tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post1563539854243877090..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Filling the GapsComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger113125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-66578918460999920002015-10-15T13:35:51.020-07:002015-10-15T13:35:51.020-07:00Ditto! Love it. The phenomenon exists in the cor...Ditto! Love it. The phenomenon exists in the corporate world, as well.<br /><br />One would hope that the Service Chiefs and Joint Chiefs would be above that kind of thing and could offer a voice of reason and logical prioritization, at least within their own service. Sadly, that's not the case. CNO Greenert, one of the worst CNO's that I've seen, failed utterly to referee those types of competitions, among his many other failings.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-23516342660969103742015-10-15T13:13:27.187-07:002015-10-15T13:13:27.187-07:00"Promotional Imperative" - I like it!"Promotional Imperative" - I like it!B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-55606003781613214762015-10-15T12:34:04.495-07:002015-10-15T12:34:04.495-07:00As I've said many times, VLS-launched cruise m...<i>As I've said many times, VLS-launched cruise missiles are niche capability and not terribly valuable or cost effective in a large, extended campaign (i.e. above hundreds or low thousands of aimpoints).</i> <br /><br />That's because it's a legacy system originally designed for nuclear war. Then when that mission stopped being plausible, something had to be done with the hardware, and it had some cool capabilities. That plus the Promotional Imperative and some chance events meant it became a key weapon system, although it's too expensive and cumbersome to be used in real mas quantities.<br /><br />The "Promotional Imperative" is the term I coined for the world view that says "Whatever it is that I do is obviously the most important thing in the Navy and I should promote the interests of my community in aggressive competition with all the other communities." This seems to be a rather important social force in the USN, and in the other US services. <br />John Dallmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01184719865727491672noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-15539675745255315582015-10-15T08:36:42.515-07:002015-10-15T08:36:42.515-07:00Again, you touch on a number of worthwhile points....Again, you touch on a number of worthwhile points.<br /><br />I completely agree that the Navy's inventory of cruise missiles is woefully insufficient to prosecute a major war. Similarly, the AF does not have the inventory of aircraft to prosecute the strike portion of a major war. Twenty B-2s won't last a month in a major war. B-1/52s are not survivable in a contested airspace. As a military, we need to decide how we are going to prosecute a major war (have a strategy, as I continually harp on) and make sure we have the resources to actually do it.<br /><br />We have the wrong aircraft, at least for the carrier roles I envision. Sadly, I honestly don't think the Navy has a formalized role for the carrier in a major war. If they do, I don't know what it is. The F-18/35 wing doesn't support any logical role I can come up with.<br /><br />You really should consider authoring a post on one of these many points/topics!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-28276220331502736712015-10-15T05:53:06.147-07:002015-10-15T05:53:06.147-07:00All airpower is pulsed rather than continuous powe...All airpower is pulsed rather than continuous power, but individual air battles have characteristics of continuous fire. Regardless, pulsed power as modeled by Hughes' Salvo equations show the same benefits of numbers, and a similar square law.<br /><br />On Navy carriers as <i>escorts</i> for Navy VLS shooters, personally, IMHO, this is a gigantic waste of resources. As I've said many times, VLS-launched cruise missiles are niche capability and not terribly valuable or cost effective in a large, extended campaign (i.e. above hundreds or low thousands of aimpoints). <br /><br />If the Navy wants to be a major contributor to a large, high threat, strike warfare campaign, they need to find additional ways to deliver huge numbers of strikes, not cruise missile pinpricks.<br /><br />Again just MHO.<br /><br />Navy fighters escorting AF bombers is a better option, but we don't have enough of either to support much, if any, attrition. <br /><br />So again, I go back to the need for large numbers of reusable robots that can afford to be lost, and a hot production line that can be rapidly scaled to produce more.