tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post3709888397592362864..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: The Commandant's ASW PodcastComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger184125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-49336773971431276962020-12-29T19:13:11.031-08:002020-12-29T19:13:11.031-08:00@CDR Chip: "I am trying to balance what can b...@CDR Chip: "I am trying to balance what can be carried on a PhibRon/ARG versus what is needed to do the job ashore."<br />+++++++++++++++++++++++<br />The force needs to be the size it needs to be, and the ability to operate for up to 3-5 days on organic sustainment is a critical. ‘Depth of penetration’ is very arbitrary way to delineate service boundaries. <br /><br />Brigades of 5-6,000 motorized/mechanized infantry is pretty much the standard around the world, for a reason – it provides the right balance of firepower, level of command, logistics, and mobility.<br /><br />Light infantry regiments have zero prospect of stopping a Russian, North Korean, or Chinese motor rifle brigade (mechanized infantry); and that is exactly the type of force we will face in a peer combat. <br /><br />Light infantry poses comparatively little combat power, little mobility, little sustainment, but are easy to destroy, bypass, or ignore, by combined arms forces.<br /><br />In terms of high intensity combat, infantry forces can expect to lose 1,000+ KIA per day plus 2-3x that wounded.<br /><br />GAB<br />GABhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07580029460978121408noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-39288178889153800472020-12-29T09:01:29.819-08:002020-12-29T09:01:29.819-08:00"1) The doctrinal MEB is already based around..."1) The doctrinal MEB is already based around an infantry regiment, I do not think that you can shrink the personnel package much and keep aviation.<br />2) I want my brigade to move 500-600 km as actual distance travelled – this has nothing to do with unit frontages. Existing AFVs like the Puma IFV can already exceed this under ideal circumstances. <br />3) My concern is the brigade be able to operate that 3-5 days for example to roll up the flank of an enemy landing force. In a high intensity war, a brigade is likely to be destroyed in that 3-5 days, but if it breaks up an enemy landing, or enables a major river crossing, or even serves as a reserve in being, it will have done its job."<br /><br />1) I am trying to balance what can be carried on a PhibRon/ARG versus what is needed to do the job ashore. Right now they are looking at an MEU of about 2200. I'm going to 3200, with air included in the increment. And my idea of Marine air is transport helos to get Marines ashore, and attack helos and fixed-wing aircraft for CAS. If the Marines need a bigger organization, then either they need a bigger PhibRon/ARG or they need two or more PhibRons/ARGs. I admittedly don't have access to all the data needed to work it out, but am starting with a proposal to be fleshed out.<br />2) If I understand correctly, you are thinking in terms of penetrating much deeper than I am. My Marine concept operates from the beach to 50-100 miles (80-150 km) inland. Pushing further is an Army mission.<br />3) I'm not contemplating a Normandy-style amphibious assault on the Russian or Chinese mainland. I think either would be foolhardy, and like Normandy an Army show if we dared attempt it. I'm thinking more in terms of actions to capture/recapture an island in the first island chain or the eastern Med or the Baltic, or somewhere in the Arabian/Persian Gulf, or port seizure or destruction efforts against Chinese ports established in South Asia or Africa. These efforts would be mostly outside the reach of current Chinese A2/AD. I would not venture much inside that envelope until those A2/AD systems were significantly impaired.<br /><br />CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-55077145672136720102020-12-28T20:35:10.852-08:002020-12-28T20:35:10.852-08:00@CDR Chip
1) The doctrinal MEB is already based ...@CDR Chip <br /><br />1) The doctrinal MEB is already based around an infantry regiment, I do not think that you can shrink the personnel package much and keep aviation.<br />2) I want my brigade to move 500-600 km as actual distance travelled – this has nothing to do with unit frontages. Existing AFVs like the Puma IFV can already exceed this under ideal circumstances. <br />3) My concern is the brigade be able to operate that 3-5 days for example to roll up the flank of an enemy landing force. In a high intensity war, a brigade is likely to be destroyed in that 3-5 days, but if it breaks up an enemy landing, or enables a major river crossing, or even serves as a reserve in being, it will have done its job.