This is not a land combat blog but, sometimes, I’ve just
gotta dip my toe into that world.
We’ve repeatedly seen the US get attacked (with very little
success) in the Strait of Hormuz by a drone or a speedboat and then we
retaliate by striking combat related facilities. The blindingly obvious question is why aren’t
we striking these targets before they can be used against us since, clearly,
we know where they are? What kind of
idiot commander allows known enemy combat facilities to exist during a war?
Now, here’s the land combat portion. Why haven’t we put a brigade ashore to sweep,
say, a 5-10 mile deep swath along the length of the strait? As best I can tell, that would eliminate
every remaining speedboat and most of the relevant combat facilities (weapons
warehoused, radars, command and control facilities, troop housing/hideouts,
etc.
Oh, but what if Iranian troops confront us? Oh no!
What will we do? Well, how about we
thank them for revealing themselves and gathering together in one place so that
we can more easily and efficiently kill them?
A sweep would remove most of the remaining ability of Iran
to harass shipping in the strait.
Are we so afraid of casualties that we won’t risk
soldiers? If so, then this war isn’t
very important. If it is important, then
ground troops are justified. This would be a training exercise for a WWII battalion.
We started the war with a good approach but it’s devolved
into a decidedly half-assed affair the last couple of weeks.
Their coastline is mountainous, fortified with an army of one million troops. "Sweeping it" would take the entire mobilized US Army over a year to deploy and stage supplies, and another year to clear it. Then what about the rest of Iran?
ReplyDeleteThere are not a million troops in the mountains!
DeleteExamining a topographical map of Iran, we see a swath around the strait of 10-30 miles flat inland in front of the more mountainous area. The speedboats are on the coast, not miles inland so that's not a problem. Simple drones and coastal missiles are almost certainly on that 10-30 mile swath as trying to transport and operate missiles and drones in mountains would be exceedingly difficult. The mountains include no cities so there are no troops. The troops are in the major population and manufacturing areas.
A brigade could sweep the relevant area in a week or two.
If Iran were stupid enough to suddenly flood the mountains with troops, then they'd have done us a favor by isolating them from resupply and concentrating them for easy destruction.
We don’t need to go far inland. The main troop concentrations we care about are in Bandar ABBAs and the islands of Qeshm and the Tunbs. All of those locations can be isolated with aerial guardian angels. 2 infantry regiments with artillery support should be enough to clear Qeshm or the Tunbs.
DeleteWe have 2 MEUs and the 82nd. Why don’t we put them to good use before they have to rotate out?
"Bandar ABBAs and the islands of Qeshm and the Tunbs"
DeleteHow they have not been totally destroyed yet (assuming they haven't?) is a complete mystery.
The latest ventures of the US ground forces (Army, Marine) in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Irak were initial successes followed by inglorious retreats. The last time it worked was in Europe WWII - where US troops were welcomed by the population.
ReplyDeleteYou need to clearly understand why forces have failed. It is not because forces are incapable of succeeding. It is because we repeatedly allow them to complete the job. The last time we allowed the military to complete the job was WWII and it was a 100% success, both war and post-war.
DeleteThe vast majority of Iran's citizenry would welcome US troops - as long as it was clear that we weren't planning to stay. Eliminate the current regime and leave.
A single brigade is not realistic. Iran is 15% of the surface and 25% of the population of the USA. The regime has dug itself for decades.
Delete"A single brigade is not realistic."
DeleteYour comment is not realistic. You would be correct if our goal was to occupy every square meter of Iran. It is not. The goal of a sweep is to stroll along the coast, destroy everything we find, and move on, occupying ZERO square meters. Honestly, a few squads could do the job. It's just that they would have to call in strikes rather than do the destruction themselves.
This is, essentially, a recon in force.
You need to come up to speed on tactics and read more carefully. Pick up the quality of your comments.
If your brigade moves in and moves out, it gives the opportunity for Iran to move back in. Vietnam, Irak, Afghanistan, but also Gaza and Lebanon have proved again and again that just "mowing the grass" is not a (permanent) solution.
Delete" "mowing the grass" is not a (permanent) solution."
