tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post8520720390629865119..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Forward BaseComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger49125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-19056898504863773302018-09-10T07:29:54.664-07:002018-09-10T07:29:54.664-07:00You're listed various possible forward bases a...You're listed various possible forward bases and noted the difficulties in establishing and operating them. Now, take a step back. Forget the technical issues like logistics or politics. What can we gain from such a base even if we could establish one? I'm not talking about vague generalities like control the seas around the base or threaten the enemy's operations. I'm talking about specifics. For any specific potential base,<br /><br />Do we want to attack China's mainland? If so, with what weapons/assets? Do we even have the weapons we would need (short range ballistic missiles, for example)?<br /><br />Do we want to interdict shipping to/from China? If so, is a forward base the best way/place to do it?<br /><br />What specific targets are in range of this base that make it worth the effort to set up and defend?<br /><br />What specific forces should occupy the base (relative to the capabilities those forces bring)?<br /><br />What enemy actions would the base prevent?<br /><br />Answer those kinds of questions and you'll have an answer about whether the base is worth establishing.<br /><br />For example,<br /><br />"Vietnam ... faster turnaround time between transit to combat zone"<br /><br />What combat zone? What area of operation would a Vietnam base impact and specifically how? What is the range to the combat zone and how does that affect sortie rates? What targets are within range that justify the base?<br /><br />Too many people think generically and list all the generic, non-specific things that a base can theoretically do. That's fine but it's the specifics that matter. We'd hate to build a base that has no meaningful impact on the actual war!<br /><br />This is analogous to the discussion on frigates. Everyone wants to extol the generic virtues of frigates without giving any thought to whether those virtues are of any actual use to the US Navy and its anticipated operations. When you look at the details, suddenly that wonderful frigate is no longer as useful - or, maybe it's incredibly useful and we should be buying hundreds more!<br /><br />Specifics matter more than generics.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-17144728724208695152018-09-10T07:15:15.554-07:002018-09-10T07:15:15.554-07:00"assume that the Chinese are going to straigh..."assume that the Chinese are going to straight away jump to nuclear fire"<br /><br />That's just ridiculous. They may be evil, ruthless, immoral, corrupt, etc. but they're not insane. Concentrating a large number of nuclear weapon explosions (ours and theirs) near or on their homeland would be self-defeating. Too many people are scared to the point of inaction or appeasement by the "threat" of nuclear weapons. The Chinese are no more likely to use nuclear weapons than we are.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-63695872732545438622018-09-09T21:05:31.449-07:002018-09-09T21:05:31.449-07:00"Trying to build major bases during an active..."Trying to build major bases during an active war is problematic, at best. It is far better to have such bases pre-existing. Pre-existing bases also complicate the enemy's strategy as they need to be dealt with. It's far harder to destroy a fully functioning base than to simply prevent a new one from being built."<br /><br />Indeed that's truae, and while I think a hot war with China is unlikely (it does not serve either the US or China's interests), the world is full of unlikely events happening. It's that catch-22 of sorts: so long as the present status quo holds, the US does not need any more forward bases, but if the status quo falls apart and a hot war happens, it's too late to build up those bases. <br /><br />Unless, perhaps, the USN and USMC can seize the Chinese bases in the Spratlys to use them as a redo of Ulithi, but I don't really think that's practical (and that assumes the Chinese don't have plans in place to sabotage said bases to deny them to the US).<br /><br />The problem is that there's no real good options, particularly if you assume that the Chinese are going to straight away jump to nuclear fire in a first strike to take out US bases in the region. On the other hand, if the aim is to complicate Chinese targeting and split the focus, then I'd say go for Changi and Sepanggar as the naval forward bases, with Camn Ranh, Hai Phong and Da Nang in Vietnam as 2nd choices - the closer proximity of Vietnam to China cuts both ways, because you've got faster turnaround time between transit to combat zone and resupply pier, but it's easier for the Chinese to send land-based air and SAGs to hit bases in Vietnam (assuming they restrain themselves from using nukes in order to avoid provoking ASEAN).