<br /><br />GABGABhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07580029460978121408noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-90632086736974758192020-12-28T13:28:19.823-08:002020-12-28T13:28:19.823-08:00"@ComNavOps: “Any scenario where we need a po..."@ComNavOps: “Any scenario where we need a port in an unfriendly area.”<br />++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++<br />If we and our allies lose Taipei, or Seoul, or Hokkaido, or Warsaw, etc. – do you think there is national will to mobilize, and build up forces to reinvade?<br />I am highly skeptical.<br />In any event, you will need to land a combined arms force like the CAR, preferably better, in order to conduct any sort of forced entry. The Corps itself came to this conclusion after WWII, and then again in 1995. <br />GAB"<br /><br />I think the more likely location would be one or more of the ports that China has built or is building around South Asia, Africa, and possibly South America. China needs those ports to be anything approaching a blue-water navy.CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-20839005681985917862020-12-28T12:17:35.163-08:002020-12-28T12:17:35.163-08:00"combined arms force"
Maybe someone nee..."combined arms force"<br /><br />Maybe someone needs to write a post about a Marine Corps version of a combined arms force? Someone … could be anyone ...ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-471250544886342792020-12-28T11:43:20.631-08:002020-12-28T11:43:20.631-08:00@ComNavOps: “Any scenario where we need a port in ...@ComNavOps: “Any scenario where we need a port in an unfriendly area.”<br /><br />++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++<br />If we and our allies lose Taipei, or Seoul, or Hokkaido, or Warsaw, etc. – do you think there is national will to mobilize, and build up forces to reinvade?<br /><br />I am highly skeptical.<br /><br />In any event, you will need to land a combined arms force like the CAR, preferably better, in order to conduct any sort of forced entry. The Corps itself came to this conclusion after WWII, and then again in 1995. <br /><br />GAB<br />GABhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07580029460978121408noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-15349969790867187642020-12-28T11:39:04.875-08:002020-12-28T11:39:04.875-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.GABhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07580029460978121408noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-58585775242663773092020-12-28T10:53:19.776-08:002020-12-28T10:53:19.776-08:00"can cover 500-600 km"
GAB, question: H..."can cover 500-600 km"<br /><br />GAB, question: How are you measuring 500-600 km? Laterally across a front, or in depth of advance.<br /><br />If you're talking about a 500-600 km wide front, I don't think a 5000-6000 strong brigade is nearly enough. If you're talking about advancing 500-600 km deep, then you're talking about something way beyond te scope of the organization I have in mind.CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-46536663060207928432020-12-28T10:33:02.982-08:002020-12-28T10:33:02.982-08:00"what scenario calls for U.S. forces to seize..."what scenario calls for U.S. forces to seize a foreign port?"<br /><br />Any scenario where we need a port in an unfriendly area.<br /><br />Example: Recapturing ports in the Philippines if China were to invade.<br /><br />Example: Taiwan ports when China invades.<br /><br />Example: Ports along the NKorean coast.<br /><br />Example: Ports in Africa to counter Chinese armed actions.<br /><br />Example: Sri Lanka, to seize the Chinese leased port of Hambantota.<br /><br />Example: Seizing a SAmerican port in the event of a coup.<br /><br />Example: Seizing a port in Crimea or along the adjacent Russian coast to support Ukraine and/or Nato<br /><br />Example: Seizing ports in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc. in response to Chinese seizures or those countries siding with China in a war.<br /><br />Example: (historical) Seizing a port in Kuwait if Hussein had advanced to the coast.<br /><br />And so on.<br /><br />Army port operations, after seizure, is a different task from seizing and securing.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-64798656932627603432020-12-28T09:49:17.862-08:002020-12-28T09:49:17.862-08:00@ComNavOps: “…Entry into a port (my candidate for ...@ComNavOps: “…Entry into a port (my candidate for the core mission)…”<br />+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++<br />Our national strategy calls for us to support allied nations (NATO, Japan, SKorea, etc.) - what scenario calls for U.S. forces to seize a foreign port? <br /><br />And almost every port is in a city.<br /><br />Port operations capability resides in the US Army (they call it Terminal Operations) as they will run all ashore logistics operations, TRANSCOM, and USSCOM (AFSOC Combat Controllers are FAA certified air traffic controllers).<br /><br />GABGABhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07580029460978121408noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-47038243577455407442020-12-28T07:32:51.967-08:002020-12-28T07:32:51.967-08:00I tend to think of it in these terms:
Army is res...I tend to think of it in these terms:<br /><br />Army is responsible for large-scale continental overland warfare.<br />Navy is responsible for surface, subsurface, and air operations at sea.<br />Air Force is responsible for strategic and tactical overland air operations, and backup to Navy air at sea.<br />Marines are responsible for operations in the land-sea interface, say up to 50-100 miles inland. <br /><br />This gets the Marines out of some things they are now doing, like "baby army" inland presence/occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan and "Navy's Army's Air Force" air superiority and long range air attack. Within that geographic focus, they may have anything from assaults down to commando raids. That is the classic purview of naval infantry, including assaults, port seizures, strikes, raids, demonstrations, and humanitarian assistance. Marines return to a, "get in, get done, and get out," orientation.<br /><br />Navy would build new PhibRons/ARGs consisting of smaller (but more capable than LAWs) and more versatile ships that can be risked in harm's way. The force would consist of CAR Marine Expeditionary Regiments (MERs) loaded on ARGs and commando forces that may be in a mix of ARGs, other Navy ships, shore bases, and elsewhere. Eventually, all Marines E-5 or above would be commando qualified, and the Marines would gravitate toward a "meanest fighters in the world" ethos.<br /><br />With this emphasis, I would propose about a 25% reduction in active Marine headcount, generally along the lines of 96,000 Fleet Marines (10 MERs of 3200 each, with a 3:1 employment ratio), up to 30,000 commandos, and 15,000-25,000 training and admin personnel, total 141,000-151,000. I would propose offsetting increases to reserve headcount.<br /><br />On the aviation side, Marine F/A-18s would join Navy CVWs, who badly need the numbers. What Marines need is a "Marine A-10," a carrier based (preferably STOVL) close air support platform. As the new PhibRons come online, the Navy would transfer LHAs/LHDs to "Lightning Carriers" as interim members of 2-carrier CVBGs, until such time as conventional CVs can be constructed (probably to enter the fleet about the time the Lightning Carrier service lives expire). The ultimate (30-40 year) objective would be 12 2-carrier CVBGs, each consisting of a Nimitz-type CVN and a Kitty Hawk-type CV, with 2 CVBGs forming 4-carrier CTFs.<br /><br />Also, as the new amphibs come into the fleet, the San Antonios would be converted to the ABM/BMD ships proposed by HII on the same hulls.<br /><br />I hope this ties my thinking together in a coherent whole. I don't really know how to be more direct than that. I am fine shutting this discussion down at this point. I am certain the topic will come up in future treads, and I would like to discuss my ideas in terms of these specifics at that time.CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-46470163022615987432020-12-28T06:19:26.388-08:002020-12-28T06:19:26.388-08:00"If you see any role for marines in ground co..."If you see any role for marines in ground combat operations then there is a utility for the CAR,"<br /><br />Granted. BUT, do I see a significant ground combat role? And if I do, under what circumstances? Just 'from the sea'? Or, are they deployed overland just like the Army - which leads to asking why have an organization that duplicates the Army?<br /><br />People list various tasks like river crossing or defense of naval bases or commando raids and those are nice capabilities to have but they do not constitute the singular core mission of the Marines. Or, if they do, then the Marines need to be downsized significantly.<br /><br />Forced entry could be a candidate singular core mission but it leads to the question, entry into what and from where? Entry across a beach? Entry into a port (my candidate for the core mission)? Entry into a city (suicidal and no need)? Entry into an air base (the Army already does that)? Only from the sea or overland, too?<br /><br />Everyone loves the Marines but right now no one, including the Marines themselves, seem to have a handle on what their core mission is.<br /><br />Returning to the CAR and ground combat, one would certainly think that some aspect of a Marine core mission would involve ground combat but what mission would that be?<br /><br />Once upon a time, after WWII, the core mission was assault from the sea but the advent of large transport aircraft has lessened the need for that, the strategic picture has changed resulting in a reduced need for that, and the Marines, themselves, have categorically stated that they are out of the iconic amphibious assault business. So, again, what core mission does that leave?