tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post3400192612221475882..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Counter AssaultComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger52125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-75084370780974173882017-04-01T11:51:31.369-07:002017-04-01T11:51:31.369-07:00I don't know. Communication with underwater o...I don't know. Communication with underwater objects is always difficult. Interesting idea, though.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-86575371095599282082017-03-31T19:53:50.457-07:002017-03-31T19:53:50.457-07:00We know of those diesel electric AIP subs that cou...We know of those diesel electric AIP subs that could be lurking in the littorals but I'd like to throw out this concept..... I think there are mines that launch torpedoes based on "noise" from ships. I wonder if these mine / torpedoes could be launched by a signal from land.<br />Guesthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15323603454223326093noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-50620983361553189792017-03-31T12:35:27.324-07:002017-03-31T12:35:27.324-07:00Budgets are a zero sum games, but keep in mind tha...Budgets are a zero sum games, but keep in mind that just the U.S. Army budget is bigger than the budget for the entire Russian military!<br /><br />SOCOM *is* too large, and too focused on kinetic operations; yet the forces are truly overstretched. <br /><br />There also exists a long-standing issue of "conventionalization of SOF" - using SOCOM to do jobs that the services should be doing. This has no easy answer: some missions are simple "call-outs" that your local sheriff could do, but the sensitive nature of supporting intelligence rules out conventional forces.<br /><br />SOCOM also has *loaned* a lot of forces to the intelligence community to do missions that, in an ideal world, are not SOCOM's responsibility either.<br /><br />The ugly fact is that even with tight budgets, the services, have plenty of fat remaining and will never get cut .Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-91073653628225551172017-03-31T06:17:31.164-07:002017-03-31T06:17:31.164-07:00"One other point: Naval Special Warfare (SEAL..."One other point: Naval Special Warfare (SEALs) and MARSOC are funded almost entirely by SOCOM, even paychecks."<br /><br />Of course, every budget dollar that goes to SOCOM is one less for the Navy or Air Force or whoever, just as every dollar that goes to a social program is one less for defense or any other program. Within a given budget year, it's a zero-sum game. If SOCOM gets a dollar, someone else loses a dollar.<br /><br />My point remains that building up SEAL numbers to conduct land warfare is inappropriate when we have dedicated land combat special forces. We should leave the SEALs to water related combat.<br /><br />I'm also unconvinced that the increases in special forces is warranted. To be fair, without having inside knowledge of the number, types, and impact of the missions they execute, I can't fairly evaluate their worth. I'd like to be able to relax and simply trust senior military leadership to make the call about appropriate sizing but given the litany of military leadership mismanagement and incompetence, I'm dubious.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-89089111577814877302017-03-31T03:57:18.783-07:002017-03-31T03:57:18.783-07:00One other point: Naval Special Warfare (SEALs) and...One other point: Naval Special Warfare (SEALs) and MARSOC are funded almost entirely by SOCOM, even paychecks. <br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-2461554534858262482017-03-31T03:52:02.759-07:002017-03-31T03:52:02.759-07:00Allocation of resources is one thing; ill-conceive...Allocation of resources is one thing; ill-conceived doctrine, supported by poor acquisition decisions, and ineffective training is another.<br /><br />You can throttle the funding for SEALs/NSW up or down, but we didn't screw up the "Navy- Marine Corps Team" - that broke itself.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-43928227205300289012017-03-30T08:27:39.415-07:002017-03-30T08:27:39.415-07:00"The SEALs are doing *exactly what they are s..."The SEALs are doing *exactly what they are supposed to do - shortfalls in USN/USMC amphibious capability are not the result of a lack of SEALs."<br /><br />You'll get no argument from me. SEALs are not the reason for amphib assault shortcomings other than indirectly as they siphon Navy funding that might otherwise go to Marine needs. And that is my concern with SEALs. The explosion in SEAL numbers and funding, while still very small in relation to the overall Navy budget, could be better spent on other Navy needs. The Navy gets nothing from the SEALs except a bit of publicity since they do not directly support Navy operations. The SEALs have become a land combat unit. The last publicly acknowledged water-connected SEAL mission, that I can recall, was the rescue of Captain Phillips of the Maersk Alabama in 2009. To be fair, I suspect that most of the SEAL missions are unknown to the public and a portion of them may be water-connected so I could be completely wrong in my conjecture.<br /><br />In any event, I'd much rather see the money spent on SEALs go to Aegis spare parts, aircraft maintenance and parts, and hundreds of other items and functions. I'd rather have hundreds of new Aegis techs and sailors in general than hundreds of new SEALs as have been raised in the last few years.<br /><br />I have nothing against SEALs and recognize that, properly used, they can be a vital aspect of naval warfare, especially during these pseudo-peace times. Unfortunately, SEALs have become a fad in the military that is expanding regardless of any real justification.<br /><br />I've got a post on this subject in the pipeline.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-63192246811948278052017-03-30T07:55:23.608-07:002017-03-30T07:55:23.608-07:00Gents,
The SEALs are doing *exactly what they are...Gents,<br /><br />The SEALs are doing *exactly what they are supposed to do - shortfalls in USN/USMC amphibious capability are not the result of a lack of SEALs.<br /><br />The solution to sea mines, both shallow water and offshore, is not SEALs.<br /><br />The solution to land mines on the beach and beach exits is not SEALs.<br /><br />The solution to obstacles in the surf zone, beach, and beach exits is not SEALs.<br /><br />UDT/UCT teams *did* address some of these problems in WWII and Korea, but the challenge of rapidly breaching these defenses by hand emplacement of explosives is just as invalid as using combat engineers to breach large minefields using hand probes and tape. <br /><br />Technically, mine clearance can be done by hand, but the time to breach a 100 meter wide mine belt is far to slow to be practical.<br /><br />GAB<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-45583921388506602972017-03-30T05:32:57.583-07:002017-03-30T05:32:57.583-07:00That video was awesome.
