realistically tank up to a dozen mines, torpedoes, or cruise missiles. None of our current warships can do that.

    And as Robert Heinlein used to observe, there's nothing as expensive as a second-best military.

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  19. War is coming. That should be the basis for our decision making. Some thoughts based on this:

    The 2020 budget has $25 billion set aside for current combat operations. If we could find a way to wind down those operations, that funding would go a long way to closing some of our capability gaps.

    The budget also calls for buying 'preferred munitions at the maximum production rate.' Those production rates would not come close to meeting expenditures during a real war. It is likely worth investing in some spare capacity so we could ramp up production faster if necessary, even if we never need it. Reserve production capacity for planes, ships and subs wouldn't be a bad idea either. And it goes without saying that whatever equipment can be preserved as reserves, should be.

    Our 'deployments' should reflect an expectation of combat

    ⦁ Forward bases in Guam, Japan, Diego Garcia, etc. should be hardened where possible, have dispersed ammo, fuel and maintenance/repair equipment, and should have plans for dispersing aircraft and ships quickly. And if tensions are low, let's not park a lot of valuable equipment within arm's reach of potential enemies. Let's not make them attractive targets, incenting a first strike.

    ⦁ Secondary/back up facilities should be prepared. We should study which locations could be useful and what capacities they might need. Saipan, Tinian, and possibly even Wake/Midway come to mind. We have a hell of a logistics train to build and protect.

    ⦁ Create some real, dedicated mine-warfare capability. Huge outage today.

    ⦁ Instead of deployments, planes and ships should be based in the US to maximise training and maintenance. If they are deployed, it should be for short periods or for war.

    In addition to having a strategy and a procurement policy based on it, we should also be focusing on building capability in general.

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  20. This about the condition of the Naval Shipyards and in particular about the Drydocks that can hold the Carriers.

    https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=16&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-7rvfq6vhAhWL4J4KHURoDrw4ChAWMAV6BAgEEAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fcraighooper%2F2019%2F03%2F26%2Fthe-truman-debacle-are-dated-dry-docks-sinking-americas-carrier-fleet%2F&usg=AOvVaw1xV28CqCUxt3XydW2q-aSW

    It is about the condition of the drydocks that can hold the carriers. There are only 2 in the US that can hold them, on is at HI and the other is here in Bremerton, at PSNS. The drydock here was built in the late 50's and early 60's. I know it has some issues but exactly what I dont know.

    From the article, it mentioned that the only drydock that can hold the Ford Class is at HI.

    Another good thing to discuss, is the condition of Naval Shipyards infrastructure.

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    1. The linked article (thanks for that) does well to bring up the dry dock issue but linking that to Truman's proposed retirement is pure speculation and, as stated in the article, leads to some idle dry dock time which would seem to be the opposite of what's needed.

      Still the general issue of drydocks is a good one. We've touched on this in previous posts, noting that there are various vulnerabilities outside of traditional 'Pearl Harbors' that could cripple the Navy. Destroying the two dry docks or the only mega crane (Big Blue) would cripple the Navy's carrier production for years. Unfortunately, the Navy is so fixated on new hulls that they are ignoring the far more important infrastructure.

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  21. CNO,

    Are you going to make new posts about naval railguns and lasers in the foreseeable future? I'd like to know if you agree with the two articles below about their limitations:

    http://www.g2mil.com/Laser_Scams.htm

    http://www.g2mil.com/rail_gun_fraud.htm

    They still get hype as naval "wunderwaffen" though, so I'd like to hear if you've changed your mind about them given your previous posts on these two weapon systems. I'd also like to know if you agree with the second article's recommendation that 8-inch guns be mounted on navy warships instead of railguns for better firepower.

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  22. One thing I would like to see discussed is naval defense of CONUS. Everyone likes to give Pearl Harbor scenarios but what about the U-boats off the US coast or a Chinese version of the Doolittle raid. Small actions that can cause fear and panic. We can’t have half the blue ocean navy stateside.
    The coast guard is here but armed as patrol boats not ASW, AAW, or even for serious ASuW.

    I know the assumption is that such a thing will unite us, lead to full production etc etc. so an enemy wouldn’t do it. But the uniting of 9/11 didn’t last that long, and partisanship is higher than since the 1860’s. I think this may make an enemy more emboldened to attack the US mainland. They are probably wrong that it would intimidate us and not unite us, but if all they see is what we see in the news it would be tempting.
    A strong defensive force protecting the coasts and Alaska could deter such thinking.

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    1. The truly nightmare scenario is for the Chinese to seed a few mines (via submarine) in a few US ports and watch the fleet convulse trying to race its entire, nearly non-existent MCM inventory back to the US and spread across all the ports in the US. That would leave our forward deployed Navy bereft of MCM and paralyzed for fear of mines.

      Delete
    2. Don’t worry The LCS will save us...sorry I can’t continue that comment with a straight face.

