tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post5596903336373241032..comments2024-03-18T17:57:44.714-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Marines Drop 120 mm MortarComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger81125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-23885590882348673252018-06-11T05:57:13.651-07:002018-06-11T05:57:13.651-07:00A few points:
1. I'm not a ground combat expe...A few points:<br /><br />1. I'm not a ground combat expert - not even a little - so I don't know this stuff!<br /><br />2. I've never heard anyone complain about having a mortar during a fight.<br /><br />3. The EFSS can be internally transported in a CH-53/MV-22 vs the M777 which is sling loaded and still needs a large truck to tow it (not sure how the trucks are transported. The point is that it seems like the EFSS can get ashore easier and sooner than the M777.<br /><br />4. The M777 is a higher level asset in terms of control whereas the EFSS is controlled at a lower unit level. Again, I've never heard a lower unit complain about having control of a heavier firepower asset.<br /><br />5. With today's (misguided) emphasis on infantry running around the battlefield in "jeeps", the EFSS seems to fit right in with that level of mobility and transportability.<br /><br />Just my non-combat knowledgeable thoughts. Correct me if I'm wrong.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-90992874548575412112018-06-11T01:15:50.374-07:002018-06-11T01:15:50.374-07:00Though to be honest, the EFSS was really an aftert...Though to be honest, the EFSS was really an afterthought. The original EFSS requirements kept slipping until it hit the bottom with the bare bones 'current' system. And now, you don't even have that.<br /><br />There is also even a question on the 'role' of the EFSS in Marine ops. The initial AAV landing, you don't bring it ashore, just infantry, so it is useless at this stage, but once you have settled ashore, you got 777s to support you then, so where is the role for the 120mm?Owlhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18391214831340182290noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-91016346043732486872018-06-11T01:09:08.064-07:002018-06-11T01:09:08.064-07:00I was involved in an 120mm mortar M-113 experiment...I was involved in an 120mm mortar M-113 experiment in 97' or so. After the 4 round stonk, the M-113 threw its tracks from the shock. To be more precise, the 'shock and relax, repeat'.Owlhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18391214831340182290noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-52768180251398874052018-05-29T11:21:58.813-07:002018-05-29T11:21:58.813-07:00"USA and USMC routinely attach and cross atta..."USA and USMC routinely attach and cross attach units."<br /><br />I was unaware of that! To what purpose, given that the units are, essentially, functional duplicates? <br /><br />It would be like the AF and Navy exchanging aviation units. Other than familiarity, which has some slight value, I guess, neither branch would gain any capabilities.<br /><br />For example, if both the Army and Marines have artillery units, what's the point of exchanging? I could see the point if one or the other had no artillery.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-68856867594450266352018-05-29T10:57:22.468-07:002018-05-29T10:57:22.468-07:00@CNO - the USA and USMC routinely attach and cross...@CNO - the USA and USMC routinely attach and cross attach units.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-11372557213875722052018-05-29T09:44:18.412-07:002018-05-29T09:44:18.412-07:00"particularly if the Army provided the tanks ..."particularly if the Army provided the tanks and, or SP artillery components of these brigades."<br /><br />Now that's an absolutely fascinating idea I had never heard of before. For an isolated operation it could surely work (ignoring training, doctrinal, and tactical differences) for the Army to "donate" units. For a major war, however, it's a zero sum game. Any units donated to the Marines reduce the Army assets. However, since all units are not constantly engaged, that shouldn't be a problem, either.<br /><br />In short, fascinating idea. Are there any problems that you can foresee, aside from the obvious parochial aspects?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-42474057052383104862018-05-29T07:56:41.358-07:002018-05-29T07:56:41.358-07:00@CNO,
1) On the Arctic Ocean... its all about res...@CNO,<br /><br />1) On the Arctic Ocean... its all about resources, and the shortcut between Asia and Europe. Petroleum and metals (e.g. gold) are obvious resources, but in 2014 U.S. commercial fisheries generated $153 billion in sales according to NOAA. <br /><br />2) Shit can the NSA of 1947 and go back to traditional USMC missions dating from inception. There are plenty of requirements for VBSS, security of naval installations, security of ships, and amphibious operations. Congress could fix this tomorrow as no Congress is obligated by prior statute – they are Congress! The Corps needs to stop pointing to this act as though it were the Constitution itself.<br /><br />On the last point, major river crossings (Muse, Don, Dneiper, Rhine, Vistula, Oder...) present comparable challenges to amphibious operations. The British and Canadians kept the same specialized forces they used at Normandy (79th armored division) to force the Rhine including LVT-4s.<br /><br />I do not think there is any reasonable professional argument against a USMC designed to field 6-9 high quality mechanized infantry brigades, particularly if the Army provided the tanks and, or SP artillery components of these brigades. Much of the USMC "2nd land army" controversy arose from the creation of USMC Division structures, which is silly in 2018 as most armies have largely abandoned divisions as a redundant level of command. Also note that many Commandants of the Marine Corps post 1947 have not held division command.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-50984346626184318022018-05-28T07:26:50.813-07:002018-05-28T07:26:50.813-07:00GAB, well, you get my vote for SecDef!