"Hey! Maybe I'l...That video was awesome. <br /><br />"Hey! Maybe I'll get my Ohantom today!"JFWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16095723023404412328noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-40758336769532882862017-03-29T16:57:59.068-07:002017-03-29T16:57:59.068-07:00If we are serious about defending our Asian allies...If we are serious about defending our Asian allies against Chinese aggression, then we would have to place more thought and resources into CA than we do now.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-60092594432166266772017-03-29T13:56:41.227-07:002017-03-29T13:56:41.227-07:00Yes, I am being being tough with the USMC here but...Yes, I am being being tough with the USMC here but they are playing hardball affecting the other services always making their play.... it is so overt now with this LTGEN in charge of their aviation forces that I cannot believe they are not any Navy leaders pushing back against them using the facts.<br /><br />BTW I was trained by Marines at AOCS in the olden days. Dudes like this "who learned me who Chesty Puller was". Men I will forever respect:<br /><br />https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6mikS7qQSN0<br /><br />The dude with the birth control glasses is SSGT Penn, my DI. Look, I love the Marines like everybody else but I just think they are really overreaching today....<br /><br />b2Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-30391098417800564892017-03-29T12:07:25.370-07:002017-03-29T12:07:25.370-07:00Caveat: I like the corps. I've had family memb...Caveat: I like the corps. I've had family members in the Corps. But I think what they are doing now is wrong. <br /><br />But, how in hell did the Corps get the legislative muscle to outmaneuver the Navy *and* the Air Force? JFWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16095723023404412328noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78905722770855718782017-03-29T11:03:39.170-07:002017-03-29T11:03:39.170-07:00More out today:
https://news.usni.org/2017/03/28/...More out today:<br /><br />https://news.usni.org/2017/03/28/marines-upgrading-todays-planes-to-prepare-for-tomorrows-distributed-high-end-fight<br /><br />Look at the USMC centric slides within their brief based on their HQ knowledge. Childish depiction of what possibly took them there....the US Navy Carrier Strike Group depicted on the lower RH corner.....<br /><br />Notice this is just USMC air they are talking about in their HQ brief....A fleet of overly expensive, developmental technology (always expensive), that bring inherently LESS capablity than other service equivalent platforms. They do this with a straight face. They have Generals Mattis and Kelly, right? In their minds they cannot win any battle for the USA unless they win the battle of the budget and fund all their fancies...Let the Navy, Army and AF fend for themselves...<br /><br />You asked the central question "What are they?" The USMC is depicted in those slides....As you can see they aren't very joint so therefore their mission must be smaller....right? ;-) Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-26984925468280382232017-03-29T07:48:37.075-07:002017-03-29T07:48:37.075-07:00"So in that sense the Marines have rarely bee..."So in that sense the Marines have rarely been expected to assault a fully functioning enemy defensive network."<br /><br />Quite right. It is operational folly to conduct frontal attacks against a fully prepared and non-degraded defense. If you can't degrade the defenses and can't gain at least localized air and sea superiority, one has to ask whether one should even be contemplating an assault.<br /><br />In other words, air and sea superiority and degraded defenses (via massive pre-assault bombardment, among other means) are are prerequisite for an assault. Our doctrine, training, tactics, and equipment include none of those things. In short, it's obvious that we are not serious about being able to conduct major assaults.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78048753784943746292017-03-29T07:43:59.955-07:002017-03-29T07:43:59.955-07:00"Having said that, what mine clearance vessel..."Having said that, what mine clearance vessel would survive in a modern combat environment?<br /><br />Is mine clearance under fire from anti-ship missiles (among other things) even a viable proposition?"<br /><br />Possibly, no ship is survivable under those circumstances. Although, the conceptual ship that could conduct mine clearance under fire would be small (to minimize its radar and optical signature), fast, heavily armed with point defense weapons, and armored to mitigate damage from hits. That's certainly not the LCS which is the vessel the Navy built to do the job!<br /><br />The other approach is to use unmanned vehicles and weapon systems. Influence sweeping conducted by unmanned surface vessels would be useful. Explosives placed to clear lanes would be useful and already exist to some extent. Unmanned subsurface vehicles with active sonar can help define the size and location of minefields.