DeleteYou seem unable to grasp that the "solution" depends on what the "problem" is. In this case, the problem would be preventing attacks on shipping in the strait. The solution is to sweep the coastal areas, destroying all strike related assets and capabilities. That infantry would move into the surrounding mountains is irrelevant (and takes them off the strategic board as well as clustering them for easy destruction!) because they have no anti-shipping capability. Presumably, after concluding the sweep, we'd monitor the swept areas with drones and destroy any attempt at re-establishing an anti-shipping capability.
On a related note, if significant numbers of troops moved into the surrounding mountains around the strait, not only would it isolate them and render them ineffective and irrelevant, it would remove them from the defense of populated areas should we want to invade.
If you want to discuss strategies, by all means do so but be sure you've studied military strategy, in general, and this situation, specifically.
You're trying to create a problem where none exists and without a grasp of the overall situation.
I'm not a fan of putting troops ashore... but clearing the coast on a mission to destroy all the small boat, mine, and any other facilities that threaten the flow through the Strait is reasonable. But... with control of the air... why can't we put a massive Navy/Air Force umbrella over the Strait and send a pack of DDGs in, using their guns and whatever else would work to destroy them ( ala "Return of the Broadside", on a more poorly armed scale)? Can't we use this overwhelming and basicslly unopposed force to do what's needed? It seems to me that it's not the Iranians that "closed the strait", it's fear and the insurance companies for the most part...
ReplyDelete1. We can run warships up and down the strait all day long, but we can’t afford to expend munitions protecting naked plodding tankers doing the same day-after-day. DDG’s munition load are slated to protect the carrier strike group of relative few ships, not ( pre-war) 130 or so commercial ships transiting the strait everyday.
Delete2. Iran can knock off the same tankers further up the Persian gulf from its parallel running long coastline (about 1000 miles long counting all the twists). All gulf state oil production facilities are sitting ducks. It makes no sense if we have physical control of the strait, yet unable to scour every inch of Iran from which Iran can launch missiles and drones against these facilities and waiting tankers.
DDGs are tasked with straits operations and cannot be spared for NGF support. Further, their NGF capabilities are minimal. We need HIMARS to set up a foothold then artillery and mortars with iron munitions. No smart munitions to snipe targets but high volume HE sweep in zone to destroy large concentrations of facilities and personnel
Delete"DDGs are tasked with straits operations and cannot be spared for NGF support."
DeleteThat's hilarious! We have around 80 Burkes and you're suggesting we can't spare a few for gun support?
"Further, their NGF capabilities are minimal. "
That is true and is why I suggested a brigade ground force who would provide their own firepower.
It is criminal that the USN cannot fire navalized versions of USA rocket artillery like the Precision Strike Missile from its VLS systems.
DeleteI also note that it should be possible to load three (3) HIMARS or M270s onto a DDG: a division of three (3) or four (4) DDGs loaded this way would provide the firepower of a MLRS Battalion.
GAB
" should be possible to load three (3) HIMARS or M270s onto a DDG"
DeleteAssuming you're talking about a temporary "parking" situation rather than a permanent, marinized adaptation for shipboard use, is it even possible for them to fire on the move? A ship, of course, is always moving, pitching, and rolling even in calm seas. Can those weapons still fire accurately (assuming not guided munitions) while moving? How would you envision reloads occurring or would you see them as single-shots?
@CNO - this is why I said it is criminal that MLRS has not been navalized. Reportedly the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is supposed to have the capability of launch from MK 41 VLS, but that capability has not been created.
DeleteMy vision is for a the ships to carry the artillery on a temporary basis - command and control is a bigger issue than ammunition resupply. An MLRS battalion does not carry many reloads.
As you know a missile is guided, whereas a rocket is unguided. Recall that MLRS was initially fielded as an area effect weapon for counter battery fire against imperfectly located enemy artillery. Lovingly referred to as a "grid square removal system" - a full salvo from a three M270 battery (our DDG) would land 23,184 sub-munitions in the target area.
GAB
I truly don't have any idea. Can an unguided rocket hit the intended grid square if the firing platform is moving? Even a few degrees error at launch becomes miles of error downrange. I assume MLRS is not gyro-stabilized?
DeleteMLRS is not gyro-stabilised. Even on land, the unguided variant of MLRS is only accurate to the closest county. To actually hit the intended grid square requires the use of Guided MLRS rockets.
