As
the name implies, the ship will feature an amphibious assault combination of
helicopters and landing craft launched from a well deck. The design includes Command and Control
facilities. The ship is expected to be
launched in 2019 and enter service in 2020.
The
Type 075 is reported to be around 40,000 tons, 820 ft long, and capable of
carrying 30 helos with six operating spots (2).
The ship, as described, is very similar in size and capability to the US
Wasp class LHD-1 which is 843 ft long and can carry around three dozen helos
and Harriers in various combinations along with three LCACs and 1900 troops. One key difference is that the Chinese do
not, as of yet, have a Harrier/F-35B STOVL or MV-22 type aircraft in
operation. Unconfirmed reports, however,
suggest that they are developing such aircraft and, given the demonstrated
speed of their military development programs, should have the capability within
five years.
Wiki
reports that armament is limited to a pair of short range HQ-10 SAMs and a pair
of point defense CIWS.
 |
| Type 075 LHD |
The
LHD will complement the Type 071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD) amphibious ships
which are analogous to the US San Antonio class LPD-17. The combination will provide the Chinese with
a very credible amphibious assault capability.
This
begs the question, why is this ship needed?
Here’s the official Chinese answer.
“The South China Morning Post reported earlier this
month, citing military sources, that the navy planned to increase the size of
its marine corps from about 20,000 to 100,000 personnel to help protect its
increasing interests overseas.” (1)
Okay,
that states the obvious that more ships are needed to carry more marines but it
doesn’t say why a large amphibious assault force is needed to begin with. This is simply more evidence that China China Taiwan China Africa
and other world wide locations. As I’ve
repeatedly said, China
In
any event, this ship class provides a significant increase in vertical assault
capability and mobile, close air support for ground troops. Such capabilities can be especially useful in
intimidation actions by the military aimed at neighbors such as Vietnam
The
US
(1)South
China Morning Post website, “China 30-Mar-2017 ,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2083109/china-building-navys-biggest-amphibious-assault-vessel
(2)The
National Interest website, “China 31-Mar-2017 ,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-new-amphibious-assault-ship-big-waste-time-19961
Equally disturbing is the growth in UNREP capability. Combining the two gives them the ability to threaten ports anywhere in the world such as ports in Africa (which they are showing interest in) or oil producing regions with seizure by amphibious assault.
ReplyDeleteThe strategic terrain in the western Pacific makes large scale land maneuvers difficult. Too many jungles and mountains, and generally bad for highly mechanized forces or warfare. Plus a lot of strategic locations are on or near the coast (Seoul, Vladivostok, Ho Chi Minh City). So it would make sense to have a strong amphib capability to threaten these strategic locations rather than have to tromp cross-country.
DeleteIt would also be the best way to project power into the Indian Ocean rather than trying to move a mechanized force over the mountains into the Indian subcontinent.
It could also be analogous to the US strategy in the early 20th century to use the Marines in the "banana wars", particularly in combination with your idea about Africa.
Sometimes its not so much the ability to "invade" as it is the ability to quickly move forces into an area to support your preferred political actors and to protect your business assets.
Of course, it would be sort of ironic for a communist government to protect it's overseas commercial assets from being nationalized by a small nation-state, but then we're discussing geo-economic power, not political theory.
All that you say about areas and uses is reasonable. However, that drops us in the same pool as the USMC/Navy in that multi-billion dollar, ultra high end amphibious warships are not needed to threaten or conduct low end, unopposed actions. A simple cargo ship, temporarily leased would suffice to transport some troops and equipment. What they're doing is immense overkill to intimidate Vietnam and the like. This suggests an alternate purpose. I've got a post coming on Chinese amphibious capabilities and rationale. Look for it!
Delete"ultra high end amphibious warships are not needed to threaten or conduct low end, unopposed actions... to intimidate Vietnam and the like."
DeleteI agree with CNOps' assertion that procuring high-end amphibious assault ships (especially in quantity, and alongside other power projection assets) is an indicator that China is preparing for a major conflict.
