tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post1055537011269846857..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Carrier Aircraft Land Attack Weapon RangesComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger70125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-84893913381806525292022-10-05T04:40:50.079-07:002022-10-05T04:40:50.079-07:00"If we can suppress enemy air defenses to all..."If we can suppress enemy air defenses to allow the air wing to support an amphibious landing, is it not possible to suppress enemy air defenses to allow the air wing to perform land attack?"<br /><br />No. You're conflating two entirely different scenarios: amphibious assault and long range land attack against a far distant, single target.<br /><br />In an assault, you have land forces, air forces, surface forces, and sub-surface forces all working in a mutually supporting way to push additional land forces ashore and you do this by establishing temporary air dominance. That allows aircraft and helos to operate without fear of enemy air which means they can hunt and destroy enemy artillery, missiles, and air defenses. AT THE SAME TIME (the mutual support part !), naval gun fire, helos, ground forces, and SEAD will be working to find and kill enemy SAMs. Ground forces will search for and destroy radars, MANPADs, SAM sites, and the like. And so on. Each component of the overall force will be supporting each other and eliminating the threats to the other components.<br /><br />In contrast, an isolated, long range carrier strike against an enemy base will have no supporting components. There won't be any ground forces hunting enemy anti-air SAMs. There won't be any establishment of local, temporary air dominance. There won't be any surface naval gun support providing general suppression and area bombardment. And so on. Without those things, it becomes very difficult to successfully conduct carrier strikes.<br /><br />One should also note that amphibious assaults, almost by definition, are conducted at the edge of enemy territory whereas carrier strike targets are located WITHIN enemy territory.<br /><br />Do you understand now?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-47574947995896194352022-10-05T02:58:38.472-07:002022-10-05T02:58:38.472-07:00"The table makes it clear that the Navy does ..."The table makes it clear that the Navy does not operate weapons with sufficient range to keep the launch aircraft out of range of land based SAMs and intercepting aircraft. It might be possible to safely and successfully attack lightly defended targets but major, well defended targets will have layered SAM defenses and nearby air bases supporting intercepting aircraft."<br /><br />"Aircraft will establish local air dominance and inland ground attack. Helicopters will hunt and kill medium range artillery and missile launchers."<br /><br />The premise of the your main post is that the Navy does not have sufficient long range weapons to allow carrier aircraft to conduct land attack, both in terms of deliverable quantity as well as weapon types; furthermore, enemy IADS and fighters will restrict air power from being brought to bear on the objective. At the same time, you are also arguing that in an amphibious landing scenario, it will be possible for aircraft to secure air dominance and hunt enemy fires in the face of an enemy IADS.<br /><br />My question is this: if we can therefore secure air dominance and operate our aircraft in the face of an enemy IADS during an amphibious assault, doesn't that suggest that the we can therefore suppress enemy air defenses sufficiently to allow us operational freedom?<br /><br />If we can suppress enemy air defenses to allow the air wing to support an amphibious landing, is it not possible to suppress enemy air defenses to allow the air wing to perform land attack?JMDhttps://weaponsandwarfare.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-25366098635537883342022-10-04T18:49:06.664-07:002022-10-04T18:49:06.664-07:00@ComNavOps: Not gonna lie, after reading your blog...@ComNavOps: Not gonna lie, after reading your blog for years, I wasn't expecting that turn, sempai. <br /><br />This has been a spirited argument, gentlemen. But this is all a moot point because the USMC as it exists is not built to perform an assault landing against a peer opponent, nor does it _intend_ to assault a peer opponent. A lot of these problems go away when you aren't trying to kick the door in against a defended coast.