tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post8595161884567741824..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Frigates in the US NavyComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger124125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-14329093104015025192019-11-23T08:12:46.097-08:002019-11-23T08:12:46.097-08:00On this most everyone agrees Except the Politician...On this most everyone agrees Except the Politicians they added more of these targets in spite of the navy not wanting them up to 35 of LCS Now!!!maybe Conops can add more to this continuation of a disaster D M Lewishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07944039365612613761noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-59372644188058126342019-11-22T13:45:17.317-08:002019-11-22T13:45:17.317-08:00A little more on CONOPS.
I don't see doing an...A little more on CONOPS.<br /><br />I don't see doing an opposed amphibious assault against mainland China or Russia, although I could see a possibility for one in southern Iran. <br /><br />I do see unopposed landings in situations such as landing on the east side of Taiwan if Chinese amphib forces were approaching or threatening from the west. Same for the Philippines, and for that matter Japan. I also see multiple opportunities for landings in lower risk combat situations. And there is definitely some advantage to having them as a show of force. For example, the murder of our ambassador in Benghazi could likely have been prevented if we had company of Marines onboard a gator just offshore. The big problem there, once the incident was underway, is that we really had no forces anywhere capable of responding. Won't go further to avoid politics.<br /><br />I also see them as relatively inexpensive and versatile platforms that could carry out many of ComNavOps's "peace" missions. They would clearly have great utility in disaster relief scenarios. My T was prepared to evacuate American citizens from Beirut during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. They can be kind of a Swiss army knife that can do a lot of different things. And using them in this way would enable combatant ships to avoid having to be tasked for such evolutions.<br /><br />More than anything else, I see them as a way to achieve the Marines' troop lift requirements in a cheaper and more versatile manner than the current amphib force of LHA/LHD and San Antonios.CDR Chipnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-10763257049260702912019-11-22T07:32:45.203-08:002019-11-22T07:32:45.203-08:00The SSGNs would be the primary strike platforms. ...The SSGNs would be the primary strike platforms. I am envisioning one would operate with every CVBG and SAG/HUK group, along with one SSN.<br /><br />Those amphib prices are about what Europe has been building similar ships for, bumped up about 10%. Some of the Europeans have been built to Lloyd's DC standards, not naval, so 10% might be a bit light. Part of the cost savings is that the US Navy has been insisting on speeds of 20-22 knots, whereas I backed off to 18, which is what the Europeans get, and about the most you can get out of a conventional LST hull. Those extra 2-4 knots can be extremely expensive to build and operate.<br /><br />The current amphib CONOPS calls for standing 25-50 miles offshore and sending almost everybody and everything in by helo or V-22, because the platforms are too expensive to risk coming in closer. That seems absurd on so many levels. <br /><br />I am envisioning a more conventional amphib CONOPS where the ships would come in close enough to make the transit to the shore by boat/LCAC. They would still be capable of helo/V-22 ops, but would not be limited to that. Because they would be cheaper and the loads would be more dispersed, losing one would not kill the whole assault. Also because they are relatively cheap and versatile, I would foresee them as fulfilling some of the roles that ComNavOps has in mind for his "peace" ships.CDR Chipnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-32932491660811156452019-11-22T05:16:00.315-08:002019-11-22T05:16:00.315-08:00CDR Chip,