<br /><br />Otoh it does depend a lot on where you're prosecuting said war, doesn't it? Vietnam is nescessary if you want to prosecute attacks into the Chinese mainland (I'll sidestep the question of whether it's necessary to hit the Chinese mainland, because I'm in a bit of a hurry). On the other hand, if you're keeping the fighting contained in the SCS - a USN CSG brawling with a PLAN CVBG - you don't really *need* Vietnam, because Changi and Sepanggar provide legit basing options (that said, there's nothing wrong with forward basing in Vietnam to provide a check on the SCS - it's the American way, ever since the Civil War, to show up to the fight with the bestest and the mostest).<br /><br /><br />"To be clear, what I've stated about Taiwan is that if a war starts, for any reason, Taiwan will be the first Chinese objective. They simply cannot allow a forward base for the US to use that close to their mainland. I've not stated that Taiwan will be the reason for a war or the only objective of a war. That seems unlikely."<br /><br />Ah, ok, now we're on the same page. I think China will definitely take steps to neutralise Taiwan, but I'm not convinced they will launch an invasion - they don't have the amphibious lift for that (not yet, anyhow; maybe that'll change once they finish their fleet buildup and recapitalisation). But they will definitely take measures to interdict the Taiwanese Navy and Air Force acting freely, and given how reportedly China has heavily infiltrated Taiwan's military, well...WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-38790066290792987862018-09-09T08:42:41.113-07:002018-09-09T08:42:41.113-07:00"My actual position is that for the present t..."My actual position is that for the present threat posture, the US does not need any forward bases in the Pacific ... as a hot war does not happen."<br /><br />Trying to build major bases during an active war is problematic, at best. It is far better to have such bases pre-existing. Pre-existing bases also complicate the enemy's strategy as they need to be dealt with. It's far harder to destroy a fully functioning base than to simply prevent a new one from being built.<br /><br />So, your approach limits the US to the few bases we already have. These few are generally acknowledged to be insufficient in number and usefulness to conduct a war with China so your approach leaves us at a distinct disadvantage. <br /><br />Fewer bases also allows China to concentrate their first strikes on fewer targets. For example, most observers believe that Guam will be rendered largely inoperative in the opening moments of a war and will remain so indefinitely.<br /><br />Your analysis is valid enough but it does nothing to improve the situation. To be fair, the Navy is, thus far, taking the same approach you advocate. Of course, to be even more fair, the Navy's record on wise decision making is abysmal. <br /><br />As noted, there are no easy/good options.<br /><br />To be clear, what I've stated about Taiwan is that if a war starts, for any reason, Taiwan will be the first Chinese objective. They simply cannot allow a forward base for the US to use that close to their mainland. I've not stated that Taiwan will be the reason for a war or the only objective of a war. That seems unlikely.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-57942903643636689222018-09-09T08:42:40.455-07:002018-09-09T08:42:40.455-07:00"2. More importantly, they offer useful basin...<br /><br />"2. More importantly, they offer useful basing opportunities for US forces to operate from. These bases would solidify the western flank of a Chinese war and offer the US offensive opportunities into the western South China Sea."<br /><br />This is a possibility, although it's my opinion that trying to base out of the Andaman and Nicobar islands runs into the same issues as Subic, only worse, in that you'd need to develop up the port facilities to support your ships. On the other hand, it's still better than nothing. There's a further consideration: if China actually manages to talk Thailand into letting them dig a canal through the Kra isthmus, that canal allows them to bypass the Malacca Strait chokepoint (which is the whole reason China wants a Kra canal to happen, allowing free movement of its merchant shipping and warships). A forward base in the Andamans allows the USN an avenue to cover and interdict the Kra canal (well, assuming the Thais don't make nice with Uncle Sam and close the canal). Although this is more of a hypothetical.<br /><br />On the other hand, there's something to be said for basing in an allied nation with its own nuclear deterrent, to give China some extra pause to the idea of just nuking the Andamans forward base.