Delete@Anon: "Even on land, the unguided variant of MLRS is only accurate to the closest county."
DeleteThis is factually incorrect: the unguided M26 rocket was designed with sufficient accuracy to destroy its priority target sets (artillery, air defenses, C4ISR, armor concentrations...) and to saturate those targets in the shortest time possible. It is absolutely the right sort of tool to employ against the types of targets described in this article.
GAB
@CNO: "Can an unguided rocket hit the intended grid square if the firing platform is moving?"
Delete1) Yes, you can hit a grid square from a moving platform: we managed to do this as early as WWII with unguided, fin-stabilized 5" rockets. We built dozens of LSM(R) rocket ships during the war, and later the much-improved IFS Inshore Fire Support Ship.
2) Desired accuracy is milliradians, not degrees – that said, soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines have solved harder problems for millennia, it is what we do. We ar not shooting danger close missions around, and particularly not over the heads of, friendly troops (something stabilized naval guns are not supper suited to anyway).
3) MLRS is not gyro-stabilized. And we are not firing from a few degrees of latitude below the arctic circle in the North Atlantic – the Persian Gulf/ North Arabian Sea are mostly calm.
The biggest problem with using MLRS and HIMARS from a naval platform is C4-ISR. We could solve that by renting a containership and embarking an entire MLRS battalion on that ship.
GAB
"LSM(R) rocket ships"
DeleteIndeed! I love these ships. I did a post about them. They are awesome for their purpose which was a pulse of area suppression firepower just ahead of the landing craft. A key point concerning these ships is that they were not standing twenty miles off shore where a minute variation (pitch, roll, whatever) at the moment of launch would translate to miles off target far down range. They stood close in shore so minute variations had little impact and they had no specific targets so any degradation in absolute accuracy was utterly irrelevant.
These ships are yet another in a long list of combat effective capabilities the Navy has abandoned without replacement.
I saw your post and appreciated it!
DeleteWe could certainly run a few modern LSM(R) equivalents up the coast at least as easy as conducting a land campaign.
I do not think the accuracy is an issue for what we are trying to do. If it is, we can use course correcting fuse technology to remedy the issue rather than going to the expense of a full guidance system.
In the end, a VLS capable version of PrSM is hugely desirable.
GAB
"as easy as conducting a land campaign."
DeleteMy rationale for suggesting a ground force to sweep the coast is the ability to recon inside buildings, inside caves, behind hills, etc. All the places that are not visible from the sea or even the air. Also, the ability to apply precision firepower from arms length, so to speak, and to engage enemy troops whether they operate singly or in larger units. Of course, having some LSM(R) supporting the operation would be even better!
I suppose drones could be used to conduct the search for LSM(R) targets but I just like the idea of overwhelming firepower, on the spot, in the form of armored vehicles. Also drones cannot see inside or under buildings, overhangs, trees, etc.
The larger point than the exact methodology is just ... sweep the damn coast! Search and destroy any threats to shipping in the strait then you don't need to negotiate with Iran about the strait because you'll own it. I do not understand the political aspect to this recent pause and negotiations but that's for some other blog to discuss.
I MEF demonstrated the ability to shoot GMLRS HIMARS from amphibs with accuracy. Even a guided HIMARS would greatly increase firepower it we could put 8 launcher six packs on DDG plus the 70-80km range is far longer than the 23km of DDG 5” NGF
Delete"demonstrated the ability to shoot GMLRS HIMARS from amphibs"
DeleteYes and no. Yes, you can park a launcher truck anywhere, including the deck of a ship, and fire it. The guided version of the rockets will hit their target (assuming unhindered GPS signal!). With no reloads, this is a very limited capability when compared to typical fire support missions for amphibious ops that require tens or hundreds of thousands of rounds, as proven in the Pacific island assaults of WWII. If you just need one target attacked and are willing to give up your aviation capability to achieve it then, yes, parking a truck on a flight deck is viable. Just don't park it for long because the launchers are not marinized and won't stand up to prolonged sea corrosion.
BLUF: MLRS (really the M26 rocket) is the right choice, but the argument over navalization (new fuse, launcher stabilization, other?) is still for consideration.
