tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post3142171089336064303..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: D-Day LessonsComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger25125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-65893056949257815982015-07-10T08:46:06.869-07:002015-07-10T08:46:06.869-07:00we already have doctrine to deal with this too. S...we already have doctrine to deal with this too. Stacking aircraft in holding patterns is just a matter of convenience, nothing more. In fact we don't typically keep that many aircraft waiting in holding patterns if there are other targets available. That's wasteful. <br /><br />Instead we use "Push CAS" to limit pointless boring holes in the sky. B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-14016641213383071532015-07-10T02:46:05.306-07:002015-07-10T02:46:05.306-07:00Smithy, what he said was that we can't stack a...Smithy, what he said was that we can't stack aircraft in a high altitude holding pattern for indefinite periods waiting for a call, as we currently do. His point, I think, is that the procedures we've developed for CAS against low end opponents won't work against a peer.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-13059971852970175402015-07-10T01:20:32.449-07:002015-07-10T01:20:32.449-07:00GAB,
I don't get how you can say we can't...GAB,<br /><br />I don't get how you can say we can't fly sorties at 30k+ ft against a sophisticated air defense in one paragraph and then advocate for "low and slow" aircraft in the next. The "low and slow" environment has been lethal to aircraft since before Vietnam, and would be exponentially more so against a sophisticated air defense. Google Tunguska, Tor, Igla, Verba, QW-2, Type 95, and even Shilka VSHORADS. <br /><br />The only aircraft that should fly low and slow are those that we don't mind losing (I.e. UAVs). <br /><br />We have well established doctrine for dealing with high altitude threats, but no effective doctrine for dealing with the low altitude threats other than avoiding them. <br />B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-91513406933504246192015-07-09T19:05:54.575-07:002015-07-09T19:05:54.575-07:00GAB, as always, absolutely fantastic comment! I p...GAB, as always, absolutely fantastic comment! I particularly like the point about parking aircraft at 30K ft. Someone should ask you to write a guest post!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-36499282894608287672015-07-09T09:36:38.795-07:002015-07-09T09:36:38.795-07:00@Smitty,
There many more hard questions that need...@Smitty,<br /><br />There many more hard questions that need to be asked, particularly given the general confusion between *ground support*, *CAS*, and *interdiction.*<br /><br />1. Artillery vs CAS/Interdiction. The ready availability of CAS has been used to justify sharp reductions in artillery support – a questionable outcome, particularly at the tactical level. Ground commanders should have sufficient fire support to conduct tactical operations: TACAIR should be allotted to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Once air supremacy is established it frees up air frames for ground attack: given the absolute air supremacy we have enjoyed from ~1943 on, we have been able to support even isolated squads in OIF/OEF; but this may not work out so well against a peer competitor in the future.<br /><br />2. Training/coordination. Fighter squadrons are not currently funded to properly support training for the air-to-air and air-to-ground missions – logically, the ground support mission should be shorted in favor of air-to-air. Ground support, particularly CAS, requires intensive specialized training and ideally collocation of the air and ground forces: post 1991 operations against weak competitors lacking airpower and having minimal AAA capability, combined with nearly static friendly force dispositions have allowed us to ignore this. It is unclear if the USA and our allies will be able to operate in an environment where our sensors, communications, and intelligence are challenged or degraded. You cannot park aircraft in orbit at 30,000+ feet in an environment with sophisticated air defenses. You cannot coordinate air and ground forces in a contested environment when the commanders are unable to consider the situation jointly. There is also an OPSEC dimension to this.<br /><br />3. Suitability of aircraft. Just as the navy found the guns of its ships to be well suited to supporting amphibious landings, the mid-war fighters of WWII were generally well suited to the interdiction mission. The aircraft had excellent slow speed/low altitude maneuverability, were robust, could be sortied multiple times a day, could operate from airfields close to the action, carried suitable armament to the task, and were cheap enough to repair or replace. Tactical jets have generally proven to have trouble visually identifying targets, and have marginal low altitude low speed flight characteristics. Again, we have been lucky that the Taliban/ISIL/AQI lacked credible air defenses and the campaigns have largely been fought in deserts. The NATO air campaign in Serbia should raise some serious doubts about everything from our aircraft capabilities to our ROE.<br /><br />GAB<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-28528710496766733762015-07-07T17:10:51.906-07:002015-07-07T17:10:51.906-07:00"The question for the military in the 21st ce..."The question for the military in the 21st century is if we can/should still expect aircraft to perform this role."