      Solving this scenario of mining say The port of LA might actually touch on your previous post on small craft. Composite and fiberglass hulled patrol craft with sweep gear and an unmanned drone boat to disable the mines could give us MCM on the cheap. While an Avenger class might have multiple systems on the same craft, we could spread them across several smaller and cheaper boats.
      Smaller craft would also be less likely to be affected by mines looking for the magnetic and acoustic signature of a large merchant or naval vessel.
      The large, metal LCS could act as a tender and command center for the boats without leaving the harbor.

      Delete
    3. "Composite and fiberglass hulled patrol craft with sweep gear and an unmanned drone boat to disable the mines could give us MCM on the cheap. "

      That's entirely feasible and would be well worth investing in something of the sort.

      Delete
  23. While the US Navy procured thousands of Tomahawk missiles for use by ships and submarines, it has not pursued the obvious step of mounting 2-4 of them on Navy aircraft like the F/A-18 to allow strikes farther inland, keeping a carrier well beyond the range of shore launched anti-ship missiles. This would double the strike range of carrier groups that could hit targets well beyond the range of ship or sub launched Tomahawks. The Navy successfully test launched Tomahawks from an A-6 decades ago. This resistance may be a desire for a stealthy carrier-based strike aircraft, which was the idea of the canceled A-12 project and now the F-35.

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  24. If you removed the third turret, it would be easy to keep 200' between the radar and the guns' muzzles. You'd mount it to the rear of the superstructure. And emperical testing was never conducted, it was just a suspicion that someone (no one knows who) had.

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    1. I haven't heard anything specific about radar susceptibility to overpressure on a BB but the destructive overpressure impact on many different types of equipment has been well documented. I've read multiple academic reports modeling overpressure impact as a function of distance, shapes, time, etc.

      Whether someone tested or modeled the impact on radar arrays, I have no idea but it is easily estimated, if someone cared to put in the effort.

      Delete
  25. Here are some photos of Drydock 6 at PSNS, Bremerton, WA. There are photos of the USS Nimitz in it.

    https://www.dvidshub.net/image/4990538/uss-nimitz-cvn-68-dry-dock-6-post-dewatering-puget-sound-naval-shipyard-intermediate-maintenance-facility

    Another article about the fix of a crack caused by settling.

    https://www.shannonwilson.com/puget-sound-naval.html

    I don't know how good of a fix it is, to me, it looks like they did one of those slab jack repairs, where they inject some form of grout into the underlying earth. Time will only tell, but to put the future work of carriers in a 60 some year old drydock is somewhat puzzling. Also, another concern I would have, is what would happen if we had a large earthquake here ? As you know, the Seattle area is prone to some rather large ones here. We are waiting for the big one, anything over an 8.0 on the richter scale.

    In my opinion, what the navy should be doing is some planning for a new shipyard some place on the west coast that can support the new Ford Class (if it ever gets fixed and running ).

    To me, what the Navy is doing now, with regards to the Ford Class, is build a new class, with very limited support for it down the road. Like if you were to have a carport and buy a bigger car than fit in it, and still get in and out.

    I have found this blog to be very informative and very accurate too. The concerns you have, seem to be lacking in the decision making process of the navy. Keep up the great work ComNavOps. I forgot to mention a couple of things, my Dad worked at PSNS from end of world war 2 to 1979. I worked there from 1978 to 1995. So I have some experience with the mindset of the navy back then.

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  26. I got into a bit of a deep dive the other night on wing in ground effect (WIGe) vehicles, hydrofoils, and aerodynamically alleviated marine vehicles (AAMVs), during which I discovered that the Navy Matters blog is shocking devoid of discussion of these classes of vehicles.

    I'm the first to admit that there were (and still are) a lot of technical problems with the old Soviet Ekranoplans - as with all seaplanes - and that they're inferior to conventional aircraft or ships for the majority of roles, but I think they are a uniquely capable class of platforms for a couple of niche uses.

    The attraction of WIGe vehicles and AAMVs compared to conventional marine hullforms is their BLISTERING SPEED compared to the latter, which they can achieve with the same power to weight ratio as a ship by largely or entirely eliminating hydrodynamic drag (and buoyancy) in favor of aerodynamic lift (and, in AAMVs, 10-30% hydrodynamic lift). Compared to conventional aircraft, their main advantages is an improved lift/drag ratio (which *recursively* benefits wing size, total drag, *and* top speed for a given mass/power, to a point), with conventional and specifically designed WIGe wings achieving around 100% increase in lift with constant drag while in ground effect. If design and procurement costs were comparable (a historical issue due to technical problems and the niche uses of the platforms), the superior aerodynamic properties should allow these vehicles to be built with less power and cost than conventional aircraft of comparable payload. Indeed, this is what allowed the Caspian Sea Monster to be built as the heaviest aircraft in the world at 494 tons (compare to Type-037 Corvette at 430 tons) without breaking either the bank or the laws of physics. The ideal role for these vehicles is probably as *heavy*, high subsonic attack craft. They can entirely replace vessels like the Type-022 and other dedicated missile boats, and they can free up fixed- and rotary-wing attack aircraft for missions that require platforms with more... flexible flight envelopes.

