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Monday, December 3, 2018

Norwegian Frigate Sinking Lessons

We previously discussed the collision and sinking of the Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad (see, “Sensors – What Good Are They?”) and noted that it was yet another example of the demonstrably inherent flawed thinking that networks and data will allow us to prevail in future wars.

Now, we see the Helge Ingstad sinking demonstrating another of ComNavOps’ recurring themes – that we’ve forgotten how to design ships for combat.  The initial report from the Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) has been released and pins the cause of the flooding and sinking on flawed watertight design features and construction.  The cause of the collision, itself, is another subject.

The initial damage and immediate flooding was not enough to sink the ship but the flawed design allowed adjoining, undamaged compartments to quickly flood resulting in the ship rapidly sinking.  From the report,


The AIBN has found safety critical issues relating to the vessel's watertight compartments. This must be assumed to also apply to the other four Nansen-class frigates. It cannot be excluded that the same applies to vessels of a similar design delivered by Navantia, or that the design concept continues to be used for similar vessel models. The AIBN assumes that its findings are not in conformity with the required damage stability standard for the Nansen class frigates. 

To start with, flooding occurred in three watertight compartments on board 'KNM Helge Ingstad': the aft generator room, the orlob deck's crew quarters and the stores room. There was some uncertainty as to whether the steering engine room, the aftmost compartment, was also filling up with water. Based on this damage, the crew, supported by the vessel's stability documents, assessed the vessel as having 'poor stability' status, but that it could be kept afloat. If more compartments were flooded, the status would be assessed as 'vessel lost' on account of further loss of stability. 

Next, the crew found that water from the aft generator room was running into the gear room via the hollow propeller shafts and that the gear room was filling up fast. From the gear room, the water then ran into and was flooding the aft and fore engine rooms via the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads. This meant that the flooding became substantially more extensive than indicated by the original damage. Based on the flooding of the gear room, it was decided to prepare for evacuation. 

The AIBN considers the vessel's lack of watertight integrity to be a safety issue relating to Nansen-class frigates …  (1)


So, what lessons can we learn from this incident?


Helge Ingstad

Combat Design.  Providing water tight seals for propeller shafts and machinery is something that has been known and mastered for many decades.  Let’s face it, this is basic watertight integrity 101.  This is the kind of thing that should have been locked in around the end of day-one of the ship’s design effort.  I have no idea how Norway goes about designing its ships but, clearly, no one with sufficient expertise reviewed the design.  In the US Navy, I’ve stated that we need to reconstitute our lost in-house design expertise to prevent exactly this kind of occurrence.  Whether it’s carrier weapon elevators that don’t work, LCS bridge wings that were overlooked, LCS galvanic corrosion prevention that was omitted, or electromagnetic catapults that act as giant locating beacons for the enemy, we utterly lack the ability to critically, thoroughly, and correctly evaluate ship designs.  We must regain our in-house design expertise and reclaim the design responsibility from industry.

Testing.  This incident also illustrates another of ComNavOps pet themes and that is inadequate testing.  Someone, somehow, some way, should have been able to identify this weakness during the ship’s various tests and trials prior to acceptance.  Clearly, if testing is inadequate to identify a fatal design flaw then the testing is flawed and worthless.  The Navy’s NavSea (Naval Sea Systems Command) has been accepting incomplete and non-functional ships for far too long.  NavSea needs to be disbanded and replaced with an independent testing group like Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).  The evidence is overwhelming that NavSea, being in the chain of command, cannot be counted on to perform its duties correctly and with integrity.

Awareness and Technology.  This is yet another in a string of incidents that prove, conclusively, that technology is not the answer to situational awareness.  The Helge Ingstad had an impressive list of sensors and yet ran into a giant, slow moving tanker.

Foreign Myth.  There is a large and vocal school of US Navy (and US military, in general) observers who believe, without any proof other than manufacturer’s claims, that all foreign ships and equipment are superior to their US counterparts.  The Millenium gun reputation, for example, has taken on near-mythical proportions despite zero evidence of its performance in any meaningful test scenario or actual combat experience.  The mere fact that it’s foreign seems to be its only claim to fame.

This also exposes the related claims that the US military-industrial complex is corrupt and incompetent.  Well, let’s be fair – they are!  However, foreign companies are, as a group, no better.  Navantia is not an American company and yet appear to be incompetent naval designers along with whatever other problems they may have.  I know nothing about the workings of Navantia so I can’t comment further.