<br /><br />One difference between then and now is that the aircraft of WWII were quite cheap even by the standards of that time. Thus, the willingness to hazard front line fighters as low level attack aircraft was much greater than we would have, today, with a $150M aircraft. A Raptor, for example, might well make a good low level strike aircraft but are we willing to risk losing it? We don't have thousands of extra Raptors as the we did with WWII P-47s, P-51s, and whatever else was pressed into service as low level strikers.<br /><br />I suspect that we'll find we're risk averse to using the F-35, for instance, even in its intended role because we'll have so few of them. The issue of monetary-induced risk aversion is one I've brought up in numerous posts and I think it is and will be a significant phenomenon.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-23089524757025550602015-07-07T14:31:31.924-07:002015-07-07T14:31:31.924-07:00Why shouldn't we?Why shouldn't we? B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-82518465518324428272015-07-07T09:26:27.208-07:002015-07-07T09:26:27.208-07:00Smitty: your points are well taken, but the real s...Smitty: your points are well taken, but the real story is that Allies were able to adapt the vast numbers of fighters that were used to smash the Luftwaffe, into a hugely effective ground attack force. <br /><br />The question for the military in the 21st century is if we can/should still expect aircraft to perform this role.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-88012992709360750292015-07-07T09:18:26.491-07:002015-07-07T09:18:26.491-07:00The British and Canadians, by design, faced the to...The British and Canadians, by design, faced the toughest objectives and the strongest German army formations or the Normandy operation. I am an American, but credit must be given to our allies where it was well earned.<br /><br />Also, I highly recommend the book: Hobart's 79th Armoured Division at War: Invention, Innovation and Inspiration.<br /><br />Marines Under Armor provides a good counterpoint to over-zealous emphasis on infantry operations: armor was very much in demand in the PTO. Tarawa was a real wake up call for the Corps and the nation.<br /><br />The U.S. Army and Marine Corps were very much impressed by the UK engineering vehicles, but the atomic era, reduced military spending (for ground forces anyway) and the loss of corporate memory are responsible for the current state of affairs.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-83114663723129565712015-07-07T08:16:47.317-07:002015-07-07T08:16:47.317-07:00Alt, with respect, there is nothing to disagree ab...Alt, with respect, there is nothing to disagree about concerning Rommel. It's documented that he advocated for fixed beach defenses. Historians and strategists agree that this seemed incongruous from him and, yet, that's what he wanted.<br /><br />The role of D-Day naval gun fire is addressed in one of the next couple posts! I have more lessons of D-Day coming.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-70080764787561944672015-07-07T08:01:20.940-07:002015-07-07T08:01:20.940-07:00The main value of air power at D-Day was preventin...The main value of air power at D-Day was preventing movement of German reserves forward to counter attack the landing. Fighter bombers hit railways and attacked wheeled vehicles in the enemy's rear areas. This is interdiction, not CAS.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-70771161381798728792015-07-07T07:43:11.175-07:002015-07-07T07:43:11.175-07:00I would have to disagree about the fact that Romme...I would have to disagree about the fact that Rommel would have advocated for fixed fortifications - he was always an advocate for mobile armor, although he had become as a result of his experiences in North Africa increasingly pessimistic due to Allied air power.<br /><br /><br />D-Day actually very nearly failed. Many of the tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment either did not make it or badly fumbled their landings. <br /><br />They had the good fortune of surprise - the Germans were astonished at the time they landed. That and in the case of Rommel, he had apparently left to celebrate his wife's birthday. <br /><br />One thing I will note that you probably should also discuss is the role of naval gunfire support. Perhaps ships like the battleship will never fight for supremacy of the seas any more, but they proved invaluable in shore bombardment. <br /><br /><br /><br />Basically the conclusion I have is - amphibious landings are very difficult because you need:<br /><br />1. An area low in naval/land mines <br />2. Total surprise (attack lightly defended positions) <br />3. Naval superiority and heavy support fire <br />4. Total air superiority <br />5. A lot of engineers and logistics<br /><br />That's a tall order.AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-54655381350161480892015-07-07T07:36:46.452-07:002015-07-07T07:36:46.452-07:00I would agree that the role of CAS has been underr...I would agree that the role of CAS has been underrated during D-Day. <br /><br />The P-47s under Lieutenant General Elwood Richard Quesada played a very important and underrated role.