    About that... that is the single greatest issue with all three of these classes of platform. The transition from low-speed, buoyancy-supported weight to high-speed, lift-supported weight places significant stresses on the hull even in ideal designs and sea states. The transition is limited to very calm seas for all classes, and high-speed operation is limited to very calm seas for hydrofoils and AAMVs. WIGe vehicles can tolerate moderate sea states once they're out of the water, but they're less resilient than conventional heavy aircraft that can operate at altitude over high seas. The final flight profile issue is maneuverability. AAMVs and hydrofoils have zero vertical maneuverability, and WIGe vehicles vary from being completely tethered to the WIGe air cushion (~14m max between the wing and the sea), to being capable of conventional flight, but well-optimized ground effect vehicles are very poor conventional aircraft and vice versa. Laterally, they must have very large turning circles owing to the necessary mitigation of drag from large lateral hydrodynamic control surfaces and the low effectiveness and efficiency of (conventional) lateral aerodynamic control surfaces.

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    1. The solution to their technical problems lies in their CONOPs. The old paradigm was to launch and land at sea, as runways were limited when these were last popular. Hydrofoils and AAMVs have no choice in this, but the optimal WIGe CONOPs likely involves launching (if not landing) these from runways that lead directly to the sea, limiting their basing while greatly increasing their tolerance to bad weather. An optimal WIGe design should be capable of climbing over any non-fixed maritime obstacles (ships, low-flying aircraft) that it can't avoid laterally but should be optimized for cruising in ground effect. This also allows the pop-up maneuver which is used to detect targets and coordinate a raid. While not expendable, their design and CONOPs should allow for attrition. As attack craft, their job is to deliver *large* amounts of ordinance against critical targets reliably. Standoff-range weapons (200-500 km) may be used, but the volume of fire offered by equivalent payloads of near-OTH (20-50 km) missiles is superior. Skirting the line(s) between bomber, missile boat, attack aircraft, and even gunship, these craft would require escort but would also carry thorough self-defense systems including LPI radar, ESM, ECM, flares, chaff, and decoys. If WIGe attack craft are used in force, a specialized WIGe platform with CIWS/seaRAM/ESSM lookalikes could improve the penetration and survivability of the force more than an additional attack craft or two, and would allow this force to *rapidly* maneuver in an A2/AD environment with its organic missile defense and attached AAW escort.

      Delete
  27. Vaguely belt/road related

    Cost of shipping goods on a ship from China to UK
    £1 per box and 8 weeks transit
    Cost of shipping goods on a train
    £2.80 and 3 weeks transit
    Cost of airfreight
    £30 a box and 3ish days.

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  28. A post on future missiles of the USN?

    With both the SM2IIIC and ESSM Block 2 having active seekers the x band directors on various warships would appear to soon be redundant.

    Is that the case? If not, why not?

    If so, how will this change tactics and roles?

    Will it offer a significant improvement in AAW?

    How effective would the SM2 be for surface attack? It has a similar warhead size to the Exocet which had successes against RN destroyers in the Falklands, however the SM2 is hitting at 3x the speed which must add to total damage.

    Is the active seeker a better option than semi active and IR?

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    1. Both the SM-2 Blk IIIC and ESSM Blk 2 require mid-course guidance to get to the point that they can use their terminal active homing. Thus, directors (or AESA guidance) will still be required. I see no chance in tactics prompted by the new models.

      As far as improvements in AAW, it offers some possible improvement in certain scenarios. Sometimes active terminal guidance is good, sometimes not.

      In anti-surface mode, the Standard missile is useful against smaller targets like patrol boats or corvettes but its blast fragmentation warhead is not optimal for use against larger ships. It is not a ship-killer. My understanding is that it has both proximity and contact fuse modes with the latter being useful in the anti-surface mode.

      Delete
    2. Okay, so what is AESA guidance? The Anzacs have CEAMOUNT illumination which apparently replaces the directors. The Hobarts have Mk99 with two directors.

      That seems to me to be two different processes. One uses fixed AESA panels and the other directional antennae.

      I'm a former infantry soldier, so excuse my ignorance here, I have an interest in naval warfare because Australia is an island and the navy, pathetic as our is, is vastly more important than the Army.

      Also, I would have thought, given the small warhead, a mix of proximity and contact attacks would be a good idea. Regardless, the Sheffield was immediately and permanently disabled by an Exocet with a malfunctioning warhead. Anyway you cut it, a 1400lb object moving a 3400 fps is going to cause some significant damage. Anyway, in my ignorance, I would have thought a mix of contact and prox fuses would be the way to go, mixing significant hull damage with electronic mission kill. Then it would be possible to close in an do more damage with 5".

      What's your view on the 3" Oto Malera Strales anti missile system?

      Delete
    3. Welcome! Always a pleasure to hear from our friends in Australia.

      "what is AESA guidance?"