In short, while the grass may always seem greener in foreign countries … it’s not.

Risk.  The entire Norwegian surface combat navy consisted of five Nansen class frigates.  Each was a modern and, on paper, impressively capable ship for a frigate.  Exactly the kind of frigate so many US Navy observers (and the Navy, itself!) desperately want.  Any now, with a single incident, the Norwegian Navy has lost 20% of its entire surface combat fleet.  Had their fleet been broken up into smaller, cheaper, numerically greater, more specialized ships, the impact would have proportionally much less.  I’m pretty sure that Norway is not rushing to replace this ship and, likely, never will.  This is the personification of why concentration of capability in a single platform is a mistake.  Yes, the temptation to cram as much capability as possible into every ship is strong, especially for smaller navies, but it is a mistake.

US Frigate.  Ominously, the AIBN issued a safety warning strongly suggesting that the entire Navantia ship line may suffer from the same watertight integrity design flaws.  Navantia is the parent design company for the General Dynamics Bath Iron Works frigate offering in the US Navy frigate competition.  The parent design is the F100 Bazan class.  The US Navy needs to look very closely at the design to ensure that the flaws are not repeated for the Navy’s frigate offering.  Unfortunately, given the complete absence of in-house expertise, I don’t know how the Navy can evaluate the Navantia design.

Western Trends.  Warships were once built to be as rugged and tough as possible.  WWII history is replete with examples of warships that absorbed immense amounts of damage and kept fighting – often surviving the encounter.  Today, the West has forgotten those lessons and bought into the myth of sensors, networks, and data in place of firepower and toughness.  We need to abandon our current direction and recommit to designing warships that can laugh at damage and keep fighting.  

To those who would counter that nothing could survive a collision with a giant tanker, WWII would beg to differ.  Ships were hit with multiple torpedoes and bombs, struck mines, and, indeed, suffered some huge collisions and yet stayed afloat and kept fighting.

As with the US Navy’s McCain and Fitzgerald collisions and various groundings, the Norwegian Helge Ingstad incident offers a wealth of lessons if only we’re willing to learn from them.

 

___________________________________

(1)Accident Investigation Board Norway,


45 comments:

  1. It's a significant issue in all modern ships.
    We build water tight compartmentalised hulls, with water tight bulkheads and sealable water tight doors.

    And then we drill holes everywhere we want to run electrical or data cables, ac ducts and plumbing and anything else we need.

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  2. "Testing"

    Money. Congress, Parliaments and likely even the Czar and China don't what to spend the money. Real testing is going to be really damaging a lot of stuff, using a lot ammunition, and finding out if the brochure was wrong (which I think all to often people making buying decisions don't want to - after all there seems to no repercussions for buying a fantasy).

    I imagine the imperative for Norway was as many 'capital' ships as possible as fast as possible. Do really think before we start building a whole new load of Burkes the USN will ask Congress for the money to say decommission the oldest 2 or 3. Then proceed to more or less break them in realistic testing to find lessened learned before we build more. Build replica parts on land for highly controlled testing. What happens to the sensor mast when its showered by shrapnel how much will really survives. It was noted here testing for the AGS was what a dozen rounds. For the USN it might mean saying we'd rather have 290 ships that are well tested than say 310 or 320 or whatever the target.

    "Western Trends."

    I think that is general really. I see no sign that Russia or China are building more durable ships.

    "Ships were hit with multiple torpedoes and bombs, ..."

    I was going to post something in the recent BB post. The final voyage of the IJN Musashi is epic. The amount of hits of all kinds the ship sustained in amazing. But in this context it notable that she was able to control flooding and then intentionally counter flood compartments to retain level sea keeping and steering control.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "Money"

      You're right, of course, with a bit of having forgotten what war is and what it demands of ships, thrown in. However, whatever the cost of testing, it is a pittance compared to the loss of an entire multi-billion dollar ship.

      The Norwegians certainly didn't come out ahead by not testing. I bet they wish now they had tested a bit more rigorously, regardless of the cost!

      "Russia China"

      I have no idea how they're building their ships but I suspect you're correct.

      Delete
  3. Addendum. You would think the integrity of the design of elements passing through water tight compartments could be tested with scale models in a pool.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. We completely mastered the design and construction of these elements decades ago. Someone must have decided to make a new design and simply assumed it would be better and would work without testing it.

      The manufacturer should be sued for the cost of the lost ship.