<br /><br />There has also been a sort of semi-stated core mission of being the first combat responders in a crisis but, again, with readily available air transport of Army units, that capability has lessened in importance.<br /><br />The Commandant, whatever I might think of his concept, has a very clear idea of what he thinks the core mission is which is to directly support the Navy from the land by sinking ships and subs. <br /><br />I don't want to belabor the point but any discussion of the Marines has to begin with a clear understanding of what their core mission, their reason for existence, is.<br /><br />As I see it, the core mission is port seizure. They can take on a few other side tasks, if they wish (defending naval bases, for example) but the core mission is port seizure.<br /><br />What do you think the singular, core mission is? Not a task list, but the single reason for existence?<br />ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-20457653435190182342020-12-27T19:45:02.970-08:002020-12-27T19:45:02.970-08:00@ComNavOps: "So, I see a CAR as being attract...@ComNavOps: "So, I see a CAR as being attractive in the abstract but I'm struggling to see the connection to the Marines because I'm not seeing the Marine core mission anymore." et al.<br /><br />+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++<br /><br />If you see any role for marines in ground combat operations then there is a utility for the CAR, both as proposed in 1995, and the motorized/mech infantry brigades I envision.<br /><br />I see great utility in elements of the CAR (LAV based motorized infantry) serving as a true reaction force for major naval installations.<br /><br />I do not see a significant conflict with the Army over a USMC mech infantry brigade that is structured to conduct forced entry, and major river crossings. Such a force, heavy in armored combat engineers, heavy dismount strength, and training in forced entry, could easily operate alongside the USA for specific operations and provide key capabilities that the Army does not have expertise in, or force structure for.<br /><br />The Army certainly could absorb the USMC. The Army could also re-absorb the USAF, after all it was the U.S. Army Air Corps in WW2. And since both the Spartan, and Roman armies operated ships and waged naval wars, the Army could also absorb the Navy. And since Wernher von Braun’s team under the USA provided the backbone of NASA during the space race, I suppose they the Army could run all civilian and military space operations as well. <br /><br />These are just different organization concepts, there is always more than one way to skin a cat.<br /><br />GAB<br />GABhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07580029460978121408noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-89680934519136075422020-12-27T18:04:20.280-08:002020-12-27T18:04:20.280-08:00Naval infantry may not be quite specific enough fo...Naval infantry may not be quite specific enough for you, but it is a well defined term that excludes a lot of the stuff Marines have gotten into over the last 50 or so years. It may not be focused enough for you, but it's a heck of a lot more focused than where they are now.<br />CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-85505748849601929862020-12-27T17:39:48.736-08:002020-12-27T17:39:48.736-08:00"You're all over the map! CAR is tanks, a..."You're all over the map! CAR is tanks, artillery, IFV/AFV, etc. It's armored and mechanized. That's about as far from your commando proposal as you can get!<br />I'm really lost as to what you want the Marines to be other than EVERYTHING. Pick a lane - and no, 'naval infantry' is not a lane. It's not a core mission. It's a generic and vague organizational descriptor.<br />I think I'll have to drop out of this until you come up with a single core mission that isn't EVERYTHING."<br /><br />Actually I've been quite specific, but I think you start writing your response before bothering to read or fully comprehend what I am saying. I'm happy with dropping this, because it obviously isn't getting anywhere.<br /><br />I will try to lay it out one more time. IMO the Marines have lost the plot because 1) in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, they've been employed as baby army rather than naval infantry; 2) in going to the LHA/LHD platforms, the Navy really eliminated the amphibious assault mission; and 3) in this context, Marine air has done their own thing by becoming the "Navy's Army's Air Force" instead of focusing on helping get Marines ashore and supporting them ashore with close air support (CAS).<br /><br />So I want to refocus the Marines on the naval infantry mission. Become the army from the sea, as opposed to the army from the land (Army) and the Army from the air (Airborne and Air Force). Based on what other countries do (and what we used to do), that mission appears to have two components that draw on similar skill sets--amphibious assault and commando operations.