The Navy deployed a
new ship pairing – a destroyer (DDG-51) and an amphibious transport dock
(LPD-17) – to test out a new concept that could supplement amphibious squadrons
and surface action groups as a formation in future operations. (1)
Okay,
it seems the Navy is serious about this as a combat group (again, are two ships
really a group?). What was the immediate
goal of the deployment? According to the
Navy,
The goal of the LCG-1
deployment was to work out the command and control, which placed a Navy captain
as the commodore of two ships … (1)
Is
this for real? The Navy has to “work out”
how to command and control two ships?????!!
Have things gotten that bad that we don’t already know how to command
and control two ships?
How
complex is command of two ships? Well,
apparently, it requires a staff … and not a small one.
LCG-1 was led by
Capt. Ken Coleman, the PHIBRON 3 commodore, and included a staff of 30 to 35 on
temporary assignment and embarked on Somerset. (1)
It
requires a staff of more than 30 people to command and control two ships?????!!
A
commodore? Seriously? For two ships? Why not just put an admiral in command –
we’ve got enough of them sitting around with nothing productive to do.
Well,
since the Navy seems serious about this lunacy, let’s go ahead and analyze the
concept.
Combat Power – What combat power
does an LPD and a Burke have? An LPD is
the smallest of the three ships that typically make up an Amphibious Ready
Group (ARG) and, therefore, carries around a quarter of a MEU and almost no
aviation (an LPD has room for a single MV-22 in the hangar). What is a quarter of a MEU going to do in
combat? They could deal with an angry
Boy Scout troop, I guess but that’s about it.
Remember the Somalia (Blackhawk Down) debacle? Small units simply haven’t got the combat
power to deal with actual combat. That
pretty well limits the “group” to very low end, non-combat scenarios which, of
course, is at odds with the word “combat” in the group description.
The
Burke, itself, has combat capability, of course, but it has that without the
LPD and, in fact, is less capable with the LPD than without because it has to
protect the LPD as well as itself, thus diluting the Burke’s combat capability
somewhat.
The
pair have no more credible combat capability than the Burke alone. This is stupidity on a plate.
Risk – Doctrinally, the Navy
won’t risk ships within 25-50 miles of land so how will this pair conduct
operations? Again, a quarter of a MEU,
with no significant aviation element, can’t transfer power ashore from 25-50
miles out in any peer level combat scenario, even setting aside the
ineffectiveness of a quarter of a MEU.
Again, that limits the “group” to inshore, non-combat scenarios.
This
grouping also puts a rare and valuable amphibious ship in harm’s way for no
gain in combat power.
Thus,
there seems to be no combat enhancement to this “group” over and above the
Burke, itself. So why is the Navy even
looking at this? I have no idea. From the article, we see the supposed guidance
that the Navy is operating under.
The Navy and Marine
Corps are revising their concepts to align with the National Defense Strategy
that focuses on warfare against a peer or near-peer adversary. (1)
That
makes this all the more baffling. How
does a single LPD and a single Burke contribute to warfare against a peer?
Navy
leadership needs to be drug tested.
(1)USNI
News website, “Navy Tests ‘Littoral Combat Group’ Concept That Pairs DDG, LPD
in South America Deployment”, Megan Eckstein, 3-Jan-2019,
https://news.usni.org/2019/01/03/navy-tests-littoral-combat-group-concept-that-pairs-ddg-lpd-in-south-america-deployment
I would think for an organization that is almost 250 years old which includes 40 years of operating MEU's, the command and control of two ships and a few hundred Marines wouldn't be a challenge. Normally, a grouping like this would be called a task force under command of the most senior captain. I don't see how the Navy is forging new ground here.
ReplyDeleteObviously it is a not war (peer) ideal. With a NSC based frigate the pairing would be perfectly fine. The kind of thing you would end to the hang out near the DRC for evacuating staff or civilians instead of having soldiers stationed in Gabon while its having an abortive coup. It could also be an useful thing to send for anti piracy. Show up after a Tsunami etc. But a Burke is a waste of time and diverting from training.
ReplyDeleteWould they be toying with using this for Spec Ops? Otherwise, as you said, the unit size is too small for successful combat missions.
ReplyDeleteI have no idea but two large ships doesn't seem very clandestine/special ops. I think it's just what the Navy says - an [idiotic] attempt at a combat pairing.
DeleteA theoretical use case would be operating Marines or other special forces units in support of an allied nation's COIN operations. The immediate case that comes to mind is the Phillipines, which has spent decades fighting insurgency after insurgency, from NPA to MILF to MNLF to the fighting in Zamboanga. Given that the Phillipines is made up of islands, having an amphib makes some sense then, because you've got organic transport that can bring your troops to every island there. A 700-odd landing force is still a lot of troops, especially when your opposition are insurgents.
DeleteThe Burke could then be used for fire support, either by using the Seahawk as a ghetto gunship with Hellfire missiles, the 5" gun, or Tomahawk missiles.
A 35-member staff then makes a bit more sense in this scenario if a lot of that staff is being dedicated to intel work.