      Delete
  4. This isn't the first time Navantia has had shipbuilding issues; there was the problem with the Malaysian Navy's Scorpene-class SSKs, where they couldn't dive properly and needed further rectification work after they'd been delivered. Much of the information regarding to Navantia and said Scorpenes was suppressed by Malaysia's former Prime Minister, Najib Razak, who was also wearing the hats of Defense Minister and Finance Minister at the time.

    It's telling that the French government wanted to subpeona him as a witness with an option to prosecute in the DCNS bribery trials a few years back.

    There has been talk, related secondhand to me by a Scandinavian acquaintance, that there's a further cultural issue that may be in play; supposedly Helge Instaad's CO came up from the FAC community, and culture among Norway's fast attack craft has a certain devil-may-care recklessness with regard to maneuvering around large ships.

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    1. As I've said previously on this matter, all the sensors in the world do you no good if they're turned OFF. Although given transcripts of the conversation between the tanker and frigate crews, I'm not entirely sure that having said sensors turned on would have helped matters any, not with such a lackadaisical crew, one that seems almost uninterested and uncaring at the prospect of an imminent collision.

      Delete
  5. The problem isn't industry. The same company (Gibbs & Cox) that designed the WW2 Fletcher also designed the Freedom variant LCS. The navy just needs to issue to the right requirements, and industry will deliver.

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    1. You're stretching a bit to call G&C in WWII the same company as today but you're on the money about the Navy needing to regain its in-house expertise and lead the design effort instead of ceding the responsibility to industry whose priority is profit rather than combat.

      You're also quite right that industry will deliver whatever it is told (and paid!) to deliver. The Navy just needs to tell industry the right things.

      Delete
  6. Remember when HMS Javelin a J Class destroyer lost both its bow and aft sections to enemy torpedos and shell fire? Only one hundred and fifty five feet of the original ships three hundred and fifty three feet remained. She was towed back to port and subsequently repaired. She was returned to service.

    This isn’t even going into US Cruisers either like: USS Houston (keel broken), New Orleans (magazine detonation), Pittsburgh (bow lost in Typhoon), and San Francisco (swiss cheesed by a lot of shells). All of them were returned to service.

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    1. HMS Javelin Picture Link: http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/wwii-damage-control

      USS Houston: http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/WarDamageReports/WarDamageReportCL81/WarDamageReport%20CL81.html

      USS New Orleans: http://ww2today.com/30th-november-1942-the-battle-of-tassafaronga-off-guadalcanal

      USS Pittsburgh: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-p/ca72-l.htm

      USS San Francisco: https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/w/war-damage-reports/uss-sanfrancisco-ca38-war-damage-report-no26.html

      Delete
    2. The collision of the 984 ton destroyer HMS Spitfire with the 21000 ton battleship SMS Nassau during the Battle of Jutland is another interesting example.

      HMS Spitfire
      http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/H.M.S._Spitfire_(1912)

      SMS Nassau
      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMS_Nassau

      ComNavOps I have recently discovered this blog. I am no expert but it is great to see some of my own views expressed so well by someone who is obviously knowledgeable and experienced. It almost feels like vindication. Cheers, I look forward to future posts.

      Delete
    3. "ComNavOps I have recently discovered this blog."

      Welcome aboard! Good example of the HMS Spitfire. I was not familiar with that one.

      Delete
  7. "Today, the West has forgotten those lessons and bought into the myth of sensors, networks, and data in place of firepower and toughness."

    Have we forgotten, or are we so removed from real combat that we avoid those questions because they are hard end expensive.

    The Naval people to whom I speak basically seem to subscribe to the idea that any war, any fight, is going to be a very short, very destructive one, and that there is no point in trying to do anything other than trying to get the crew off.

    Robust designs and testing require money. They require some humility in accepting that your pet idea might not work out well. They require that you work hard at not only coming up with designs, but trying to reasonably break them (Make sure you try to break things within reason. I could build a tough frigate, and nuke it, and make it unusable due to contamination, but that is at least unlikely to happen...)

    But we seem in short supply of humility and focus. We want short cuts and hulls to command.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. "seem to subscribe to the idea that any war, any fight, is going to be a very short"

      History and logic both disagree with that position.

      Delete
  8. "Had their fleet been broken up into smaller, cheaper, numerically greater, more specialized ships, the impact would have proportionally much less."