Thanks for the details. I see your SSG...CDR Chip,<br /><br />Thanks for the details. I see your SSGN is actually a VPM'd Virginia, not a Columbia. That helps. <br /><br />I do think you're underestimating in a few areas, especially the amphibs. IMO, we'd be very hard pressed to build an LPH/LPD/LSD for $600M. But overall, most seem reasonable. The battlecarrier might also be low, given its size and complexity, but you only buy eight, so a few billion more won't change the bottom line that much.<br /><br />I'm curious about the CONOPS for your amphibious fleet. Given numbers and types, it appears to be similar to the current fleet, just with a composition that's more like what we used to have. <br /><br />Again, thanks! <br /><br /><br /><br />Anon2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-56063803938219807152019-11-21T20:40:23.728-08:002019-11-21T20:40:23.728-08:00“The RAND CVN-LX was the size of a Forrestal (~70,...“The RAND CVN-LX was the size of a Forrestal (~70,000t). The combination of CVN-LX and CV-LX may not cost that much more than a Ford, but it may only be incrementally more capable.”<br /><br />Compare the Forrestal (Mid-1980s)/CV-LX Air Wings to the Ford Air Wing, and there is a significant difference. Plus, for my big carrier I’m looking at something between CVN-LX and Nimitz, so more like 80-90,000 T. <br /><br />Aircraft Type/Forrestal Mid-1980s/CV-LX/Total/Ford<br />VF/24/0/24/24<br />VA/24/24/48/24<br />EW/10/0/10/5<br />AEW/6/0/6/5<br />AEW Helo/0/6/6/0<br />ASW/Patrol/10/0/10/0<br />ASW Helicopter/2/5/7/6<br />GP Helicopter/6/0/6/6<br />COD/2/1/3/2<br />Total/84/36/120/72<br /><br />That looks to me like more than incrementally more capable. As for cost, see below.<br /><br />“I suspect your fleet will cost considerably more than the Navy's proposed "355" fleet, especially the submarines. If the SSGN is based on the Columbia-class, they could be $7-10B each. And the sheer numbers of subs will be expensive.”<br /><br />The theory of the high-low mix is to fill out the numbers with low-end ships, so the costs become more manageable. Going through by categories:<br /><br />Carriers: The 355-ship Navy calls for 12 Fords at $15B each, or $180B total. I am calling for 12 Nimitz/CVN-LX at $9B each and 12 CV-LX at $4B each, or $156B total. That $24B savings could translate into 240 additional aircraft at $100MM each. The difference could actually be greater to the extent that existing LHAs/LHDs could be converted to CV-LX for perhaps $2B each.<br /><br />Submarines: The 355-ship navy calls for 12 SSBNs at $9B each, and 66 SSNs at $2.8B each, or $293B total. My sub fleet is 12 SSBNs at $9B each, 20 VPM Virginias at $3.2B each, 30 Virginias at $2.8B each, 30 FR Barracuda/DARPA Tango Bravo SSNs at $1.5B each, and 30 AIP SSKs at $750MM each, or $323B total.<br /><br />Surface combatants: The 355-ship Navy calls for 22 cruisers at $4B each, 82 AAW Burkes at $2.8B each, and 52 LCS/frigates at $600MM each, or $349B total. My fleet would include 8 battlecarriers at $5B each, 20 cruisers at $4B each, 40 AAW Burkes at $2.8B each, 60 mini-Burke GP escorts at $1.25B each, 80 ASW frigates at $450MM each, 12 ABM cruisers at $1.7B each, and 8 ASW carriers at $1.2B each, or $373B total.<br /><br />Amphibs: The 355-ship Navy calls for 11 LHA/LHD at $3.4B each, 12 San Antonio LPDs at $1.7B each, and 15 Harpers Ferry LSDs at $325MM each, or $63B total . My fleet would include 10 each of Juan Carlos LHA/LHD at $1.6B, Mistral LPH at $600MM, Albion LPD/LSD at $600MM, Newport/Kanimbla LST with LST bow at $450MM each, LPA/LHA at $350MM each, and land attack frigates at $400MM each, or $40B total .<br /><br />Littoral combatants: The 355-ship Navy calls for none. My fleet would include 30 corvettes at $300MM each, 15 patrol ships at $200MM each, and 30 mine warfare ships at $175MM each, or $17B total.<br /><br />Auxiliary/service force: The 355-ship Navy calls for 32 UNREP ships at $600MM each, and 39 command and support ships at $500MM each, or $39B total. My fleet would include for 40 UNREP ships at $600MM each, and 51 command and support ships at $500MM each, or $49B total.<br /><br />All told, the 355-ship Navy would cost $923B, or $23.1B per year over a 40-year time frame, while my high/low fleet would be 600 ships for $959B, or $24B per year over a 40-year time frame. The cost differential is $36B in total, or $900MM per year. The Navy’s cost per ship is roughly $2.6B, while the high/low fleet has an average cost per ship of $1.6B.<br /><br />You may quarrel with individual ship type costs, but overall I think the costing out of both fleets is reasonably close.