You leav...GAB, well, you get my vote for SecDef! <br /><br />You leave me with two questions:<br /><br />1. What do you see as critical in the Arctic? I haven't studied it extensively so I am likely missing something but what do you see as the benefit of operating and/or (controlling?) the Arctic? Resources? Strategic basing? ICBM/IRBM missile attack/defense? Something else? I see a lot of discussion around the Internet about the need to build Arctic equipment but no discussion about why.<br /><br />2. So, you appear to want to beef up the Marines from the current light/med infantry to med/heavy infantry/semi-armored. Fair enough. Now, what do you see them being used for?<br /><br />Obviously, they can be flown in to some spot and used as an army as was done throughout the last couple of decades - but, one has to ask, why not just increase the size of the Army and drop the Marines?<br /><br />They can conduct assaults from the sea but I consistently ask, against who and in what scenario? I just don't see any assaults being strategically or operationally useful or likely against China, Russia, or NK. Maybe against Iran but those would be the low end of the spectrum.<br /><br />So, where do you see a likely assault scenario especially in the peer war category (China)?<br /><br />Yes, there's always the "you never know" scenario that no one can predict but that's a LOT of cost for an unlikely "you never know" case.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-14865026492911028932018-05-28T06:17:10.668-07:002018-05-28T06:17:10.668-07:00Our political and military leadership has an endle...Our political and military leadership has an endless appetite for intervention in third world nations, wars that cost a great deal of blood and treasure, but are not vital to protect our sovereignty, and do not prepare us to win against aggressive peer competitors. http://futuredefensevisions.blogspot.com/2017/11/doug-macgregor-recommends-reading.html<br /><br />As to what we should do with our defense budget:<br /><br />1. Reevaluate our vital national interests including every military threat and also *every treaty obligation* we have committed ourselves to.<br /><br />2. End every treaty that does *directly and materially* contribute to our sovereignty and national interests.<br /><br />3. Bring our overseas troops home from every foreign nation described by #2 above.<br /><br />4. Fire the bottom 10% of uniformed members tomorrow.<br /><br />5. Reduce the officer overhead by 30% and eliminate 75% of general and admiral ranks. Cut the Pentagon and surrounding DC military billets by 75% and return them to combat units throughout CONUS. Establish a staffing policy to over-staff ships, squadrons and ground combat units to 105% of their war-time strength.<br /><br />6. Ruthlessly reevaluate our plans, doctrine, tactics, and training in light of defeating aggressive peer competitors. Validate these concepts in large scale unscripted exercises.<br /><br />7. Implement a procurement policy to support acquisition of vehicles and equipment to support number 6 above. This is the bloodiest as I would end the “share the pie” mentality at the Pentagon. The USAF would get the largest share of the defense budget, followed by the Navy, and much farther down the list is the USA and Corps. Sorry, but space power, airpower, strategic forces, and sea power are priorities over ground combat power in a world where there is no credible territorial threat to the U.S. of A. <br /><br />8. Evaluate and improve our infrastructure (transportation, communication, power, water, etc.) to support the mass movement of forces IAW numbers 6 and 7 above.<br /><br />9. Establish civil defense as a priority. This includes the full spectrum of ABM, SAM, SOSUS nets, coastal artillery (ASCM/ASBM), fallout shelters, decontamination facilities, airport and harbor repair teams, and so forth. The national guard is probably more useful in this capacity than to expect it to perform combat missions in a peer conflict.