    I agree in theory, but I don't think this is practical for a small country like Norway. The population of Norway is just 5.3 million and their active duty military is just over 18,000 strong. The Norwegian Navy is about 3,700 strong and their combat fleet consists of 4 frigates, 6 patrol boats, and 6 submarines.

    More ships mean more sailors for operations and maintenance, more weapons, and other equipment. All of which means more money for the navy. As of 2016, their defense budget was 1.62% of their GDP. Norway doesn't have many resources to grow their navy.

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    1. The real question there is why does Norway have those Frigates at all?

      Beyond Norway wanting to say they have a navy, what do they do?

      Delete
    2. " their defense budget was 1.62% of their GDP"

      The world average for military spending is 2.2% of GDP. NATO countries are expected to spend at least 2%. Thus, Norway is below any average or standard. They could spend more if they chose to, without straining their resources. Of course, they might have to make some choices about the value of social programs over defense.

      Domo asks the very good question, what are the frigates for? What can five (now four) frigates accomplish?

      I would suggest that Norway would have been wiser to spend its money on small, specialized ASW corvettes and mine and mine countermeasures assets rather than frigates. For the same cost as the frigates, they could have had dozens of corvettes and mine/MCM vessels.

      The 120 or so crew of each Nansen class frigate could have manned half a dozen or more corvettes and mine vessels.

      " I don't think this is practical for a small country like Norway. "

      What's practical is staying within your means and objectives. Norway is capable of only coastal defense. Hence, small ASW corvettes and mine/MCM vessels and lots of them.

      Delete
    3. The Nansen looks like something of a prestige buy. It certainly gave Norway a credible by the specs capital Frigate. Budget aside at least they can float them unlike Germany.

      Norway's problem is what do they want to be. A hard bite for anyone who gets ideals, an appendage of NATO that can rely on the US, An appendage of the EU that can rely on the EU?

      Norway's got a bit problems than coastal defense, they need to police their now growing more useful Arctic waters and their Oil. Although I agree buying in on Sweden aborted replacement for the Gotland sub class would have been more cost effective as a deterrent.

      But their problem is also a USN problem I mean lack of ASW and Mine warfare does not look so bad if you assume depending on the war NATO or Japan are all in. If not that's a problem.

      Delete
    4. "The 120 or so crew of each Nansen class frigate could have manned half a dozen or more corvettes and mine vessels."


      True. But, if AAW is a primary role of the navy, they would need something like the Nansen-class. How many is up for debate. And, a frigate sized ship would have the capabilities and endurance to participate in NATO naval operations. Probably the reason for going with frigates. Why they don't have more corvettes and subs, I don't know.

      Delete
    5. " lack of ASW and Mine warfare does not look so bad if you assume depending on the war NATO or Japan are all in. If not that's a problem."

      Another absolutely great comment/issue. Would the US come to the aid of Norway if a conflict developed with Russia? We stood by and watched Russia annex Crimea and launch a proxy invasion of Ukraine. Is Norway absolutely certain the US won't just watch especially if Russia were to replicate its Ukraine tactics - supporting a Norwegian rebel faction that ostensibly wants to join Russia, thus making it an 'internal' issue for Norway?

      The US has just finished ceding the entire E/S China Seas to China. I'm far from certain that the US would intervene in a Russian/Norwegian 'dispute'.

      If the US opted not to intervene, where would that leave the Norwegian navy? I bet they'd want ASW and mine vessels far more than four or five frigates that wouldn't last a day in combat.

      Norway is taking a big gamble with its national security if it's planning on the US helping.

      Delete
    6. " if AAW is a primary role of the navy, they would need something like the Nansen-class."

      Absolutely not and especially not in coastal waters. A small, cheap, expendable ASW corvette is what's needed. A dipping sonar of some type is the basic sensor. ASW helos, if desired, can be provided from land bases in a coastal defense setting.

      Small SSKs are also a great choice for coastal defence. Four or five frigates are about the least useful type of vessel.

      Delete
    7. "True. But, if AAW is a primary role of the navy, they would need something like the Nansen-class."
      If AAW was the key role, they would need something with much bigger missiles than this has, which are short range, far from area defence bubbles.
      But if it was, why?

      The US has AAW Destroyers, to defend the rest of the fleet, these appear to exist to defend themselves.
      More skjolds and F16s would seem a far more useful mix, maybe even a few patriot batteries

      Delete
    8. Conceptually, the only way to justify the Nansens is if the Scandinavian and Baltic navies were going ot be operating together in wartime, with Norway's Nansens providing the AAW FFG component and other navies providing other components for the fleet mix, ala the wargame Naval War Arctic Cirlce.

