tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post1771883281701824009..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: USS Ronald Reagan and Force ZComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger80125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-38041824977210659982018-09-02T10:54:55.956-07:002018-09-02T10:54:55.956-07:00Interesting. I've seen the impact of losing a ...Interesting. I've seen the impact of losing a big gantry crane. It's forecast to take 2 years to fix as a new A-Frame has to come from Germany. Completely shut down a major Sawmill.Georgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17731178888696691472noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-5903116846972220342018-09-02T07:20:39.346-07:002018-09-02T07:20:39.346-07:00We've discussed aspects of this. Check out th...We've discussed aspects of this. Check out this link.<br /><br /><a href="https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-next-pearl-harbor-shipyards.html" rel="nofollow">The Next Pearl Harbor - Shipyards</a>ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-57827833703530374302018-09-01T15:04:46.519-07:002018-09-01T15:04:46.519-07:00I would personally expect China to go after every ...I would personally expect China to go after every single US carrier on day one of the war.<br /><br />Likely using asymmetric warfare where possible. You can imagine what a 40' container loaded as a massive shaped-charge could do to a ship tied to a pier.<br /><br />I would also expect shipyards capable of building/repairing carriers to be at the top of the target list.Georgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17731178888696691472noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-7447941156178287012018-09-01T06:26:10.411-07:002018-09-01T06:26:10.411-07:00Everyone's made their points are we've pro...Everyone's made their points are we've probably reached the end of useful discussion on this. Let's end this thread and move on. Thanks.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-18710305939317273762018-09-01T06:20:52.192-07:002018-09-01T06:20:52.192-07:00The trainers in Georgia were never intended to fig...The trainers in Georgia were never intended to fight, and thus are not a tripwire. The composite battalions in the Baltic’s are intended to fight, and thus are a tripwire. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-56607261510657253052018-09-01T05:46:28.572-07:002018-09-01T05:46:28.572-07:00You've summed up one of the key differences th...You've summed up one of the key differences that the West refuses to recognize and that is that the Chinese do not have the same value system we do and do not think as we do. Until we recognize that we'll continue to miscalculate about them.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-62556110436259766052018-09-01T01:22:52.256-07:002018-09-01T01:22:52.256-07:00Well, few people would call a CVBG at sea a "...Well, few people would call a CVBG at sea a "tripwire force" either, and people consider mere composite battalions in the Baltics (one per country) a tripwire force, so I suppose 127 trainers in Georgia were considered to be relevant in the tripwire role by the Georgian government. Their problem was that the Russian one disagreed.<br /><br />Regarding PH; I note that you quit without bringing forward arguments. You should feel invited to look at the history (especially Yamamoto's respect for U.S. industrial capacity after his time in the U.S.) from this angle.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-983010049649238492018-08-31T21:57:26.724-07:002018-08-31T21:57:26.724-07:00"In other words, if you're a reasonable p..."In other words, if you're a reasonable person and are so worried about nuclear escalation, why isn't China?"<br /><br />I dunno, they think differently, perhaps. :V<br /><br />You talk about distinguishing between conventional and strategic ballistic missiles, but until the missile impacts you can't actually tell what the warhead is. The only difference between an ASBM and an MRBM is the warhead: in terms of everything else that is externally observable, they are the same missile, they have the same flight profile, the same launch mechanism.<br /><br />My read is that the Chinese are taking advantage of Clinton shifting the US strategic posture from launch on warning to retaliatory attacks. Presumably they may think that the US will wait to see the missiles impact and conduct BDA before deciding to retaliate with nuclear fire. That might work if they're trying to do targeted attacks on American ships pierside at Yokosuka, Sasebo, or Guam. It's a different story if they're trying to shut down US airbases in Japan and Korea, because as the Syria Tomahawk strike showed, airbases are pretty hardy things with a lot of target points you need to service to keep them permanently out of commission, and the conventional warheads on DF-21 and DF-26 are at most what, 2000 lbs? The fastest way to shut down those airbases is going to be dropping nukes on them - _that_'s what gets you your nuclear retaliation.<br /><br />The other thing to consider is that the Chinese may indeed have anticipated American nuclear retaliation if they nuke US airbases, but have made the judgement call that American retaliation will be discriminatory and in kind, and they may consider it worth it to lose several airbases of their own to retaliatory ICBM attack in order to take PACAF's bases off the table. <br /><br />"I nuke you, you nuke me, but I've decided I can afford to eat your nukes, as painful as that may be."WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-63067229603875704652018-08-31T21:46:23.890-07:002018-08-31T21:46:23.890-07:00Okay, real talk time here: The average reader goin...Okay, real talk time here: The average reader going through these comments is going to get confused, because you've been consistently arguing for greater ASW training and assets in the USN, but when they see you say that subs have an overwhelming advantage in ASW, they're going not reasonably wonder: "Wait, if the subs have an overwhelming advantage, if the ASW fleet as an overwhelming disadvantage, what's the point?"