tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post3152736137324580085..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Open Ocean Ship DetectionComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger49125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-67592104556167152552019-10-28T17:55:51.000-07:002019-10-28T17:55:51.000-07:00I agree with your premise. I found this ocean sea...I agree with your premise. I found this ocean search capability claim for the Chinese Gaofen-3 (GF-3) satellite*: "extremely-wide-swath 650 km [~400 mi]" Not impressive for the open-ocean search problem you address here. Over the Horizon Surface Wave radar can detect out to 100 nmi from shore** but, again, not impressive. Open ocean acoustic surveillance is being revived and improved.*** SIGINT satellites will find you anywhere if you don't maintain radio silence. Satellite AIS**** provides deconfliction for ocean surveillance sensor contacts, but AIS can be faked*****. The ultimate problem in benefiting from open ocean sensor contacts of interest is the need to reacquire each one by other sensors that will then track, classify, identify and communicate back to the command center: this means tasking many air-, sea- and/or satellite-borne sensors, a tough materiel allocation problem especially in peacetime when the open ocean can be full of such contacts.<br />*https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors/special_issues/gaofen_3_SAR_sensor<br />**Thales coastWatcher100.pdf<br />***https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/us-navy-upgrading-undersea-sub-detecting-sensor-network/<br />****https://www.orbcomm.com/en/networks/satellite-ais<br />*****https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520421/ship-tracking-hack-makes-tankers-vanish-from-view/Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-2209372504950469012019-10-20T12:56:19.989-07:002019-10-20T12:56:19.989-07:00Can an AI looking for a specific warship or class ...Can an AI looking for a specific warship or class of warship be fooled by minor modifications? Will it miss my ship if I change the shape of the funnel? Or weld a few extra pieces on the deck here and there? Maybe reroute some exhaust to change the thermal "picture" or ding a prop ti change my acoustic "signature"?<br /><br />Alternatively; can I make cheap visual/thermal/acoustic decoys go fill my little corner of the ocean with false positives for the US Navy to chase and shoot at?Kirbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08160163509930734619noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-9977590282969791652019-10-19T06:05:11.806-07:002019-10-19T06:05:11.806-07:00"It's self-evident a carrier can be hard ..."It's self-evident a carrier can be hard to find if such supposition comes with a prerequisite of significant degradation of opposition's 'eyes and ears'."<br /><br />Congratulations! You're now beginning to understand how a carrier operates.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-60306467757064808722019-10-19T06:03:22.519-07:002019-10-19T06:03:22.519-07:00" Is a mere few days worth of non-detection r..." Is a mere few days worth of non-detection really useful,"<br /><br />If you'll study the history of carrier operations you can answer your own question.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-75288345055292904802019-10-19T06:02:34.989-07:002019-10-19T06:02:34.989-07:00You don't play future-rebuild games with exist...You don't play future-rebuild games with existential survival. There's no point to saving space and losing your country. You deal with the existential threat first, by whatever means necessary, and worry about the clean up later.<br /><br />Almost unbelievably, history and crude etchings on subway walls seem to indicate that our country once operated and thrived without space. That's probably just a myth but, who knows, most myths are based on a bit of truth.<br /><br />Satellites will disappear on day one of a peer war. Seriously, this isn't even a debatable topic.<br />ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-74981501026079469642019-10-18T23:07:55.572-07:002019-10-18T23:07:55.572-07:00"..no carrier is ever going to venture within..."..no carrier is ever going to venture within a thousand miles of China until significant rollback of defenses have occurred"<br /><br />It's self-evident a carrier can be hard to find if such supposition comes with a prerequisite of significant degradation of opposition's 'eyes and ears'.Timnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-22230089898692064112019-10-18T21:21:05.789-07:002019-10-18T21:21:05.789-07:00"Does this mean the Soviets found them after ..."Does this mean the Soviets found them after several days? Is a mere few days worth of non-detection really useful, given the exorbitant cost of carrier groups and SAGs?"