<br /><br />The Navy is in a unique position of having <b>relocatable</b> launch platforms, that are harder to hit than fixed airbases. They just need more of them, and better and more numerous vehicles to launch (and recover!). <br /><br />Flat tops of various sizes should become the Navy's primary surface vessel design. It is the most flexible and useful configuration for a surface ship. <br /><br />Small flat tops can carry rotary wing aviation, UAVs, and UCAVs. Perhaps even a well deck for an LCAC, replacing amphibious ships.<br /><br />Medium sized flat tops can carry a superset of the small flat top, plus some manned aircraft like E-2D or limited numbers of fighters. Maybe these replace LHA/Ds.<br /><br />Large flat tops can carry traditional CVN+ airwings.<br /><br />All can carry Marines, large air wings, or mission modularized components.<br /><br />Costs for UAVs and UCAVs need to be controlled. Numbers are as important as individual platform capability.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78468516428069524032015-10-15T05:50:02.075-07:002015-10-15T05:50:02.075-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-26459481776412243172015-10-14T18:54:31.254-07:002015-10-14T18:54:31.254-07:00Swarms of UCAVs seem to be a pulse rather than a c...Swarms of UCAVs seem to be a pulse rather than a continuous fire that is the basis of the Lanchester laws.<br /><br />That aside, you touched on a number of worthwhile points in a brief comment.<br /><br />Yes, we are ignoring the concept of numbers.<br /><br />Yes, I think we are vastly overestimating our exchange rates especially given that we'll be fighting in the enemy's playground.<br /><br />Yes, we are going to find that we have far too few bases located far too far away from the battlespace and far too vulnerable to cruise and ballistic missile attack. Further, we're going to find out that our few and greatly disbursed bases are going to present serious logistic supply challenges once we start expending consumables at major war rates of use.<br /><br />Attrition tolerance - what a great topic. It ties in with one of my overarching themes - that we've forgotten what real war is. We've adopted the habit of zero casualties as our main objective. All of our ROEs, operation planning, and tactics are geared at zero casualties. That's laudable but only to an extent. Risk aversion seriously limits operational flexibility.<br /><br />Navy fighter numbers (I assume you mean air wing size, at least indirectly) are far too small for the roles they will be asked to play. This ties into my theme of the role of the carrier as an escort for the AF bombers and the Navy shooter ships (the Burkes). We do not have the number or type of carrier aircraft for that role.<br /><br />You summed up much of this blog in a brief comment!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-46470538253897264762015-10-14T15:34:51.934-07:002015-10-14T15:34:51.934-07:00The Heavy and IBCTs lost a battalion a while ago (...The Heavy and IBCTs lost a battalion a while ago (down to two), but are getting it back as part of this reorg. <br /><br />Strykers are "medium" in that they are lighter than the heavy BCTs but heavier than the IBCTs. :) They have organic armor all the way down. Granted, Stryker armor isn't the same as Bradley or Abrams armor, but better than what the IBCTs get. IBCTs don't get much in the way of vehicular mobility in general. <br /><br />IMHO, IBCTs need "full vehicular mobility". Now what that form takes is debatable. I'd go with modular recapped HMMWVs, personally. We can't afford to buy enough JLTVs for this, and they are too heavy anyway. We don't need light forces that are as heavy or strategically immobile as our SBCTs. HMMWVs have served us well.<br /><br />I've seen various approaches to organizing this, but I'd go with something that looks like a Stryker unit, only replacing the ICVs with armored troop carrier HMMWVs. Pimp them out with a variety of SPECOPS mods. Then at least we don't have to scrounge for vehicles every time we deploy an IBCT. <br /><br />We can always swap out HMMWVs and FMVTs for JLTVs and MRAPs in theater, if needed.<br /><br />B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-6415380387489088792015-10-14T13:47:12.579-07:002015-10-14T13:47:12.579-07:00My understanding (and I may well be wrong about th...My understanding (and I may well be wrong about this) is that the armored brigades have also gotten smaller as well as less numerous. Something about dropping or downsizing the component battalions so that there are significantly fewer tanks in the brigade than before. I just read that but I don't track or catalog ground combat writings so I can't give you a link.<br /><br />I also don't consider a Stryker to be even "medium" but that's just an opinion.