      This is, needless to say, not a likely or realistic proposition. :V

      Delete
    9. In that Scandinavians, the Baltics and europe overall have no unity and are at times working to cross purposes, and have no common goal.

      But if you had allied nations that were willing to put the work in, it could be done - I'm reminded of the Cold War RN and cold war-present JMSDF, which were ASW navies that could operate in concert with the USN.

      Delete
  9. Completely agree on all the technical issues cited by CNO so won't rehash.

    Far more interested is hearing about the human side. How well prepared was the crew? Who made the first call ship was ok and then the second call that the ship was sinking? Could it have been repaired and why not? How much practice did they get in damage assessment/repairs and was it enough? If the crew was "lackadaisical" with handling the ship, were they properly prepared to deal with this emergency?

    Hopefully a comprehensive report in English will get published with more info...

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  10. I'm shocked. You are assuming some preliminary and unchecked speculation from that AIBN is the established truth.

    "The initial damage and immediate flooding was not enough to sink the ship but the flawed design allowed adjoining, undamaged compartments to quickly flood resulting in the ship rapidly sinking."

    That's your conclusion. The report states that three compartments were flooded and "some uncertainty as to whether the (...) aftmost compartment was also filling with water". Four flooded compartments exceed the flotability requirements, and are enought to sink the frigate.

    The watertighness of the first three norwegian frigates was tested by the builder actually flooding the compartments, with norwegian officials presence. That test was deemed unnecessary for the last two.

    An internal report from the Spanish Armada estimates four compartments were damaged in the initial collision. As I said, that exceeds flooding survival requirements. Aditional damage may have been caused by running the ship aground. Of course, this can't be substantiated until ship's inspection.

    At this time, I can't point to any public sources, but I reckon you dropped your usually stringent requeriments about solid information sources in this case by accepting as truth a very preliminary speculation based on compromised sailors interviews.

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    1. Seriously, did you read the post? Here's the relevant quote from the post AND FROM THE AIBN report:

      "Next, the crew found that water from the aft generator room was running into the gear room via the hollow propeller shafts and that the gear room was filling up fast. From the gear room, the water then ran into and was flooding the aft and fore engine rooms via the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads. This meant that the flooding became substantially more extensive than indicated by the original damage."

      Flooding passed through and into two supposedly watertight compartments due to design flaws. This is not my conclusion, this is a direct quote from the report. If you believe AIBN has it wrong then take it up with them.

      "The watertighness of the first three norwegian frigates was tested by the builder actually flooding the compartments, with norwegian officials presence."

      I flat out don't believe that. I've never heard of that being done on any ship. Give me a reference.

      Delete
    2. I just found the AIBN website and started reading the report. For those interested in reading it without the newspapers summary:

      https://www.aibn.no/Marine/Investigations/18-968

      Delete
    3. You didn't have to search for it. This link was cited in the post and provided at the bottom of the post as footnote (1).

      Delete
    4. Yes, I read the report. I read the safety alert (Appendix A) too. I know what the norwegian sailors said. I put so much trust in their word, but I'm willing to accept they are right. But we are talking about a collision. Bulkheads bend. Machinery moves. The claim about a design error is too serious and it can't be made so lightly.
      I saw the video with the "rescue" operation. Initialy, the ship was agroud but floating. Then the tugs started tilting and pushing the poor frigate against the rocks, and I new she was doomed...

      The AIBN report is, like we say in Spain, "encender el ventilador" ("starting the fan": the tale is about putting your s**t in a fan and then... you know).

      The only public source I can find about the watertighness test is here: https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/ferrol/ferrol/2018/11/30/navantia-inundo-parte-dos-fragatas-noruegas-probar-estancas/00031543600425817182639.htm (Sorry, only in spanish). I though there was three ships tested, and several compartments. The newspaper talks only about one compartment tested by flooding in two frigates... maybe my memory is failing me.

      Delete
    5. [Sorry about the typos: *agroud->aground, *new->knew. I'm not used to write in english, and don't know how to edit the post, if possible.]

      Delete
    6. My last post here. Sorry, but I don't need to speak in public.

      Just point that your logic is flawed, and your post is rigged:

      "Flooding passed through and into two supposedly watertight compartments due to design flaws. This is not my conclusion, this is a direct quote from the report."

