tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post5369744040808959988..comments2024-03-19T04:54:36.782-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Light Or Heavy - Either Could WorkComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger70125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-64254074505037570512018-08-16T08:57:27.984-07:002018-08-16T08:57:27.984-07:00I guess they listened to you...ONR had issued an R...I guess they listened to you...ONR had issued an RFP for an Armored Recon Vehicle (ARV)to help "extend the reach of the Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) battalion". 8 vendors selected and now a follow on RFI to propose additional functionality (Source: ONR RFI Announcement # N00014-18-RFI-0010). Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-1442337987374205382018-01-02T16:21:22.156-08:002018-01-02T16:21:22.156-08:00"Should we be constructing an artillery-focus..."Should we be constructing an artillery-focused army rather than a tank-focused one?"<br /><br />I might not go that far, but I would argue for a substantially more indirect fire assets and MRL capable of delivering PGMs to long range.<br /><br />How much “more” indirect fire? I advocate adding a self-propelled mortar platoon (8 tubes) to every tank or Mech Infantry battalion, and believe every armored brigade should have 18 self-propelled howitzers, and 18 MRLs capable of firing podded rockets from 127mm/5”, 160mm, and 203mm (not HIMARS or M270 MLRS).<br /><br />You might want to look up Colonel Douglas MacGregor and his Recon Strike Group concepts. http://www.douglasmacgregor.com/<br />He reportedly advocated adding MLRS to ACR squadrons a couple of decades ago. I am not a true believer, but I like most of his ideas.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-4998441917475619532018-01-02T16:01:51.417-08:002018-01-02T16:01:51.417-08:00More thoughts on AFV fleet performance…
Mobility ...More thoughts on AFV fleet performance…<br /><br />Mobility is not determined by the first, or most agile vehicle to cross a given obstacle, but by the *last vehicle(s)* to cross the obstacle after the ground/bank/obstacle has been torn up by hundreds of vehicles that proceed it. These can often be the least capable vehicles (e.g. maintenance shop trucks). No commander is going to accept leaving a portion of his force stuck in frozen mud except in the most extreme circumstances. Note that relatively immobile vehicles can sometimes benefit from following more capable vehicles. Consider a fuel truck that cannot drive through deep snow, or pass through a forested area: If tanks knock down trees to create a path, or plow a road and compressed the snow – the trucks can follow.<br /><br />Also consider that "top speed" ratings for vehicles are almost irrelevant as an army moves at the speed of its slowest unit. <br /><br />An army cannot outrun its fuel and ammunition by much more than the operational range of its AFVs.<br /><br />The mobility of an army's trucks (logistics) impose more mobility constraints than the mobility constraints of AFVs. <br /><br />No one seems to care about fording rivers except the Russians: if your AFVs can cross a river, but your fuel trucks cannot, your column will stop until engineers create a ford for the river.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-57752966680111210782018-01-02T13:31:41.091-08:002018-01-02T13:31:41.091-08:00There is not a picture of, or reference to, an M1 ...There is not a picture of, or reference to, an M1 Abrams or any modern armored tank in the article you cited. Do not try to twist things to make it appear otherwise. Be clear, honest, and straightforward. You disputed my statement that tanks are, for practical purposes, immune to near misses by citing an old test on 1950s era M48 Patton tanks. You have offered no evidence, whatsoever, that a modern tank is routinely susceptible to destruction from near misses. Acknowledge it and move on.<br /><br />Trying to obfuscate the issue by noting that non-tank vehicles can be destroyed by artillery is utterly irrelevant since no claim to the contrary was made.<br /><br />There's nothing wrong with misstating something. Simply acknowledge it and move on. As you do so, try to further the discussion with comments relevant to the premise of the post.<br /><br />This snippet of discussion is ended.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-75896754401905244542018-01-02T13:12:39.668-08:002018-01-02T13:12:39.668-08:00It states clearly, "The second test was condu...It states clearly, "The second test was conducted over a period of seven months. It was designed to provide updated fragmentation data for modern armored fighting vehicles and tanks." <br /><br />Was an M48 a "modern tank" circa 1988? <br /><br />They do show a picture of a damaged Bradley as well.<br /><br />But whatever. <br /><br />M113s, Bradleys, HMMWVs and trucks compose the vast majority of vehicles in an ABCT. Lose them and you lose a combat-effective ABCT. Tanks won't just soldier on by themselves with no command vehicles and logistics. A strike on an HQ or convoy will render the unit a mission kill or out of gas.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-4658225430954105272018-01-02T12:39:33.263-08:002018-01-02T12:39:33.263-08:00Reread it yourself. Nothing in the article mentio...Reread it yourself. Nothing in the article mentions that testing was conducted on Abrams tanks and, in fact, the third test refers to Fig 3 which shows a damaged tank that is clearly not an Abrams. The tank shown has very small wheels and an open side without any skirt armor - as best I can tell, an M48. <br /><br />I repeat, either find some data or let it go.<br /><br />Regarding the number of M113/557s, that is utterly irrelevant as no one has claimed that they have any immunity to artillery.<br /><br />This, by the way, is exactly the kind of irrelevant, tedious argument that I detest. It has nothing to do with the premise of the post and simply wastes time.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-70384901073403517002018-01-02T12:25:33.966-08:002018-01-02T12:25:33.966-08:00Reread it.