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-73392544153218056072015-10-14T13:29:44.078-07:002015-10-14T13:29:44.078-07:00Well.. I've always conceived of using swarms ...Well.. I've always conceived of using swarms of A2A UCAVs in conjunction with other air warfare assets, so I don't think i'm overextending it. <br /><br />The problem right now is that we are <b>ignoring</b> Lanchester's Square Law, with our tiny fleet of supposedly high LER F-22s, ever fewer F-15s, and limited, vulnerable basing in the Pacific. <br /><br />We don't have much attrition tolerance in our OCA/DCA system today. At least not on the scale of what would be needed in the Pacific. The Navy brings virtually none. It might be able to muster 80-120 fighters, assuming we can move 2-3 CVBGs simultaneously. And all of them mediocre, short-ish ranged air-to-air aircraft. Many of whom will be needed to protect the carrier.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-63525230164320568872015-10-14T13:10:01.730-07:002015-10-14T13:10:01.730-07:00In 2013 we had the following:
17 armored brigade ...In 2013 we had the following:<br /><br />17 armored brigade combat teams<br />8 Stryker brigade combat teams<br />10 infantry brigade combat teams<br />6 infantry brigade combat teams (airborne)<br />4 infantry brigade combat teams (air assault)<br /><br />Total: 45 BCTs<br />Heavy: 38%<br />Medium: 17.8%<br />Light: 44%<br /><br />Now we have:<br /><br />Total: 30 BCTs<br />Heavy: 33%<br />Medium: 23%<br />Light: 43%<br /><br />So yes, we drew down on the heavy side a bit (5%), but the percentage of light BCTs went down slightly as well. Medium (Stryker) BCTs increased (as a percentage of the force).<br /><br />So if anything, besides being smaller, we became more "middle weight". <br /><br />I do agree that development dollars have gone far more towards COIN and infantry, rather than the high end. <br /><br />Personally, I always thought the Strykers needed an autocannon and ATGM. The Army was too focused on carrying the 9-man squad at the expense of vehicular weapons, and too focused on packing them into C130s (which was unrealistic from the start).<br /><br />Just MHO, though.<br /><br />B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78357563317342582942015-10-14T12:07:32.303-07:002015-10-14T12:07:32.303-07:00I am not a ground combat expert by any means and I...I am not a ground combat expert by any means and I don't follow the Army that closely. Still, what I've read indicates that we've shed around 15 BCTs since 2012 (that's reduction - not really the point of this conversation). Worse, two (more?) BCTs have been converted to light infantry, air drop units. I seem to recall reading that two or three armored units will be dropped, as well. Even some Stryker units (and I don't consider those to be armored vehicles) are losing their vehicles and becoming light infantry.<br /><br />I'm looking not at current numbers but at trends and training. All the trends are towards light vehicles. As I said, it's the only vehicle we're purchasing. Yes, there are upgrade programs in place for the Abrams and maybe that's sufficient - maybe not. Our focus is on training for light infantry deployments. Our technology development is focused on notepads for the individual soldier, backpack UAVs, guided bullets, etc. Those are all nice things but they are not going to suffice when we face armored divisions. Where is our focus on things that go BOOM? The Army, like the Marines, have made the decision to emphasize the light end of the combat spectrum. That's a decision I think we'll come to regret. <br /><br />Why is the Army frantically trying to upgun the Strykers in Europe? Because we've gotten too light and now we're looking at Russian armored units and panicking because we realize we're outgunned.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-49865564518006915612015-10-14T11:45:18.618-07:002015-10-14T11:45:18.618-07:00Be careful not to overextend the applicability of ...Be careful not to overextend the applicability of Lanchester's Square Law (or his other work, for that matter). The equations have limited applicability because they model a very simplistic system (single kills, no defensive capability, continuous fire, etc.). They do not model missiles, machine guns, aircraft, bombs, grenades, etc. - all the weapons of modern warfare!. The equations are like Hughes work - very simplistic. Useful for grasping some very basic concepts but not much more than that.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-64538723560563506622015-10-14T11:40:47.418-07:002015-10-14T11:40:47.418-07:00I'm with you on all of that. You know me, I&#...I'm with you on all of that. You know me, I'm a big proponent of numbers over technology (within reason - no amount of Sopwith Camels will help). I like the "throwaway UCAV". To repeat myself, I'm just dubious that we can build one with sufficient capability at an affordable cost but I'd like to be proven wrong.