      AESA guidance is simply using the AESA-type radar to not only detect targets but also provide outgoing missile guidance commands. Neat trick, huh, to be able to use a single radar to track and guide?

      Forgive me as I'm not intimately familiar with the CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT system but as I understand it, CEAFAR is the radar detection system and CEAMOUNT is the associated illuminator (guidance) which, in the case of the ANZAC frigates is panel mounted as opposed to a trainable mount. The CEAMOUNT array is actually directional but it uses electronically steered beams rather than mechanically steered beams as on older, traditional illuminators - same function, though.

      As far as using surface to air missiles in anti-surface mode, there's nothing wrong with it and, as I said, they can be quite effective against smaller targets. However, they are not optimized for use against larger targets. You note that a fast moving 1400 lb object is bound to cause damage and it will - just not a lot relative to the target. A destroyer size ship is in the vicinity of 8000-10,000 tons! 1400 lbs (0.7 tons) is tiny by comparison. It will cause some damage but it won't sink a ship. It will punch a hole and cause some fire and damage but it isn't all that threatening by itself. Also, the warhead is fairly small at around 140 lbs and most of that weight is the fragmentation portion rather than the explosive weight, as I understand it. Contrast that to a purpose-designed anti-ship missile like Harpoon which has an explosive warhead of 488 lbs or even the fairly small Chinese C-801 which has an explosive of around 350 lbs.

      Regarding the O-M Strales, no gun system in the world has yet been shown to be effective in a realistic AAW role. The manufacturers can make any claim they want but until I see a realistic test, I have zero faith in those claims and believe with 100% certainty that they are next to useless in the AAW role. Shooting down a slow, low drone? Maybe. Shooting down an incoming missile? No way.

      Let me ask you a question. What do you see as Australia's relationship with China and what is Australia's relationship objective for China? Always good to hear opinions from those on scene.

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    4. Yeah.... well, it is complex.

      Aussies are growing rapidly wary of Chinese investment and intervention in our government.

      I don't see them as much of a military threat. They're just not. I realise we'll disagree here, but nobody at all actually likes China. Evil always contains the seeds of its own destruction and China's behavior, both internally and externally will lead to it's ruin.

      If a war was to start tomorrow, looking at the stats, China's greatest military allies would be the US and Russia.

      Both the US and Russia however have significant bones to pick with China. OTOH, if a war broke out, you'd have the navies of the US, UK, Japan, S Korea, India, Australia and various others. What what I've been able to glean from RAN personnel, the PLAN has a long way to go in terms of operations, equipment and culture.

      China is a long way from self sufficient and suffers from severe geographical problems. There are choke points which can be covered by, in one case, a battery of 155mm artillery. She currently imports 70% of her oil, & a large amount of food. There are significant infrastructure liabilities. Beijing for example could lose 70% of it's water supply courtesy of a half dozen cruise missiles.

      There are internal political issues and perhaps most seriously, economic issues which pose significant problems.

      OTOH, China buys a *LOT* of stuff from Australia and is our biggest trade partner.

      Objective? No real idea. The next big monetary crash is going to be a doozey because there now soemthing like 4 times as much debt as the last one and Australia is in real trouble with huge federal, state, corporate and private debt.

      Australia is pretty well screwed regardless, but if China falls over we're extra double plus ultra screwed unless we can start a huge trade program with India or someone. A huge part of our exports is our coal, but that's starting to fall over as large numbers of coal stations are being closed.

      So yeah, not exactly clear.

      Delete
    5. Okay, you've outlined the current status and potential for future problems. So, in your opinion (you know, king for a day) what should Australia be doing? What should you do to shore up your trade vulnerabilities? Where should you be looking for investors (if you even need external investors?)? What should you be doing about debt levels? Who should you be looking to sell to, if not China?

      Regarding Chinese vulnerabilities, yes, they exist, however, they are moving very aggressively to eliminate or minimize them. For example, they are building multiple overland oil pipelines through Russia to minimize their sea based oil imports. In, say, 10 years many of those vulnerabilities will be eliminated or greatly reduced and China will be in a much better position for a sustained war.

      Similarly, the Chinese military that you are somewhat dismissive of is rapidly learning and they are training hard - harder than the US. Again, in 10 years, they will be much advanced over where they are now and your assessment of them will, presumably, be quite different. What is Australia doing (or what should you be doing) to deal with the anticipated increased quality of the military threat in 10 years? How is your military responding to the coming increase in threat, if at all?

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    6. Well, King for the Day. Pay off debt, get rid of the Greens, ALP and other parasites. Invest in massive infrastructure projects to ensure water security which ensures food security. Further investment in manufacturing and high end stuff. Develop a nuclear industry. Reform education. Sell to anyone. But sell our tech instead of primary produce.

      After that, reintroduce conscription as a part of education. Don't want to serve in the military, fine they probably don't want you, so a Green army, police or fire auxiliaries, that kind of thing.

      Develop stronger diplomatic/military ties with Israel, Africa, South America.