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78160507103286090542017-03-29T07:35:12.829-07:002017-03-29T07:35:12.829-07:00The real issue isn't the mines in emplaced bef...The real issue isn't the mines in emplaced before the amphibious assault, it is the scatterable mines the enemy emplaces *after* the landing when the objectives of the landing are clear!<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-39802060576137738402017-03-28T22:45:00.067-07:002017-03-28T22:45:00.067-07:00I think one thing worth considering here is that m...I think one thing worth considering here is that most large amphibious landings in US military history have occurred in scenarios where the US already had complete air and naval superiority over the area being assaulted.<br />D-Day occurred at a time when the Allies had long since established air superiority and naval superiority over Norther France and the English Channel respectively (and almost certainly would have been a bloody failure if that hadn't been the case).<br /><br />The same is largely true of most of the assaults conducted in the Pacific (with the notable exception of kamikaze attacks in later campaigns, and the obvious exception of Guadalcanal where they did so in a contested air and naval environment).<br /><br />So in that sense the Marines have rarely been expected to assault a fully functioning enemy defensive network.<br /><br />It's usually the case that only after the US has wrested naval control of the approaches and air control of the beachhead and surrounding areas that the Marines go in.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-86460398503458198392017-03-28T22:35:55.315-07:002017-03-28T22:35:55.315-07:00This is an interesting point - I agree that the LC...This is an interesting point - I agree that the LCS would last five minutes under sustained fire close to shore in a MCM capacity.<br />Having said that, what mine clearance vessel would survive in a modern combat environment?<br /><br />Is mine clearance under fire from anti-ship missiles (among other things) even a viable proposition?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-79273169882091632112017-03-28T15:12:23.729-07:002017-03-28T15:12:23.729-07:00You're quite correct. Mines are cheap and dev...You're quite correct. Mines are cheap and devastatingly effective. We have no high volume mine clearance capability. Heck, we almost have no mine clearance capability at all! We also have no combat clearance capability - meaning, we have no capability to clear mines while under fire as we would be when trying to clear the approaches to a beach and the actual assault lanes. The LCS cannot stand and fight (and if it did, it could not survive a hit) and clear mines at the same time. The LCS mine clearance rate is 1 to 2 mines per hour. That is utterly useless in an assault scenario.<br /><br />This is why building a $750M LCS-MCM vessel never made sense even if the MCM module worked.<br /><br />We have really allowed our MCM in general to atrophy and our combat MCM to vanish.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-21892295062958982982017-03-28T14:57:06.300-07:002017-03-28T14:57:06.300-07:00"It's generally believed that one of the ..."It's generally believed that one of the most vulnerable times of an amphibious assault is when a small beachhead is established."<br /><br />As an abstract statement, this is reasonable. However, for the current Navy/Marine operating concept, there is a much more vulnerable point. The entire sustainment load is envisioned to flow from cargo ships through the MLPs and then to the beach. We only have, or plan to have three or four MLPs. If you want to stop an assault cold, sink the MLPs - no MLP, no sustainment; no sustainment, no assault. The MLPs are utterly defenseless, large, and slow moving, though they will have escorts while in theater. However, the MLPs can be sunk/mission killed while docked, long before any assault. They can be sunk on their way to an assault assembly area. They can be sunk on their way to the actual assault. They can be sunk at the assault location when their location is well known and they are essentially a fixed target. If an enemy had to sacrifice an SSK to take out an MLP, it would be an excellent trade from their perspective - no MLP, no assault.<br /><br />Our current inability to land supplies directly via an LST or similar, has led to the creation of almost a single point of failure in amphibious assaults with the three or four MLPs. <br /><br />The loss of even a single MLP might well be fatal for the sustainment of an assault.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-45786818893752234712017-03-28T14:34:16.140-07:002017-03-28T14:34:16.140-07:00Another question, what about stopping mines?