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-20553504191824411622015-10-14T11:40:09.638-07:002015-10-14T11:40:09.638-07:00The Army has thousands of Bradleys and M1s still i...The Army has thousands of Bradleys and M1s still in service. They will remain in service for a long time to come. The Army is not converting to light infantry forces. They converted some light infantry to SBCTs and downsized overall.<br /><br />According to Wikipedia, in July 2015, the Army's plan was to have the following BCTs:<br /><br />10 armored brigade combat teams<br />7 Stryker brigade combat teams<br />6 infantry brigade combat teams<br />4 infantry brigade combat teams (airborne)<br />3 infantry brigade combat teams (air assault)<br /><br />Personally, I think we have too many IBCTs, which all need to be enhanced with additional organic morbility. We don't need specialized air assault BCTs. We probably don't need 4 airborne BCTs either. <br />B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-88032584090322958812015-10-14T10:56:59.963-07:002015-10-14T10:56:59.963-07:00I am certainly a proponent, but i do at least try ...I am certainly a proponent, but i do at least try to temper my enthusiasm with simpler, hopefully more realistic, goals. <br /><br />On numbers, <br /><br />Lanchester's Square Law says, essentially, the quantitatively inferior force needs a relative "combat power" equal to the square of the ratio of forces in order to achieve parity.<br /><br />So if you go strictly by Lanchester, if we had 30:1 numbers in favor, the enemy would need a relative combat power of 900:1 to stay even. <br /><br />Even small differences can have huge impacts, especially over multiple engagements. Large differences are magnified. <br /><br />Attrition is a bitch. <br /><br />Now clearly wars aren't won with equations, but there's a point where numbers alone can turn the tide of a battle.<br /><br />So to some extent, we can buy our way to victory by simply bringing more, even if they aren't that good. This is taking a page out of the Russian playbook. UCAVs afford us the opportunity to build something cheaper, and smaller than we could otherwise. Can't realistically put a human in a 2-3000lb MTOW fighter aircraft., but a robot brain fits in there fine. Can't realistically plan to throw away American lives in a 1:9 LER against. But we can plan to do that with robots. <br /><br /><br />B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-12484029206983026402015-10-14T07:11:19.171-07:002015-10-14T07:11:19.171-07:00I was speaking in general terms. There are many p...I was speaking in general terms. There are many people who ascribe near magical properties to UAVs. Honestly, you a have a small tendency in that direction in that you believe we can achieve a far more extensive combination of capabilities and low costs than I do. That's fine at the moment. Until someone attempts to build something like this we can each hold on to our opinions.<br /><br />The UCLASS that Congress and others are describing is an example of exactly what I'm talking about regarding a fantasy combination of capabilities and cost. The same applies to many of the UCAV discussions I've seen. People think we're going to build a Cylon automated fighter that will go toe-to-toe with manned fighters, beat them, and only cost a million dollars (to be fair, you've never gone that far in your discussions!). I get emails all the time (including some in the military who should know better) along this line. There is a strong feeling "out there" that unmanned air/ground/sea/subsurface vehicles are the answer to everything.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-57309635755150245362015-10-13T20:15:17.654-07:002015-10-13T20:15:17.654-07:00Reread my posts. I never said any such thing. Reread my posts. I never said any such thing. B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-6402923192255827392015-10-13T17:58:39.360-07:002015-10-13T17:58:39.360-07:00You're correct, in theory, to a small extent. ...You're correct, in theory, to a small extent. Unless we can achieve ridiculous engagement ratios of 30:1, or so, small differences in engagement ratios won't have that much impact. In fact, larger engagement ratios may simply make for a more target rich environment, as they say. I envision enemy aircraft standing fairly well off and just picking off UCAVs until they run out of missiles and then retiring. Of course, if the UCAVs are so stealthy or so hard to hit that the enemy aircraft have to come within gun range then the equation changes. Unfortunately, in order to achieve that kind of stealth and capability we're looking at individual UCAVs on the order of F-35s.<br /><br />I'm afraid that believing that UCAVs can combine stealth, small size, enormous range/loiter, large payloads, supersonic speed, etc. with dirt cheap prices is just pure fantasy. If such a combination were feasible we'd have already done it instead of creating the F-35.