They did a second test against modern ...Reread it.<br /><br />They did a second test against modern armored vehicles and a third test against a modern mechanized infantry team in a defensive position. All circa 1988-9, eight years after the M1 was fielded. <br /><br />And there are more M113/557s in an ABCT than M1s.<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-56277356995556665322018-01-02T10:56:20.987-08:002018-01-02T10:56:20.987-08:00The M1 Abrams is immune to near misses for all pra...The M1 Abrams is immune to near misses for all practical purposes. Could an occasional near miss with exactly the right set of circumstances disable a tank? Sure, but that's the unlikely case.<br /><br />Regarding the study you linked, did you read it? If so, you noted that the tests were conducted against M113, M557, and M48 tanks!!! The M48 Patton tank was built in the 1950's - hardly indicative of a modern armored tank!!! Likewise, the M113/557 were built in the 1960's and do not even remotely represent a modern armored tank.<br /><br />If the article you linked is your evidence, you need to go back and find something relevant. Find some data showing M1 Abrams subject to near miss destruction in any significant numbers.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-63587100224603297072018-01-02T10:14:27.194-08:002018-01-02T10:14:27.194-08:00Tanks are not immune to near misses. Fragments ca...Tanks are not immune to near misses. Fragments can cause significant damage. Read through the article I posted. <br /><br />Rear areas are prime targets for long-range, MLRS strikes. <br /><br />In front-line roles, JLTVs are replacing armored and unarmored HMMWVs. It's actually a net improvement in mobility and protection over what we have now.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-73438023052176649222018-01-02T09:19:27.226-08:002018-01-02T09:19:27.226-08:00"I mean that the concentration of PGMs and ot..."I mean that the concentration of PGMs and other weapons, combined with the costs of weapon systems will tend to force ever greater dispersion upon the battlefield."<br /><br />Given that firepower concentration is what matters and given the limited range of a tank's weapons, this might suggest that artillery is the preferred weapon of the modern battlefield - it is capable of long range, lethal, concentrated fires from multiple, dispersed locations, unlike tanks.<br /><br />Should we be constructing an artillery-focused army rather than a tank-focused one? The tanks, in such a construct, would become armored "spotters" for the artillery rather than primary fighters. I'm not a land combat expert so what do you think? Just mentally meandering, here, not really putting forth an actual proposal! Just following the logic.<br /><br />The Russian-Ukrainian combat experience, what I know of it, suggests that an artillery-focused army might, indeed, be effective.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-38770214417381631332018-01-02T08:24:39.654-08:002018-01-02T08:24:39.654-08:00"Tanks aren't immune to artillery."
..."Tanks aren't immune to artillery."<br /><br />No, but they are immune to all but a direct hit as opposed to a "jeep" which is susceptible to moderately near misses and simple shrapnel.<br /><br />"Even in heavy units, there are more trucks and HMMWVs than tanks."<br /><br />I don't know that that's true but I'll accept it for the moment. The point is that "jeeps" that are intended to run around the rear area are fine - they provide rapid and easy transport. The problem arises when the "jeep" becomes the front line vehicle as the Army/Marines have been pushing towards. They are not discussing the "jeep" as a rear area transport convenience; they're discussing the jeep as the front line vehicle and they're now trying to mount all manner of add-on weapons on them. A recipe for disaster.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-18966744346095056192018-01-02T07:53:57.937-08:002018-01-02T07:53:57.937-08:00Tanks aren't immune to artillery.