It&#...Another question, what about stopping mines?<br /><br />It's likely that there will be mines, both inland and naval mines against landing craft, then any craft that make it ashore.<br /><br />The goal is not so much to stop the enemy as to slow them down for a large counterattack. That means clearing enemy mines quickly is extremely important. AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-70772774920841202532017-03-28T14:31:12.416-07:002017-03-28T14:31:12.416-07:00Yeah I'd agree if this is about keeping the mo...Yeah I'd agree if this is about keeping the money flowing so to speak. See my comment below.AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-39982802003129180122017-03-28T14:30:20.318-07:002017-03-28T14:30:20.318-07:00If that is the case then we have to take a hard lo...If that is the case then we have to take a hard look at the Marines altogether. What are they? <br /><br />- If they are not fighting the Japanese Imperial Army for anything like Iwo Jima any soon<br />- If there are no plans for another amphibious landing because either we don't need so much for fighting a third world nation or because there is no way to conduct a D-Day like assault against the likes of China or Russia or a nation with the serious ability to fight back <br /><br />Then is it better to assume that the USMC is a second land army? I mean scenarios I could see:<br /><br />- Assault from sea from shore of a third world nation<br />- Maybe trying to assault Taiwan after China has landed in a hypothetical China-USA war<br />- If tensions with Russia decline to war, rescuing the Baltic States (Kaliningrad can attacked from Poland, a NATO nation)<br /><br />What is the probability of this happening? What is the ability to do the mission? If they cannot do the mission, should the second land army strategy be implemented? Should they be training and procuring things with that in mind? <br /><br />The other problem is that the Marine Corps is allocating some very specific things that they asked for. The F-35 is one of them:<br /><br />https://warisboring.com/fd-how-the-u-s-and-its-allies-got-stuck-with-the-worlds-worst-new-warplane-5c95d45f86a5<br /><br />A joint fighter between the USN and USAF would be quite different without the VTOL ability. The VTOL ability caused the F-35 to have such a fat and draggy fuselage. Without it, you could easily get something closer to the F-22 for what the F-16 was to the F-15. <br /><br />The reason of course is the lift fan needed for VTOL. The problem is that there are huge penalties in weight and drag. Even though the F-35 variants are not the same, the airframe is common enough that it's a problem.<br /><br />The other big USMC procurement aircraft, the V-22 Osprey is very problem plagued.<br /><br />https://warisboring.com/your-periodic-reminder-that-the-v-22-is-a-piece-of-junk-db72a8a23ccf<br /><br />The problem is the tilt rotor concept is itself flawed.AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-77510117168746607852017-03-28T12:04:23.517-07:002017-03-28T12:04:23.517-07:00re "Do you see and appreciate the distinction...re "Do you see and appreciate the distinction?"<br /><br />Yes I do, and I appreciate you pointing that out to me. I had noticed your taking on the Major Amphibious Assault syndrome the USMC traditionally desires, but I couldn't help but soapbox about my similar leanings and to remind folks that we can't have it all and we must start with the core Army-Navy needs after over 25 years of neglect..<br /><br />We need several ARG-MEU groups for forward presence but not as many as what the USMC wants the Navy/DoD to procure. Did you read the USMC air requirements doc that came out today? Their aircraft requirements, to meet an expeditionary force role only, require aviation platform resources equal to what the USAF and US Navy need to just tread water to replace legacy platforms like the F-5/16 and F-18C, P-3, etc. Add 'em up...After a 40 year investment and tremendous costs for the V-22 they now require even more F-35Bs (replaces the role of the harrier..) and now the H-53K. Their demand in resources for their role is out of whack with their size or real function. They figure the other services just waste what they get... <br /><br />So they strike while the iron is hot now that they have Mattis/Kelly in position, plus, who can easily say no to the USMC in the first place, G love 'em? As Gomer Pyle says: "Surprise, Surprise, Sargent Carter!" Us squids need to resist, big time.<br /><br />b2Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-26987753118992486222017-03-28T10:49:18.596-07:002017-03-28T10:49:18.596-07:00The reasons are Money and Mission.
No Service w...The reasons are Money and Mission. <br /><br />No Service wants to give up a mission, even if they know it is not doable or one they want to do because they will lose money.<br /><br />NO Service will EVER give up Money, whether they can spend it effectively or not.<br /><br />Once again the self licking ice cream cone effect is alive and well.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com