<br /><br />I'm not convinced however that basing in the Andamans will be relevant to a conflict in the South China Sea. I think it's too far, especially given your suggestion of offensive opportunities into the western bit of the SCS - that's basically vietnamese waters (of which the obvious potential base sites are Da Nang, Hai Phong, Cam Ranh, etc), but we just get back into the same issues with Vietnam basing I talked about earlier.<br /><br /><br />"This dilutes the A2/AD defensive strength in half, in a sense."<br /><br />Possibly. On the other hand, the problem is that it really depends what the nature of the war is like - sure, ASEAN, SK, Taiwan and Japan have their own beefs with China that would bring them in on the side of the US in a war, but I'm not sure it'd be enough to bring in everyone to wage a two-front war. China stirring shit in the SCS and going after ASEAN isn't going to bring in Japan into the picture, what with the lack of alliance with ASEAN (and I'm not sure Abe would be able to sell joining the US to fight China on ASEAN's behalf as collective self defense :V). On the other hand, China going after Taiwan or Japan isn't going to get ASEAN hot and bothered, because Japan isn't ASEAN's problem. <br /><br />So politcal factors may mean that the US may not necessarily get that 2-front war. Although, stranger things have happened - China overreaching and pissing off everyone enough is certainly not outside the realm of possibility.WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-83932566256509161032018-09-09T08:42:28.633-07:002018-09-09T08:42:28.633-07:00"I agree that India's current, direct con..."I agree that India's current, direct contribution potential is limited. To some extent, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy. We seem to be reluctant to sell them useful, front line equipment and they seem reluctant to buy it!"<br /><br />This deserves a bit more exposition for other readers reading this - I suspect you may well know a fair bit of what I'm typing below.<br /><br />I'm going to need to simplify and skim over a lot of details, but basically Prime Minister Modi, for the last decade, has been pushing his Make in India initiative, of which, as that relates to the defense sector, indian companies should make kit for the Indian military and they shouldn't buy foreign. The problem is that the defense sector, and indeed the industrial sector in India as a whole, is atrophied and underdeveloped, due to a combination of shitloads of red tape, massive bureaucratic corruption making it hard to get shit done, tremendous protectionism, and Indian economic planning in the 90s, where they decided to skip industrialising and jump straight to a tech/service/knowledge based economy.<br /><br />The other reason firms are reluctant to sell to India is because of a massive song and dance where nothing gets done. Consider the French firm Dassault. A decade ago, Dassault was desperate for Rafale sales, and offered the Indians a very good deal for 128 aircraft, including technology transfer and local manufacturing and supply chain setup. And then the Indians dragged everything out in a song and dance and kept demanding all sorts of changes to the contract, and kept wanting to renegotiate the contract - the cherry on the cake being that Dassault (in France) would be responsible for any and all defects in the Rafales locally built in India by HAL.<br /><br />Yup. You read that right. Dassault would be responsible for defects and shoddy workmanship performed by HAL.<br /><br />In the circles I run elsewhere, Indian defense procurement has become a meme and we look pityingly at any foreign arms maker who's desperate enough to sell to the Indians and get stuck in the circus that is Indian defense procurement. Heck, consider their ATGM purchase last year. First they say Javelin won. Then they said no, it was Spike. Then they said no, Spike and Javelin are disqualified, the local indian-made ATGM is superior to both so they'll take that. Then suddenly they annouce they're going to go with Javelin again. Or Spike.<br /><br />Like I said, it takes a special sort of terribleness to make the F-35 program look good.<br /><br />To be fair to India, they're in a catch-22. They want and need to develop their own military-industrial complex in order to maintain armaments independence, to give them that strategic independence. The problem is that the Army is screaming bloody murder about how they need kit that works now, fuck developing the MIC while soldiers are dying. And India can only afford to do one.<br /><br />Develop the military-industrial complex, it's going to take decades before that sees fruition, and meanwhile the airforce is flying fighters that are falling apart, the army's using shit rifles that break and spray oil in your face... but on the other hand if you don't develop the military industrial complex, then you're forever at the mercy of your foreign suppliers.WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-24832370682559042502018-09-09T08:04:49.511-07:002018-09-09T08:04:49.511-07:00My actual position is that for the present threat ...My actual position is that for the present threat posture, the US does not need any forward bases in the Pacific - Guam, Sasebo and Yokosuka are sufficient, and will remain sufficient so long as a hot war does not happen.