<br /><br />@Anon2: If you refer to source 2, "How to Hide a Task Force", you'll note that the author states that they intentionally revealed themselves at the end of those 4 days, after operating in soviet waters and conducting mirror image training strikes on strategic soviet installations. <br /><br />The author also points out that had they been doing this for real, the Soviets would have learned on Day 1 that there was an American carrier group in the area, because getting your bases blasted to rubble is a pretty good indication that someone is up and about.WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-35034964985792772322019-10-18T20:24:39.991-07:002019-10-18T20:24:39.991-07:00Sure, but even in an existential war for survival,...Sure, but even in an existential war for survival, where the aim is to survive, once you've won that war and survived, you need to rebuild in the peace - the Marshall Plan was a thing, afterall. The postwar rebuilding is going to be hard enough in the terrestrial sphere; no need to make it any harder by adding the need for an orbital cleanup and rebuilding your orbital infrastructure - if you can even clean up at all: worst case, you can't use space at all.<br /><br />https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome<br /><br />I think you're underestimating the concerns of NASA a little: this isn't on earth, where gravity means all frag/shrapnel falls to the ground, this is in space, a vacuum, where objects in motion continue on, and satellites are regularly passing each other's orbits.<br /><br />That said, this is a potential future application for laser weaponry, the idea that you can use lasers to reach out into orbit and blind satellite sensors. A blind satellite and a destroyed satellite are just as operationally useless, and you have the benefit of not potentially creating a debris field so dense that it prevents you from using space.WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-85570437709441043362019-10-18T19:05:00.968-07:002019-10-18T19:05:00.968-07:00If you're engaged in an existential war for su...If you're engaged in an existential war for survival with China, orbital debris is the least of the problems. China certainly isn't going to worry about debris!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-39806376699036472592019-10-18T18:20:30.501-07:002019-10-18T18:20:30.501-07:00Also while it's fine to say "blow the sat...Also while it's fine to say "blow the sats and damn the consequences later", if you've sucessfully kessler syndrome'd so hard that you can't replace your satellite infrastructure... well. That's a problem. This isn't Ace Combat 7, where, in the wake of Osea and Erusea kessler syndroming the world by shooting down each others sats, causing a chain reaction of debris blowing up everyone else's sats, spaceship Pilgrim One came around and presumably spent the next year clearing the debris. :V<br /><br />I don't see NASA having launched a spaceship with a legit bigass laser...WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-80285833177639909082019-10-18T18:17:53.921-07:002019-10-18T18:17:53.921-07:00"While you can hide some electronic emissions..."While you can hide some electronic emissions, how are you going to hide the IR footprint of the escorts? Gas turbines generate a lot of heat..."<br /><br />@George: In the satellite context, IR refers to Infrared Imaging, rather than heatseeking like Sidewinder, because 1) IIR lets you see something of what you're looking at, and 2) atmospheric diffusion means that the effective range of detecting something, purely by heat signature, is very short, and not viable at all for a satellite in orbit.<br /><br />You hide from IR imagery sats the same way you hide from EO sats: by avoiding their orbits, by manuevering to present a more deceptive profile, and using decoys and deceptive lighting measures. The problem all search sats have is that their resolution is limited in order to have wide field of view, and from orbit, a carrier looks a lot like merchant shipping, size-wise.WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-74660402520352082042019-10-18T17:29:48.586-07:002019-10-18T17:29:48.586-07:00"in the case of China, it'll be our ship ..."in the case of China, it'll be our ship taking on their fort (i.e. carriers vs. peer level land based assets)"<br /><br />Only an idiot would even consider that. As gently as I possibly can, I say to you, you do not seem to have a grasp of modern naval operations. You're hypothesizing about something that no sane naval commander ever do.<br /><br />You need to do some serious studying on naval operations. Here's a starting point to consider: no carrier is ever going to venture within a thousand miles of China until significant rollback of defenses have occurred. Thus, none of your imagining could ever take place.<br /><br />As I state in the Comment Policy page, a certain base level of knowledge about naval operations is required to comment effectively. I urge you to study naval and carrier operations. ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-24150527388879197592019-10-18T16:36:45.844-07:002019-10-18T16:36:45.844-07:00My point: Both sides can be found in battle. In M...My point: Both sides can be found in battle. In Midway, it was ship on ship, however, in the case of China, it'll be our ship taking on their fort (i.e. carriers vs. peer level land based assets) the latter got 9-lives cuz they don't sink (e.g. that Syrian AB took 59 Tomahawk hits and was resuming air operation half day later.)<br /><br />As for the lead up, the minute their SATs went offline (our carrier position is most likely tracked as long as their original SATs are up), they'll know the gig is up and start looking (and China's geography and locations of their important asset pretty much dictate a front of 2000 miles stretching from lower Japan to upper PH where we might show up). It's still a big area, but it's not like they have to look for us in the middle of Pacific; hence it's just a math (and resource) issue to cover that 2000 mile front.