IMO, pairing the DDG with the LPD is meant to be a test case of the most basic of building blocks, somewhat akin to how the MAGTF concept scales up and down in size from an MEU to an MEF.
The issue with this setup is that it's not very suitable for high end war. It's very much something for COIN/stabilisation ops in an allied/friendly/permissive nation, where combat may occur, but not to the extent of Major Combat Operations, i.e. the big ticket hot war.
"especially when your opposition are insurgents."
DeleteSo, you're suggesting that a single LPD would be appropriate for small unit actions like capturing a single warlord in a quick in-out raid (Somalia Blackhawk Down), extracting refugees (2013 South Sudan), or embassy defense (Benghazi)? Of course each of those have demonstrated that small units are not viable when opposed.
The constant repetition of patrols in Iraq/Afg that get ambushed and decimated is another example of small units being inappropriate for actual combat.
People, including our professional military leaders, have forgotten what combat really is because we've been conducting police actions and nation building for so long. We consistently insert small units into situations that they're not equipped to handle.
Even larger scale operations are vulnerable when opposed as demonstrated in the 2003 Apache attack in Karbala which resulted in 31 Apaches being damaged or destroyed by nothing more than small arms and machine gun fire.
So, no, a quarter of a MEU with no aviation support is not suitable for even COIN operations. This is how you get a unit into a situation that's over its head (Somalia, Sudan, Benghazi, patrols).
Finally, as documented in the article and post, the Navy is supposed to be preparing for high end war with China, not COIN.
Nothing about this concept is valid or viable.
A single LPD can carry up to 700 Marines. That could consist of one or two infantry company-equivalents plus attachments.
DeleteMight be good enough to lift a force suitable for Somalia , but not operate it from the ship due to lack of helo spots. However, perhaps a bit small, in hindsight. Task Force Ranger was around 400 soldiers. Two LPDs should be able to comfortably carry Task Force Ranger and an armored Bn(-) QRF.
One LPD should be good enough for embassy defense (Benghazi).
Juba is too far from the sea for it to be useful extracting refugees, though only a squad-sized Marine unit was used here.
"Might be good enough to lift a force suitable for Somalia"
DeleteNot likely. The original Task Force Ranger had 400 personnel and 16 helos. The relief force that rescued them had over a hundred vehicles including a handful of tanks and that force got badly shot up, as well. So, no, 700 infantry with no aviation support would not have been adequate.
The larger point, which I'll repeat, is that a single LPD offers no high end, peer war combat capability which is what the Navy has been tasked with developing, as documented in the article and post.
Two LPDs, carrying 1400 Marines/SOF should do it then.
DeleteThe Navy has many missions, not just high end, peer warfare.
Two LPDs was not the Navy's concept and two LPDs would be even less useful in a peer war since they would lack any air defense, ASW, or land strike that the Burke provided.
DeleteThe Navy does, indeed, have many missions. However, to repeat yet again, the article and post note that the Navy has been tasked with preparing for a high end, all-out war (with China) and this misguided "group" is one of the Navy's concepts for that war. Whether this group is suitable for other, lesser, missions is possibly interesting but utterly irrelevant.
The concept appears flexible enough to support different numbers of LPDs and DDGs, depending on the requirements.
DeleteI, humbly, don't see much value in such "disaggregate" operations in high-end wars, other than economies-of-force missions.
"The concept appears flexible enough to support different numbers of LPDs and DDGs, depending on the requirements."
DeleteYes and no. No, small groups such as this have no combat usefulness so scaling to a small handful of ships is pointless. Yes, we've already scaled the concept up and we call them ARG/MEUs and carrier battle groups.
The Navy has simply forgotten how to fight a war and is flailing around trying to come up with something. Unfortunately, the institutional knowledge of war has been lost and the leaders that are coming up with these idiotic ideas have no expertise and, apparently, no ability to critically analyze the ideas. They're just throwing crap at the wall to see if anything sticks. This is the sad and low state to which our Navy leadership has sunk. Can you seriously imagine Nimitz or Halsey thinking that a transport and a destroyer would have any combat value as an isolated pair?
"Can you seriously imagine Nimitz or Halsey thinking that a transport and a destroyer would have any combat value as an isolated pair?"
DeleteYes, in economies-of-force applications.
"Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the reciprocal of mass. It requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to achieve superiority—overwhelming effects—in the decisive operation. "
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_force
"secondary efforts"
DeleteYou understand that we're talking about peer war, right? Of course we don't need to send a carrier group to sink a single patrol boat but that's not what we or the Navy are talking about.
I don't know what you're trying to argue for or against - or are you just looking to argue?
In what possible peer war scenario is an LPD and a Burke going to accomplish anything worthwhile?
@ComNavOps: You make some points, but I feel your perspective is a little incomplete because, as you yourself have acknowledged, ground combat is not your forte.
