tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post6824691531624336515..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Navy Testing DeficienciesComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-2245484431852097202015-05-14T15:18:15.506-07:002015-05-14T15:18:15.506-07:00What strikes me as shocking is how self inflicted ...What strikes me as shocking is how self inflicted this whole situation is. The unwillingness to invest in training, maintenance, and serious testing is a cultural problem it would seem? <br /><br />Part of the problem is that the defense industry seems to hold so much power over the military procurement process. <br /><br />The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation office was created in the 1980s after the failures involving the Bradley due to the defense reformers back them exposing it.<br />AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-54760262460616073312015-05-14T15:13:44.521-07:002015-05-14T15:13:44.521-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-11611582508474904312015-05-13T08:14:45.708-07:002015-05-13T08:14:45.708-07:00It does seem we have a lot of institutional inerti...It does seem we have a lot of institutional inertia. Our Navy in the '90's it seems was geared towards fighting non peers in the littorals and really gutted the blue water aspect, IMHO. <br /><br />Harpoon was left to age. I don't give them too much flack over TASM because with the tech at the time it was questionable but still. Tomcats and intruders were replaced with the Super hornet, which still had short legs but a very high sortie rate and great maintenance; so you can park your CVN close to shore and just keep flying. But there goes the outer air battle and long range strike. <br /><br />ASW work seemed to be very de-emphasized. Perry's retired with the idea we didn't need escort frigates; Vikings retired; ASW drills on destroyers becoming more rare. <br /><br />Finally we all but eliminate indigenous tanking. <br /><br />And all that may have been fine for dealing with Bosnia in the '90's. The SH may have been a rational decision even. But how that we have real blue water and near shore competition; with enemies reviving old stuff (Backfires, Sunburns) and creating new (Lada, Severodvinsk, Brahmos, DF-21, etc....) we seem to be doing... very little. DDG1000 was compromised and is a 3 unit class. The LCS is going full tilt. The F-35C is... who knows. We don’t seem to be addressing the threats. <br /><br />I hear again and again in the political realm that we have an 'overwhelming battle fleet'. But That fleet is made up of 'Burkes at various stages of maintenance and upgrades, gaps in ASW, Tico's at various stages of maintenance and upgrades that the Navy wants to retire, a bunch of LCS, and CVN’s with shrinking air wings of questionable range. <br /><br />In a near peer war we could face a very realistic situation where we have the old (backfires) combining with the new (SSN's from China and Russia, AIP boats) that could cripple our CVN's. And without that punch our options are thin with Flight IIa's having no harpoons, and the harpoons we do have being old. <br /><br />To be able to go into harms way, you have to be able to handle the level of harm out there. <br /><br />Jim<br />JFWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16095723023404412328noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-34634939171645695372015-05-13T06:05:42.424-07:002015-05-13T06:05:42.424-07:00Coffee Man,
Spot on!
Unfortunately the lists of ...Coffee Man,<br /><br />Spot on!<br /><br />Unfortunately the lists of potential adversaries is growing, but the impact on USN behavior is not addressing the situation.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-39827481280499281212015-05-13T05:27:17.802-07:002015-05-13T05:27:17.802-07:00"High failure rates due to lack of proper tec..."High failure rates due to lack of proper technical training for the crew – the lack of technical training is stunning. "<br /><br />I see this everyday at work. I have been working in the ship repair industry since retirement and it is obviously clear that he Navy, or any other service, does not train their folks to be anything but button pushers. Their idea of fixing is to try to push the button again. Talking with the young sailors that man these ships, training consists of computer based training, no hands on. What is bad for the Navy is good for me, keeps the paychecks coming. <br /><br />I saw this first hand during briefs of CWIS testing. They would brief what they were going to do, the procedures to do it, and then and that they would be submitting the CASREP when they completed. This is for a 3 second burst and they are already planning a CASREP?<br /><br />A blue water navy without a potential adversary loses its edge.<br />Coffee Manhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07303759803639176370noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-24427477768611484162015-05-12T14:05:03.050-07:002015-05-12T14:05:03.050-07:00I remember reading (I think) an Edward Beach book ...I remember reading (I think) an Edward Beach book on the US Navy in which he stated that the US Navy in peace time could tend to fall apart in training and planning. <br /><br />Now seems worse than ever though. Bad training is one thing. Bad ships we've seen before but often because they were test beds or because they were treaty ships. But this extends massively into procurement and planning as well. <br /><br />I'm getting rapidly frustrated. With the leadership we have now I just don't see the point of spending the money if the Navy is going to use it to build CVN's that have questionable air wings and have huge gaps in protection, LCS's that are a test ship design that was rushed to full production, and skimp on maintanance on proven ship designs... <br /><br />The SSN fleet is still good but its going to shrink in the coming years. <br /><br />Am I being too dramatic? Is there another time when the Navy seemed so adrift? JFWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16095723023404412328noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-27473417512763405002015-05-12T12:20:25.447-07:002015-05-12T12:20:25.447-07:00Off Topic
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/navy-ho...Off Topic<br />http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/navy-hornets-mock-dogfight-with-malaysian-flankers-in-s-1703838609<br />"Malaysia’s Su-30MKMs were especially dynamic, showcasing “maneuvering speeds estimated at close to Mach 1, making training aggressive and realistic.”"<br /><br />But I thought our allies were intimidated by tier 1 kit and only wanted to train against low end corvettes.<br /><br />Seems like Malaysia was quite happy to square off against a full carrier battle group...TrThttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07316335177828136131noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-5298195753932908162015-05-12T12:08:28.508-07:002015-05-12T12:08:28.508-07:00Yes look at the Release 4 Program Reviews - System...Yes look at the Release 4 Program Reviews - System test reported the numbers because I told them it was either going to be me or them that reported them and it would look better if they did. Fall of 2012 is the timeframe.<br /><br />Look for a brief presented in Nov 2012 to the Certification Team at Dahlgren that reported the same information and what it meant for system integration and test. That with 15% release allocated requirements failing, any mission thread that needed at least 6 of the requirements had a pretty good chance of not working. And you can't tell where in the thread that it will not work. It may not detect, it may not classify, it may not engage, it may not fly right, it may not report destruction, etc.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-91315067490699658682015-05-12T10:01:15.057-07:002015-05-12T10:01:15.057-07:00That's fascinating. Do you have any documenta...That's fascinating. Do you have any documentation or source that you can share?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-25614722580259264102015-05-12T08:09:58.354-07:002015-05-12T08:09:58.354-07:00Yes thank goodness, because the Navy internally is...Yes thank goodness, because the Navy internally is so subverted that it is no safe anymore.<br /><br />For example on the system testing of DDG 1000 Release 4 (of 7) 15% of the lower level SW requirements were either not tested or failed. This was duly reported to the Navy Certification Team which decided NOT to tell the Certification Lead. Release 4 (and the others) were duly certified by the Navy so that the Contract continued, always with the CYA action of saying it has to get better the closer you get to Operation.<br /><br />In addition, to reduce costing tests the System Integrator proposed that System test be only 8 hours long for Release 4. Even that was too much for the Navy that quietly pushed back with Aegis has to run for 25 hours at least. So the System test time was extended to 25 hours.<br /><br />The foxes are in the Hen Houses, all to keep the money flowing.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com