<br />CDR Chipnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-37307005182159397802019-11-21T12:17:18.402-08:002019-11-21T12:17:18.402-08:00The first number (3.96%) is probably the best, sin...The first number (3.96%) is probably the best, since it's the Navy's reported growth in labor and materials costs in the carrier shipbuilding industry from 2007 to 2013. In theory, that doesn't include cost increases due to new, more expensive technologies. <br /><br />https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51469-Carrier_Inflation.pdf<br /><br />The DDG-51 rate might apply over time, once we were building a carrier design at a stable rate. <br /><br />Anon2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-71722169084235235062019-11-21T11:42:26.312-08:002019-11-21T11:42:26.312-08:00"At that rate, a 2001 Nimitz costing $4.9B wo..."At that rate, a 2001 Nimitz costing $4.9B would still cost $9.4B in 2020. "<br /><br />Using the actual rate of inflation, a 2001 Nimitz at $4.9B would cost $7.1B today - thereby saving $8B!!!!!!<br /><br />Even using your numbers, we'd save $5B-$6B!!!!!<br /><br />"Well then it's no longer a Nimitz. It's something else. "<br /><br />That's right, it's a conventional Nimitz. Knock another billion or two off the cost!<br />ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-33624638612889138702019-11-21T11:32:17.011-08:002019-11-21T11:32:17.011-08:00"We don't need nuclear power."
Well..."We don't need nuclear power."<br /><br />Well then it's no longer a Nimitz. It's something else. <br /><br />It's doubtful that you can recreate a full on, 2020 Nimitz with cost growth rate any lower than the DDG-51 class. <br /> They have had a very stable design and production history and yet still exhibited a 3.4% cost growth per year between 1990 and 2004. <br /><br />At that rate, a 2001 Nimitz costing $4.9B would still cost $9.4B in 2020. <br /><br />Anon2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-59391071422185675912019-11-21T11:00:08.533-08:002019-11-21T11:00:08.533-08:00"It would be an "Advanced Nimitz" w..."It would be an "Advanced Nimitz" with the commensurate set of changes to reflect technology obsolescence and growth "<br /><br />Certainly!<br /><br />"You can't go back to a $4.9B Nimitz."<br /><br />Oh but you can. I've described how in previous posts and comments. The Navy's shipbuilding index is based on run-amok designs. Go back to good, solid designs. You don't need a Dual Band Radar or AMDR or Enterprise radar on a carrier. It's not going to radiate in combat, anyway. A basic, short to medium range radar for point defense is all that's needed. We don't need EMALS, AAG, magic weapon elevators, etc. We don't need nuclear power. We don't need spacious, luxurious berthing for the crew. And so on. We can duplicate a Nimitz with just modern updates for the obsolete equipment.<br /><br />I've been over this so I won't belabor it.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-49916228213037655592019-11-21T10:45:55.517-08:002019-11-21T10:45:55.517-08:00If you did, it wouldn't be the same Nimitz we ...If you did, it wouldn't be the same Nimitz we last bought in 2001. It would be an "Advanced Nimitz" with the commensurate set of changes to reflect technology obsolescence and growth (e.g. retirement of SPS-49).<br /><br />But in any case, if you use the Navy's shipbuilding cost growth index (3.96% annually), a Nimitz that cost $4.9B in 2001 would cost $10.4B in 2020. <br /><br />CVN-81 is estimated to cost $12.5B in 2020 (assuming they hit it), so not nearly as huge of a difference.<br /><br />You can't go back to a $4.9B Nimitz. <br /><br />Anon2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-62437468221430074782019-11-21T07:43:45.052-08:002019-11-21T07:43:45.052-08:00"I suspect that "going back" to Nim..."I suspect that "going back" to Nimitz is not an option anymore"<br /><br />Why not? We could go back to Civil War ironclads, if we wanted to. What do you see preventing us from going back other than our own desire to spend even more money?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-74201881767805470822019-11-21T07:39:45.276-08:002019-11-21T07:39:45.276-08:00Some random thoughts:
1. I like the focus on putt...Some random thoughts:<br /><br />1. I like the focus on putting together groups, rather than looking at ships individually.<br /><br />2. The RAND CVN-LX was the size of a Forrestal (~70,000t). The combination of CVN-LX and CV-LX may not cost that much more than a Ford, but it may only be incrementally more capable. <br /><br />Also, I suspect that "going back" to Nimitz is not an option anymore, and wouldn't produce massive cost savings anyway, once required modernization and inflation is factored in. Might shave off a couple billion, at best.<br /><br />3. I suspect your fleet will cost considerably more than the Navy's proposed "355" fleet, especially the submarines. If the SSGN is based on the Columbia-class, they could be $7-10B each. And the sheer numbers of subs will be expensive.<br /><br />4. Estimating the cost of the Battlecruiser is difficult. My guess is well north of the DDG-1000s, but that's just a guess. To be honest, I'm not a huge fan of this kind of hybrid. Not a huge fan of battleship-like vessels either. <br /><br />In my opinion, there are better ways to do NSFS nowadays. Definitely not with an extremely expensive, low density warship, regardless of how "survivable" it is.<br /><br />5. I like the bimodal design as well, though I'd stick to fewer types that can swing-role to different missions. But that's just personal preference.<br /><br />Thanks for the description, interesting stuff!Anon2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-60089322997632368842019-11-21T05:55:44.704-08:002019-11-21T05:55:44.704-08:00The LCS has to be one of the worst procurement opt...The LCS has to be one of the worst procurement options the US has made recently. It can't usefully be pawned off to the USCG. Its too expensive and useless to pawn off on allies (vs old Perry types or even old cutters). It can't even be forward deployed to any actual hot spot. The USS Detroit is going to 'forward deploy' from Florida to do drug interdiction? A what 600+ million dollar ship doing a job an Heritage cutter could probably do better at something like one quarter or less in terms of cost per ship.<br /><br />I really can't see why they don't kill the last LCS (12-15?) run and add 5-10 more FF(x)s. They have to end up as better ships and that many more is useful and would be better than more LCSsKathhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09782968433043931011noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-75706874605627883382019-11-20T21:36:27.631-08:002019-11-20T21:36:27.631-08:00Anon2,
I've laid it out, probably in bits an...Anon2, <br /><br />I've laid it out, probably in bits and pieces elsewhere on here, but will do a quick summary:<br /><br />I was on active duty in the Zumwalt years, and really like his high/low mix philosophy to build some top of the line ships and flesh out the numbers with cheaper ships. ComNavOps has a somewhat different war/peace approach, reflected in his proposed fleet at the tab here. Either way, I think we are way better off than under the current Navy approach of ever smaller numbers of ever more expensive ships. Here’s my “dream fleet”:<br /><br />12 CVBG, each consisting of 1 large carrier (Nimitz or RAND CVN-LX) and 1 small carrier (RAND CV-LX or converted LHA/LHD "Lightning Carrier")--ComNavOps and I have disagreed here. He wants the 2nd carrier to be more like a Midway or Forrestal. I would like that, too, but just don't think the money to do that will be there, and I don't like the LHAs/LHDs as amphibs, or the stand-off CONOPS that they dictate, so I'm trying to find a different use. I’d also like to go with a cheaper second carrier to save more money for aircraft.<br /><br />8 Surface action/hunter-killer groups, consisting of 1 battleship (like the 1980s proposed battlecarrier, 2x3 16" forward, 256 VLS cells, and Kiev-type flight deck with 15 STOVL and 15 helos) and 1 ASW helicopter carrier (like Japanese Hyuga, 10 ASW helos).<br /><br />20 screening task units for each of the CVBG/SAG/HUK groups, consisting of 1 true cruiser (Des Moines class hull, 2x3 8" fore and aft, 192 VLS cells, Aegis/successor radar, and a large helo/UAV deck), 2 AAW Burkes, 3 GP mini-Burkes, and 4 ASW frigates. <br /><br />Total surface fleet, 12 large carriers, 12 small carriers, 8 battlecruisers, 8 ASW carriers, 20 cruisers, 40 AAW Burkes, 60 GP mini-Burkes, 80 ASW frigates, 240 ships. <br /><br />Submarines--12 SSBN, 20 SSGN, 30 SSN Virginia, 30 smaller SSN French Barracuda/DARPA Tango Bravo, 30 AIP SSK Swedish A26 or comparable. Total 122 submarines. <br />Strategic forces would include the 12 SSBNs, and 12 San Antonio class converted to ABM cruisers.