      Effectively quadruple our navy maintaining four fleets, 1st, Nth, East and West. Each fleet to maintain one VSTOL escort carrier, air warfare cruiser, multiple Hunter class frigates, multiple Anzac equivalent frigates, fleet submarines and patrol craft. Each fleet base to also have "independent" units such as frigates, attack subs, cruise missile subs.

      Delete
    7. 1st Fleet would effectively be a Christmas tree so that as vessels require significant overhauls we can maintain 3 fleets. Also 1st Fleet would contain things like oilers, tenders, major amphibious ships, survey ships etc with the intent of being disbanded immediately upon declaration of war so that we have replacement ships for the inevitable losses.

      Develop a national or private fleet of bulk and container freighters which will be nationalized in the case of significant war.

      Investment in weapons such as cruise missiles, ICBM with conventional MIRV warheads to enable long range strike of choke points in enemy facilities and ports. Such long range weapons are inherently destabilizing, especially so if there is a possibility of nuclear warheads, and so will be open to inspection at regular intervals by negotiated treaty so that no one has grounds to consider Australia a nuclear weapon threat.

      Protect our EEZ and fisheries properly. i.e. seize ships, use them for target practice. Crews arrested, tried, jailed, deported. Operating companies that are repeat offenders targeted for sanctions.

      Airforce to be dramatically increased in size and capability for maritime surveillance, ASW, ASuW, interdiction, tactical and strategic strike. Current force structure concentrates on Growlers, Lightning IIs which is a good start but we need some kind of long range survivable or expendable platform so P8s are inappropriate, but I don't know what or how to replace them.

      Maintain a small but effective professional army.

      Significant investment in cyber ops, in particular a sane version of Skynet. A Doomsday internet machine which will put the entire human race back into the mid 20th Century.

      That force will allow us to conduct non warfare operations, and in the case of war, limited convoy protection, independent strike and effectively contribute to allied blockade operations.

      Harden as far as possible, both cyber and physically. Install an air gapped Aegis Ashore, Iron Dome or similar around major military bases and capital cities.

      Contribute to a network of sonar lines running from S Korea to Japan and south. This network should effectively map submarine movements throughout Pacific. This will inevitably be knocked out within minutes of a war, but if the infrastructure is there can be repaired etc. In peace it will allow for intelligence acquisition on patterns of movement, sonar signatures, capabilities and location of enemy assets prior to hostilities.

      Ultimate aim is to make Australia much like Switzerland. It's impossible to invade either of us, we can't actually invade anyone else, but we can both make life absolutely miserable for anyone who tries it on. Unlike the Swiss, we have to maintain sea trade routes. Also, politically, and personally, Australia should be involved in various operations of quasi/military nature such as disaster relief, anti-piracy, other aid to civil power operations and limited warfare.

      After we've achieved that we should form a coalition with any willing human, angelic, alien or AI partners to invade Nth Korea and prosecute Kim Jong-un for crimes against sentient existence.

      That hair cut just has to go.

      Delete
    8. Obviously that's unrealistic but you did ask for a King for a Day response. Some aspects are more reasonable than others and limited scale implementation, such as increasing military expenditure, clearly are reasonable and practical.

      Delete
    9. Forgot. Transports. Increase numbers of C-130, C17, CH53 and some sort of HMAS Tobruk replacement. Ideally the Tobruk replacement should be a semi expendable design. Just ram the thing at full speed onto an appropriate beach at high tide then disengage the non-expendable portion. The expendable section then lowers it's ramp, providing a limited breakwater/dock sort of arrangement. Kind of like a Mulberry Harbour. Ideally the forward expendable section should be able to connect to other purpose designed sections to form an expedient harbour. These are something you'd build and just leave in reserve somewhere against the superstorm/earthquake/Krakatoa eruption that obliterates an entire island nation state.

      Probably make that last a SEATO/NATO/PACRIM funded resource with a multinational crew stored at various worldwide locations in historically less climatically areas. As a worldwide standard all LHD/LCH amphib ships could be built with appropriate cranes/ramps connections to enable a multi national response.

      I'd similarly like to see a power ship. Heads to an emergency and generates enormous amounts of power which can be connected to the shore. Also equipped with comms etc and massive desalination ability as fresh water is absolutely critical to emergency relief. Basically just a floating nuclear reactor to provide emergency power. Idyeall shallow draught and an armoured hull and shrouded screws and rudders because the quality and quantity of detritus that floats down a river after a major storm is amazing.

      Again, I'd like to see these as Australian assets but I'd also just like to see them at all whether Aussie or alliance/UN operated.

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    10. What is Australia doing (or what should you be doing) to deal with the anticipated increased quality of the military threat in 10 years? How is your military responding to the coming increase in threat, if at all?

      Our navy used to be 3 Charles F Adams/Perth class, 6 by Oliver Hazard Perry/Adelaide class, 6 by Oberons and a bunch of other stuff. The RAAF was F111/Mirage. The Army, when I joined was effectively the same as the Viet Nam war.