<br /><br />Over the years, I've come to the opinion that the Marines' amphibious assault force is really more akin to undeployed paratroopers, in that they are a threat in being that has a greater degree of freedom to chose the time and place of attack. The adversary is presented with a dilema: does he to hold a greater portion of his forces in reserve to respond to the paratroopers/marines, or does he reinforce his forces currently engaged and risk giving the paratroopers/marines a free zone to operate? (Note Desert Storm, with the amphibious landing threat to Iraq that pulled the General Staff's focus.)<br /><br />Mind you, the problem with using paratroopers and marines is that this threat in being lasts only so long as they are not committed. Once you commit them, the enemy knows where you are and how large your force is, and you either need to reinforce them ASAP or write off your force. Note VDV's air assault of Hostomel Airport, where they dropped in unsupported, fought hard, and got mauled because there was no armor linkup, which was ??? <br /><br />On the other hand, there are times when your intention is to do just that. Back in the 90s, Singapore Army's warplans called for dropping heliborne infantry batts into Johor to act as roadbumps on Malaysian invasion routes. The units were expected to be completely destroyed within 24 hours, and MINDEF saw that as the cost it had to pay stall TDM and buy time for mobilisation of reservists.Ghiskey Wolfhttps://navy-matters.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78928990393984887332022-10-04T09:59:32.373-07:002022-10-04T09:59:32.373-07:00"if you're going to teach me, please, TEA..."if you're going to teach me, please, TEACH ME."<br /><br />I am not going to teach you. I state this very clearly in the Comment Policy page. A certain level of knowledge is required to productively participate in these discussions and to be gently blunt, you do not seem to have that level of knowledge. There are many good sites where you can go to learn the basics of amphibious assaults. I urge you to make use of them.<br /><br />I am happy to explain particular, specific points for readers but I simply don't have the time to engage in fundamental-level education on broad topics.<br /><br />"I am genuinely bewildered "<br /><br />That is because you appear to lack a fundamental understanding of warfare in general and naval warfare, in particular. Thus, some of what's being presented seems incongruous to you.<br /><br />Brush up on the fundamentals and then this blog will make more sense to you.<br /><br />For example, study Normandy. We used battleships to great effect. Why? Why weren't the sunk by enemy artillery? Why weren't they sunk by enemy subs? Why weren't they sunk by enemy aircraft? Why did we use paratroops and gliders? These are all related questions and if you understand the fundamentals, you'll know the answer(s). Hint: it's all, essentially, the same answer.<br /><br />What were our fleet carriers doing during WWII Pacific island assaults? ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-63194388279571326902022-10-04T09:40:11.089-07:002022-10-04T09:40:11.089-07:00" slaughter the landing force with impunity. ..." slaughter the landing force with impunity. "<br /><br />You need to grasp how an amphibious assault is conducted. It is performed by a single battleship and a few troops. Instead, it is performed by a co-ordinated and joint assembly of forces, each of which offers mutually supporting capabilities. A battleship is not solely responsible for all land attack responsibilities. A battleship will provide immediate, close range fire support. Missiles will provide longer range precision attack. Aircraft will establish local air dominance and inland ground attack. Helicopters will hunt and kill medium range artillery and missile launchers. And so on. An assault provides for layered ground attack at all ranges against all threats. Battleships play their part in that assembly of force and play it supremely well.<br /><br />Before you comment further, you need to study how assaults are planned and conducted. You also need to avoid the common trap of evaluating assets in isolation. We do not fight in isolation. We fight as components in a multi-faceted force.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-71404027529325301632022-10-04T09:07:45.159-07:002022-10-04T09:07:45.159-07:00"Now, go study and contemplate the role of na..."Now, go study and contemplate the role of naval gun fire. Hint: there are many more uses than just standing off a beach."<br /><br />Sir, if you're going to teach me, please, TEACH ME. I don't understand why you're disagreeing with me so when I have read your blog for years and I have tried to understand your thinking, and from where I am sitting I am genuinely bewildered because it looks like you are departing from the body of thought you have developed over the years, while I have been posting based my understanding of the principles you have developed.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-67136598971068340222022-10-04T09:04:36.754-07:002022-10-04T09:04:36.754-07:00I will repeat again the problem as I see it:
&quo...I will repeat again the problem as I see it:<br /><br />"A battleship in the naval gunfire context, on the other hand, cannot close with a land-based enemy beyond the beach, because ships can't travel on dry ground."<br /><br />You have been critical of what infantry have been doing in Afghanistan, where they are engaged by weapons that outrange them, and thus resort to taking cover and calling in supporting fires to deal with those problems. I don't understand why you seem to consider that approach valid for a battleship, when the battleship is supposed to be the supporting fires that deals with the problem.<br /><br />In any other context on the high seas, outside of naval gunfire support, the battleship and its targets have equal freedom of movement, in the same way my rifle squad has equal freedom of movement with enemy infantry. That's why I haven't bothered to address that, because that's not a problem at sea. The problem is that in NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT, the shore is impassable terrain to a battleship. The only weapons available that can threaten enemy fires staged inland are missiles and PGMs and strike fighters, which are expensive and, as you've repeatedly said over the years, are not suitable for area bombardments - the role which naval gunfire and artillery serves.<br /><br />Sure, we can bombard the immediate defenses on the beach, and our desron can fire tomahawks to take care of the big, obvious fixed targets. But we can't touch the enemy's mobile artillery, who can fire on the beach and slaughter the landing force with impunity. Yes, the Marines' doctrinal counter to enemy mobile artillery is HIMARS, and HIMARS is an excellent weapon. But to use HIMARS, we have to unload those trucks from the landing craft, all while under fire from the enemy.<br /><br />Any plan that requires my enemy to let me set up perfectly to counter him, is a plan that is doomed to failure.<br /><br /><br />"You understand the role of infantry/rifles and you see a value in them despite the fact that many enemy artillery, rockets, missiles, aircraft, etc. are beyond the range of infantry with just their rifles."<br /><br />We have counters to the enemy's weapons that allow our infantry to close with the enemy. We drive to the battlefield in APCs and IFVs, we suppress the enemy's long range fires with our own long range fires, and we the Air Force as our long range deep strike precision artillery. If our tubes are rockets are out of range, we drive closer. We don't have a counter for the fact a ship cannot drive onto dry land, and our lack of long range naval gunfire is a weakness that the enemy can exploit.<br /><br />The Army, our biggest competitor, is making 70 mile guns, and they are still trying to make 1000 mile guns. But the Navy seems wholly uninterested in long range artillery after the failure of the railgun, and I suppose I'm just disappointed in how this is not a priority for the Navy.<br /><br />Evidently the Navy and Marines no longer think we're in the opposed landing business, and if we're not doing opposed landings, I suppose we don't really need naval gunfire, so this is all a moot point and academic. It's frustrating, is what it is, seeing the decisions being made in the Pentagon.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-23691235610010764832022-10-04T04:32:26.621-07:002022-10-04T04:32:26.621-07:00"The purpose of the infantry"
Excellent..."The purpose of the infantry"<br /><br />Excellent. You understand the role of infantry/rifles and you see a value in them despite the fact that many enemy artillery, rockets, missiles, aircraft, etc. are beyond the range of infantry with just their rifles.<br /><br />Now, go study and contemplate the role of naval gun fire. Hint: there are many more uses than just standing off a beach.<br /><br />" rifle squad has LEGS"<br /><br />And a ship has ENGINES.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-20387176564439987682022-10-04T01:33:15.573-07:002022-10-04T01:33:15.573-07:00Some further details:
* The M4A1's 14.5"...Some further details:<br /><br />* The M4A1's 14.5" barrel gives enough velocity to M855A1 rounds that at 550 yards, the round retains sufficient velocity on impact to consistently violently fragment and create lethal wounds. At 650 yards, the round's velocity has slowed enough that it does not consistently fragment, "merely" creating a wounding effect in human tissue - which is still good enough to suppress an enemy rifleman and his squad.<br /><br />** All three magnified optics enhance the soldier's ability to fight at range, as iron sights become less effective outside of 200 yards, due to the limitations of the human eye. ACOG is a no frills 4x fixed magnification sight; DVO is a 1-6x Low Power Variable Optic, and NGSW-FC is a 1-8x LPVO with an integral laser rangefinder and ballistic computer. Both DVO and NGSW-FC can be used as close combat optics on the 1x power setting, and all three optics feature etched reticles that do not require batteries***.<br /><br />*** ACOG has a fiber optic tube that collects sunlight to illuminate a chevron in the reticle to make it easier to see; DVO uses a battery to light up the reticle, creating a red dot in 1x mode for faster target acquisition. NGSW-FC uses a battery to power the laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, and illuminated red dot in 1x mode. Both DVO and NGSW-FC can be used on 1x power for close combat, without the illuminated dot; the dot function exists as decades of experience has shown that the human eye more easily perceives a red dot versus a crosshair reticle at close range (note the Aimpoint brand of close combat optics, which feature a red dot).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-65589410430559667032022-10-04T01:26:55.340-07:002022-10-04T01:26:55.340-07:00On your infantry rifle analogy, the relatively sho...On your infantry rifle analogy, the relatively short range of the rifle squad's weapons is mitigated by the fact that the rifle squad has LEGS. The purpose of the infantry is to use fire and maneuver to close with the enemy and defeat them in close combat. A battleship in the naval gunfire context, on the other hand, cannot close with a land-based enemy beyond the beach, because ships can't travel on dry ground. <br /><br />I'm not saying to get rid of naval guns. I'm saying that if we are going to be serious about naval gunfire, we need to be developing longer ranged guns, because short ranged guns aren't going to cut it, and aren't going to give us enough range to deal with land based fires. Yay, we pounded the beach! But what good does it do when we can't suppress enemy fires, because they're staged beyond the range of our guns?<br /><br />Ignore the issue of SSM batteries, and let's talk about enemy tube and rocket artillery. Until the Marines land their own artillery, the Navy has to provide naval gunfire and attempt to counterbattery enemy fires. But 24 miles means that our reach inland, and thus our ability to counterbattery enemy artillery, is limited. Let's assume we've come within 1 mile of the beach, which means that we can range inland 23 miles. Our European competitors have already made tube artillery that can shoot out to 40 miles. The Army's working on new artillery guns that can shoot out to 70 miles. <br /><br />What this means is that the adversary's artillery can fire on the beach and hammer the landing force with impunity, because they can't be suppressed. I guess we could try use strikefighters and helicopters like long range artillery to hunt and suppress enemy fires, but then they'll be running into enemy air defenses so they're going to be suppressed, the F-35's stealth doesn't work, and I recall you viewing tac air with a well-founded skepticism. Plus, how many fighters can we even spare for this? We need to keep a CAP to protect the carrier.<br /><br />What I'm saying is that if we are going to be serious about naval gunfire and battleships, we need to be serious about developing new guns that are competitive with the pace of developments on land. Long range guns aren't viable on destroyers because they're built too light, but that's a non-issue with battleships. But otherwise, if we think that 24 miles is enough range, then we shouldn't build battleships for naval gunfire, we should build more destroyers: steel is expensive, and we shouldn't be paying for 45,000 tons of warship just to carry 5" guns. And historical records show that destroyers contributed a lot to naval gunfire missions in the pacific war...<br /><br />Big Army is working on long range artillery, the Europeans are working on long range artillery, the Chinese are working on long range artillery, and the Russians were working on long range artillery. I don't understand how this is so controversial, the idea that we need more range if we want to be serious about naval gunfire.<br /><br />But that assumes that we, America, as a nation, actually WANT to be serious about naval gunfire.<br /><br />Coming back to the infantry rifle analogy - infantry rifles used to be short ranged weapons, effective out to two football fields or so, because iron sights are ass to use. Today, infantry rifles worldwide average 400 yards effective range. The M4A1 rifle can get lethal hits at 550 yards and wounding hits at 650 yards*, and Big Army's mass issue of ACOGs, DVOs and NGSW-FC optics means the soldier can exploit his weapon's range to the fullest**. He has a greater zone of control, as opposed to giving up, hunkering down and calling for fires (mortar, artillery, airstrike, etc), and his rifle is still just as effective in close combat.