<br /><br />You and I know what the point is - they don't. <br /><br />The way I see my presence here, it's to discuss, provide an intellectual challenge (iron sharpens iron, afterall), and at times act as an audience surrogate, asking the questions from their perspective. In future I'll be more direct about that - I forget you haven't known me as long as SB has.WIld Goosehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16911145032644199127noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-53912347785927023452018-08-31T15:08:44.166-07:002018-08-31T15:08:44.166-07:00"not combat troops. Those trainers/advisers &..."not combat troops. Those trainers/advisers "<br /><br />A handful of advisers is hardly a tripwire force. You should probably drop this discussion at this point.<br /><br />Similarly, your view of Japan's war with the US is equally wrong. Again, we've probably reached an end for this discussion.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-6606088820916203382018-08-31T14:11:48.416-07:002018-08-31T14:11:48.416-07:00CNO; I wrote American troops, not combat troops. T...CNO; I wrote American troops, not combat troops. Those trainers/advisers weren't exactly paper-pushers, though. Trainers/advisers were effectively part of their trainee combat formations in many other conflicts.<br /><br />You are likely wrong about Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto had a giant respect for the American war industry. The disabling of the Pacific Fleet was a precondition for the southward expansion, which was necessary for resources and for gaining a merchant marine big enough to at least cope with Japanese peacetime transportation demands.<br /><br />A plausible war plan was a necessity for the IJN leadership to dare a war with the U.S. (and the Empire at the same time). A dovish IJN leadership would have prevented the war.<br /><br />A Pacific Fleet safely moored in San Diego might have led to the Japanese compromising on their ambitions in China in exchange for access to foreign oil. I understand that's not quite the perspective that's being promoted in the U.S..S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-59875415289347240462018-08-31T12:46:14.980-07:002018-08-31T12:46:14.980-07:00"There WERE American troops in Georgia"
..."There WERE American troops in Georgia"<br /><br />I'm not aware of any US combat troops having been in Georgia. Do you have a reference to support that?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-13541936013854320282018-08-31T12:43:00.946-07:002018-08-31T12:43:00.946-07:00"targets that enticed an aggression."
N..."targets that enticed an aggression."<br /><br />No. Your examples did not entice a war into being. Pearl Harbor, for example, was not why the Japanese started the war. It was merely a convenient initial target. The war was going to happen regardless. If Pearl Harbor had not existed, the war would simply have started somewhere else.<br /><br />The same is true for the German attack on Russia (I assume that's what you're referring to). Hitler had made up his mind to do that regardless.<br /><br />The British attack on the Copenhagen fleet was simply part of the larger war against Napoleon.<br /><br />None of those example were the reason a war started.<br /><br />To the best of my knowledge, there is not example in history to support your contention. There is nothing wrong with having your theory but recognize that there is no supporting historical evidence for it.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-76346452322986105902018-08-31T11:12:36.572-07:002018-08-31T11:12:36.572-07:00There was no US tripwire force in Georgia.
I do...There was no US tripwire force in Georgia. <br /><br />I don't think any of your other examples were intended as tripwire forces either. (Danish forces, Soviet red army, Pearl Harbor)<br /><br />Of course Pearl Harbor did propel the US into WWII (casus belli). So it acted as a tripwire, even if it wasn't meant to be one.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-31905809496135241412018-08-31T11:04:05.159-07:002018-08-31T11:04:05.159-07:00About a Georgia example: There WERE American troop...About a Georgia example: There WERE American troops in Georgia, but they did NOT matter at all.<br /><br />A response beyond some petty cruise missile diplomacy was impossible in the South Ossetia conflict. Americans have issues coming to grips with such limitations, but the U.S. was powerless (that's the nice choice of words) in that conflict. Practically no relevant forces were able to arrive in time. Russia dominated the skies over Georgia - airlift was thus unbearably risky.<br />Erdogan's Turkey was the power that the Russians had to be concerned about, not the U.S..<br /><br />Two things would have mattered;<br />1 contingency planning together with Turkey<br />2 to avoid the diplomatic blunder of letting Saakashvili believe he could attack Russians and get away with it because of magic White House toleration. He go that stupid idea because he provided auxiliary troops to one of the U.S.'s stupid small wars.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78463145157341996802018-08-31T10:55:34.019-07:002018-08-31T10:55:34.019-07:00It's difficult to tell when war would not have...It's difficult to tell when war would not have happened, even in hindsight. We do know of historical tasty targets that enticed an aggression.<br /><br />1 The Danish fleet at Copenhagen<br />2 The proximity of Soviet read army and air force forces close to the border to the axis.<br />3 Pearl Harbour (taking out the Pacific Fleet's battleships was very central to Yamamoto's war plan)<br /><br />Overall, it's about as difficult to find a case where tripwire forces clearly preserved the peace as it is to find a case where they (or otherwise exposed and very close forces) were considered more a target than respected as a force or signal.