*<br /><br />If the US absolutely must have forward basing in order to prosecute a war with China, then IMO Changi and Sepanggar are the best options, in the sense of being existing naval bases with facilities to support US ships, while being in close enough proximity to large airports (Changi & Paya Lebar airbases, KK International Airport & TUDM Labuan**) for munitions to be flown in and offloaded and trucked to the bases. Both are also sufficiently far enough from China so as to complicate retaliation and Chinese attack: fighters from Woody and the Paracels can barely reach both places to attack, while sending SAGs to deal with either base puts PLAN ships in the whole scenario I mentioned above, meaning the only option China has is to fire MRBMs at either base. It's one thing to be firing MRBMs at Japan (China's ancient foe) or Guam (American soil); it's another thing to be firing MRBMs at nations that China wants to turn into vassal states. <br /><br />I strongly doubt China will do that, because that would unify ASEAN against China; right now, China's having a grand old time playing off the ASEAN member states against each other because all the ASEAN countries hate each other and consider each other rivals and foes. China attacking Singapore and Malaysia would galvanise the rest of ASEAN, and the member states would set aside their rivalries to concentrate on a common enemy, because if there's one thing that could unite ASEAN, it's the sentiment of "Fuck China. No, seriously, Fuck China." (This is why, if you look at Chinese behaviour in the region, it's been a mix of diplomatic posturing and massive Chinese investment and playing all member states against each other, and relatively little military posturing.)<br /><br /><br />*As I say this, I am reminded of the Royal Navy's 10 Year Plan that assumed no major wars would happen in the next 10 years. WW2 kicked off a few years later. :V Of course, it also depends on the nature of said flare up, and how things escalate. I disagree with you that there will be a war for Taiwan - with the way the Taiwanese economy is shrinking while the Chinese economy is growing, and with how China has suceeded in diplomatically marginalising Taiwan, plus the rising reunification sentiment and the weakening Taiwanese military, China doesn't actually need to invade Taiwan. It can afford to play the long game and wait a decade or two, or three, until the Taiwanese themselves want to reunite with the mainland, because China doesn't actually need Taiwan. <br /><br /><br />**Labuan would be more of a PITA deliver munitions, since you'd have to fly them to the airport, unload, truck them to the wharf, and then deliver said munitions by ship to Sepanggar (or, if you wanted to complicate things further, ship munitions to KK, then truck them to Sepanggar). But it could be done.WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-19860415971573391862018-09-09T07:02:07.206-07:002018-09-09T07:02:07.206-07:00"skeptical that India can make any substantia..."skeptical that India can make any substantial contributions"<br /><br />I agree that India's current, direct contribution potential is limited. To some extent, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy. We seem to be reluctant to sell them useful, front line equipment and they seem reluctant to buy it!<br /><br />In my mind, the real value of India is two-fold:<br /><br />1. They present a land army invasion threat which will tie up significant Chinese military resources, as you noted.<br /><br />2. More importantly, they offer useful basing opportunities for US forces to operate from. These bases would solidify the western flank of a Chinese war and offer the US offensive opportunities into the western South China Sea. Essentially, US bases in India forces China to wage a two-front war - Taiwan, Japan, and the eastern seas being one and the South China Sea, Malaysia/IndoChina region being the the other. This dilutes the A2/AD defensive strength in half, in a sense.<br /><br />What do you think?