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-82755140765461054142022-10-03T13:01:20.463-07:002022-10-03T13:01:20.463-07:00"My point is that 24 miles really isn't m..."My point is that 24 miles really isn't much range"<br /><br />An infantry soldier's rifle has a range of only a mile or so and far less than that for effective range. So, should we get rid of all our infantry rifles? Of course not but why not? Go ahead and answer that and you'll be on your way to understanding naval guns.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-73095422663279272392022-10-03T02:15:45.396-07:002022-10-03T02:15:45.396-07:00My point is that 24 miles really isn't much ra...My point is that 24 miles really isn't much range, and while the individual rounds are of course more powerful, in terms of reach it's about the same with existing 5" guns. while an escort squadron is an inevitability, if the escorts are gonna be throwing Tomahawks to counter battery... why did we need have a battleship again? <br /><br />If we're going to be really serious about naval gunfire, then legacy 16" and 5" won't cut it. We need to seriously look into developing longer ranged guns , because more range gives us more flexibility: like SSM batteries, we can either position at a greater offset from the shore, or reach further in and remain more of a threat. A gun able to range 100 to 200 miles would give us more engagement brackets beyond just the 24 miles of 5" and the 1000 miles of Tomahawk. Zumwalt and AGS is a failed opportunity there.<br /><br />But the elephant in the room is that naval gunfire is not really a priority for the navy, and it doesn't seem likely that the Navy believes it will ever do an opposed landing against a peer opponent anymore...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-50799487938648768662022-10-02T13:23:30.571-07:002022-10-02T13:23:30.571-07:00"The old 16" guns only give us 24 miles ..."The old 16" guns only give us 24 miles of range, which means that we can only really strike the beach head and shore batteries throwing missiles at us have the range advantage."<br /><br />If we simply parked a battleship off an enemy's beach and challenged them to sink it, this observation would have some validity. This is an example of the common one-versus-everything-the-enemy-has thinking. The reality is that a battleship would be supported by escorts whose job is to take on anti-ship missiles and air support whose job is to hunt and destroy anti-ship missile launchers. The battleship would only have to cope with the occasional missile that got through the layered protection. In the meantime, it would be providing immensely valuable gun support.<br /><br />Of course, that's only one scenario. A battleship, as part of a joint force, would excel in many other scenarios.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-21874985248716516462022-10-02T13:18:46.370-07:002022-10-02T13:18:46.370-07:00"have armor large armor piercing warheads&quo..."have armor large armor piercing warheads"<br /><br />I've been unable to find any definitive evidence of armor piercing warheads on missiles. I've seen Russian claims but not from any authoritative source. I've also seen descriptions of armor piercing that seem like they're not actually armor piercing constructs. If you have a definitive, authoritative source, please let me know.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-72919615780514052242022-10-01T18:14:02.010-07:002022-10-01T18:14:02.010-07:00Our adversaries already have armor large armor pie...Our adversaries already have armor large armor piercing warheads as options for their large carrier killer missiles: it seems overly optimistic to assume more of such warheads will not propagate as we return battleships to service.<br /><br />I think people tend to get too hung up on the survivability of the battleship, and don't consider the conops enough. What is the point of the battleship? What is the CONOPS? Back in the day it was carrier escort and shore bombardment and ASuW. The old 16" guns only give us 24 miles of range, which means that we can only really strike the beach head and shore batteries throwing missiles at us have the range advantage. We can of course put VLS cells for missiles to do Tomahawk shoots and fire SAMs to defend the carrier, but then do we really need a battleship to do that when a new no-frills Spruance would perform just as well as a missile shooter?