However, I also agree with Jay Kay's comment. Taiwan is not going to be an uncontested landing. Ho Chi Minh city is not an uncontested landing. Retaking their bases in the SCS if they get "liberated" will not be an uncontested landing (barring a complete failure in US strategic thinking). Okinawa and Kunsan are not uncontested landings. I'd rather China never attempt any of that, but strictly speaking, those could all be legitimate objectives if a (perceived) existential threat to their nation is using any or all of those locations to project power.
What's surprising to me is that their amphibious forces have lagged behind so much for so long. All of those targets (and many more!) have existed for a long time, and any major conflict would have necessitated strikes (if not assaults) against them. Perhaps China just genuinely believed a major conflict was unlikely until now because it had a sufficient deterrent to prevent unprovoked conflict... and this is their tacit recognition that they're provoking conflict, with hegemonic intent or otherwise.
"this is their tacit recognition that they're provoking conflict, with hegemonic intent or otherwise."
DeleteIn large measure, BINGO!!!
"What's surprising to me is that their amphibious forces have lagged behind so much for so long."
Delete@DarthAnubis: My take, which I've talked about before, is that it was a matter of prioritisation. Even China can't recapitalise its surface fleet and amphib fleet at the same time.
Ultimately, a serious blue water fleet gives China more benefit than a recapitalised amphibious fleet - it's not that new amphibs aren't beneficial, but that the surface fleet brings more benefit and utility to the PLAN table.
"ultra high end amphibious warships are not needed to threaten or conduct low end, unopposed actions. A simple cargo ship, temporarily leased would suffice to transport some troops and equipment. What they're doing is immense overkill to intimidate Vietnam and the like."
Delete@ComNavOps: The SEA take on this is that this is basically China flexing militarily and T-posing. China's narrative has always been that it's one of the great powers, that it's a player on the world stage - it's doing this as a statement: "See, I am the Chinese Dragon, hear me roar, I am as power as the United States Navy."
That said, the expectation is less that this is for use in SEA, and more for China to project power into Africa, as a way of guarding its interests, and having this big stick of overkill to keep African nations in line. An African dictator might think that his army might have a chance against a chartered cargo ship. He'd think twice about fighting a Chinese amphib group dropping tanks on the beach, flying gunships overhead.
@Wild Goose, I was going to add something along those lines. We should be devoutly hoping for China to over-invest in this kind of power projection without procuring enough blue water combat power to protect their amphibious forces in a conflict with the USN.
Delete@Darth Anubis: Alas, your hopes are dashed. The Chinese weren't that stupid. They quite sensibly chose to prioritise their surface fleet recapitalisation over their amphib fleet. Consider that the bulk of the Chinese Navy used to be 80s, 90s era ships with mechanically scanned radars: now all their serious combatants are being built with AESA radars.
Delete@Wild Goose. A surprisingly conservative procurement process too. If you check through PLAN DDGs commissioned through the 1990s and 2000s, they went through a long period of obtaining only a couple examples of a design and then iterating to an updated design.
DeleteThat only seems to have stopped when they settled on the Type 052C and Type 052Ds a few years ago.
It's always weird when a military doesn't go about procurement in a totally bone-headed manner
@Anonymous: Pretty much, yes.
DeleteTo the outside world it seems that China has recapitalised their fleet overnight, but that's not really the case; what we're seeing is the results of the last 3 decades or so of development work, which has had its own delays that we're not as cognizant of because the Chinese don't trumpet news like the US. Consider Liaoning - according to the Chinese carrier roadmap they laid down in 1987, they were supposed to have the basic R&D done by 1999, but they missed that target date by a decade-odd: talk about schedule slip!
Naval shipbuilding wise, the last 3-odd decades have basically been them throwing things at the wall and observing naval shipbuilding trends, and the small numbers of ships they've built have essentially been used basically to test out the concepts and designs and see whether things work for them. As you note, they've now settled on what they want their DDGs to look like, and are now going full steam ahead with their finalised designs. In that respect, the USN head start, while advantageous in the beginning, also served the PLAN by giving them an idea of where they should be looking towards.