DeleteYou mentioned TF Ranger and its 400 personnel in Somalia - the actual combat presence deployed on the mission was a company of Rangers, split between the chalks on the helos and the Hummvee convoy, and a Delta Force squadron - 160 men total is a lot less shooters than the total 400 bodies in Task Force Ranger, but still more than what the Army conventionally considers a small unit action. It needs to be noted that that the raid objectives were accomplished; what got everyone bogged down were Super 6-1 and Super 6-4 being shot down, causing command to pull helo extraction out, and the troops moving on foot to secure the Super 6-1 crash site and recover survivors.
(You're correct that the lack of significant aviation lift is a problem in this matter; Mogadishu also shows that if you really want to force your way into a city, you really truly do need to have IFVs and tanks.)
Juba was a case of Marines flying out with C-130s to evacuate embassy staff in advance of a deteriorating security situation. I'm not sure what's the point you're trying make with that.
Benghazi, meanwhile, was 7 guys fighting their way to the compound, extracting 5 out of 6 people there, and then fighting their way back to their base and holding their position throughout the night, fighting off dozens of attackers. That's a pretty good showing for a small unit equipped only with rifles and hand grenades. And I should point out that if you had 700 Marines there, they'd have _outnumbered_ the opposition, and that's before the crew-served weapons come into play.
To elaborate further on Karbala 2003, it was an ambush executed by Iraqi insurgents on overconfident Apache crews; they kept the Apache base under observation, and used camoflaged machineguns and autocannons to ambush the Apaches which flew a regular flight plan - not only that, they mixed in their crew-served weapons amongst civilian housing, which complicated targeting for the Apaches, particularly with the ROE in place. I consider that a good example of an overconfident, complacent force being outplayed by a wily adversary. It doesn't mean that repeats of Karbala 2003 are an inevitability; the factors that lead to that situation can be mitigated and avoided provided one avoids complacency and does not subscribe to a false aura of invincibility. (This is, admittedly, easier said than done, at times.)
Ultimately I think the only way a lone DDG and LPD can work in a hot war is if you do blocking force memes like what one of my Singaporean acquaintances mentioned to me before: he was in a helimobile battalion, with a wartime tasking of being inserted behind Malaysian lines on a one-way trip to harrass and stall the Malaysian advance as long as possible. They weren't expected to live very long (wartime kit was twice as much ammo as standard load, and only ONE DAY of rations), just long enough to be a nuisance to buy time. The DDG is the bare minimum credible escort to get the LPD to the objective point and offload its 700 Marines, while still being a small enough force that it can be written off in combat (because, at the end of the day, everyone and everything is expendable in combat, but it behooves commanders to spend those assets wisely).
But that assumes that China is going to go invade somewhere, which is a pretty doubtful assumption to me - outside of Taiwan, they don't really need to invade anybody, and they don't really have the amphibious lift for a major invasion (not yet, anyway, the blue water fleet as priority for now). Maybe you could send those 700 men on a one way trip to raid somewhere in China and make a nuisance of themselves to divert China's military focus (because if you scale this up and use multiple DDG+LHD/LHA/LPD teams to drop dozens of Marine companies all along the coast, those companies could make a fair nuisance of themselves), but I dunno. Not sure I would call that wise spending.
Delete" the actual combat presence deployed on the mission was a company of Rangers"
DeleteNo, the actual combat presence was the total force that was used during the mission and that included a hundred vehicles, more aviation, and a handful of tanks. You're incorrectly referring to the initial, planned force. And, if the mission had gone perfectly according to plan … wait now while I add up all the missions in the history of warfare that have gone perfectly according to plan - okay, it's zero … then you'd be correct. Of course, since no plan survives contact with the enemy, you're wrong. The force required to execute a mission includes backup and contingency forces, search and rescue forces, standby or alternate forces, logistics support forces, etc. Believing that a mission involves only the initial action forces belies a complete lack of understanding of what a mission is and how it is planned, manned, and executed. Ground combat is clearly not your forte.
"Juba"
Delete?? I referred to the Dec 2013 attempted evacuation of non-combatants from South Sudan by three V-22s. The aircraft were badly shot up, crew were hit, and the mission was aborted. The point being to illustrate what a very limited LPD aviation element is susceptible to and how that very limited element cannot offer any credible high end combat capability.
I never mentioned Juba. As I've said so many times in the past, comment on what I've actually said.
"Benghazi"
DeleteAgain, this illustrates how small units can be quickly overwhelmed when faced with actual resistance. We've seen this in countless small unit actions in Iraq/Afg. A single LPD is a combat disaster waiting to happen and it's all the worse because they have no backup and no aviation element to call on.
"Karbala"
DeleteThis demonstrates that when faced with actual resistance, we need many times more forces than for the peacetime patrol type of work we now think of as "war". Again, comparing the inadequacy of these Apaches to the nearly non-existent aviation element of an LPD reveals how quickly and deeply into trouble an LPD ground element get in actual combat.
You consider that an example of an overconfident and complacent force but isn't that exactly what the concept of a single LPD as a ground force is? It's a Karbala waiting to happen.
You're either not understanding the broad concept here, at all, or you're simply looking to argue. This won't continue.