<br /><br />For sure, there's a time and place for naval gunfire, but we actually need to have the guns to do the naval gunfire. I don't actually think the Zumwalt CONOPS was entirely flawed in its thinking - I see value in a longish range gun to do accurate shore bombardment, so that Tomhawk can be reserved for targets truly deserving its range. But as with so many things, it's the execution...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78880871484941652472022-10-01T01:35:53.924-07:002022-10-01T01:35:53.924-07:00https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rapid_Dragon_(missil...https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rapid_Dragon_(missile_system)<br />First test over the Gulf of Mexico on December 16, 2021 using MC-130J flown by Air Force Special Operations Command.<br /><br />Future plans, to launch it from EC-130 SJ and C-17A<br />It is said that <br />C-130 variants could launch 12 JASSM cruise missiles<br />while C-17A could launch 45 JASSM cruise missiles<br /><br />Air Force's Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE) group is also researching integration of<br />- Live tests with C-17s, AGM-158C Long Range Anti Ship (LRASM) and 1900km range AGM-158D JASSM-XR which became available in low production numbers in 2021<br />- Boeing's lower cost but shorter range (80 km) JDAM-ER bombs<br />- Raytheon's ADM-160 MALD decoys<br /><br />What do think of this Palletized airdrop standoff missile launch system, Its Payload and How is it going to received target data from a distant command and control node while in flight ( as stated by them ).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-17210576847000525762022-09-29T16:38:18.408-07:002022-09-29T16:38:18.408-07:00As I pointed out before, the Navy sends many offic...As I pointed out before, the Navy sends many officers to schools to learn management. I assume part of that is cost management and cost reduction (God knows Jack Welch taught only this). So we should get our money's worth and have them do it. I don't know what the big cost drivers are on these ships. I just know military HW is the ONLY thing that increases in cost the more you build of them. But if I was doing this, I would rank items by cost and do the pareto analysis to see what are the big ticket items. Then you do a vicious "Do you need it to fight your attack mission" ONLY line by line examination. Line out items if it does not support launching, recovering, rearming attack aircraft. Notice I do not mention repair facilities. Get rid of EVERYTHING that<br />does not support attack. Depend on the Fleet Carrier Battlegroups to protect you. That is the kind of diciplined appraoch that will make this happen. This: what about, wouldn't be nice to be able to, what if, etc. is what gives us gold plated, multimission targets that cannot be put in harms way. Think of these new CVLs like the WWII DDs or DEs. My 2 cents.John Galthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05479269386331792318noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-81198688291227286272022-09-29T05:17:52.518-07:002022-09-29T05:17:52.518-07:00"note the Yamato, and plenty of other ships d..."note the Yamato, and plenty of other ships destroyed by bombs"<br /><br />To be accurate, Yamato was hit by at least 11 torpedoes and 7 bombs before sinking. Sister ship Musashi was hit by 19 torpedoes and 17 bombs before sinking. Bombs didn't sink either ship; torpedoes - lots of them - did the fatal damage. Descriptions of their final battles make clear that the bombs caused topside damage but did not, in any way, threaten to sink the ships.<br /><br />It should also be noted that the bombs that were used were mainly armor piercing. In contrast, the most common types of anti-ship missiles are not armor piercing and would be unlikely to penetrate a battleship.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-85541562075388854652022-09-29T03:19:41.969-07:002022-09-29T03:19:41.969-07:0064-96 cells seems to be the sweet spot for a destr...64-96 cells seems to be the sweet spot for a destroyer-sized combatant; the Spruances had 61 cells, the Burkes have 96. More ships is less efficient in generating large salvoes, but lets is mitigate risk by spreading out the missile inventory, and affords more opportunities for sea duty and command. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-69406494678157734842022-09-29T03:14:03.524-07:002022-09-29T03:14:03.524-07:00WW2 showed that it's possible to bypass a batt...WW2 showed that it's possible to bypass a battleship's belt armor with top-attack munitions - note the Yamato, and plenty of other ships destroyed by bombs. Given the proliferation of popup terminal attack profiles amongst cruise missiles and the top-attack flight profile of ASBMs, plus the large heavyweight Russian shipkiller missiles, this would suggest that a modern battleship would require greater deck protection - the Iowa has combined 7.5 inches* of deck armor, versus the 12 inches of the belt armor. This is doable, but as ComNavOps has noted, steel is what makes ships expensive.