      Our navy will soon be 3 x Hobarts, 8 x Anzacs which in current form are actually pretty impressive on paper AFAICT, 6 by Collins which are again pretty impressive AFAICT, two potential ASW destroyer/landing ships, and OPVs which could be converted to expendable sub hunters relatively easily with future tech.

      In the future we'll have 9 by Hunters which are vastly more capable than Anzacs, as you'd expect them to be at twice the displacement and 12 subs.

      Similarly we will soon have a world class air force made entirely of Growlers, F35 and P8s. And comparatively, plenty of them.

      The army is significantly more capable than even 5 years ago. As new armoured vehicles come on line etc we'll be significantly more capable in another 5 years than we are now.

      Assuming our clueless politicians don't completely screw it all up by continuing to use the ADF as a social experiment.

      Delete
    11. Actually the Anzacs actually pretty well sum up Australia's capability.

      When first launched their offensive armament was a single 5" gun. Defensively they had 8 by VLS Sea Sparrow. Radar, no towed array, no intrinsic chopper.

      They're now ECM, Harpoon, ESSM, 2 x 25mm Tyhpoon, Romeos, MU90 torpedo on chopper and boats, Ceamount/Ceafar/Vagem...

      The next frigates are all that and more and in greater numbers. Our capabilities are increasing dramatically and future capabilities and numbers are significantly superior again.

      Delete
    12. Wow. Opened the floodgate there!

      Seriously, that is some first rate thinking. As you note, not all of it is instantly doable but this kind of planning is the necessary first step towards doing. Take those ideas and push for them any way you can. Well done!

      Just a couple of notes related to your various thoughts:

      -I love your recognition of, and emphasis on, cyber hardening. Spot on. China, in particular is causing the US endless grief on the cyber hacking front today.

      -Regarding air-gapping, my understanding is that isn't sufficient. I've read articles stating that an aircraft, AESA equipped, in particular, can by hacked through its radar which, of course, is designed to take in signals and is connected to various other systems and networks both directly and indirectly. The actual form of the injected hacking signals to a radar is beyond me but the articles claim it's quite doable. Kind of scary.

      -The USS Lexington CV-2 in 1929 provided emergency power to the city of Tacoma, Washington and surrounding areas for an extended period when a severe drought rendered the area's hydroelectric station inoperable. Just an example of your power ship in action!

      -Along with building up the military's equipment to meet the Chinese threat (and other threats), Australia needs to evolve its geopolitical and military strategies towards China. It does no good to have a strong military but no plan how to utilize it.

      -Love your sonar lines idea (presumably, you're referring to a SOSUS-like installation. Those would actually be fairly survivable since, as passive systems, their locations would be very difficult to ascertain.

      All in all, just a great series of comments. Now, make them happen!

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    13. "Australia needs to evolve its geopolitical and military strategies towards China. It does no good to have a strong military but no plan how to utilize it."

      Yeah, I'm actually one of those people I hate. AS I stated before my knowledge of naval matters is pretty dismal. I'm a tactical guy, always have been. I'm much happier in a hole with my rifle than figuring out strategy and logistics, but if you have sufficient S&L you can *almost* do without guys like me.

      I don't think FreeNav ops are worth the fuel we waste on them. I don't know how to avoid the war that is coming. We've had the trade and currency wars, shooting comes next unless the Chinese socialist economy collapses which, horrible as it sounds is what I'm hoping for. (lesser of two evils) The ensuing revolt may see off the communist government and perhaps even destroy Chinese unity. We may see several Chinese nations following such an event.

      How do you use a navy in peacetime? Don't know. Port visits? wave the flag? Certainly disaster relief is a good use. What do you do about China in peacetime. I'm not convinced there is a good use of a conventional navy. In war, security of our trade routes, hence the escort carriers. Run say 4 x f35, bunch of ASW choppers, some kind of AEW platform. I'm not a fan of the UKs Merlin solution, but we used to have planes that could take off and land on my son's bottom lip, things like the Fiesler Storch. Get something like that, slow flying STOL, can land without CATOBAR, but just slowly circles the convoy. Yeah, it could give away the position but were likely talking a half dozen military ships and a dozen or more freighters. Not exactly hard to find so it's not like you're giving the position away, just giving yourself a chance. My understanding is a decent S band radar should pick up stealth fighters long before they can launch even VLRAAMs just not give a weapons grade track. so the AEW dives for the deck and f35s are scrambled, convoy takes whatever action they're supposed to and escorts go to "Instant" of whatever the naval equivalent is.

      In concert with US carriers we'd just rely on E2s of course and embark extra F35/choppers.

      Delete
    14. "How do you use a navy in peacetime?"

      First, there is no such thing as peacetime, especially in the Chinese view. Peace is just war without ordnance flying and is only an illusory, momentary condition. Thus, the Chinese have an inherent advantage over us because they don't fear confrontations and escalation since they're already at war. We, on the other hand, cower out of fear of confrontation and escalation. China is already at war with us whether we want to admit it or not. We need to start fighting back.