<br /><br />Amphibs. Convert LHA/LHD to "Lightning Carriers" and San Antonio LPDs to ABM Cruisers. Replace with a more conventional amphib force, 10 PHIBRONS, each consisting of 1 smaller LHA/LHD like Spanish Juan Carlos/Australian Canberra, 1 LPH like French Mistral, 1 LPD/LSD like UK Albion, 1 LST like Australian Kanimbla modification to Newport class, but with conventional LST bow, 1 LPA/LKA, and 1 shore bombardment frigate with 2 or 3 5" guns and a bunch of anti-surface missiles. Total 6 ships per squadron or 60 total.<br /><br />Littoral forces—15 squadrons, each consisting of 2 ASW corvettes, 1 patrol ship (like Swedish Visby), 1 Mine countermeasures ship (like small LSD, mother ship for drone sweeps and helicopter sweeps), 1 MHC, total 75 ships (plus the 30 AIP SSKs). <br /><br />Auxiliary/service force—40 UNREP ships, 25 MPPF ships, 26 miscellaneous, total 91 ships.<br /><br />Total ship count<br />240 Surface (including carriers)<br />24 Strategic command (SSBN and ABM cruisers)<br />80 Submarines (excluding SSBN and SSK)<br />60 Amphibious forces<br />105 Littoral force (including SSK)<br />91 Auxiliary/service force<br />600 total<br /><br />We can build the 24 carriers for about the cost of 10 Fords, and the 200 screening ships for about the cost of current 22 Ticonderogas, 82 Burkes, and proposed 35 LCSs. The battlecruisers and ASW carriers would be incremental. We can build the 30 smaller SSNs and 30 AIP SSKs for less than the cost of 30 Virginias. We can build a squadron of 6 amphibs for about the current cost of one LHA/LHD, so total amphib costs are comparable. Overall, because of the high/low mix approach, this fleet could be assembled with annual shipbuilding costs of around $23-25 billion, which is about the range that the navy is looking at for its proposed 355-ship fleet.<br /><br />CDR Chipnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-62617759840957875182019-11-20T16:23:08.407-08:002019-11-20T16:23:08.407-08:00CDR Chip,
You have mentioned part of your Navy &q...CDR Chip,<br /><br />You have mentioned part of your Navy "fantasy fleet". What does the rest look like? Maybe we can compare it with the upcoming 2019 Navy FSA when it comes out.Anon2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-17736173668972339692019-11-20T12:54:04.831-08:002019-11-20T12:54:04.831-08:00Agree 100% about the need for a strategy. I'v...Agree 100% about the need for a strategy. I've said before that I see three potential hot spots--China Sea, Mideast, and Eastern Europe. My strategy would be to contain each--at the first island chain, the Straits of Hormuz, and the GIUK gap, the Skaggerat/Kattegat, and Bosporus/Dardanelles, respectively--and to support our allies to the point of keeping sufficient balance to keep the would-be hegemons--China, Iran, and Russia--at bay. I don't see us going inside those perimeters to conduct direct assaults. Nor do I see carriers going inside those perimeters to conduct ground strikes or troop support.<br /><br />I guess my question is what strategy do you embrace? I am guessing that our different concepts of future force structures are derived to at least some degree by different grand strategies. <br /><br />I would describe my objective, at the end of the day, to mean having the biggest, baddest military in the world, and never having to use it, because nobody dares pick on us, and we don't go around picking on them. I think that before we can get there, there is going to have to be somebody who tries to pick on us, and we are going to have to respond by killing them until they get tired of dying. We haven't done that yet, but I predict that things will get better for if and when we do. I think we worry too much about being liked and not enough about being respected. There are people who are not going to like us no matter what we do. But if they respect us, that's good enough.CDR Chipnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78370601426480719492019-11-20T01:49:00.392-08:002019-11-20T01:49:00.392-08:00My question about the F125 concept is why does it ...My question about the F125 concept is why does it have literally zero ASW capability? No ASW sonar and no ASW weapons, except for what might potentially be carried on embarked helicopters. <br /><br />CDR Chipnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-33641306706120471792019-11-19T20:48:19.339-08:002019-11-19T20:48:19.339-08:00Also for