<br /><br />For the amphibious operations, I think the Navy needs to restructure the ARG, and the Marines need to restructure into what I will call a combined arms regiment--infantry, tanks, artillery, amphibious armor, logistics, and an air assault/CAS air wing--that the CAR and ARG need to be sized together. I've looked at about 3200 Marines per CAR/ARG, 10 of them would be 32,000, and a 3:1 rotation would make 96,000.<br /><br />On the commando side, Royal Marine commandos are about 8,000 and Dutch commandos are about 5,000, and I think we want something bigger than that, so I came up with 30,000 as a working number.<br /><br />96,000 Fleet Marines and 30,000 Marine commandos would be 126,000, plus 15,000-25,000 for training and admin produces a USMC of 141,000-151,000. That's a 25% reduction in the current Corps because I am focusing strictly on naval infantry--infantry from the sea.<br /><br />I would expect every Marine E-5 and above would become commando qualified, and would rotate between commando and Fleet Marine forces. The goal would be to recreate the few, the proud, mentality and provide a fitting force second to none.<br /><br />Littoral missions would range from commando raids to full-fledged assaults, with appropriate personnel chosen for particular missions.<br /><br />CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-84131871924366559332020-12-27T15:54:04.335-08:002020-12-27T15:54:04.335-08:00"No, which is why the CAR appeals."
You..."No, which is why the CAR appeals."<br /><br />You're all over the map! CAR is tanks, artillery, IFV/AFV, etc. It's armored and mechanized. That's about as far from your commando proposal as you can get!<br /><br />I'm really lost as to what you want the Marines to be other than EVERYTHING. Pick a lane - and no, 'naval infantry' is not a lane. It's not a core mission. It's a generic and vague organizational descriptor.<br /><br />I think I'll have to drop out of this until you come up with a single core mission that isn't EVERYTHING.<br /><br />ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-36365560920547213242020-12-27T14:26:43.726-08:002020-12-27T14:26:43.726-08:00"You know what the RM can't do? They can&..."You know what the RM can't do? They can't fight a war. As far as I know, they have no armor, no modern artillery, no armored personnel carriers, no IFV/AFV, and their heaviest vehicle is an all-terrain 'jeep'.<br />Do we really want to follow that model?"<br /><br />No, which is why the CAR appeals.CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-3509941247097379802020-12-27T14:26:08.703-08:002020-12-27T14:26:08.703-08:00"A regiment is too small, especially with avi..."A regiment is too small, especially with aviation, and it adds an unnecessary O-6 billet: the target should be a 5-6,000-man brigade sized force; a matrixed combined arms organization that fights as 2-3 task forces/battlegroups/kampfgruppes (led by O-5s); can cover 500-600 km, and operate for 3-5 days without resupply. <br />About three (3) of these brigades would be organized under a small corps. <br />And yes, the tanks can come from the Army."<br /><br />If you organize like the Army, you're right. But I'm thinking of the Marines as a different type of organization. And my concept of aviation is helos, maybe V-22s, to transport troops and light equipment, and attack helos and a "Marine A-10" to provide CAS. Having their command unified with the infantry, tank, artillery, and amphib armor commands at the regimental level should facilitate much closer cooperation than the Army sometimes gets with the Air Force.<br /><br />As far as the tanks coming from the Army, maybe, but that starts to get complicated from a command perspective. And I've never been a huge fan of the Abrams. I think something like a Leopard might be more appropriate for Marine purposes. CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-82853657372790287272020-12-27T14:19:17.599-08:002020-12-27T14:19:17.599-08:00“How does a CAR (even properly implemented) suppor...“How does a CAR (even properly implemented) support the core Marine mission - whatever that is? A CAR, or any other combat unit/organization is just a tool - a means to an end - the end being the achievement of the [core] mission.”<br /><br />Exactly. It’s a tool, not a mission. But I think it can be a very useful tool. You may think not. You’re entitled to.<br /><br />“The Army has (or has the same potential as the Marines) combined arms units, don't they? If we need CARs, the Army can, presumably, supply more - and better? - of them. So, how does a Marine CAR fit into our overall United States military force? This is another way of asking what you see as the Marine core mission?”