<br /><br />Also, zigzaging homebound waypoints only mean the carrier had to stay around longer.Timnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-81633114684675641672019-10-18T14:55:26.248-07:002019-10-18T14:55:26.248-07:00"In Midway, INJ did find our carriers even af..."In Midway, INJ did find our carriers even after we cracked their code and got a jump on them first."<br /><br />Yes, they did find ONE of our carriers (out of 3). As you know, since you cited the battle, the Japanese fleet was sighted at 0900hr on 3-Jun and subjected to multiple attacks from then until all four Japanese carriers were sunk. The Japanese, in contrast, didn't launch their first attack until 1100hr on 4-Jun, over a day later! So, yes, the Japanese eventually found one of our carriers - the other two were not found - and paid the price of four lost carriers to do it.<br /><br />So, what was your point?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-72572304178041573192019-10-18T14:50:23.301-07:002019-10-18T14:50:23.301-07:00???????????? What are you talking about? Maybe y...???????????? What are you talking about? Maybe you should abandon the bee analogy and stick to actual ships and planes.<br /><br />Are you under the misconception that aircraft fly straight back to their carrier rather than flying circuitous routes designed expressly to avoid giving away the carrier's location? This tactic was figured out the day after the first aircraft launched from the first carrier!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-85923074942605488402019-10-18T12:38:27.833-07:002019-10-18T12:38:27.833-07:00Well, these bees gonna fan out at me (the ship, no...Well, these bees gonna fan out at me (the ship, not the planes) at Mach 3+ (did you see their fast looking drone reconn planes in the parade?) while I'm going balls out at 40 mph trying to get the hell out. That means in the time these drones covered 1000 mile (about 30 min), I've moved 20 miles (maybe 40 miles if I get a head start right after launch). At 60,000 ft (or higher) looking down panoramically, I basically didn't move much in 30 min. And you're telling me, I gotta do this over and over again (sneak in, launch strike, recover planes, and out) after the flag is up?<br /><br />In Midway, INJ did find our carriers even after we cracked their code and got a jump on them first.Timnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-39395950067443746332019-10-18T11:04:42.713-07:002019-10-18T11:04:42.713-07:00"once I poke the nest, the hornets are gonna ..."once I poke the nest, the hornets are gonna beeline at me"<br /><br />Your analogy is … um … flawed. If you can outrun the bees then you can poke it as often as you want and with impunity.<br /><br />A carrier strike (not the wisest way to go but, for sake of discussion...) vanishes after it attacks. Nothing can catch up with the aircraft as they egress and they can't be easily backtracked to their carrier.<br /><br />Beyond that, I have no idea where you're going with your analogy.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-72466988448148865472019-10-18T10:43:32.098-07:002019-10-18T10:43:32.098-07:00"if China's sensors are as effective as y..."if China's sensors are as effective as you believe, why hasn't the Pentagon/SecDef abolished the Navy since it would be instantly spotted and destroyed in combat?"<br /><br />1) The Navy (as with most human enterprises) lags behind the implications of technology. <br />2) The Navy, as a political enterprise, is not something the SecDef can just abolish. And really we're just talking about the surface Navy. The subsurface Navy is still immune to satellite surveillance. Plus, Chinese coverage is focused on the Pacific. Other areas of the world are less of a problem.<br />3) Detection does not mean instant death. <br />4) The Navy has in place, or is working on, means to defeat wide area satellite surveillance (e.g. SM-3, exploiting gaps in coverage, ECM). <br /><br />Anon2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-67941267573383261882019-10-18T10:40:43.275-07:002019-10-18T10:40:43.275-07:00@Wild Goose: I was thinking about 'hornets nes...@Wild Goose: I was thinking about 'hornets nest and poking it with a 10-ft pole'. While it's possible to get within 10-ft or even hand touch the nest, it is not advisable because it makes hornet's job easier of detecting me. If the pole can be extended, say another 2 ft (i.e. air-refueling), that means I can move in an area depth of between 10-12ft and side-to-side, like a belt wedge, but once I poke the nest, the hornets are gonna beeline at me, and if I can't knock it down in 1 swoop, then the only way for me to go is backward.<br /><br />So the question is really 2 folds: <br />1. Can I get within 10-12 feet?<br />2. Can I knock it down in 1 swoop? If not, can I outrun the hornets?Timnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-11466941844384748492019-10-18T09:38:20.410-07:002019-10-18T09:38:20.410-07:00I'll just say you have an unrealistic idea of ...I'll just say you have an unrealistic idea of how satellites work and how effective they are. I'll leave it at that.