Looks like the PLAN Marines are getting ready to enforce the Belt & Road loan agreements. Also protect Chinese minorities and smite natives who say unkind things about the Emperor.
ReplyDeleteThe Co-Properity Sphere with Chinese characteristics.
Smedly Butler III
Looks to me like it would also be very useful for landing troops to secure the Indonesian choke points on the shipping lanes and control access. Equally, can't see Australia being too happy about this - perfect for landing there too once Indonesia is taken.
ReplyDelete"Equally, can't see Australia being too happy about this - perfect for landing there too once Indonesia is taken."
DeleteWhich takes us back to Australia needing to stop trying to ride the fence and start making decisions about who their friends and enemies are.
A simple question if China or any other country doesnt plan on think these ships will be used then Why would they build them we use ours a lot so do the other countries that actually have them
Delete"Why would they build them"
DeleteYou've asked exactly the right question. I've got a post coming soon that answers that question.
AIT (American Institute in Taiwan) asked one of Taiwan's likely (and heavily favored) 2020 Presidential candidate (current Taipei mayor) if Taiwan's armed forces can last 2 days before any acts of US intervention. If war breaks out, Taiwan's last redoubt will be the AFB (completely dug inside a granite mountain, runways and all, inaccessible to missile strikes) on Taiwan's east coast. I'd imagine PLAN's marine has a contingency plan for that, bypassing the Taiwan's steep central mountain range by going around the island.
ReplyDeleteSlightly off piste re Chinese shipyards and build standards. The Type 055 13,000t destroyer/cruiser, re HENRI KENHMANN's Eastpendulum web site on "the secrets of manufacture for the biggest Chinese destroyer" 2017
ReplyDeleteSpeed was important for the new ship and the use of a "certain" lighter material seemed to be the best technical choice that existed to control weight, although the lighter material is very easily deformable during welding, needed to control the size of each main module to a precision of 2 to 3 millimeters, so that the modules can be assembled without major adjustment (it's said that some European shipyards work to 1 mm tolerance).
It's known that Dongbei Special Steel (东北 特钢 集团) reportedly supplied a "large quantity" of titanium alloy for build. To weld the materials together was only first obstacle, how to bend them into different shapes for the hull modules another major challenge for the Chinese shipyard. Developed the SKWB-2500 a three-dimensional digital controlled bending machine able to exert a pressure of 6,000 tons on a sheet plate, pic on site shows of what appears to be a 25mm plate being shaped?, which if understand correctly is thicker than used in Burkes, 2/3 inch plate?
Shipyard had to network all the welding machines and link them to a large database, in order to precisely control the parameters of each welding spot, all the parameters pre-configured in each machine, including current and voltage, and the system will automatically stop welding and man's work if things go out of tolerance.
" if understand correctly is thicker than used in Burkes, 2/3 inch plate?"
Delete2/3 inch??? I wish! The Burkes use around 3/8" at the waterline with some 7/16" strakes mixed in above and below the waterline. The exact thickness depends on the exact location. The steel is mostly HY-80 or HSLA-80 in a few spots.
Interesting. I believe Titanium is pretty corrosion-resistant in seawater at most normal temperatures.
DeleteAlthough an unopposed landing can be carried out from cargo ships and passenger ferries, it takes very little to successfully oppose such a landing.
ReplyDeleteTroops trying to run down boarding planks on to docks stripped of all cover, under machine gun fire all the way, are not going to have a good day.
A few teams Recoiless rifles and mortars, if not actual artillery, would easily block an invasion.
A ship like the Type 75 would allow the Chinese to land 30 plus Squads to seize the docks and surrounding area.
Not against determined opposition.
But it's a lot easier to find people willing to shoot incoming cruise ships than marines with gunship support.
There is something interesting about this image. It shows that the Type 075 has a pair of vertical launch missile modules. That would indicate a far superior anti-aircraft capability for the vessel than merely having point defense systems.