<br /><br />But Army doesn’t get combined arms until you get to a much larger unit. The unique thing the Marines bring is the ability to combine arms at a lower level, and that creates some unique capabilities for small units in places like the first island chain, the Arabian/Persian Gulf, the eastern Med, and the Baltic. <br /><br />“If the core mission is amphibious assaults, I can see lots of problems with trying to get a CAR ashore in the proper order to take advantage of the CAR capabilities.”<br /><br />Since we’ve never done it before, obviously. We don’t even know how to stack stuff on the transports because we don’t know what needs to come off first. Do a few and figure it out. That’s how we mastered assault in WWII, so do it again.<br /><br />“If the core mission is commando raids as CDR Chip suggests, a CAR is not appropriate.”<br /><br />Don’t misquote me. I suggest that it’s a component of the naval infantry mission, but not the core mission, so no further comment.<br /><br />“If the core mission is port seizure, as I've suggested it ought to be, a CAR would have to be heavily modified to be useful.”<br /><br />For one thing, you’d have to bring along a SeaBee unit of some size to get the port back into shape and working ASAP. That would require additional transport(s). But the CAR would be a formidable force to start the job with.<br /><br />“If the core mission is to fight land battles via overland delivery, we already have an Army to do that.”<br /><br />That is the Army’s mission, and the less the Marines have to do with it the better.<br /><br />“If the core mission is shooting missiles at passing ships from platoon size units hidden on islands, the CAR is useless.”<br /><br />So is everything else, because EABO anti-surface is a stupid mission, just like EABO ASW.<br /><br />“So, I see a CAR as being attractive in the abstract but I'm struggling to see the connection to the Marines because I'm not seeing the Marine core mission anymore.”<br /><br />The Marine core mission is to be naval infantry. That includes several related task areas, just as any military organization has. Two of them are not being the Army’s caddie or the “Navy’s Army’s Air Force.” There are several naval infantry functions, and concentrating on them narrows the focus quite a bit.<br /><br />“So, what do you see as the Marine core mission and how does the CAR support that?”<br /><br />Naval infantry, just as it was for the first 200 or so years of the republic’s existence. And just as the Brits and Dutch see it, albeit with smaller forces to go with their overall smaller militaries. Be the force that carries out coastal and littoral missions from the sea. Those missions may differ in detail, and require different organizational components, but the ship-to-shore skill sets are common across them. And the CAR would have all the skill sets that any of them need. Let the separation from the Army be geographically based—Army marches them in, Airborne flies them in, Marines come ashore from the sea. Unless we go to war with Canada or Mexico, we’re going to have to fly them in or sail them in. Sometimes you may need one, sometimes you may need two, sometimes you may need all three. <br /><br />I tend to wonder if maybe it’s been so long since the Marines have been Marines that we’ve forgotten what that looks like.<br />CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-26293219630464216602020-12-27T13:10:26.557-08:002020-12-27T13:10:26.557-08:00"Western Allied planning required the seizure..."Western Allied planning required the seizure of Antwerp to sustain sufficient armies to defeat and occupy Germany. Cherburg was a critical first step, but Antwerp moved more supplies to allied armies than all of the other ports combined from D-Day to VE day, even though Antwerp was opened at the end of November 1944."<br /><br />Yes, but we had to have Cherbourg and LeHavre before we could take Antwerp.CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-11386295394825610822020-12-27T13:05:58.150-08:002020-12-27T13:05:58.150-08:00@CDR Chip: “GAB, these issues all strike me as thi...@CDR Chip: “GAB, these issues all strike me as things that could have been worked out over time, and had they been properly sorted the result would have been a very capable regiment-sized force.”<br /><br />+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++<br /><br />A regiment is too small, especially with aviation, and it adds an unnecessary O-6 billet: the target should be a 5-6,000-man brigade sized force; a matrixed combined arms organization that fights as 2-3 task forces/battlegroups/kampfgruppes (led by O-5s); can cover 500-600 km, and operate for 3-5 days without resupply. <br /><br />About three (3) of these brigades would be organized under a small corps. <br /><br />And yes, the tanks can come from the Army.<br /><br />GAB<br />GABhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07580029460978121408noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-73391538748148080412020-12-27T12:58:31.104-08:002020-12-27T12:58:31.104-08:00"The Brits and the Dutch have their Marines t..."The Brits and the Dutch have their Marines trained to do all those things."<br /><br />You know what the RM can't do? They can't fight a war. As far as I know, they have no armor, no modern artillery, no armored personnel carriers, no IFV/AFV, and their heaviest vehicle is an all-terrain 'jeep'.<br /><br />Do we really want to follow that model?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-40389099243802021192020-12-27T12:50:33.026-08:002020-12-27T12:50:33.026-08:00"Combined Arms Regiment (CAR)"