"multiple DDG+LHD/LHA/LPD teams to drop dozens of Marine companies all along the coast"
DeleteSure, I can see those groups, with their single Burke escort, surviving the thousand mile A2/AD zone penetration to carry out that mission and I can see Company size forces with no logistical or aviation support being able to beat millions of Chinese soldiers, aircraft, armored divisions, and massed artillery.
Thank you. You've made my day with that bit of humor but now offer something serious.
"No, the actual combat presence was the total force that was used during the mission and that included a hundred vehicles, more aviation, and a handful of tanks. You're incorrectly referring to the initial, planned force."
DeleteYou've misunderstood me: I was speaking specifically about 1) the number Task Force Ranger's shooters vs total complement, and 2) the shooters deployed specifically on the *raid*, not the larger Battle of Mogadishu. It should also be noted that looking at the overall forces employed for the entire Battle of Mogadishu and thinking a thoudand troops are what's necessary isn't a complete understanding of the matter.
TF Ranger's problem was that it was using light infantry, deployed via helicopter and in softskin vics (Humvees); these are vehicles that rely on not getting hit, which is a problem in urban warfare because getting hit is an inevitability. The Rangers and Deltas relied on getting in and out quickly, and ran into trouble once the Blackhawks were shot down and pulled out; they weren't setup nor expecting prolonged fighting. An equivalent-sized force running in IFVs would have had less trouble, because:
1) IFVs are hardier vs RPGs than helos or Hummvees,
2) the mechanised infantry force would have been concentrated and operating together, instead of the split between the Humvee convoy and Blackhawk chalks,
3) autocannon-equipped IFVs act as force multipliers for the mech infantry squad by dint of needing heavy AT weapons to suppress, while having a big gun of their own.
The size of the relief column meanwhile was because shit had hit the fan, people were panicking, and wanted to roll in with overwhelming force against what looked like a city that had risen up against them all. That's not a bad thing, but I'd caution against using that as a benchmark for future planning. It's all very situational. It very much depends on what you are doing. An overstrength mech infantry company with over a dozen IFVs has a decent chance of rolling up at dawn, raiding the compound, and driving away. That same force isn't going to deal quite as well with driving into a city in the afternoon when everyone's up in arms and there's a gun in every window and an RPG around each corner.
"?? I referred to the Dec 2013 attempted evacuation of non-combatants from South Sudan by three V-22s. The aircraft were badly shot up, crew were hit, and the mission was aborted. The point being to illustrate what a very limited LPD aviation element is susceptible to and how that very limited element cannot offer any credible high end combat capability."
Ah, we're thinking of different incidents in South Sudan (Juba is the capital of South Sudan). That explains the misunderstanding we're having. Well, that's one way of looking at things; the other way is that incident is a reminder that flying into an unsupressed LZ is a great way to catch bullets (from the OSINT sources on the matter, it's noted that the flight crews were expecting to fly into a permissive environment).
"Again, this illustrates how small units can be quickly overwhelmed when faced with actual resistance. We've seen this in countless small unit actions in Iraq/Afg. A single LPD is a combat disaster waiting to happen and it's all the worse because they have no backup and no aviation element to call on."
Sure, but what I was trying to say is that even without any aviation elements in play, 700 Marines at Benghazi would have numerical superiority over the attackers, and that's before the weapons company's crew served weapons - machine guns, mortars, ATGMs - come into play.
"You consider that an example of an overconfident and complacent force but isn't that exactly what the concept of a single LPD as a ground force is? It's a Karbala waiting to happen."
DeleteYes and no. When I think about the Apaches at Karbala, I'm reminded of how the British Apaches operated in Helmand and avoided serious attempts by the Taliban to hunt them, because they were on the ball, played to their strengths, and were not complacent like the Americans at Karbala.
We're both in agreement that a single LPD can't contribute much in Major Combat Operations, in the serious big ticket war. My point was that the single LPD's forces can, theoretically, be viable *if* you use them on COIN missions in situations where the opposition does not have parity with you, which is the sort of thing you see around SEA - 700 troops is a major troop movement in that part of the woods (outside the Singaporeans, perhaps, but then their troop movements are a lot easier when they're redeploying from one end of the city to the other :V).
I don't know about you, but I'm of the opinion that this has been a fine discussion. The back and forth is something that gets other readers to think and learn.
"Thank you. You've made my day with that bit of humor but now offer something serious."
Oh, I wasn't expecting them to be able to beat Chinese! :P I was alluding to them doing the same things my Singaporean acquaintance's battalion was supposed to do (and they weren't the only people with that tasking, btw). Remember, they were issued only with enough rations for ONE FUCKING DAY, which says a lot about their life expectency: If you're going to be dead by tomorrow, you only need enough food to last you for today.
I was just theorising a possible use for this concept in a hot war (I'm reminded of the saying about making silk purses out of pig's ears... :V). I don't think it's a practical or worthwhile to spend all that effort to send thousands of Marines on a one-way trip for very little gain/result.