<br /><br />* 1.5 inch main deck, 6 inch second deck.<br /><br />In my opinion, the bigger minus against a modern gun battleship, in the near future, is the lack of long-range gun for servicing targets**. The old 16" guns had a range of 24 miles, which, as the main post shows, does not afford us much standoff range. The Zumwalt's 100 mile gun affords us a bit more range, but at a million dollars a shell, that's a hell of an expensive fire mission (and there are only 6 Zumwalt guns in existence, anyhow). We could, of course, put VLS cells into a battleship and carry cruise missiles, as they did with the Iowas, but then that goes back to the question of what is a battleship, what is the CONOPS of a battleship, and how do we envision the form of said battleship to take place (i.e., is it a gun BB or is it a missile BB)?<br /><br />(As an aside, if we're going to primarily use these boats for cruise missile shore bombardment and ASuW, then do we need Aegis or long range guns? Maybe what we really need is a repeat of the Spruances: good, no frills ships that did their job well, in sufficient anumbers.)<br /><br />** On the other hand, a battleship would make a viable hull platform for railguns, being large enough to hold the railguns and the necessary power generation, which would be in excess of what can be contained on a destroyer hull. This would, however, require that railguns actually become viable weapons in the near future (as opposed to the next 50 years - I'm reminded of how Aegis was conceptualised in the 50s, began development in the 70s, and was only deployed in the late 80s: it took almost 4 decades for the vision to be realised).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-48600557898912581612022-09-28T19:44:31.992-07:002022-09-28T19:44:31.992-07:00It will be interesting to see how Boeing's Pow...It will be interesting to see how Boeing's Powered JDAM project goes along. It's essentially a wing and engine kit to turn 500 lbs JDAMs into cruise missiles (or powered glide bombs if we're being pedantic). Promised range is 200 miles.<br /><br />It has its limitations, of course, and likely won't be as effective against moving targets as purpose built cruise missiles with multiple seekers, but if pursued, it could be a worthwhile option for increasing standoff weaponry, potentially at a lower cost than buying more cruise missiles - JSM has been suggested to cost 2 million apiece. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-47960687388014294152022-09-28T14:00:22.707-07:002022-09-28T14:00:22.707-07:00"isn't the AAW capability the most expens..."isn't the AAW capability the most expensive part of the Burke"<br /><br />No. The basic hull and machinery are far and away the most expensive part. I've done a couple of posts on this and presented actual cost data. Please feel free to use the archives and come up to speed on this.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-83886703298484284522022-09-28T12:22:57.557-07:002022-09-28T12:22:57.557-07:00Read where the navy contracted to have an upgraded...Read where the navy contracted to have an upgraded Tomahawk missile. Several years ago they talked about replacing this missile.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-13849861543783649572022-09-28T11:18:15.105-07:002022-09-28T11:18:15.105-07:00Of course there are many other roles for surface f...Of course there are many other roles for surface force. But isn't the AAW capability the most expensive part of the Burke (Aegis ... etc.) ? If the Burke becomes an arsenal ship it would not be very cost efficient. And I thought that destroyers' role was AAW escort for carriers - now if carriers are meant to be AAW escort for destroyers, isn't it a catch 22 situation ?<br /> Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-5697593836703958222022-09-28T08:51:22.659-07:002022-09-28T08:51:22.659-07:00"Burkes, which have a limited capacity for cr..."Burkes, which have a limited capacity for cruise missiles (30 ?)"<br /><br />False. A Burke has the capacity for 96 cruise missiles, if desired. A surface force with multiple Tomahawk-loaded Burkes would constitute a powerful land attack force. A Burke is an AAW platform with the option to become, in a sense, an arsenal ship.<br /><br />"what is the role of surface force ?"<br /><br />As you know from your thorough reading of the many posts and comments on this blog, a surface force does what surface forces have always done: land attack, ASuW, ASW, AAW, supporting amphibious landings, establishing sea control, establishing local air superiority, and so on. They do what navies do.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com