<br /><br />Ponder this … if China's sensors are as effective as you believe, why hasn't the Pentagon/SecDef abolished the Navy since it would be instantly spotted and destroyed in combat? Why are Navy ships built with stealth features since they can't hide from satellites anyway? Could it be that your assessment is a bit off? Something to think about ...ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-47304459019225768712019-10-18T08:24:42.706-07:002019-10-18T08:24:42.706-07:00"Of course! We have little exact, direct evid..."Of course! We have little exact, direct evidence so we have to resort to related evidence which, fortunately, we have a fair amount of. The point stands - if we can't track large, non-stealthy aircraft (with transponders!) then we aren't going to be able to track stealthy (to some degree) ships that are actively trying to avoid detection."<br /><br />Those two things don't have much in common. <br /><br />Commercial aircraft detection is primarily by land-based radar and transponders. If an aircraft is out of range (or line of sight) of land-based radars, then the only means of tracking it is self-reporting via transponders.<br /><br />Aircraft are smaller, move an order of magnitude faster, and only exist in the area of interest for a few hours at most. <br /><br />China's satellite system isn't designed to track short-lived, transient, aircraft contacts. It does appear to be designed to provide multiple revisits by different types of satellite over any given spot in the area of interest per day. <br /><br />Ships need to exist in the area under observation for days, weeks, or even months. That's many potential passes by many satellites. Many chances for detection.<br /><br />Obviously spec sheets don't give the full story, but they do provide the upper bounds for a system's capability. We should be concerned about these upper bounds, as well as an honest assessment of likely capability.<br /><br />My gut says the reality is somewhere in the middle. They don't have instant, 100% detection throughout the Pacific. But they do have a good chance of finding and tracking task groups, especially given the amount of time such groups have to dwell in and/or transit through the area. <br /><br />Anon2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-29165404936425951482019-10-18T07:51:24.632-07:002019-10-18T07:51:24.632-07:00"Most of your examples are unrelated to the s..."Most of your examples are unrelated to the subject of detecting ships at sea, other than in the broadest sense (i.e. failures of technology to deliver on promise, and human fallibility)."<br /><br />Of course! We have little exact, direct evidence so we have to resort to related evidence which, fortunately, we have a fair amount of. The point stands - if we can't track large, non-stealthy aircraft (with transponders!) then we aren't going to be able to track stealthy (to some degree) ships that are actively trying to avoid detection.<br /><br />"China has optical, radar and electronic capabilities to detect, identify and track ships at sea."<br /><br />You're falling into the manufacturer's claim syndrome. Yes, China has the theoretical capabilities but it requires a detection chain to actually find something.<br /><br />Let me give you an analogy. You own a flashlight. In theory, then, no burglar can possible sneak up on your house without being detected. The flaw(s) in this conclusion is that you don't have 100%, continuous coverage. You have to go to sleep sometime and during that time you won't be scanning your property. Okay, let's say you hire someone to continuously walk around, looking. That's great but they can only cover a very small area at any given moment. That leaves 99% of the property uncovered. And none of this considers the possibility that the burglar may be employing cammo or other means of avoiding detection. You get the idea, here, right?<br /><br />Similarly, with satellite or other sensors, those assets can only cover small areas at certain times (unless they're in geosynchronous orbit). Further, someone has to analyze and recognize the data the sensors are collecting. As I pointed out in the post, with every terrorist incident it turns out we had all the data we needed to prevent it but no one recognized it for what it was. <br /><br />Have you ever looked at satellite images or BDA photos? They're just vague shadows. Yes, we have sensors capable of zooming in and counting rivets but then the area of coverage is vanishingly small. There's the dilemma. You can cover the entire Pacific with one photo but you won't have the resolution to distinguish anything or you can zoom in to count rivets but then you won't any useful coverage whatsoever. Now, if you had 10,000 satellites then you could have zoomed in resolution and good coverage but no one has that.<br /><br />So, yes, on paper, a ship can be seen at sea. In reality, it's very difficult to do. ALL THE EVIDENCE, direct and indirect supports this conclusion. ALL THE LOGIC supports this conclusion. ALL THE UNDERSTANDING OF OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS (how data is collected, analyzed, and acted on) supports this conclusion.<br /><br />"So to survive in the Pacific, we need to find ways to degrade or destroy this capability."