https://i...Tanks aren't immune to artillery. <br /><br />https://imgur.com/gallery/gIjCo<br /><br />Better a JLTV than an unarmored HMMWV. Even in heavy units, there are more trucks and HMMWVs than tanks. All are vulnerable to massed artillery and MLRS strikes.<br /><br />The Russian-Ukrainian conflict showed the need for robust and rapid counter-battery as well as counter-UAV capabilities. Improved C-RAM for mobile forces would be nice too.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-13994285626921618802018-01-02T07:35:02.036-08:002018-01-02T07:35:02.036-08:00"The caveat being that the days of concentrat..."The caveat being that the days of concentrating an armored corps are likely over."<br /><br />I mean that the concentration of PGMs and other weapons, combined with the costs of weapon systems will tend to force ever greater dispersion upon the battlefield.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-783942710780179342018-01-02T07:27:10.733-08:002018-01-02T07:27:10.733-08:00"What would be an example of a fleet characte..."What would be an example of a fleet characteristic that would not be readily apparent in an individual specification?"<br /><br />Human factors (ride quality/crew position comfort): specifically the degree (time) to which the crew can continue to advance in and fight their vehicle. Tracked vehicles are enormously fatiguing to operate/ride in due to vibration, and poorly designed or cramped crew stations hamper the ability of armored columns to strike deeply into the enemy formations (corps, army, and beyond). Movement warfare is really a race against time: a race to break through a line before local reserves can be called up, and a race to break through the enemy decision loop at successive levels of command. Stopping, whether caused by enemy action, logistics depletion, or crew exhaustion, basically tends to reset the clock to static (attrition warfare) as lines reform. The WWII German army (Heer) armored formations tried to assign two crews per tank, which enabled them to extend operations by swapping crews during breaks to refuel or rearm – an organizational solution instead of a technological solution.<br /><br />Another example:<br /><br />Operational range: I am not talking about fuel consumption, although it is a factor, but rather the unrefueled range of a tank. Even though it has the worst fuel consumption of any vehicle in an army; in armored formations the tanks are not the biggest consumers of fuel. Far more important is the ability of a tank to extend operations without demanding a logistics halt. Fan boys laud the King Tiger tank for its many technological wonders, but in many ways, the ridiculously short operational range of ~70-110 miles seriously hampered its utility in exploiting break through. (see: Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II by Christopher W. Wilbeck with the intro by the tank ace Otto Carius).<br /><br />A final example:<br /><br />Power plant characteristics: much derision has been heaped upon the M1 Abrams for its ridiculously thirsty Honeywell AGT1500 gas turbine and other annoying traits (e.g. exhaust temperature), but critics almost never acknowledge several advantages, that admittedly may, or may not win the argument, but are useful points of discussion:<br /><br />1. The gas turbine is more compact and weighs about half the weight of an equivalent diesel power plant of that era, leaving almost 1.25 tons of usable weight – a very great deal for a tank designer to play with.<br />2. Fuel consumption: much has been said about the thirst of a gas turbine at partial throttle settings, but at full throttle operations in open terrain, the basic thermodynamics and stochastic ratios governing energy extraction from fuel hold, and the differences between fuel consumption in a diesel and gas turbine are more comparable. <br />3. The depot maintenance interval for the gas turbine is almost twice that of an equivalent diesel power plant of that era, a key logistics factor for expeditionary forces.<br />4. A gas turbine can be shut down allowed to freeze to -58 °F (-50 °C) or lower and restarted with no worries (assuming the fuel does not freeze) – a diesel engine will not tolerate nearly the same level of abuse. If you plan to operate in northern/eastern Europe, or in Alaska, this could be critical, and the cost of running diesel power plants continuously to avoid freezing may erase any advantages in fuel consumption.<br /><br />I am not trying to pick a fight, but point out that tradeoffs are not quite as obvious, depending on your point of view. The Swedish (Stridsvagn 103 (strv 103)) and Russian (T-80) gas turbine powered AFVs were not accidents, or knee jerk reactions.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-89588012563718570872018-01-01T08:50:35.505-08:002018-01-01T08:50:35.505-08:00"The caveat being that the days of concentrat..."The caveat being that the days of concentrating an armored corps are likely over."<br /><br />What do you mean by that? Are you referring to the susceptibility of concentration to artillery and air power? Or something else?<br /><br />I see concentration being not a physical location phenomenon but a fires phenomenon. For example, the shoulder-to-shoulder riflemen of the 1700's were concentrated physically in order to concentrate their firepower on a given target. If they had spread out, the limited range/accuracy of their muskets would have destroyed their concentration of fire. Once the machine gun appeared, the physical concentration could be spread out while still maintaining a concentration of fire. With modern missiles and artillery, physical concentration is not required to achieve concentration of fire.<br /><br />Thus, side-by-side tanks are not required to achieve massed fire by tanks (even more so if the tanks are considered to be frontal fire control nodes for artillery!). So, I don't see that concentration of armored fires are a thing of the past. Perhaps (quite likely?) I'm missing your point?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-73469226354654985852018-01-01T08:43:07.529-08:002018-01-01T08:43:07.529-08:00"tanks vehicle qualities are relevant only wh..."tanks vehicle qualities are relevant only when defined in fleet terms, because tanks are designed to support operations en masse."