a ship that size their range and enduranc...Also for a ship that size their range and endurance don't add up and I suspect they are not rated for arctic operations. Who knows what their sea keeping is like. Poor as I understand.Kathhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09782968433043931011noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-79036859535467147852019-11-19T18:48:22.691-08:002019-11-19T18:48:22.691-08:00"We have some differences of what to do about..."We have some differences of what to do about it, "<br /><br />This perfectly illustrates the necessity to have a geopolitical strategy and a coherent military strategy that supports it. One of the reasons for our differences is that you're designing to a completely different military strategy (standoff blockade) than I am. Not surprisingly, that results in radically different force levels and structure. If we were both designing to the exact same strategy, our solutions would likely be pretty similar.<br /><br />You can't design a ship without a CONOPS and you can't design a fleet structure without a military strategy. Seems simple enough but the Navy utterly fails to grasp the concept.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-23968118466861469142019-11-19T18:43:23.916-08:002019-11-19T18:43:23.916-08:00" Give them to USCG, if they will take them.&..." Give them to USCG, if they will take them."<br /><br />They won't. Remember that the LCS, by design, requires a massive shore side maintenance commitment. The Coast Guard operates on a very austere budget. They want no part of a maintenance black hole.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-37470997224310254312019-11-19T18:24:28.035-08:002019-11-19T18:24:28.035-08:00"If the Navy continues to pile stupid on stup..."If the Navy continues to pile stupid on stupid, as they're currently doing, then there is no 'better' scenario that can work."<br /><br />Looking for common ground, I think we are in total agreement on that. The Fords, Zumwalts, and LCSs are unconscionable wastes of taxpayer dollars. If this country ever made me president, I would immediately fire everybody who ever signed off on any of the three of them.<br /><br />I also think we agree that an amphib CONOPS that involves standing 25-50 miles offshore, because the ships are too valuable to risk closer in, and flying everybody and everything in with helos and V-22s is patently absurd.<br /><br />We have some differences of what to do about it, but the discussions we have had here probably make more sense than anything the top Navy brass have had. And that is truly unfortunate.CDR Chipnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-54833135806434657172019-11-19T18:12:27.046-08:002019-11-19T18:12:27.046-08:00"It is absolutely stunning to me that after o..."It is absolutely stunning to me that after over a decade in service, not a single LCS has ever participated in an ASW exercise or a MCM exercise."<br /><br />Not stunning to me. They have zero capability in either area. <br /><br />USCG needs cutters. Give them to USCG, if they will take them.CDR Chipnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-68310175140243567082019-11-19T12:59:11.802-08:002019-11-19T12:59:11.802-08:00It is absolutely stunning to me that after over a ...It is absolutely stunning to me that after over a decade in service, not a single LCS has ever participated in an ASW exercise or a MCM exercise.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-54506757807902116882019-11-19T12:09:43.741-08:002019-11-19T12:09:43.741-08:00Yeah but how would it cost and based onbthe last d...Yeah but how would it cost and based onbthe last decades junk piles would it actually work?D M Lewishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07944039365612613761noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-77364161621828025322019-11-19T12:05:22.026-08:002019-11-19T12:05:22.026-08:00It seems to aside from stopping them the only poss...It seems to aside from stopping them the only possible use is to keep tinkering with the surface warfare ability. And deploy the 20 we are stuck with the the Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa and maybe SE asia to minimize the load on Burkes doing low end stuff. But stop pretending they will ever clear mines or hunt subs.Kathhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09782968433043931011noreply@blogger.com