<br /><br />10. Work with the Russians, Canadians, and other Artic Ocean member states to Chinese to enforce and defend against threats (primarily by the Chinese) against the Artic Ocean. Ironicly, this means establishing artificial island bases a la the Chinese. We also need ice breakers, airfields and other infrastructure. <br /><br />So were does the USMC fit in this vision? I would like to see the Corps largely get out of the aviation business and reimagine itself as an amphibious, mechanized ground combat force structured around brigade sized forces. I would take the MEB and rebuild it as a true brigade with the regimental infantry regiment fully supported with APC/HAPC transport. I would add a tank battalion, a SP artillery battalion reinforced with MRL (122mm, 127 mm (adapt the rocket motor of the 5” Zuni rocket for surface to surface fire), or 160mm). I would then add a robust SP air defense capability (0-10,000 meters).<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-27581352262246609202018-05-27T17:46:11.479-07:002018-05-27T17:46:11.479-07:00"A MEU is good enough for fighting against mi..."A MEU is good enough for fighting against militias and irregular forces in Toyota pickups, but it does not remotely match against a peer competitor in a high intensity conflict."<br /><br />So, from a purely analytical perspective, why are we maintaining a Marine Corps and a fleet of 30+ very expensive amphibious ships? What do you see as the Marine's reason for existence, today?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-12729971950059479012018-05-27T17:10:45.411-07:002018-05-27T17:10:45.411-07:00DL,
No, HIMARS is a distinct capability, but not ...DL,<br /><br />No, HIMARS is a distinct capability, but not really an artillery buff. The point is that the ground component of a MEU (a reinforced infantry battalion) has lost its tank company, and gone from self-propelled howitzer battery (six tubes, maybe eight), to a towed howitzer battery (six tubes), and then to a section of two towed howitzers. Not impressive<br /><br />Yes, HIMARS does add capability, but MRLS, especially LRPF or ATACMS rockets, are really corps level assets. An infantry battalion cannot sustain these systems in high intensity conflict, nor effectively employ these systems. Adding HIMARS to a MEU is window dressing, allowing an infantry battalion to shoot $500,000 GMRLS missiles at illiterate goat herders is publicity stunt. The acid test is how many reload missiles does the MEU deploy with?<br /><br />A MEU is good enough for fighting against militias and irregular forces in Toyota pickups, but it does not remotely match against a peer competitor in a high intensity conflict. If you doubt this, compare this to a Russian tank or mechanized/motorized infantry battalion or one of the experimental Battalion Tactical Groups fighting in the Ukraine. A MEB fares even worse as it is a reinforced infantry regiment that will be facing Russian or Chinese tank or mechanized/motorized infantry brigade.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-6378097742957655202018-05-25T19:47:41.938-07:002018-05-25T19:47:41.938-07:00Question wasn't that what HIMARS is for just a...Question wasn't that what HIMARS is for just asking Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-1944819953659567272018-05-24T12:25:39.475-07:002018-05-24T12:25:39.475-07:00The rifling also gives superior dispersion, a poin...The rifling also gives superior dispersion, a point that was highlighted when the Marines began to have their rifled (and automatic) mortar programs in the naughties.<br />It cans till shoot ordinary fin-stabilised 120 mm ammo.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-66958439620186523462018-05-24T10:26:19.310-07:002018-05-24T10:26:19.310-07:00Spot on!Spot on!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78584183768955363592018-05-24T10:22:48.771-07:002018-05-24T10:22:48.771-07:00"The tolerance for paying ..."