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-31479575905021692222015-10-13T12:31:49.431-07:002015-10-13T12:31:49.431-07:00The loss exchange rate is dependent on the numbers...The loss exchange rate is dependent on the numbers you bring.<br /><br />For example, if you just run 1-on-1 engagements over and over vs an Su-30+, this A2A UCAV may have a LER of 1:10. The Flanker may win most engagements. <br /><br />But if you switch that to 5-on-1 engagements, the Su-30+ may get, say, three UCAVs before it finally succumbs to numerous missile shots. So then the LER drops to 1:3. <br /><br />If, by virtue of lower cost and large buys, we can afford to bring MANY more UCAVs to the fight than the enemy has fighters, we can change the LER without requiring each UCAV to have a high LER on its own.<br /><br />Lanchester's Square Law.<br /><br />The only way we can take advantage of this, without killing a LOT of pilots is with UCAVs. <br /><br />Of course this A2A UCAV may actually have better than 1:10 on its own anyway, owing to stealth, small size, lack of emissions, and so on.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-32285290617604217822015-10-13T12:30:39.622-07:002015-10-13T12:30:39.622-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-13364605717108066132015-10-13T06:49:37.021-07:002015-10-13T06:49:37.021-07:00The cost/exchange rate issue is why I find the who...The cost/exchange rate issue is why I find the whole UCAV concept to be so questionable, by the way, and why I've never expressed much enthusiasm for it in previous posts and discussions, in case you were wondering.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-16869630670115134222015-10-13T06:47:09.425-07:002015-10-13T06:47:09.425-07:00This is kind of the crux of the issue. If the exc...This is kind of the crux of the issue. If the exchange rate is 1:1, we could afford a much more expensive UCAV than if the exchange rate is 1:10. If the rate is 1:100, to take the concept towards the worst case extreme, there probably is no UCAV cost that would make the concept affordable or tactically useful.<br /><br />My uneducated guess is that 1:10 is about the "sweet spot" given current costs and tactical usefulness.<br /><br />Now, can a UCAV achieve a 1:10 rate? I have severe doubts about that unless we build a near-F-35 UCAV which would invalidate the entire concept.<br /><br />If we could build a $5M UCAV and achieve a 1:10 exchange (so, $50M lost to achieve 1 kill) that might be affordable and tactically useful by saving our F-22/35/18/15 and thinning the enemy ranks a bit. If we start to bet much beyond $5M, it starts to become unaffordable. If the UCAV costs, say, $10M with a 1:10 rate, we're spending $100M to achieve 1 kill. That's getting pretty questionable. We'd be better off building an actual F-35 (assuming we could build one for $100M which, at the moment, we can't).<br /><br />Can we build a $5M UCAV that is capable enough to achieve a 1:10 exchange rate? I don't know but I'm dubious.<br /><br />What do you think?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-60276825194916194962015-10-13T05:31:45.545-07:002015-10-13T05:31:45.545-07:00There isn't an easy answer for this. A lot de...There isn't an easy answer for this. A lot depends on numbers bought, number of carriers available, how well they can integrate with the larger air superiority "system of systems" (ick) framework. And then finally, how well they individually perform in the role.<br /><br />It may be easier to figure out what the loss exchange rate needs to be to counter Chinese numbers in specific scenarios and work back from there. What would it take to turn the tides?B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-90224744482743285092015-10-11T17:13:14.452-07:002015-10-11T17:13:14.452-07:00"Nobody expects JLTV to be a high-end, front-..."Nobody expects JLTV to be a high-end, front-line combat vehicle. <br />...<br />JLTV fits a COIN niche. "<br /><br />You say that but ... Look at the evidence. What is the only vehicle actually being procured by the Army? The JLTV. How many? Over 50,000!!!! Meanwhile, we have no Bradley or Abrams replacement program. The Marines have no AAV replacement program (decades of study but no actual program). The Marines are shedding tanks and artillery. The Army and Marines are converting to light infantry forces. Our heavy armored divisions don't even train as complete units anymore.<br /><br />To me, that adds up to the Army viewing the JLTV as their major combat vehicle in a completely misguided view of how wars will be fought.<br /><br />So, you say that, but the evidence doesn't exactly wholeheartedly support you.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com