      That leads to the second point about using a Navy in peacetime. YOU HAVE TO BE WILLING TO ACTUALLY USE IT!!! As I just said, we are so afraid of confrontation and escalation, we back down from every incident. For example, China ordered one of our Tico cruisers out of an area in the South China Sea (international waters!), AND WE OBEYED.

      So, you have to be willing to confront. Here's some examples of what we should have done and could do.

      -Should have prevented the illegal island building by blockading, swamping, and, if necessary, ramming the construction ships.

      - We should have bombed the E-3 that the Chinese forced down and seized.

      - We should have ignored the ship that ordered the Tico to leave and we should have harassed it and bumped it (why were we operating a Tico by itself??).

      - We should park a task group a hundred feet off those artificial islands (they're illegal and in international waters) and collect intel.

      - We should be tailing every Chinese sub as we did in the Cold War to Soviet subs (maybe we are??).

      - We should be intercepting every Chinese aircraft that approaches our surveillance planes and responding in kind when they make unsafe maneuvers.

      - We should be making port calls to Taiwan on a regular basis.

      - We should be trailing Chinese surface groups whenever they're at sea.

      - We should be popping subs up in the middle of Chinese surface groups.

      And so on. Is this confrontational? Yes, but no more than China has done to us. Could this escalate? Yes, but so what? We're already at war. If we have to fight China, I'd rather do it now while we have the advantage than wait 10-20 years and try to do it when they're even stronger.

      Delete
    15. Agreed - Currency war, trade war, shooting war. We're on our way. I wrote about it in another post which seems to have been lost, which is really annoying.

      Anyway, Islands - Agreed.

      E3 - No. Act of war. I think a better approach would be international asset freeze, seizure of Chinese flagged vessels and crews while making it abundantly clear that the US was engaging allies in planning military strikes. Bluffing, but make them call it.

      Problem is one of culture there. Our cringing elites are scared of offending the "lesser races." No, I'm not a white supremacist or something, that's how the current enlightened members of our society view others. Their over riding moral virtue is equality, so if western culture is "better" (however that is gauged) then it must be because the west is oppressing them. We should therefore sacrifice ourselves to improve their station. When you give up on moral objectives, as the West did 200 years ago you end up always making the wrong decisions. It's a complex but bullet proof argument that you can see everyday in the behavior of modern Western politics.

      What's a Tico? Sorry, have to plead ignorance on that issue.

      Parking a fleet off the island, nah... make our own. Pack it full of unmanned intelligence devices and booby trap the whole island. :D

      Tailing subs and fleets - only in so far as we do not reveal anything of tactical importance.

      Taiwan, disagree. Should maintain a rolling presence. 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 365 a year a US, UK, Aus, NZ or Canadian warship, troops or aircraft should be on port call, engaging in cross training or similar so that any attack on Taiwan is an immediate attack on the Five Eyes partners.

      Sub pop ups, no. Don't want them collecting intel on our best assets. If you want to go down that path, have them pop up in the harbour of major Chinese port cities on CNYE and let off some fireworks to help them celebrate. Do it simultaneously in a dozen ports.

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    16. China should be punished in other ways too, but no one does. Roll back the agreements made under Slick Willy Clinton.

      Don't want to obey the rule of law and pay for IP? Fine, We'll seize assets and distribute funds to the affected companies.

      So on and so on.

      Delete
  29. How do you contain China? I don't think we should. You don't fight against what is wrong. You fight for what is right.

    If the living standards and economies of the world rise, that doesn't contain China per se. However it comparatively contains China by reducing the differential in power between China and others.

    How do we do that? Capitalism, strong rule of law etc are all good. Penalise China for not doing the right thing, by removing it from the agreements signed under Slick Willy Clinton. A lot of thought provoking material can be found in a doco called "Death by China."

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  30. Sejong the great class of destroyer -- South Korean Burke clone, longer and wider. More VLS than a Tico.
    Ideal outcome. Outsource the renovation of one or more of the national shipyards to Hyundai Heavy Industries with the order of 12 American built Sejong Class destroyers with AN/SPY-6 (V)1 radars as part of the contract for renovation.
    The first three Korean built destroyers cost $923 million. Some competition might be nice in the destroyer/cruiser marketplace.
    I would also include an order for 24 double hulled oilers for the fleet as part of the renovation contract.
    The smaller ships (LCS) need more frequent refueling and the current fleet of oilers will be pushing 30 plus years soon. The current fleet is single hulled and with the environmental regulations for fuel transport in most nations requiring double hulls we could find our oilers denied admittance to foreign ports to "protection of the environment", an easy out for a country wanting to stay neutral in a dust up between China and the USA.
    Make the number of ships and the duration of the work sufficient that it makes economic sense to renovate the shipyard.

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    1. Umm … okay. Why would we want to outsource a shipyard renovation rather than have a US company, presumably the shipyard itself, do it?