This tou..."The tolerance for paying ..."<br /><br />This touches on one of my recurring themes and that is that we've become so used to horrible acquisition decisions and programs that we've come to believe they're normal!!!<br /><br />We now think that a 20 yr development cycle for an F-35 is normal - forgetting that we went from concept to deployed F-14 in about 5 yrs. We now think that a $15B carrier is normal - forgetting that the last Nimitz was on the order of $8B. We now think that the Burke is a great warship - forgetting that its basic design features would have been laughed out of WWII warship design efforts. And so on.<br /><br />The bar has been so lowered that we now believe that bad is good!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-61338754667042268272018-05-24T09:15:05.043-07:002018-05-24T09:15:05.043-07:00I think the larger point here is the disturbing te...I think the larger point here is the disturbing tendency to replace tried, cost effective weapon systems that work with new shiny things that have a high coolness factor and questionable (if any) fitness for the job at hand (winning a serious war). Examples abound -- Fords for Nimitzes; F35s for F18s; UAV refueling for S3As; Zumwalts for ???; LCS for MCMS & real ASW; V22 for helos;... and don't get me started on the A10.<br /><br />And it all comes from very questionable budgeting...why spend $$ maintaining and training on the old, effective stuff when you can spend those $$ on cool new toys?<br /><br />Last time I checked, war was kinda a down&dirty thing. Your stuff had to WORK...shiny didn't count for much.<br /><br />Old Sailorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15924259360910623660noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-24624556189974471832018-05-24T08:29:46.829-07:002018-05-24T08:29:46.829-07:00The tolerance for paying $250,000 for the M1161 (9...The tolerance for paying $250,000 for the M1161 (900 kg cargo capacity), a very lightly armored 4x4 unique to the USMC, is abhorrent.<br /><br />For comparison, the 8x8 HEMTT M985A4 cargo truck (9,100 kg cargo capacity or) is about $500,000 - showing how little value the tax payer gets from the unending series of poorly conceived, and badly executed programs.<br /><br />No, a HEMTT is not going to fit in any light/medium lift aircraft, but it can keep up with tanks cross country, something the Growler cannot do, and do it while carrying 10x the load of an M1161.<br /><br />A HEMTT is a war winning logistics vehicle, a M1161 might contribute to one or two battles, but 99% of the time we would be better off with HEMTTs.<br /><br />If we could not design the V-22 to fit the HMMWV (JLTV will only substitute for about a third of the HMMWVs), then the Marines should have designed the V-22 to accommodate a light commercial pickup like the ~$40,000 Toyota Hilux or similar.<br /><br />The lack of foresight on everything V-22 related is appalling and the willingness to throw good money after bad for overspecialized vehicles is almost criminal. <br /><br />GAB<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-56505971946446916242018-05-24T07:52:14.039-07:002018-05-24T07:52:14.039-07:00"But we also need to spend money on the JV fi..."But we also need to spend money on the JV fight... You know, the conflicts we ACTUALLY fight day to day, year to year, decade to decade."<br /><br />You and I are so close to agreement.<br /><br />Regarding the JV conflicts that we seem to jump into at the drop of a puck (little hockey reference for you, there),<br /><br />1. Many/most of them we fight incorrectly. We bring odds and ends pieces of capability without any concrete plan to decisively win and end it. We need to either bring everything we have and DECISIVELY END IT in weeks, not screw around for years or we shouldn't be in it. ComNavOps: "In it to win it or don't get in it." How much bloodshed over how many years could we have avoided if we had decisively ended Desert Storm by continuing just a bit further and killed Hussein there and then? Of course, that leaves the issue of nation building which is another topic. How many lives, time, effort, and money could have been saved if we had ruthlessly crushed ISIS instead of trying to conduct a no-casualty war?<br /><br />2. We absolutely need a "peacetime" or "JV" force. I've written about a two tier peace/war force. The key is that the peace tier doesn't need V-22s, Super Hornet truck plinkers, etc. A greatly reduced capability force is adequate. Super Tucano type aircraft, for example. Commercial type helos for transport instead of a V-22. And so on. Anything you identify as "maybe not completely useful in a peer war" has no business in a peer war and is too expensive for the "peace" conflicts. We need a peace tier.<br /><br />3. More than equipment, we need the will to enter a "peace" conflict and end it without undue regard for casualties. If a "civilian" driver is driving an oil tanker for ISIS, he and it die and we'll be saving lives by not allowing more funding for ISIS to kill more people.