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-33932928694631422622018-09-09T06:51:25.566-07:002018-09-09T06:51:25.566-07:00"forward base in SEA, I would say the only re..."forward base in SEA, I would say the only real options available would be Changi, Subic or Seppangar,"<br /><br />Okay, you're getting there but not quite yet. You've summed up some options (less well known options so there's some value in that summation) but then more or less ruled them out for various legitimate reasons which leaves us/you back at square one. Recognizing that there are no good options, what's your actual recommendation/solution? It's easy to criticize options, including your own, but the real value in this type of discussion comes from offering a concrete solution. As a side note, perhaps you're beginning to gain an appreciation for the challenges in writing this type of blog. Every post is criticized by people who can list faults but few have concrete alternatives to offer. I try to find and encourage those who have the vision and are willing to put forth viable alternatives for discussion. There's some value in critiquing, for sure, but there's far more value critiquing and offering alternatives!<br /><br />So, you've summed up the issue(s) with forward basing and noted the challenges. You've laid the groundwork, so to speak. Now, what is your specific recommendation(s)? You're 2/3 of the way - now finish it!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-80529871474585833332018-09-08T23:11:18.599-07:002018-09-08T23:11:18.599-07:00(2/2)
I am honestly quite skeptical that India ca...(2/2)<br /><br />I am honestly quite skeptical that India can make any substantial contributions in an American war with China. Their army and air force aren't built to do long range expeditionary fighting, and their readiness and serviceability rates are pretty low. Their procurement and weapons development is a mess. The HAL Tejas has spent 35 years in development for a light fighter that's at best an early 90s Mirage 2000 equivalent. They took almost 10 years to build and commission the first Kamorta-class corvette.* And then there's the question of whether they're existing beef with China is enough to get them on the American side and support naval operations against China - I don't see that happening. On the other hand, I think being a threat in being tying up Chinese reinforcements and restricting Chinese merchant shipping is good enough, within the limits of what they can do. Would it be good to have more positive military advantages, sure, absolutely, but from what I've seen of their military, I'm unconvinced the Indians can actually provide those advantages.<br /><br /><br />*It takes a special sort of terribleness to make the F-35 and LCS programs look real good in comparison. :V To put things into perspective, the LCA program that birthed Tejas began in 1983; 35 years later in 2018, there are only 26 aircraft flying. This is with a single design single manufacturer, mind. Meanwhile the F-35 program began in 1992; 26 years later in 2018 we're coming onto 400 aircraft built and flying, and this includes the whole JSF flyoff between the X-32 and X-35 prototypes.WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-22548420282586095912018-09-08T23:10:59.699-07:002018-09-08T23:10:59.699-07:00(1/2)
It's meant as a starting point to provok...(1/2)<br />It's meant as a starting point to provoke more discussion, lol :p<br /><br />In the current peacetime scenario, basing in Vietnam may be an attractive option because it puts a reminder to China that hey, Uncle Sam is in the neighbourhood. I'm just not convinced it's worth it in the srsface war that's your thought paradigm for this blog, because Vietnam is in China's backyard and well within range of attack from Chinese forces, which are also going to have an easier time of interdicting sea-based supplies and reinforcements coming into Vietnam (although the flipside is that they're putting themselves into the threat bracket of land-based air, so it's not exactly a done deal). <br /><br />(This kinda ties into why the SEA navies - the nations that aren't in China's pocket, anyway: looking at you Laos, Myanmar :V - aren't really so concerned about building srsface warships to challenge PLAN dominance in the South China Sea, because the operational distances involved put limits on what the PLAN can bring to the party, and operating in the South China Sea and attempting to act against any of the ASEAN navies puts Chinese ships within range of land-based air, and in the absolute worst case, if ASEAN trades corvettes 1:1 with PLAN DDGs, it's a painful exchange that favors ASEAN and makes any Chinese victory a phyrric victory in terms of the costs involved: ships, sailors, money, institutional experience. But I digress.)