      A foreign company is going to have difficulties with language, workers, communications, parts sourcing, labor laws, national and Navy security requirements (especially for nuclear capable yards), etc.

      I like the idea of renovating shipyards but I'm unsure why outsourcing is your preferred approach?

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  31. A Korean or Japanese shipbuilder would bring significant commercial shipyard management experience to the renovation. I'm afraid that you would get more of the same if you let the shipyards renovate themselves.
    The current private shipyards (GD/HII/Austal/BAE/Lockheed) would rather get paid to use their shipyard and I don't blame them. Every repair at a national shipyard is money not captured by the private shipyards. The national shipyards are needed for war time surge building, major refits and nuclear refueling. The current private yards are maxing out their building capacity and most cannot handle the nuclear work.
    Maybe it should not be a renovation but rather a new build national shipyard/commercial shipyard with the builder of the shipyard guaranteed a significant amount of work.
    I was suggesting Hyundai Heavy Industries based upon the Sejong class destroyer. It is a known design with three ships that could be evaluated for service in the US Navy. The design offers a ship comparable to the Ticonderoga class with a price similar or less than the Burke
    Foreign companies like (BAE, Austal, Fincanteiri Marine) already work with the Navy. I don't see the Koreans or Japanese as any different than the British, Australians or the Italians.

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    1. " I'm afraid that you would get more of the same if you let the shipyards renovate themselves.

      The current private shipyards GD/HII/Austal/BAE/Lockheed) would rather get paid to use their shipyard and I don't blame them"

      I think you're missing how private industry works. For example, Ford Motor Co. is not building today's cars on the same assembly line that built the Model-T. They've heavily invested in the NEWEST POSSIBLE robotics, computers, and equipment SO THAT THEY CAN BUILD MORE CARS WITH FEWER WORKERS AND AT A GREATER PROFIT. Industry is incentivized to constantly upgrade their equipment and facilities. ALL THEY NEED IS AN ASSURED, STEADY SOURCE OF ORDERS.

      If we lay out a schedule of private shipyard work that the companies can count on, they'll modernize themselves in order to maximize their profits!

      Now, I think you're suggesting a foreign company be used for the public yard renovations rather than private yard renovations (correct me if I'm misunderstanding you). That's a completely different game. The public yards have zero incentives to upgrade because profit does not exist for them. This is a 'simple' matter of the Navy funding upgrades rather than new construction. If you think a foreign company can do the upgrades better than US companies then, sure, use a foreign company (good luck getting Congress to approve funding for a foreign company!). It's one thing to buy occasional pieces of military hardware from a foreign company but it's another to have a foreign company come onto an American base/yard and do work.

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  32. Yes, use a private firm to come in and renovate the government shipyards to make them able to handle a surge of shipbuilding activity. The government
    shipyards should designed like the most productive shipyards in the world even if they are not utilized to their fullest. The the USA does not have any shipbuilding companies that are internationally competitive. The Koreans and the Japanese shipbuilders are the only allies with shipyards that are high volume producers of ships and can compete with China. China has high shipbuilding volumes but I don't want them designing our shipyards!

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    Replies
    1. While the Japanes/Koreans may have expertise (more or better than HII, NASSCO, etc.?), the practicalities of having a foreign company come to the US to renovate a shipyard are likely prohibitive. Consider just something as simple as labor sourcing. Unless they shipped in foreign laborers (Congress won't stand for that!), foreign firm would have no contacts in the labor pool, no connections, no labor contracts, no relationships, and no understanding of US labor laws and practices. It would be a disaster, I'm afraid.

      Of course, they could just act in a supervisory capacity and hire out the labor management to a US company but then all you're doing is adding another layer of bureaucracy and winding up with US quality and standards which is what you're trying to avoid by using a foreign company.

      How do you see the practical aspects of this working?

      The foreign auto companies located plants in America and use US workers but it took years to iron out that mechanism!

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  33. Most likely it would be through acquisition of a US shipyard near one of the National yards or construction of a new national shipyard near a current private shipyard.
    Maybe a technology park type of arrangement with a government side and a commercial side with space for lease. The benefit of the commercial side is a workforce that could be pressed into service during war.
    Austal, BAE, Fincanteiri all set up or acquired American companies to do the work. I would assume the Asian Shipbuilders would do the same.
    Maybe a shipyard best practices guide could be developed based on the best commercial shipyards and have the process engineers work up the best way to renovate the yard.

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  34. Interesting technology that could be useful in reducing drag.
    Superhydrophobic metal treatment which traps air between two metal plates.

    https://phys.org/news/2019-11-spiders-ants-metal-wont.html

    I was thinking that if a multitude of plates were perpendicular to the hull of the ship, submarine or torpedo the surface friction of the hull would be decreased. A cushion of air would be present over the majority of the ship hull and only the edges of the plates would interact with the water. If the plates were thin there should be less friction than a hull without the surface treatment. It could really extend the range or increase the speed of torpedos.

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