<br /><br />Quite right and we've already demonstrated various means to do so and I'm sure there are other means that we haven't heard about (I sure hope there are!). Functioning satellites will be a scarce commodity in a peer war and most will be destroyed on day one.<br /><br />Do not mistake theoretical capability for reality.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-73628788612778742512019-10-18T07:32:54.868-07:002019-10-18T07:32:54.868-07:00"not planning for a visual range slugfest. If..."not planning for a visual range slugfest. If they were, they might focus more on larger calibre guns with guided shells, perhaps?"<br /><br />You raise an interesting question. On the face of it, the Chinese appear to be largely duplicating the US Navy force structure. However, there's a huge difference in how they would be employed. For the foreseeable future, a Chinese war will be fought in the E/S China Seas. With that reality in mind, the Chinese can bring to bear not only naval assets but their entire land based missiles and aviation. Thus, there is no need for the Chinese to be able to fight a close range, guns slugfest. Once they sight a target they can step back and attack repeatedly with land based cruise and ballistic missiles and aviation. Their bomber force can launch long range, large anti-ship cruise missiles repeatedly for as long as their missile inventory holds out.<br /><br />The US, in contrast, has only what they can carry with them on their ships. Yes, there will be occasional Air Force contributions but with the nearest AF assets located in Guam or CONUS, those occasions will be rare and short-lived and that assumes that Guam remains operational which is unlikely.<br /><br />So, similar force structures but radically different operational concepts. Does that make sense to you? <br /><br />We have a tendency to view and assess enemy's forces through the lens of our operational concepts and that's never correct. We need to develop the habit of viewing an enemy's forces through THEIR operational perspective. That's challenging to do but necessary to get a clear understanding.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-23813754131391557322019-10-18T06:16:16.534-07:002019-10-18T06:16:16.534-07:00"I’ll state the reality flat out: finding a s..."I’ll state the reality flat out: finding a ship in the ocean is a very difficult task and tracking it is even harder. Now, what evidence do we have to support that statement?"<br /><br />Most of your examples are unrelated to the subject of detecting ships at sea, other than in the broadest sense (i.e. failures of technology to deliver on promise, and human fallibility).<br /><br />The only example given that actually relates to detecting ships at sea is the supposed difficulty of the Soviets detecting carrier groups at sea. Even this example was only for "several days". <br /><br />Does this mean the Soviets found them after several days? Is a mere few days worth of non-detection really useful, given the exorbitant cost of carrier groups and SAGs?<br /><br />And this is Soviet technology circa 1970s-80s, not Chinese technology 30-40 years later.<br /><br />The Chinese satellite system is their primary broad-area detection, identification and tracking capability. They have nearly 50 satellites devoted to open ocean tracking.<br /><br />This link provides a useful breakdown and assessment of their capability.<br /><br />https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/09/20/the-chinese-maritime-surveillance-system/<br /><br />Their conclusion,<br /><br />"Thanks to its satellites, China has optical, radar and electronic capabilities to detect, identify and track ships at sea. Even without taking into account real-time tracking from geostationary orbit, the wide-angle JB-9 constellation and the JB-5 and JB-7 SAR constellations can find contacts in a vast area every day, and have a good chance of refreshing the location of the most interesting ships every few hours. Consequently, it seems unlikely a naval group could hide in the ocean for long.<br /><br />However, when the weather is very cloudy, only the SAR satellites are able to look through, which severely limits the capabilities of the system. This does not mean China is blind: other means of detection, such as it trans-horizon radars, or its long range patrol aircrafts can complement the satellite system, and help challenge the defenses of US aircraft carriers. This makes a US intervention in a new Taiwan Strait crisis much more risky, and consequently less likely."<br /><br />So to survive in the Pacific, we need to find ways to degrade or destroy this capability. This could include SM-3s used in ASAT mode, jamming of SAR satellites, laser blinding or damage to optical satellites, or other means.Anon2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-41170663142046681102019-10-18T04:21:51.685-07:002019-10-18T04:21:51.685-07:00The first thing to go in any serious war is going ...The first thing to go in any serious war is going to be recon satellites. And damn the consequences later. I suggest the Chinese are taking that task more seriously than anyone else at the moment, and that isn't good news.<br /><br />While you can hide some electronic emissions, how are you going to hide the IR footprint of the escorts? Gas turbines generate a lot of heat...Georgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17731178888696691472noreply@blogger.com