<br /><br />If you're going to do a forward base in SEA, I would say the only real options available would be Changi, Subic or Seppangar, being close enough for the action (well, for a given value of "close", anyhow), but just far enough to challenge Chinese attack on said bases. Changi is the obvious choice: Singapore is friendly with the US and in a war with China has a 70-30 chance of coming down on the US side, and has extensive port facilities and can support American warships. Subic would need billions in refurbishment and is an outside possibility given how close Duterte is leaning to China. The Royal Malaysian Navy built Seppangar with the idea that it's positioned to cover the South China Sea and it has the facilities to support American CVNs; the question of whether the USN gets to use Seppangar is more political, given that Malaysia's relationship with the US varies in its closeness. If it's a serious war with China that has implications towards Southeast Asia, then there's a good chance Singapore and Malaysia will agree to let the US use their bases as forward bases, in exchange for taking down China a peg or two, as well as concessions: loans, aid, investment dollars, and in Malaysia's case, sweetening the deal by offering more military tech (Malaysia has never liked how it's considered a 2nd class customer compared to Singapore, what with Singapore always getting the good stuff first from the US). <br /><br />(This assumes that China is not going to straight away jump to nuking said forward bases. I think they probably will not do so; they still want to be a player on the world stage, not an international pariah, especially with a lot of Chinese rhethoric playing up how China is a more responsible national actor than the US. :V)WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-55568691028625001242018-09-08T08:38:01.083-07:002018-09-08T08:38:01.083-07:00You've got the beginnings of a more productive...You've got the beginnings of a more productive discussion. However, you've simply stated the obvious and stated what has been said many times in this blog. Take it a step further and offer solutions to the difficulties and challenges you've noted.<br /><br />For example, basing in Vietnam - how can we make it viable, if it even can be? How would we logistically support it during a war if it could be made viable?<br /><br />For example, India - what should we be doing to bring India firmly on our side? Aside from a potential threat, what can we gain from better relations with India that produces a more positive military advantage?<br /><br />For example, how do we nudge Russia away from China? Would Russia's far eastern territories offer advantageous basing for the US if we could reach that point in our relations?<br /><br />Address some of these issues rather than restating the obvious and you'll be producing valuable content. It requires a little effort to research and ponder these topics but you clearly have the enthusiasm so put it to work! Good start.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-64912474314912925642018-09-08T07:52:32.469-07:002018-09-08T07:52:32.469-07:00The A-10 can't use Harpoon. It has hardpoints ...The A-10 can't use Harpoon. It has hardpoints that can take the weight of the missile and launch rail, but the A-10 lacks a radar, and so it can't cue the Harpoon. Theoretically you could still fire Harpoons off an A-10 by setting them to seek targets on their own and just firing them off and letting them find their own targets, but then you'd need an offboard sensor asset to guide the A-10, and the problem with this method of launch is that you're blindfiring a missile which could go off anywhere or lock onto the wrong ship. It's iffy.WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-57940269101155058062018-09-08T07:49:36.172-07:002018-09-08T07:49:36.172-07:00Vietnam would be a lot more open to alliance and b...Vietnam would be a lot more open to alliance and basing with the US than one might expect. The Vietnamese attitude to the US is, "Yeah, we fought a war, but we won and that was 60 years ago, I'll let it go if you'll let it go, the real enemy is China." Vietnamese history is basically a long string of fighting off Chinese invasions - heck, China invaded them in the 70s, after the Vietnam War, so that's still in living memory.<br /><br />THat said, assuming alliance with Vietnam and basing therein... well, the problem is that puts your bases right in striking distance of China. Take Da Nang - it's only 200 miles from Hainan. Basing in South Vietnam would complicate Chinese targeting somewhat, but it's still in range of Chinese attack - even the Type 056 corvettes with their 3500 nautical mile range can reach South Vietnam. If even Singapore is considered iffy as a forward base, Vietnam would be even worse. (This assumes Singapore comes down on the side of the US; Singaporean foreign policy revolves around playing off the US and China against each other and being friendly with both nations. That said, if Singapore absolutely had to pick a side... I'd give it 70-30 they'd side with the US over China.)<br /><br />India's value as a strategic partner is, I submit, less in direct combat power, and more of a threat in being: so long as the Indian Army and Indian Air Force remain a credible threat on China's borders, China is going to have to keep combat power on its borders to counter India, which denies China those assets for concentration of firepower on its eastern seaboard. (This is not to say that China cannot already concentrate airpower to cover the Taiwan Strait and Yellow Sea, but every bit helps.) I don't see the Indian Navy supporting the USN and participating directly in combat with the PLAN, but the Indians can control the entry to the Malacca Strait, which means they're in a position to cut off merchant shipping heading for China, which is not insignificant, IMO.