Like I've said before, the only real use I can think of for a full on MEU in a hot war with China is either rushing reinforcements to Taiwan (because Taiwan's hilly and mountainous territory means it's a fucking pain for an invader to fight in, so that lets Taiwan be a tarpit to suck in Chinese focus), or keeping it around SEA to stiffen the resolve of regional allies - or at least to keep them from getting any ideas about declaring for China, because an MEU may not be worth for landing on China's shores, but it's a threat that the SEA militaries need to respect, especially given most forces in ASEAN are setup as counter insurgency/regime protection forces.
About the only Chinese "soil" that I think a MEU has a chance of capturing would be China's big artificial islands/built up atolls with their naval bases and airbases, but I'm not convinced it'd be a worthwhile effort (and the fighting for those bases is probably going to wreck the very infrastructure that makes them a target).
"TF Ranger's problem was that it was using light infantry, ... An equivalent-sized force running in IFVs would have had less trouble"
DeleteDo you grasp what we're talking about? I'll refresh your memory. We're talking about the potential combat usefulness of an LPD carrying a quarter of a MEU and no significant aviation element. Do you know what kind of soldiers are on an LPD? They're Marines. Marines do not have IFVs. Marines are, essentially, light infantry. You noted that the TF Ranger problem was that they used light infantry - EXACTLY WHAT A SINGLE LPD HAS! You then state that a force of IFVs would have been able to do the mission while ignoring the fact that Marines don't have IFVs.
You acknowledged the point being made and then turned around and argued about it.
I'm not going any further down this rabbit hole because you're clearly just looking to argue with no rational basis.
"You noted that the TF Ranger problem was that they used light infantry - EXACTLY WHAT A SINGLE LPD HAS! You then state that a force of IFVs would have been able to do the mission while ignoring the fact that Marines don't have IFVs. "
DeleteWhen the Marines landed in Mogadishu earlier, they landed with AAVs and tanks. Both are carried by LPDs.
An AAV is not an IFV and is not used as such. An entire MEU is allocated 4 tanks. A single LPD in this type of group would likely not have any tanks. Further, MEUs are generally deploying without any tanks today.
Delete"numerical superiority over the attackers,"
DeleteYou are failing to grasp the reality of these situations so I'll lay it out as plain as possible. Each situation (and so many others in Iraq/Afg) started out as small situations with a force that was deemed adequate but when resistance was encountered that force was quickly found to be inadequate. At that point, either additional forces were required or the additional forces were too far away (both time and distance) to be effective.
In hindsight, we can sit back and say, argumentatively and pointlessly, that 700 Marines would have been enough for some mission without recognizing the fact that no one is going to deploy 700 Marines for what is believed to be a 50 man operation. The problem is that when unexpected resistance is encountered, it's usually too late to employ the remaining 650 troops.
This is not a difficult concept to understand.
"In hindsight, we can sit back and say, argumentatively and pointlessly, that 700 Marines would have been enough for some mission without recognizing the fact that no one is going to deploy 700 Marines for what is believed to be a 50 man operation. The problem is that when unexpected resistance is encountered, it's usually too late to employ the remaining 650 troops."
DeleteWell that explains why we're talking past each other then, because my thinking is for using said LPD's 700 Marines has always been as a large cohesive force, with maneuver in the field by companies, not just platoons or squads. The CONOPS I'm thinking of is stuff the Phillipine Army tries to do, making sweeps of the islands to clear out Abu Sayaff and other insurgents; what keeps them from being able to really do that, despite trying hard, are the fucked up PAF procurement (platoon leaders are using cellphones for comms, over radios that don't work!) and their lack of amphibious transport.
@Anon: Calling the AAV an IFV is, IMO, overselling it. It's not really protected enough, IMO, and the other criteria that really seperates an IFV from an APC is that the IFV has at least an autocannon, and more often than not has ATGMs for antitank work.
DeleteLooking at the ACV program, there is some hope that, if things work out and BAE doesn't fuck it up, the USMC will get a replacement for the AAV that will be more useful on the land. I'm still a little disappointed the Terrex didn't win the ACV 1.2 competition, because it's basically a complete package: it's an existing wheeled 8x8 APC with decent armor protection, with weapons options for MG, AGL and autocannon (which would tip it over into the IFV bracket). We can only hope that BAE's realised ACV will have an autocannon to provide more credible infantry support.
"700 Marines has always been as a large cohesive force"
DeleteYou are really not grasping this. 700 infantry is not a large cohesive force. It's a disaster waiting to happen. The MEU is the smallest force capable of independent combat operations. Anything smaller, like a quarter of a MEU with no aviation support, is a penny packet potential disaster. You might get lucky and get away with it sometimes but, inevitably, you're going to get Somlia'ed when you underestimate the threat. There's a reason why MEUs are supposed to sail as a single force rather than this idiotic single ship, distributed force concept.
We're done with this.
Agree with Anon and Kath. Only thing I would add, while reading the article, I was thinking, this might, maybe, hypothetically, possibly, might, kind of make sense if USN would keep the 2 ships together for at least a few years so you would learn how the 2 ships could complement each other on a bunch of diverse missions and operations....BUT doing this for a few weeks, really is useless. I was hoping the USN was thinking along the lines of a combined force "a la US Army" mixing up tanks with infantry BUT that requires a lot of time, effort, training and operating together to LEVERAGE both types of separate elements and mold them into something BIGGER...this, is just a waste of time and money.