DeleteI pulled my copy of 'U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft’ by Dr Friedman and it is pretty clear on the discussions in chapter 16, pages 450-454, that a combination of MLRS, with 8”/62, or vertical 155mm naval rifles was the desired mix for fire support. It was not clear if they contemplated a stabilized launcher, but digital fire control to reduce the time to process a call for fire was a must. There were a number of design iterations, some also provided in chapter 14, my favorite being a Knox-class conversion with a 350-round magazine for the hypothetical naval-MLRS launcher. 350 rounds is an enormous amount of ammunition.
This all strays from this post, but if MLRS is not the answer, surely tomahawk (cluster munition versions) is probably cheaper than developing a new ACAT 1 weapons program.
GAB
"clear on the discussions ... that a combination of MLRS, with 8”/62, or vertical 155mm naval rifles was the desired mix for fire support."
DeleteYou have opened a very interesting and debatable (or maybe not really debatable?) aspect of naval fire support - an aspect that is fundamental to our understanding of the state of fire support, today. That aspect is time and relative perspective. Huh????
I don't have the book you refer to so I'm winging it a bit.
WWII established that the desired mix of fire support was battleships and cruisers. Destroyers, LSM(R)s, and various other assets also chipped in but the heavy lifting was done by BBs(16") and CAs(8"). As time went on, the BB was [foolishly] retired and the 16" support went away. We then rationalized our [then] existing 8" (also going away) would be sufficient. As time went by, the CA(8") option went away. The Marines were upset but reached a compromise with the Navy and rationalized that the AGS(155mm) of the Zumwalt plus some DDG(5") was the optimum fire support. As time went by, the AGS(155mm) went away and we now rationalize that DDG(5") and perhaps a future navalized MLRS is sufficient.
The point here is that the requirements didn't change over time ... our ability to meet the requirements changed (decreased) and we rationalized to avoid admitting we were failing.
Similarly, we once recognized a strategic necessity to be able to fight and win 2-1/2 wars. Over time, as our military shrank, we rationalized our way down to the current win one regional conflict (not a war) and hold in another. The reality and requirements haven't changed, we've just rationalized our failing.
So, after that long winded exposition, did the discussions in Friedman's book reflect requirements or rationalization of decreased capabilities and failings?
A lot to unpack here!
DeleteI blame competing priorities: fire support was not funded because there were too many higher priorities. The USMC also bet on vertical envelopment (air assault) over traditional surface landing due to the a-bomb. What really killed opposed amphibious landings over the beach was the inability to clear sea-mines, not the prospect of enemy resistance.
A USMC division sized amphibious assault via surface landing was: two (2) regiments with a third in reserve. Each of the two (2) assaulting regiments was expected to land two (2) of its three (3) battalions in the initial assault, again its third battalion in reserve. This meant four battalion sized landing beaches (Red 1, Orange 3, Green 4, etc.).
For the Navy, through the 1960s the fire support expected for a USMC division sized landing was:
1x BB (or CA) per division
2x CA; 1x CA per regimental landing (2x battalions landing on 2x beaches)
4x DD; 1x DD per battalion landing beach
4-8x LSM(R); 1-2x per battalion landing beach
Ideally one or two destroyers were in reserve.
Note: a ‘beach’ was typically ~1,000 yards wide
I would argue that the rocket ships were more important than battleships; by late WWII they were tasked with neutralization fire and they apparently did that job exceedingly well and did it quickly. I had a chat with Captain Hughes, who had a front row seat to the Normandy landings from his mine sweeper. When landings ran into serious trouble, it was the destroyers that came in very close to shore (800-1000 yards) and started knocking out individual German pill boxes, not battleships or cruisers. Keep in mind that the bluffs where those defenses were located presented ideal vertical targets for the ships. Had those positions been on reverse slopes they would have been very difficult for the destroyers to engage given the shallow trajectory of naval rifles. A lot of fire support craft were equipped with rifled 4.2” mortars (the goon gun), which probably had the best potential accuracy of any support weapon and might have been key had those defenses been on reverse slopes.
I saw a U.S. Army wartime film comparison study of the effects of different weapons fire against carefully exact scale models of heavily reinforced Japanese log bunkers, and the 4.2” goon gun was a stand out in destroying them. I suspect that the 120mm mortar would also work against anything less than a heavy concrete structure. A thermobaric weapon like TOS-1, would be devastating.