<br /><br />Russia is no friend to the US, but it's no friend to China either - they've had more than a few dust ups during the Cold War. I think it may be possible to get the Russians on the US side - or at least, to not support China, given that China and Russia are competing for influence in similar spheres. The US will definitely need to offer something to Russia to make it worth their while though, given how vital trade with China is to the Russian economy (hell, to *every* economy).WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-84400910084881326652018-09-05T16:30:48.840-07:002018-09-05T16:30:48.840-07:00The A-10 is not certified for the LRASM and, to th...The A-10 is not certified for the LRASM and, to the best of my knowledge, is not certified for Harpoon missiles. I could be wrong about the Harpoon and would happily say so if you can provide a reference to the contrary.<br /><br />Now, this doesn't mean that it couldn't become certified if the need were there.<br /><br />By the way, Wiki lists a 250 mile combat radius with an anti-armor load. Carrying LRASMs at 2500 lbs each would significantly decrease that radius. So, the combination of reduced radius (say, 180 miles?) plus weapon range gives an effective threat range of 380+ miles.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-76786905533332832442018-09-05T15:59:29.859-07:002018-09-05T15:59:29.859-07:00A-10 long range missile.
The Air Force jointly de...A-10 long range missile.<br /><br />The Air Force jointly developed the LRASM with the Navy. They have an air launched version and the Navy has a ship launched version. I don't know the specifics of hard points on the A-10 but, they can launch Harpoons. It is likely that the Air Force has not considered the question, since they want to retire the A-10.<br /><br />Perhaps this is an inquiry that the Navy can make?<br /><br />The AGM-158C is 2500lbs and has a range "over 200 miles" with speculation of an actual range of 300 miles. The A-10 could carry 4 LRASMs and a 600 gallon external fuel tank. It also has the capacity to carry 2 Sidewinders but I don't see any use for them in this role.KHhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13886905588388554170noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-14941074086636116672018-09-05T11:20:29.305-07:002018-09-05T11:20:29.305-07:00It depends on how the war unflods, what China'...It depends on how the war unflods, what China's objective are, and what our basing agreement in Okinawa includes. <br /><br />If China wishes to control the South And East China Seas, they will want to neutralize Okinawa. I don't see the Japanese submitting to Chinese control of their major trade routes.<br /><br />The same is true if China wishes to invade Taiwan--they will need to neutralize Okinawa to protect the invasion fleet. Here I think they would simply strike first to defend the fleet.<br /><br />If our basing agreement in Okinawa allows us to act independently, then China will strike first to protect their coastal industries and naval bases.<br /><br />All in all, I have a hard time imagining war aims for China that would persuade Japan to choose neutrality and prevent the US from using Okinawa to strike back. Were they to do so, they would be accepting Chinese hegemony over an American alliance.Haznoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-76689884204919725522018-09-05T09:31:14.032-07:002018-09-05T09:31:14.032-07:00"we can probably count on the Japanese, as Ok..."we can probably count on the Japanese, as Okinawa will be the first target, and I don't see the Japanese backing away from that fight."<br /><br />Likely true. Of more concern is what if the Chinese don't attack Japan? Then what? Do the Japanese jump into the war unprovoked? Do they remain neutral? Tough political choice, huh? Tough spot for the US, too!<br /><br />I think that not attacking Japan would be a strategic masterstroke by China. If Japan enters the war then they are viewed as aggressors on the world stage and China gains sympathy.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-43844821440250124162018-09-04T19:54:41.620-07:002018-09-04T19:54:41.620-07:00In terms of Base useage in event of a war, we can ...In terms of Base useage in event of a war, we can probably count on the Japanese, as Okinawa will be the first target, and I don't see the Japanese backing away from that fight. Beyond that, we basically control the defense policy of Micronesia, so Angaur, Yap, and Peleliu are more or less at our disposal. Personally, I think we should approach the Japanese very quietly about access to Iwo Jima.