ReplyDeleteI'm sure this somehow ties into the distributed lethality concept, if we spread out the invasion over 1000km, china wont be able to throw us off the beaches for however long it takes them to arrest the small invasion parties.
ReplyDeleteDon't worry CNO, any issues with this idea will be solved by more "networking" and maybe the addition of an LCS to the group.
Maybe the commodore needs a staff of 30-35 to safely maneuverer two vessels to avoid collisions...
Sarcasm aside, This makes no sense... peer-2-peer, really? A two ship group like this is only practical in the safest of environments. Maritime raids? That is better suited by subs and seal teams.
I can't make sense of it and hopefully the navy lets this "good idea" fade to distant memory.
The part where USN needs a commodore and a staff of 30 people to operate 2 ships together should NEVER been released, I mean, come on, seriously USN, you can't safely operate 2 ships together without an entire team detached to do that?!? How far out of touch is USN that NOBODY INSIDE USN said or spoke out how bad this looks and sounds? This passed the smell test?!?
DeleteRelative to the aviation capacity, if Wiki is correct, an LPD-17 can "launch or land up to two MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft simultaneously with room to place four MV-22s on the flight deck and one in the hangar deck." And, with a well deck large enough for 2 LCACs, its conceivable she could carry 2, maybe more, Mk VI patrol boats to provide additional capability to move troops.
ReplyDeleteYou understand what you read/wrote, right? You seem to be implying that an LPD can operate up to 5 aircraft. It can't! Four aircraft on the deck is for transport - you can't operate them. If you look at the LPD flight deck, you'll see that there are only two spots - hence the statement that you can operate two aircraft. Theoretically, you could carry three operational aircraft by having two constantly on deck but I've never seen V-22's deck-stored on an LPD. Aircraft maintenance has to be done in the hangar and it would involve a lot of juggling to do that with three aircraft. Practically, an LPD would operate a single V-22. However, even three V-22 would not constitute a viable aviation element for high end combat (or even low end! - witness the 2003 Sudan rescue fiasco).
DeleteIf you go just by this, they sailed with at least two CH-53s and on UH-1.
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XRikgPuuLC0
Yep, that would be a valid alternate aviation fit.
DeleteI wasn't implying an LPD-17 could operate 5 MV-22s, but I was certain it was more than one and 2-3 seems to be the right number. And, such a fit would be more applicable for going after pirates and the like as opposed to high-end combat.
DeleteJust a suggestion, if your ASW carrier is up to it, such a ship might carry 4-6 MV-22s in lieu of 10 Seahawks. There would have to be space available for the Marines and other details to workout. But, it would also be a less expensive platform to use.
"There would have to be space available for the Marines and other details to workout. But, it would also be a less expensive platform to use."
DeleteNo, it probably wouldn't. By the time you add space to berth, say, 700+ Marines and their vehicles and gear plus additional hangar space, maintenance shops as well as significant additional galley capacity, food storage (you're gonna feed the Marines, right?), water storage, frozen storage, laundry facilities, Marine command and control space, enhanced comms to support the ground element, hospital space (Marines are gonna get wounded in combat, right?), etc., you've sized up to, and costed up to, a typical big deck Navy amphibious assault ship.
People tend to think they can "just" add a few extra [fill in the blank] without considering the added crew, berthing, galley, storage, support, etc. that goes with the addition of anything.
https://media.defense.gov/2008/Mar/12/169332/750/422/0/080311-N-6423H-030.jpg
DeleteThose are the retired CH-46 Sea Knights. I normally discourage links or photos without accompanying comments since whatever caught your eye would not be obvious to others. Do you have a comment to go with the link?
DeleteRelative to cost, the average cost of an LPD-17 is $1.6 billion (per Wiki) and given your ASW carrier is built to commercial standards and presumably smaller, it would be a less expensive platform to use.
DeleteAlso, SPMATGF-Peru consisted of about 300 Marines and Sailors, probably a reinforced Marine company, which is less than half the capacity of San Antonio class. I suggested your ASW carrier as the Navy sometimes repurposes ships for different missions. In hindsight, perhaps one of the Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD) and Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ships is a better choice for a one-off mission like this.
"given your ASW carrier is built to commercial standards and presumably smaller, it would be a less expensive platform to use."
DeleteIt would if you only wanted it as a helo platform. However, you postulated adding a ground force element to it:
"There would have to be space available for the Marines"
As I stated in my reply, the ASW carrier might be cheaper initially but by the time you add berthing, equipment storage, and all the other things I mentioned to support the ground force, you're right back up to a nearly full fledged amphibious ship. Those amphibs are the size they are for a reason and cost what they cost for a reason!
" In hindsight, perhaps one of the Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD) and Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ships is a better choice for a one-off mission like this."
DeleteIn foresight, the mission never should have happened for the reasons we've cited. That aside, if one was bound and determined to conduct a worthless mission then you're correct that there were several better choices. The JHSV would have been a good choice in addition to the possibilities you mentioned.