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-69661500831754502952018-08-31T10:22:44.262-07:002018-08-31T10:22:44.262-07:00"tripwire forces ... can make war more likely..."tripwire forces ... can make war more likely if they're a tasty coup de main target."<br /><br />That's an interesting thought but I'm dubious. Can you think of any example where that has actually happened?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-47777230713718575362018-08-31T10:20:15.353-07:002018-08-31T10:20:15.353-07:00I don't see how a small force added to the ind...I don't see how a small force <i>added</i> to the indigenous forces makes war more likely, unless the aggressor wants war with both nations anyway. Maybe I missed that part of your argument.<br /><br />Casus belli is integral to deterrence, especially tripwire deterrence. It has to play on the aggressor's fear of causing a wider conflict, especially against a superior foe. If the aggressor doesn't fear this, then this form of deterrence won't stop the conflict.<br /><br />The US didn't intervene militarily in the Ukraine or Georgian conflicts with Russia, but what if a US brigade was on scene and attacked in either situation? We would not have just responded with strong language and sanctions if Americans were killed. The US public would have demanded a military response. <br /><br />It's simple schoolyard game theory,<br /><br />A bully may pick on a weaker kid, but if the weaker kid has a big brother, the bully may be deterred. If the bully picks on the kid anyway, the brother has casus belli to beat the tar out of the bully. Yes the kid might still get beat up, but so will the bully.<br /><br />OTOH, the big brother might not step in to protect another, unrelated kid. No casus belli.<br /><br /><br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-32172861520115661792018-08-31T09:38:22.661-07:002018-08-31T09:38:22.661-07:00You're neglecting the extra costs incurred whe...You're neglecting the extra costs incurred when the tripwire force gets overwhelmed. You also avoided my point that tripwire forces can affect the probability of war counter-intuitively; they can make war more likely if they're a tasty coup de main target.<br /><br />Moreover, I don't consider a "casus belli" as again whatsoever. It's the failure to keep the peace, so the failure case is differing only by whether the tripwire force was destroyed or not.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-60989181534050663562018-08-31T08:16:56.799-07:002018-08-31T08:16:56.799-07:00@SO,
Key:
success = no hostilities
failure + casu...@SO,<br /><br />Key:<br />success = no hostilities<br />failure + casus belli = hostilities, but unambigious national and international mandate for response<br />failure = hostilities, no clear mandate for response<br /><br />Cases:<br />No tripwire + no hostile intent = success<br />No tripwire + hostile intent = failure<br /><br />Tripwire + no hostile intent = success<br />Tripwire + hostile intent + deterred = success<br />Tripwire + hostile intent + not deterred = falure + casus belli<br /><br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-55191517648047285642018-08-31T07:27:21.650-07:002018-08-31T07:27:21.650-07:00"Some in the Navy had been opposed to what am..."Some in the Navy had been opposed to what amounted to forward-basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor in mid-1940."<br /><br />In the short term it certainly proved disastrous. However, over the course of the war, Pearl Harbor proved absolutely vital as a forward base.<br /><br />The best approach might have been to forward base the fleet at Pearl but do so with some intelligent defensive measures.<br /><br />You've raised a fascinating historical point that is relevant today. What are your thoughts? Should we or shouldn't we be forward basing significant fleet assets?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-21678624286675619822018-08-31T07:23:49.897-07:002018-08-31T07:23:49.897-07:00"Its has the US spending like crazy to defend..."Its has the US spending like crazy to defend against a threat that China has never demonstrated against even an anchored barge."<br /><br />While ballistic missiles have not been demonstrated against a moving target (a ship), no one doubts their effectiveness against a fixed target like Guam. The Navy is working on ballistic missile defense partly for ships but just as much or more for defending land bases.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-91109604607557799482018-08-31T07:21:06.465-07:002018-08-31T07:21:06.465-07:00"Why not resurrect the Pegasus class with the..."Why not resurrect the Pegasus class with the NSM and a sea ram."<br /><br />I love the PHMs but the problem with the PHM now, as then, is basing. They are short ranged and we lack the forward basing to make them operationally effective. Where would you envision them operating and how would you support them.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-22902389629265646562018-08-31T07:18:40.229-07:002018-08-31T07:18:40.229-07:00"rhethorical flourish ... socratic method&quo..."rhethorical flourish ... socratic method"<br /><br />You and Socrates might be more effective to stick with straightforward, factual discussions. This blog is fact and logic based. Incorrect statements, however intended, will always be challenged. Keep it simple and to the point and you'll do well. Feel free to engage in speculation and opinion (I do it all the time!) but be sure to indicate it as such.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-73565545268500256512018-08-31T07:15:46.449-07:002018-08-31T07:15:46.449-07:00@Anon;
that doesn't matter.
There's practi...@Anon;<br />that doesn't matter.<br />There's practically nothing to be gained by tripwire forces. Their "success" is an illusion.<br /><br />Mobilise all the rationality and calmness and objectivity that you can muster, draw a matrix of the different cases and the outcomes with my texts in mind.<br /><br />You may see through the illusion.S Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03359796414832859686noreply@blogger.com