<br /><br />The Philippines are obviously crucial, but so long as Duerte is in office, I don't see any kind of stable relationship.Haznoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-30858241917305336392018-09-04T19:06:45.450-07:002018-09-04T19:06:45.450-07:00"A-10s have a long range (1100ish miles) and ..."A-10s have a long range (1100ish miles) and very long loiter time which is ideal for scouting, and would force the Chinese to keep their ships at least that far away"<br /><br />I don't see that. The A-10 has no long range, anti-ship cruise missile that I'm aware of. It's missiles are very short range Hellfire and the like. Thus, it would have to approach well inside a ship's defensive missile zone and would not survive long enough to attack.<br /><br />I don't follow Air Force matters that closely. Maybe the A-10 has a long range missile I'm not aware of?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-12544849928078025832018-09-04T19:03:11.595-07:002018-09-04T19:03:11.595-07:00"Google has a photo of an A-10 with a tail ho..."Google has a photo of an A-10 with a tail hook down,"<br /><br />Give me a link. I'm absolutely certain such a photo is not real.<br /><br />As far as theoretical operation from a carrier, the listed specs say no. <br /><br />Minimum Take Off Distance - 3,100.36 feet<br />Minimum Landing Distance - 2,001.29 feet<br />Link <a href="https://www.aircraftcompare.com/helicopter-airplane/A-10-Warthog/8" rel="nofollow">here</a>ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-71344015895412057272018-09-04T18:57:16.048-07:002018-09-04T18:57:16.048-07:00"If we were willing to dredge and fill like t..."If we were willing to dredge and fill like the Chinese, there are all kinds of additional possibilities on top of the above."<br /><br />Good point.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-50802200825708753262018-09-04T18:47:16.365-07:002018-09-04T18:47:16.365-07:00Sorry I took so long to reply.
A-10s on carrier...Sorry I took so long to reply. <br /><br />A-10s on carriers.<br /><br />Google has a photo of an A-10 with a tail hook down, landing on arresting wires. Also, a question on Quara provided this answer: <br /><br /> Bob Keeter, Retired flight test / systems engineer / engineering lead<br />Answered Jul 24, 2017 · Author has 4.5k answers and 3.6m answer views<br />An A-10 with its STOL capability quite possibly could operate off of a carrier deck without the catapult or arresting cable, assuming that the carrier is making good speed into a stiff breeze. As for the rest, the aircraft would be ripped apart by the cat and the gear would collapse with a trap.<br /><br />Not an ideal carrier based aircraft but, we don't seem to have anything better for an attack plane (and they're FREE)! <br /><br />Guam Island defense.<br /><br />Assuming that a shooting war has already started, A-10s have a long range (1100ish miles) and very long loiter time which is ideal for scouting, and would force the Chinese to keep their ships at least that far away, Area Denial. Loaded with LRHAshMs they would provide even longer Area Denial distance. <br /><br />KHhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13886905588388554170noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-3806931359594258842018-09-04T18:19:11.529-07:002018-09-04T18:19:11.529-07:00Wake and Midway have as much useable area for an a...Wake and Midway have as much useable area for an airbase as Diego Garcia. Midway has an anchorage of about a square mile, but would need additional dredging and the removal of some coral heads to open it out. It has an inner harbor that also needs additional dredging and warf reinforcement, but once done it would yield 5000 feet of Quay. For reference, Apra harbor has an anchorage of 2.5 square miles and 10,000 feel of Quay. <br /><br />So not firstline bases, but not useless either. If we were willing to dredge and fill like the Chinese, there are all kinds of additional possibilities on top of the above.Haznoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-20384181404260292582018-09-04T13:06:38.217-07:002018-09-04T13:06:38.217-07:00Wake and Midway (the others even smaller..) are ti...Wake and Midway (the others even smaller..) are tiny little coral atolls with nothing more than a runway and a cluster of support buildings. They are not real estate we would want to leverage any strategy off of. Tiny, no water, no port facilities possible.<br /><br />Nope. We cannot dodge the bullet. We need more CSGs with the right mix of purpose built carrier jet aircraft, more SSNs, cruisers/destroyers, frigates and at sea replenishment ships.. Also more long range USAF bombers and finish upgrades to the Nuclear TRIAD systems and modernization of the nuc weapons themselves soonest.<br /><br />Expensive, eh? Real defense aint cheap.<br /><br />b2Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com