Do you see that if we're going to send ships to sea and rack up wear and tear and spend operational funds and hours, those ships ought to be training for combat? We have so many other ways that are so much less expensive to accomplish simple PR visits and wouldn't use up warship life on non-combat jobs. That's the main point along with the utter lack of combat usefulness of the littoral combat group concept. And, if we're bound and determined to form littoral combat groups then we should be putting them through combat training (it's right in the group title, for gosh sakes!) not humanitarian assistance and PR visits. If the Navy wants a littoral combat group then, fine, put them into a combat training situation and see what they can do. Don't waste the time.
"Also, SPMATGF-Peru consisted of about 300 Marines"
DeleteYeah, I wondered if the ship was actually carrying to capacity but I didn't see any actual Marine numbers. Where did you get that number?
Also, if true, that makes the littoral combat group even less combat effective!
It is worth pointing out that a MEU (no less 1/4 of a MEU) is not a relevant combat organization to project ashore.
ReplyDeleteMost armies have long adopted brigade sized forces as the ideal building block organization, but the USMC has its head stuck in the sand pretending that battalions and regiments are somehow relevant even though almost every other 1st world ground force has moved on.
GAB
The MEU is relevant for the types of presence operations envisioned (e.g. raids, embassy evac, HA/DR).
DeleteThe MEB or MEF is the invasion force.
Of course there are counter-examples as well.
DeleteThe Russians have effectively employed Battalion Tactical Groups (reinforced battalions) in Ukraine.
The French have employed both reinforced, independent company (SGTIA) and battalion groups (GTIA) as their primary units in Mali.
"Of course there are counter-examples as well."
DeleteSure, for low end scenarios. The Russians have only semi-committed forces in Ukraine and only in support roles. The French were attempting a counter-insurgency / anti-terrorism action and still wound up committing around 5000 troops.
We're talking about high end, peer war scenarios. Yes, if the scenario is at the low end of the threat spectrum then you can get away with smaller units - until they encounter actual resistance (Somalia being the classic example).
This is all about high end, peer war, not semi-peacetime actions.
An over-emphasis on the peer war.
DeleteWe can't ignore non-peer conflicts. They are all we've fought in the past 70+ years.
The Russian example has applicability in the high-end fight. BTGs fought with heavy doses of indirect fire support. Their smaller size made them harder to detect and target.
Distributed lethality on land.
"An over-emphasis on the peer war."
DeletePeer war is the Navy's primary mission!!!!
If you can handle a peer war then you can handle any subset of war.
Now, if you're referring to the blog's emphasis on peer war, that comes and goes depending on what I'm posting about. Again, though, given that the Navy's mission is peer war, the majority of posts will be about peer war. Logical, right?
We've done many posts on lower end scenarios. I've discussed realistic alternate uses for the LCS in low end scenarios, for example. I've discussed a two tier peace/war fleet composition. I've discussed peacetime deployments versus missions. And so on. Check the archives.
@anonymous
DeleteThe MEU is as irrelevant, as are the “presence operations” that you advocate MEU and MEU (-) participating in.
There is absolutely no reason to tie up a $2.5B destroyer and a $1.7B LPD and the time of hundreds of sailors to support Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions, particularly given that the majority of FID missions are executed by in-country troops. This is a particular waste of ships, training opportunities (ASW, AAW etc.), and O&M.
Humanitarian Assistance and similar missions are better run by USAID and FEMA – the institutions with the expertise and clear statutory mandates to do those missions. The Special Inspector General reports for Iraq and Afghanistan chronical staggering levels of DoD incompetence in executing HA and infrastructure projects and criminal levels of lost accountability for hundreds of billions of dollars.
MEU and MEU(SOC) are at the absolute bottom end of the totem pole when it comes NEOs, and absolutely when it comes to Hostage rescue. More than 90% of NEO evacuations are conducted with the USAF simply flying out the civilians (often on contracted commercial airlines).
If it comes to a real hostage rescue, a National Special Mission Unit flies into the country or a neighboring country, puts bullets in bodies, and goes home. Rarely the need for Ships, even less for a MEU.
Finally, you completely missed the fact that that regiments and divisions are anachronisms. Comparing a Russian Battalion Tactical Group, which is a motorized rifle or tank battalion with attached SP artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and logistics support, to a MEB built around an infantry regiment, is a joke. The tragedy is when a Russian or Chinese motor rifle or tank brigade curb stomps a MEB or MEF, which it will do.
GAB
AnonymousJanuary 9, 2019 at 7:07 AM
Delete“We can't ignore non-peer conflicts. They are all we've fought in the past 70+ years. “
These conflicts represent no credible threat to the USA territorial integrity and rarely can be tied to any meaningful national interest - of course we can and should ignore them!
GAB
Going to question "their smaller size made them harder to detect and target" regarding battalions.