How does..."Combined Arms Regiment (CAR)"<br /><br />How does a CAR (even properly implemented) support the core Marine mission - whatever that is? A CAR, or any other combat unit/organization is just a tool - a means to an end - the end being the achievement of the [core] mission.<br /><br />The Army has (or has the same potential as the Marines) combined arms units, don't they? If we need CARs, the Army can, presumably, supply more - and better? - of them. So, how does a Marine CAR fit into our overall United States military force? This is another way of asking what you see as the Marine core mission?<br /><br />If the core mission is amphibious assaults, I can see lots of problems with trying to get a CAR ashore in the proper order to take advantage of the CAR capabilities.<br /><br />If the core mission is commando raids as CDR Chip suggests, a CAR is not appropriate.<br /><br />If the core mission is port seizure, as I've suggested it ought to be, a CAR would have to be heavily modified to be useful.<br /><br />If the core mission is to fight land battles via overland delivery, we already have an Army to do that.<br /><br />If the core mission is shooting missiles at passing ships from platoon size units hidden on islands, the CAR is useless.<br /><br />So, I see a CAR as being attractive in the abstract but I'm struggling to see the connection to the Marines because I'm not seeing the Marine core mission anymore.<br /><br />So, what do you see as the Marine core mission and how does the CAR support that?<br />ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-91699483567839966952020-12-27T12:03:54.693-08:002020-12-27T12:03:54.693-08:00"In spite of the issues, the CAR represented ..."In spite of the issues, the CAR represented a great experimental formation the potential to be a true combined arms force."<br /><br />GAB, these issues all strike me as things that could have been worked out over time, and had they been properly sorted the result would have been a very capable regiment-sized force. In particular, I think 3), 4), and 5) could have been corrected organizationally. And with 3200 personnel plus logistics support shipping, there is room for a fairly capable logistics function. As far as air, I'm conceptually cutting Marine air back to air/airborne assault and CAS, and having those commands down at regimental level should be exploited to develop some very much more effective tactics and coordination. What I'm really thinking is that, as you seem to imply, if we could make this thing work it would be an extremely potent force.<br /><br />I kind of backed into the number of personnel based upon what my notional PhibRon/ARG could carry. But I have to believe that such a combined arms regiment would present a formidable force. And the ability to deploy it amphibiously would be a major capability.<br /><br />I can see the possibility that the Army would latch onto a few of them to advance overland, rather than let them deploy amphibiously, kind of like the way they took Marines inland with them after Normandy, and that could lead back toward "baby army" territory. But keep them focused on the naval infantry, rather than overland infantry, role and I think they'd be okay.CDR Chiphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16596017728508279652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-84269065724827498652020-12-27T11:54:20.880-08:002020-12-27T11:54:20.880-08:00"Dozens of very closely related skill sets,&q..."Dozens of very closely related skill sets,"<br /><br />I'm not sure you appreciate the disparity in those skill sets. For example, amphibious assaults are radically different from vertical envelopment. Raids are radically different from combined arms which is tank/AFV/artillery/mechanized operations. Combined arms is an armored/motorized unit as opposed to a raiding force which is very light infantry. Aviation, of course, is radically different from everything else. Riverine ops are radically different from amphib ops. And so on down the list.<br /><br />To call those skill sets closely related is like calling tankers and infantry closely related - they have almost nothing in common.<br /><br />You seem to have latched onto a do-everything mind set - ironically, the same as our current military leaders!<br />ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com