      Indeed, it is your conclusion. The report gathers crew's declarations about water flooding through stuffing boxes and the propeller shaft. It's your conclusion there's a dessign flaw, not theirs.

      Delete
    7. @Anon
      The most interesting part would be when that test happened.
      Before or after fitout

      Its no use testing for flood containment and then cutting additional holes in the ship.

      You are also using a slightly more legalistic definition of "design"

      ComNavOps isn't assigning legal culpability, merely stating that a ship that sinks so quickly after so little damage is ineffective.

      It's very easy to believe after the flood test, someone cut a hole in that bulkhead to run an ethernet cable, and either didn't seal the hole, or sealed it with a rain gland or a bit of silicone or foam, rather than a proper pressure gland.

      Repeat that a few hundred times and you're in real trouble.

      Delete
    8. "The report gathers crew's declarations about water flooding through stuffing boxes and the propeller shaft. It's your conclusion there's a dessign flaw, not theirs."

      You say you accept the report's findings that water passed through prop shafts and stuffing boxes and yet you deny that's a design flaw. That must mean you believe that water was intended to pass through. It's either a design flaw or was an intended design feature. Which is it?

      There's just no way around it. Water being able to pass from compartment to compartment is not how watertight ships are supposed to function.

      You clearly don't want to accept any criticism of Spain/Navantia and are willing to deny reality to do so.

      Oh well ...

      Delete
    9. "The only public source I can find about the watertighness test is here"

      Any Spanish speaking readers out there who can translate and summarize? I've never heard of testing a compartment by flooding it in an actual ship. I don't believe that's what happened.

      Delete
    10. Using google translate, the important bit is

      "He remembers them well because they consisted of the flooding, with thousands of liters of water, of the reduction gear chamber , one of the parts that make up the ship's engine room."

      Well, the reduction gear chamber is "part" of the engine room, certainly not a compartment,
      As for water volume, well, my living room is approximately 6*3*2.5
      45cubic metres, or 45,000 litres.
      "thousands and thousands" isnt a lot of water

      Delete
    11. Sorry, that's just gibberish to me. I have no idea what it means, how the test was conducted, or what the result was. I'll say it again, I'm certain that an entire compartment wasn't filled with water to test the watertight integrity, as claimed in the earlier comment.

      We need to see a good translation of the entire document.

      Delete
  11. We're here laughing at Norway, but they've just launched the first AEGIS Submarine./s

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  12. How much armor do we have to preposition in Norwegian caves to not make you question whether we would come to Norways aid? This is to
    ComNavOps. We would come to the fight with a hard-on.

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    1. I'll repeat much of my earlier comment since you seem to have ignored it. We did nothing when Russia annexed Crimea. We've done nothing about Russia's proxy invasion of Ukraine. We did nothing to even slightly hinder China's annexation of the entire South China Sea. We've done nothing to prevent Chinese incursions into sovereign Philippine territory.

      All that and you're 100% confident that we'll jump to Norway's defense? I'm not. I'm not saying we wouldn't, just that it's not a sure thing.

      Delete
    2. From reading through a good number of topics here. I think most of the top brass know, we would be unable to fight a near peer. I believe they are afraid we just might lose and act accordingly. Sort of like the bully who meets his match.

      As sort of an aside, when they count vessels, do they count the USS Pueblo in their numbers ? It is still on the registry as a commissioned ship. It is still in possession of North Korea, and used as a museum of sorts.

      Delete
  13. IMHO A consequence of our current "Data is Good" mindset, married to our extreme risk aversion culture will be an extreme susceptibility to decoys.

    We will spot the decoys (barring an EMP/hacker/magic bullet/ Pearl Harbor event wiping out our eyes.) No matter how obvious and patchetic the decoys are, top brass will insist on engaging 'just to be sure'. Not to mention the PowerPoint slides "Destroyed XX suspected SCUD launchers". We risk expending alot of guided ordinance on plywood and sheet metal.

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  14. "electromagnetic catapults that act as giant locating beacons for the enemy"

    I've never heard anything about that. Could you expand upon it?

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    1. This is an old issue. CNO Greenert commented on it a few years ago and acknowledged that the US Navy had dropped the requirement for electromagnetic emissions control (EMCON) from equipment. Specifically, he pointed out that the series of electric motors that makes up the catapult are each massive powerful and emit enormous electromagnetic waves with no way to shield them.

      Delete

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