DeleteYeah, I suppose that's true in certain scenarios, but in peer warfare a battalion lacks the needed organic components to sustain combat operations. It won't have anything heavier than TOW missiles or 81mm mortars. I can't find any current TO&E for a USMC battalion, but I don't believe it has much in the way of EW, AA, medical or engineering assets. A battalion is typically dependent on the parent unit to provide these capabilities.
"Humanitarian Assistance and similar missions are better run by USAID and FEMA – the institutions with the expertise and clear statutory mandates to do those missions."
DeleteBe clear though. USAID/OFDA has a total of 300 employees worldwide.
They're good at cross governmental coordination, but they rely on others for implementation. (Like the Marines)
It has been repeatedly stated, here, that we need to identify a lead agency(s) for humanitarian and similar missions and fund them appropriately so as to free up the Navy to do what it's supposed to do.
Delete16,000 military personnel were deployed to Haiti after the earthquake. 12,600 were deployed for the Indian Ocean tsunami.
DeleteThere are less than 4,000 USAID employees total.
USAID simply can't be the boots on the ground without enlarging it to be the size of another military service.
Only the military has the personnel and world wide reach to do this.
"16,000 military personnel"
DeleteLet's be fair and note that the vast majority of them had no direct involvement. For example, a carrier with 5000 crew would only have a handful directly involved with aid distribution. A single RO/RO cargo ship with a crew of 50 pretty much equals an entire Navy task force in terms of amount of aid it can deliver.
Not even close.
DeleteA RO/RO can carry the aid, but delivering and distributing it requires boots on the ground, helicopters, aircraft, and vehicles.
In the case of Haiti, the port was wrecked, so there was no place for a RO/RO to even dock until it was repaired.
TF-Haiti had up to 300 helicopters and fixed wing aircraft and manned sixteen distribution points. They also provided security for relief efforts.
You're being intentionally argumentative. If USAID needs a construction "battalion" then let's fund one. If they need a small helo cargo ship with cargo helos (not SH-60s) then let's fund one. The cost of these things would equal around 0.00000000001% of the US budget.
DeleteFinally, if there's a disaster so big that we think we need to send in combat troops for security or assistance then, fine, once every couple of decades we can do that. No big deal.
The point, backed by overwhelming data and logic, is that the military should not be the primary disaster relief agency.
That's about all that needs to be said on this topic.
If i sound argumentative its because i'm arguing you're wrong.
DeleteUSAID is fundamentally incapable of being the primary agency.
Read up on the huge level of manpower and equipment required during these operations. There are lots of studies and reports on the Internet.
A USAID "construction battalion" would be the equivalent of Trump tossing paper towels to disaster victims - worthless. Try "construction brigades" or "divisions" plural, with prepositioned ships, supplies and equipment all over the world.
"If i sound argumentative "
DeleteYou're being argumentative because you're ignoring what I've said and you're constructing an argument based on the most extreme case possible.
You're ignoring that I've stated we should fund USAID appropriately so that they can do the job.
Most humanitarian efforts don't require massive resources and personnel. We conduct several such missions each year and most are minor. Once every ten years or so a larger one comes along and you're also ignoring that I've said that if such a one comes along and we feel we need more resources then, sure, bring in the military. Once a decade or so won't hurt anything.
That's why you're being argumentative.
If you were interested in a discussion rather than an argument, you'd address the wear placed on military assets during HA/DR missions and how that reduces our warfighting readiness, the time and money taken from training opportunities, the fact that HA/DR is not a military warfighting mission, the gross inefficiency of using the military for HA/DR missions and you'd offer solutions rather than arguments.
I've had enough of this unproductive conversation.
Permit me to play devils advocate. What if this exercise was a scale test? The real world operations would involve dozens more ships. But the Navy realizes that if they did it full scale it would be a complete Charlie Foxtrot given all the recent failures in seamanship and leadership. So they start small getting command staff a little experience-hence the large command element-then will do more exercises with more vessels later. So do now they have a single Burke representing a squadron providing air cover and fire support and single amphib represents an otherwise larger Marine element. A minor training excercise that is exaggerated in importance by the Naval PR machine.
ReplyDeleteBest case, reasonable scenario?
Of course it’s actually more likely an example of the institutional stupidity that rules the upper echelon but I can hope its something more positive right?
Presumably we all read the article after reading CNOps' post, so I'm a bit surprised nobody has pointed out the context of LCG-1's formation. Sure, the navy hyped it up as a Next Generation, Distributed, Future Combat System... just like everything else. However, the article clearly states that this was a formation of convenience. Both the DDG and LPD in question were in the area for EXPONAVAL, and formation of LCG-1 consisted entirely of placing a couple dozen extra officers on one ship to integrate command of the group into one command structure.
ReplyDeleteNobody should argue that this "group" has any real value in a peer war, and these ships probably wouldn't be deployed in a peer war as a group of 2. That said, the navy hyped might not be all wrong. On a larger scale, integrating command of an amphibious squadron with a small SAG (1 Tico, 2 or more Burkes) actually could increase the capabilities of both, perhaps more than placing the SAG ships in a CVBG, granted that the CVBG would need a lot of escorts not to benefit greatly drom a few more.