GAB
"For the Navy, through the 1960s the fire support expected for a USMC division sized landing was:"
DeleteAs described in my comment, even this amount of gun support was drastically scaled down from actual WWII requirements. For example, fire support for Okinawa and Iwo Jima consisted of:
Okinawa
7 divisions (103,000 troops)
18 BB (8 new, 10 old)
14 CA
17 CL
132 DD
Iwo Jima
3 divisions (70,000 troops)
9 BB (8 new, 10 old)
8 CA
The Iwo Jima pre-assault bombardment was, itself, scaled down from the Marines requirement of 10 days of pre-assault bombardment to 3 days, totaling just 13 hrs.
The true requirements have never changed. Only our rationalization for decreasing capabilities has changed.
I will be excoriated for saying this, but the European, not the Pacific is not the model to follow for afloat fire support. Neutralization fires, not destructive fires is what we are after. Not to be nice, but to favor surprise, and speed of landing forces, over slow destruction in detail.
DeleteThe ETO and the PTO were very different; the enemies had opposing capabilities and defense strategies; worse, there seems to be little coordination between the two theaters WRT fire support requirements (the LSM(R) is an obvious exception). The Germans possessed extremely effective armored forces, had exceptional skill, and almost maniacal devotion to counter attack. The Japanese were also quite fanatical, but lacked the capability to conduct mobile defense/offense in most cases.
In the ETO, the USA, British, Canadian, and other allied armies avoided prolonged pre-invasion bombardments in favor of surprise; so quick neutralization fires were favored over prolonged destructive fires in the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Southern France. Had the Allies tried to pound every defensive position to dust in Normandy, it would have required days. This surely would have tipped off the Germans and the allied forces would have faced immediate powerful armored counter-attacks on D-day that were every commander’s nightmare.
In the PTO, destructive fires were favored because most invasions were against geographically and strategically isolated targets. Surprise was of limited value because the Japanese could not mass armor against the invasion force. The PTO in WW2 resembled WWI trench warfare in France more than any other model. Ironically, much of the Eastern front resembled WWI too.
Today, it is questionable how many armies would choose to try to man a continuous stretch of beach to defend against potential invasion as in the past. We should expect a mobile defense, heavily supported by artillery, particularly rocket artillery, TACAIR, and drones. Land and sea mines, along with channeling obstacles are far more likely physical defenses than the immense concrete and cave structures of WW2. Apart from the mine issue, we know how to destroy troop concentrations and are really good at it.
Could we do better? I say yes, but I would look to improved, or navalized versions of existing weapons MRLs, PrSM, and a longer ranged, sea equivalent to the Russian TOS series of thermobaric weapons.
GAB
"I will be excoriated for saying this, but the European, not the Pacific is not the model to follow for afloat fire support."
DeleteNot so! What you described is simply history and there is no disagreement possible although one might make an argument that a pre-D-Day bombardment might have resulted in the Germans mobilizing their reserves and clustering them for our battleships to engage. The Germans appear to have been quite concerned about our BBs impacting their reserve and armored movements. Especially given our air superiority, getting Germany to mobilize and move/reveal their reserves might well have been a good result. I can't offer a definitive assessment since I don't know where the German reserves were or what their counter-attack plans were. If they didn't plan to approach within 20 miles of the beach then the BBs would have been unable to engage although air assets could have. Of course, if they refused to commit within 20 miles of the beach, that would be a win for us.
That aside, you are quite correct that if surprise is a factor (European model), pre-assault bombardment is not the choice. On the other hand, if surprise is not an issue (Pacific model) then pre-assault bombardment is the choice. This brings us to reality, meaning which scenarios are likely? Against China, the most likely assault scenarios involve Taiwan and the Philippines. In both cases, the defending forces would be isolated (in terms of rapid response) and surprise would be difficult to achieve, anyway. Thus, pre-assault bombardment (if we had any!) would seem the choice. Even against Iran, where isolation would not be possible (although interdiction would), if we wanted to conduct an assault somewhere, Iran could not muster a viable counterattack so loss of surprise would not be a concern and pre-assault bombardment would seem to be the choice. Korea could go either way, depending on the specific circumstances.