<br /><br />"find a use for them"<br /><br />Find a use for them is not how you build a peer combat force. Unfortunately, we have way too many "find a use" assets: LCS, V-22, Zumwalt, UAVs, JLTV, etc.<br /><br />Setting the fun of arguing aside, I don't see that we disagree to any great extent.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-52634679093679446502018-05-24T07:31:30.722-07:002018-05-24T07:31:30.722-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-2123970120506645752018-05-24T06:24:39.375-07:002018-05-24T06:24:39.375-07:00"GD Flyer 60 appears to be a decent example o..."GD Flyer 60 appears to be a decent example of an internally transported vehicle for the V-22."<br /><br />To what purpose? The vehicle is essentially a jeep. It offers nothing on the the peer war battlefield where artillery will rule. <br /><br />In various comments, you have acknowledged that the aviation assault is a flawed concept. I agree. That being the case, why do we care about fitting a useless vehicle into the V-22?<br /><br />Sure, there's always the peacetime and anti-terror work to do but we can use any vehicle for that. Simple, small ATVs would be fine.<br /><br />This is the loss of focus that I've been preaching. We've forgotten what the military's primary responsibility is, which is to fight peer wars, while we dither about which jeep can best fit into a V-22 when neither the V-22 nor the jeep have much use in a peer war. We've lost our focus.<br /><br />The Army has had a mini-awakening with the realization that they might have to fight the Russians. Now, they're frantically scrambling to upgun everything. I note that they're not scrambling to get more jeeps. They're beginning to realize that they are woefully unprepared for peer combat.<br /><br />That is the premise of the post - that we're dropping firepower for information - not which useless vehicle will fit in a useless aircraft.<br /><br />"SOCOM bought 10 for use on CV-22s. Would be interesting to know what they think of them."<br /><br />Who cares what they think? They don't fight peer wars. They have a completely different set of responsibilities so their view of, and opinion of, the vehicle is meaningless. Again, this is the lack of proper focus.<br /><br />If we don't radically change our trends, the next peer war is going to see us throwing jeep infantry into artillery battlefields and they'll be slaughtered.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-63293512834321068412018-05-24T04:25:29.838-07:002018-05-24T04:25:29.838-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-60530244755385880032018-05-23T11:22:16.674-07:002018-05-23T11:22:16.674-07:00""If you can play with the varsity, you ...""If you can play with the varsity, you handle the JV with ease."<br /><br />This is historically not true."<br /><br />This is absolutely true. What is also true is that poor execution and stupidity can ruin any war plan.<br /><br />Vietnam was the poster child for poor execution and stupidity: sanctuaries for the enemy, off limits ports and resupply locations, off limits enemy air bases, etc. Had we fought the war as a war it would have been over in a matter of months. You know this so I can only assume you're arguing for the sake of argument.<br /><br />The Korean war was over until the Chinese opted in. Then we refused to commit to total war and end them. Again, stupidity. Again, you know this.<br /><br />Iraq/Afg were examples of stupidity and a desire to avoid casualties to anyone. That's not a war, that's police actions and stupidity. IED's should have been nothing more than a minor/non-existent annoyance if we had simply staked out the supply routes we wanted to use and then sanitized them by killing everyone who approached - you know, kind of like a war.<br /><br />Please don't continue this. It's beneath you. There are so many more important things to discuss.<br />ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-29325805005091959082018-05-23T08:30:12.743-07:002018-05-23T08:30:12.743-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-91154028066559124312018-05-23T08:15:21.371-07:002018-05-23T08:15:21.371-07:00"Ignore JV at your peril."
If you can p..."Ignore JV at your peril."<br /><br />If you can play with the varsity, you handle the JV with ease.<br /><br />You're being argumentative about nothing.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-75519034980811937672018-05-23T07:10:03.129-07:002018-05-23T07:10:03.129-07:00Seems to me the Marines have fallen in love with t...Seems to me the Marines have fallen in love with the fancy gadgets like the MV22&F35 resulting in cutting everything else as to artillery don't they use the towed M777 instead 9f the M109 and to the AD question they really need some kind of FAAD system maybe they should look at the Army is looking at with the Stryker variant that has Hellfire along with AA missiles some I've seen with the AIM 9X mounted Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com