<br /><br />I think that many of Patton's advances might not have been possible later on without them. AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-8339897045034253532015-07-07T05:22:48.961-07:002015-07-07T05:22:48.961-07:00A minor point of order. When you are bombing the ...A minor point of order. When you are bombing the enemies front line units, you are doing CAS. Interdiction was blowing the bridges over the rivers further back.<br /><br />Yes interdiction stopped units from moving, but destroying them (Panzer Lehr Commanders report) on the front line is CAS.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-29670945342924236682015-07-07T04:07:10.018-07:002015-07-07T04:07:10.018-07:00Interesting video. Thanks for the link.Interesting video. Thanks for the link.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-90625874165145584862015-07-06T19:36:00.557-07:002015-07-06T19:36:00.557-07:00An excellent video talking about the myths surroun...An excellent video talking about the myths surrounding US armor in WW2, along with a couple of other items like CAS, is here: https://youtu.be/bNjp_4jY8pYSeal Of Lionhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05304620391386824536noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-2480858148298133702015-07-06T17:55:03.850-07:002015-07-06T17:55:03.850-07:00Very nice articles, as always. Thanks for the lin...Very nice articles, as always. Thanks for the links! Even today, the U.S. remains reluctant to invest in specialized engineering vehicles. Puzzling.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-57176703442518666742015-07-06T17:33:52.125-07:002015-07-06T17:33:52.125-07:00We did employ heavy bombers at Normandy but they c...We did employ heavy bombers at Normandy but they caused mass destruction to towns and Germans and allied units. After killing General McNair and a few hundred other Americans due to yet another "error" Ike banned them. They went back to slaughtering German civilians.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-41790788323006860792015-07-06T17:32:27.906-07:002015-07-06T17:32:27.906-07:00Smitty beat me to it!Smitty beat me to it!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-82555631384181716392015-07-06T17:31:32.864-07:002015-07-06T17:31:32.864-07:00Randall, SNAFU is on my daily reading list but I a...Randall, SNAFU is on my daily reading list but I appreciate the heads up! Now, do you think the Zubr is a good idea, generally? Only effective against a non-peer? Just a big fat, high risk target against a peer? An effective means of landing armor in the initial wave? Something else? What's your take on it?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-75433649123098604202015-07-06T17:27:56.109-07:002015-07-06T17:27:56.109-07:00Ambrose is more a flag waver than a military histo...Ambrose is more a flag waver than a military historian, which is why he is popular. Rommel experienced allied airpower in Africa and knew any large counterattack force would be smashed on the road. Hence fortifications, which deterred the allies from Calais and other ports. He had smaller division size armored units for counterattacks, but those were withheld too long because Hitler was certain Normandy was a diversion. The lesson remains. LSTs are the ultimate amphib vehicle, and we have no more.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-28496003677345511782015-07-06T15:09:48.798-07:002015-07-06T15:09:48.798-07:00This is actually an example of air interdiction, n...This is actually an example of air interdiction, not CAS. It was done primarily by non-CAS-specialized aircraft.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-91603730519840008892015-07-06T13:58:59.796-07:002015-07-06T13:58:59.796-07:00Only generally related to this post, Snafu posted ...Only generally related to this post, Snafu posted some interested pics of the Chinese MLP equivalent. Its just big enough to carry a Zubr-class LCAC on deck. This gives the Zubr the strategic mobility it lacked, combined with its speed and cargo capacity. Definitely worth checking out.<br /><br />Randall RappAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-75028078586742428462015-07-06T11:28:46.368-07:002015-07-06T11:28:46.368-07:00I agree with all of your points except one. Germa...I agree with all of your points except one. German Armor could not move during the day due to Allied airpower and supremacy. Indeed few armored divisions ever made it over to face the Americans and the one that did Panzer Lehr was obliterated in the carpet bombing that opened the way to St Lo and Avaranches.<br /><br />Not that I think that Airpower rules, but these are great examples of where CAS completely negated the enemy his choice tactic, maneuver and concentrate for strikes. He was forced into a grind it out defensive battle that he ultimately lost.<br /><br />NOTE that CAS did this NOT strategic bombing. KEEP THE A-10!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-35705148569258065252015-07-06T07:20:32.081-07:002015-07-06T07:20:32.081-07:00Two posts on the subject of combat engineering and...Two posts on the subject of combat engineering and logistics for you<br /><br />http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2013/06/d-day-sir-percy-hobart-and-the-funnies-of-the-79th/ <br /><br />and<br /><br />http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/ship-to-shore-logistics/the-d-day-normandy-landings/ <br /><br />Think Defencehttp://www.thinkdefence.co.uknoreply@blogger.com