On a related note, is surprise even possible today? Given the plethora of sensing methods (including being fed sensor data from enemy allies such as Russia feeding Iran) and the desire of the media to immediately vomit forth information on our deployments (witness the reporting on this Iran conflict as far as the movements and dispositions of our forces), is it even possible to mount a surprise amphibious assault? If it isn't, that would also suggest that pre-assault bombardment is the choice.
Of course, since we have no significant bombardment capability the entire discussion is fascinating but moot!
Iran runs two parallel militaries - the regular army (known as Artesh), and the IRGC.
ReplyDeleteAn analogy would be Germany’s WW2 armed forces which consisted of the regular Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS.
Artesh is a conscript force, with a core of professional officers and NCOs, and its make up reflects Iran’s ethnically diverse population. The IRGC are volunteers, overwhelmingly ethnic Persians, and its members are politically aligned with the Iranian government.
Most of our strikes to date seem to have been focused on eliminating the IRGC leadership and its bases around the country, rather than trying to destroy Artesh.
My assumption is that the original plan was for the decapitation strike to take out the Iranian government along with as much of the IRGC’s infrastructure and leadership as possible, leaving Artesh to step in and fill the vacuum, leading to the elusive ‘regime change’.
It hasn’t happened yet, but perhaps the fuze is burning.
Rather than a ground campaign, I would execute a sharp, large scale raid on a coastal or island target (e.g. Kharg island), along with strikes on Iranian military bases, government offices, air ports, power stations... I would drop aerial mines in every Iranian harbor (e.g. quick strike).
ReplyDeleteThe point of the Raid would be as General Pete Schoomaker said: "To get in their faces." The military, economic, political value of the target is less important than the emotional shock value. Peoples in the Middle East do not really seem to respect bombs or cruise missiles, but culturally kicking doors and ending them, or worse capturing people 'man-to-man' gets their attention.
The other issue, and it would be controversial: is to resort to flame weapons (napalm, white phosphorous, thermobaric etc.). These weapons are legal under the Geneva Convention (also look up retaliation in the same document). Imagine the effect off hitting an IRGC HQ, or small boat swarm with napalm.
GAB
The desirability of your proposed action(s) goes back to what our goals and end state are which, unfortunately, the administration has not clearly articulated. We can infer some of them such as eliminating Iran's nuclear capability but others, and the end state, are unclear - a perpetual problem since WWII. For example, is/was keeping the strait open a goal? You would think so but it doesn't seem to be based on our anemic efforts in that regard.
DeleteIf one of our major goals is to open the strait for normal traffic, we need to sweep the coast and anywhere else anti-shipping attacks originate. Honestly, a few squads could conduct the coast sweep. They would just have to call in strikes rather than destroy the targets themselves - a perfect mission for special forces! I'm envisioning, essentially, a recon in force sweep with the brigade destroying the targets as they find them instead of having to call in strikes. Either approach would work.
"along with strikes on Iranian military bases, government offices, air ports, power stations."
My reaction is that if any of those types of targets remain, then we've failed to follow through on the initial strikes (again, what is our goal?). There should be NO surviving military bases, government offices, air bases, naval bases, weapons storage, weapons factories, or known leaders. All should have already been destroyed. I'm dismayed each time I read that we're launching retaliatory attacks against such targets. That tells me we haven't been serious about this war or that we've got a half-assed strategy.
In it to win it or don't get in it.
"Kharg Island"
DeleteWell, the President appears to be listening to you! I just now see that he's announced that we'll be seizing Kharg Island (has he heard of operational secrecy? not that it matters, in this case) and other oil facilities.
This conflict is very much a kabuki dance: I am convinced that 'Iran' is not the primary objective!!!
DeleteNeither side has truly shut down the straights (or wants to shut down the straights!); all kinds of fighting is going on in unexpected theaters, and the proverbial shoe has yet to drop. Even who is actually fighting who, and who is actually helping who, is not publicly discussed.
Finally, a total destruction of Iran, may be necessary, but it is a last resort. Choking off Iran's oil completely strengthens the EV industry of the PRC, one of its few healthy sectors.