<br /><br />Absolutely fascinating. What would be an example of a fleet characteristic that would not be readily apparent in an individual specification?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-76441512183864251452018-01-01T05:06:15.649-08:002018-01-01T05:06:15.649-08:00"It is the transportability and rough terrain..."It is the transportability and rough terrain maneuverability that define a medium weight tank in practical terms."<br /><br />Anyone who has seen the T-90 and other Russian designs perform in the field has to conclude that the Russian MBTs have a distinct edge in mobility compared to western MBT designs.<br /><br />Also, individual AFV comparisons are as of little consequence as comparing a Roman legionnaire to a German tribesman - tanks vehicle qualities are relevant only when defined in fleet terms, because tanks are designed to support operations en masse.<br /><br />A lot of hidden qualities and hidden defects come to light when we start looking at groups, fleets, and systems instead of individual items. The caveat being that the days of concentrating an armored corps are likely over.<br /><br />GAB Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-66506755628598695082018-01-01T04:40:39.084-08:002018-01-01T04:40:39.084-08:00CNO,
Too much emphasis is put on specific systems...CNO,<br /><br />Too much emphasis is put on specific systems, endless "tracks versus wheels" debates, and spectacular simplifications of deep operational theory.<br /><br />These considerations should drive the theory=>strategy=>organization=>acquisition chain; but they do not have much effect.<br /><br />Land forces need to return to true strategic operations considerations: works from theorists like JFC Fuller and Tukhachevsky need to be dusted off and re-evaluated.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-39092476298081606532017-12-31T15:04:39.155-08:002017-12-31T15:04:39.155-08:00There are some serious problems with pre-positioni...There are some serious problems with pre-positioning.<br /><br />1. Pre-positioned storage presents a concentrated, tempting, and completely vulnerable target. Imagine China hitting our MPS ships at the outset of a war. We'd lose huge quantities of equipment in a heartbeat. <br /><br />2. Pre-positioning only helps if the equipment can be moved to the battlefield. In the case of MPS ships, the same problem applies as with amphibious assault - how to get heavy equipment ashore someplace useful without a port. If we need a port, then we limit the flexibility and usefulness of the pre-positioning.<br /><br />Air transport, no matter how we redesign and improve it, can still only transport a fraction of the necessary material. We need ships which means we must have access to safe ports for unloading. I've stated many times that I think a core (maybe THE core?) capability of the Marines should be port seizure/repair/defense. Without a port we cannot sustain a high intensity war on foreign soil. <br /><br />Recall the Gulf War/Desert Storm. Without access to the ports, we would have been unable to build up the necessary mass of equipment and supplies. Had Sadaam somehow destroyed the port facilties we used, we would have had a hard time even starting the combat phase!<br /><br />Consider Russian Special Ops forces and/or cruise missiles and the concept of pre-positioning in Europe. Those pre-positioned supply sites would be a huge target! That doesn't mean they wouldn't be useful and viable, just that we need to give some thought to undefended storage areas and how we can protect them.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-24925238198007662642017-12-31T13:17:01.367-08:002017-12-31T13:17:01.367-08:00Making meaningful transportation throughput improv...Making meaningful transportation throughput improvements is difficult, and highly sensitive to local infrastructure.<br /><br />There is a third approach to rapid deployment that works better than your other three, assuming you have some foreknowledge of where you will fight: pre-positioning hardware. (e.g. Reforger, MPS ships)<br /><br />Flying people is much easier and faster than flying or moving equipment. <br /><br /> Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-1172791707121787422017-12-31T09:54:27.758-08:002017-12-31T09:54:27.758-08:00Happy New Year to you and yours!Happy New Year to you and yours!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-59172770567030763102017-12-31T07:29:06.309-08:002017-12-31T07:29:06.309-08:00CNO
Happy New Year and thanks for your time and ef...CNO<br />Happy New Year and thanks for your time and effort for the best analysis/blog on the US Navy.Nickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12567148391327455726noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-79550414374057544152017-12-30T16:29:42.216-08:002017-12-30T16:29:42.216-08:00"Light IFVs look like death traps."
Yes..."Light IFVs look like death traps."<br /><br />Yes, and the Army's pursuit of glorified jeeps, the JLTV, to roam around the battlefield in will result in soldiers being utterly wiped out when faced with artillery.<br /><br />The Russian-Ukrainian example contains many lessons for us and, sadly, we are failing to heed most of them.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-55659940869054495552017-12-30T15:58:25.637-08:002017-12-30T15:58:25.637-08:00Recent Ukraine experience where the Russians wiped...Recent Ukraine experience where the Russians wiped out a Ukrainian armoured column with the Russian queen of the battlefield artillery, tube and rockets, with the thermobaric munitions.<br /><br />Light IFVs look like death traps.<br />Nickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12567148391327455726noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-81082605962245875402017-12-30T14:21:20.328-08:002017-12-30T14:21:20.328-08:00The U.S. has lots of old M1's. Are you sugges...The U.S. has lots of old M1's. Are you suggesting that we convert them into HAPC's?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com