ReplyDelete"The LHD will complement the Type 071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD) amphibious ships which are analogous to the US San Antonio class LPD-17. The combination will provide the Chinese with a very credible amphibious assault capability."
ReplyDeleteWill it really?
I mean, our LHAs/LHDs are virtually useless at landing anything that can't be carried by helo or V-22. Our LPDs may be somewhat better, but I don't see either one as having viable ship-to-shore connectors to support an opposed amphibious assault.
So China is basically copying two of our bad ideas. Except they do seem to have better connectors, in particular an amphibious tank as discussed in other threads.
I would think their 29 LSTs and 30-odd LSMs might actually pose a greater amphibious threat.
But one has to ask why they seem to be expanding their amphibious force so rapidly while we are not doing the same with ours. Taiwan, perhaps? But what after that?
Let's look at the structure of China's amphibious force, currently:
ReplyDelete2 LHA
8 LPD
32 LST
31 LSM
Clearly, they aren't nearly as big-deck-happy as we are. Partly that is because their most obvious amphibious objective--Taiwan--is quite close, whereas any amphibious action on our part would require a transit of some distance from CONUS. But they may also have needs for amphibious activity further from home--elsewhere around the first island chain or anywhere that threatens their oil supply route from the Mideast. It will be interesting to see how the structure of their force changes as they try to expand their reach.
Assuming 2000 per LHA, 1000 per LPD, 400 per LST, and 250 per LSM, the Chinese amphib force would appear to have a lift capacity somewhere in the 30-35,000 troop range. That's nowhere near enough to invade Taiwan, so they would have to press merchant shipping into service and/or utilize a huge airborne component (and Taiwan's air defenses would presumably be able to inflict huge losses on any massive airborne effort). That suggests to me that China's force intentions are more to intimidate neighbors into compliance than to conduct large-scale kinetic warfare. In that context, I think a significant ongoing USN presence would be sufficient both to solidify alliances and to slow down China's bullying a bit. I'm not talking about silly FONOPS. I'm talking about a CVBG and an ARG hanging around the area all the time. China had a cow when we put two carriers in the SCS a few weeks ago. Showing China (and its neighbors around the first island chain) that doing so is going to be our SOP going forward (and remember, my idea of a CVBG is 2 carriers, with 4 in a CTF) would be a huge step in altering the regional calculus in our favor.
Let's look at the structure of China's amphibious force, currently:
ReplyDelete2 LHA
8 LPD
32 LST
31 LSM
Clearly, they aren't nearly as big-deck-happy as we are. Partly that is because their most obvious amphibious objective--Taiwan--is quite close, whereas any amphibious action on our part would require a transit of some distance from CONUS. But they may also have needs for amphibious activity further from home--elsewhere around the first island chain or anywhere that threatens their oil supply route from the Mideast. It will be interesting to see how the structure of their force changes as they try to expand their reach.
Assuming 2000 per LHA, 1000 per LPD, 400 per LST, and 250 per LSM, the Chinese amphib force would appear to have a lift capacity somewhere in the 30-35,000 troop range. That's nowhere near enough to invade Taiwan, so they would have to press merchant shipping into service and/or utilize a huge airborne component (and Taiwan's air defenses would presumably be able to inflict huge losses on any massive airborne effort). That suggests to me that China's force intentions are more to intimidate neighbors into compliance than to conduct large-scale kinetic warfare. In that context, I think a significant ongoing USN presence would be sufficient both to solidify alliances and to slow down China's bullying a bit. I'm not talking about silly FONOPS. I'm talking about a CVBG and an ARG hanging around the area all the time. China had a cow when we put two carriers in the SCS a few weeks ago. Showing China (and its neighbors around the first island chain) that doing so is going to be our SOP going forward (and remember, my idea of a CVBG is 2 carriers, with 4 in a CTF) would be a huge step in altering the regional calculus in our favor.
Chip, you're repeating comments. If it's because it doesn't show up right away, that's just the moderation process on older posts to prevent spam. Don't worry, the comments will show up!
DeleteSorry about that. Was on a new computer and I didn't appear to "take" the first time.
Delete