Since the report came out
about the lapsed certifications among the deployed 7th Fleet ships
and crew, I’ve been trying to find out more about the mechanism by which this
state of affairs was sanctioned. The
mechanism was the “risk assessment and management plan” (RAMP). Apparently, RAMP was used to directly and
consciously bypass mandatory Navy training and certifications. Among 7th Fleet deployed
destroyers and cruisers, around 40% of crew certifications in damage control,
navigation, flight operations, and basic seamanship had lapsed (1)
Despite my efforts, I’ve
been unable to find any mention of RAMP as an official Navy program. It appears that it may have been a locally
(local to the 7th Fleet) devised and implemented program that lacked
official Navy sanction. Whether it was
universally know throughout upper Navy leadership and unofficially sanctioned
is unknown.
The conclusion from this is
obvious. The program has led to
disasters, deaths, and horribly damaged ships.
Someone must be held responsible and pay the price and, indeed, VAdm.
Joseph Aucoin, commander of the 7th Fleet, has been relieved. Of course, the firing may have been largely
symbolic since he was due to retire in a few weeks, anyway.
There is another person who
must pay the price and that is current CNO Richardson.
If he did not know about an unsanctioned
program intended to bypass mandatory Navy readiness certifications for an
entire major fleet then he should be fired for incompetence and
obliviousness.
If he knew about the program
then he should be fired for violating the trust of the country, the Navy, and
the sailors serving under him and hazarding the military preparedness and security of the country.
Either
way, he has to go.
Get used to it. You’re going to hear me continue to harp on
this. CNO Richardson is the Captain of
the Navy and the Captain is accountable for everything that happens on his ship
– his ship being the entire Navy. I have
lost confidence in his ability to command.
Let’s be fair. This didn’t all happen on Richardson
A Chinese or Russian mole
agent could not do more damage to the Navy and our nation’s security than our
own Navy leadership is doing.
____________________________________________
(1)Defense News website, “US Navy worked around its own standards to keep ships underway: sources”, David B. Larter,
Seems to me that part of this comes down to the Navy's readiness to take on tasks that it cannot afford to fulfil.
ReplyDeleteThere has long been talk of budgets being insufficient to allow the Navy to perform the tasks assigned to it -- with the implicit or explicit assumption that this means budgets should be increased.
It seems to me that the Navy needs to be more prepared to say 'sorry Dave, I can't do that' than it has been to date. The task of aligning requirements and budgets cannot be fulfilled without the active involvement of the military, but it is not the military's responsibility alone.
I don't know precisely how it unfolded, but the optics of the recent 'carrier gap' seem like Thale Navy could at least be taking steps in this direction, i.e. instead of putting a ship, air wing and crew to sea that wasn't ready, the Navy allowed the requirement to go unfulfilled, thereby drawing immediate attention to the mismatch between responsibilities and resources that has existed for some time, and which is manifested throughout the fleet.
Unlike most who get this far, I don't think the answer necessarily involves more money, or at least not primarily more money. In fact I would suggest it involves some rather frank and uncomfortable conversations about the real strategic interests of the United States, the requirements and priorities that derive from those interests, and the programs, platforms and budgets required to fulfil those requirements.
Based on evidence available to date, I think there is precisely zero chance of such a conversation happening.
"frank and uncomfortable conversations about the real strategic interests of the United States, the requirements and priorities that derive from those interests, and the programs, platforms and budgets required to fulfil those requirements."
DeleteExcellent.
Now, where do America's strategic interest lie? Where should the Navy be deployed, if anywhere. Conversely, where should the Navy NOT be deployed?
"Now, where do America's strategic interest lie? Where should the Navy be deployed, if anywhere. Conversely, where should the Navy NOT be deployed?"
DeleteIsn't that predicated upon whether or not Mahanian Naval Theory is still valid in the 21st Century?
"Isn't that predicated upon whether or not Mahanian Naval Theory is still valid in the 21st Century?"
DeleteNo. America's strategic interests are independent of any naval theory or capability. Our strategic interests are simply the international goals that are in our best interests. Naval theories and capabilities are just the mechanism of how we achieve those goals.
Fittingly, ramp is the dutch word for disaster.
ReplyDeleteYou might have too short of a list for firing. Squadron Cmdr, ComPacFleet, Cmdr Naval Surface Forces Pacific, and several in OpNav that have played budget games to where wee are at this state.
ReplyDeleteYou're quite right, of course. Every admiral in the Navy should be fired. All have aided and abetted in the hollowing of the Navy, decrease in readiness, deferral of maintenance, lack of training, etc. I just don't have space to name them all.
DeleteAt this point firing and hiring a new CNO wouldn't do much unless the President, Sec Def, Sec Navy, and congress made it very clear what the requirements and expectations entail.
ReplyDeleteWhen I was young, I saw the military as something special. Even though it was a function of government, I thought it was different from other government agencies. While I was in the Navy, I became very frustrated as I saw careerism as the main goal rather than mission readiness.
MM-13B
I understand and share your frustration and pessimism about the possibility of change. It is worth noting, though, that this situation is nothing new and has been the norm throughout history. During peacetime, careerism predominates and when war comes, a period of "weeding out" occurs during which the incompetent leaders are fired and actual warfighters eventually take their place. This occurred, for example, at the start of the US Civil War when President Lincoln fired commander after commander. It occurred at the start of WWII when timid leaders were replaced wholesale (the submarine community being a particularly good microcosm example).
DeleteToday is no different and today is not unusual. That doesn't make it right or acceptable - just not unusual. Whether that gives you any tiny amount of comfort is probably unlikely but perhaps it offers a measure of assurance that the situation can and will be corrected when war finally comes again. One comfort we can take is the knowledge that our enemies will experience the same phenomenon.
My concern is that with the speed with which a new, major war might develop, with the M&M nature of our Navy (Hard shell, squishy center), and looking at the state of our ship industrial base, we may not have time to weed out bad, peacetime commanders. Or make up losses incurred by bad, peacetime commanders.
DeleteI feel that this whole "RAMP" program is an example of trying to run the Navy like a business.
ReplyDeleteYou can't apply the same standards as business to the Navy, business in most cases delivers a specific service at the lowest price possible in order to compete. On the other hand a military needs to be prepared to complete any task asked of them at a moments notice. So you spend extra, preparing for something that may never happen, but that doesn't help the bottom line and probably isn't defined as "efficient". Yes government needs to be efficient, but we need to stop pretending the same management metrics can apply to the military as business, they are fundamentally different beasts.
Any thoughts on new CNO nominee, ADM Lisa Franchetti? I don't think there's any question that being a woman counted more than anything else in her selection. But I have a hard time believing that she will be worse than her predecessors Gilday, Greenert, and Richardson.
ReplyDelete" But I have a hard time believing that she will be worse than her predecessors Gilday, Greenert, and Richardson."
DeleteI would suggest that each of those was, indeed, worse than their predecessor so I do NOT have a hard time believing she'll be even worse. In fact, recent history almost guarantees she'll be worse.
One of the things that made each CNO worse than their predecessor is that each one allowed the accumulated failings of their predecessors to stand while adding their own failures to the growing list of problems. It's one thing to inherit a bad situation but it's abject failure to allow it to stand (and then add to it!).
Similarly, I completely expect the new Commandant to be worse than his predecessor because he'll allow Berger's failures to stand. That, alone, makes him worse than Berger and then, of course, he'll add his own failures on top of what he inherited. I hope I'm wrong but I've never been wrong yet so ...