GAB
"I am convinced that 'Iran' is not the primary objective!!!"
DeleteWell, that's interesting. I would guess that you then believe China, in some respect, is the ultimate objective? Perhaps you have something else in mind? Feel free to email me if you wish to discuss this!
Certainly, there are profound secondary effects emerging from all of this (manipulating China's oil industry and supply, manipulating NATO, altering the world's dependence on the Middle East for oil, eliminating Iran's influence on world oil markets, forcing "allies" to shoulder more of the world's policeman burden, reducing the effectiveness of various world wide terrorist organizations that have depended on Iran for economic and military support, reducing China's influence in the region, etc). Whether those are truly secondary effects or actually primary effects if you suspect another ultimate objective is a fascinating consideration.
If Iran is not the primary objective, that would mean we have some truly deep, long term, intelligent thinkers at work and I honestly don't see that. I'd like to believe it but I don't see any evidence of that quality of strategizing. Perhaps I'm wrong?
Delete@CNO: " ...that would mean we have some truly deep, long term, intelligent thinkers at work and I honestly don't see that."
Certainly not from DoS foreign service officers in Foggy Bottom!
GAB, there is this proverbial asking: can you outrun a lion? Answer: as long as I can outrun the next guy.
DeleteI do believe Trump had China in mind when he seized Venezuelan oil and whacked Iran, just months/weeks before his trip to China, to drive a hard bargain. However, what’s not calculated was that our E.Asia allies (i.e. Japan, S.Korea, Australia, Singapore, Taiwan, PH) are even more dependent on ME oil/gas (on average 80%, for Japan it was 95%, whereas China is about 40% dependent). Right now some oil is getting through ( about 25% , of original 20M bpd, through overland pipes to Red Sea and gulf of Oman), the U.S. is increasing its export by about 1+M bpd, and nations are drawing down their strategic reserves, so E.Asian economies are not panicking yet. But come this fall/winter, if the strait is not open, all our E. Asia allies will be in dire straits, and China is about 3-6 mo. beyond them in terms draining its oil reserves. That will be an interesting strategic picture indeed (a severely affected China stood among dead E.Asian economies).
Anon: "...Japan, S.Korea, Australia, Singapore, Taiwan, PH..."
DeleteAre these nations reliable allies?
GAB
None are what I would consider rock-solid, reliable allies. Their "alliedness" will depend heavily on the circumstances of the moment. This makes basing in those countries suspect and questionable and we should NOT be betting our war plans on their availability. It also suggests that we should be making maximum use of those countries during peace because we may not be able to make any use of them in war, circumstances depending.
DeleteWe need to be working to establish bases and facilities in territories we have rights to and working to obtain basing rights for extended periods, irrespective of war.
Alternatively, we need to consider the possibility of a war philosophy of simply seizing and using bases in other countries. This would be the least desirable approach but might be a strategic necessity.
We also need to get serious about defending bases. It's pointless to have basing rights and be unable to defend the base.
"None are what I would consider rock-solid, reliable allies"
DeleteI suspect that there may not be any such thing as a rock-solid, reliable ally.
“ a severely affected China stood among dead E.Asian economies “
DeleteI wasn’t aware of its meaning when I wrote that.
But, a neutered China among dead E.Asia economies = without competitors, by default American economy stands alone and great again ( it does rhyme with Trump’s style when he conducted tariff war regardless friends or foes ). I’m a never-Trumper, but if above was by design he would be a crazy genius imo.
"consider the possibility of a war philosophy of simply seizing and using bases in other countries" If the war is important to enter in the first place than it's important enough to do what's needed to win, including seizing bases in other countries, putative allies, potential belligerents, or neutral parties.
Delete@CNO: "... consider the possibility of... simply seizing and using bases in other countries."
DeleteDial 911 - extension 75th Ranger Regiment; 1st, 2nd, or 3rd battalion...
This was perfected decades ago and used ruthlessly. This is yet another of many, many, many weapons in SOCOM's quiver.
GAB
"I suspect that there may not be any such thing as a rock-solid, reliable ally."
DeleteWhich leads one to question why we're wasting time, money, and resources on foreign basing (looking at you NATO countries), cross-training, etc.?
"I’m a never-Trumper,"
DeleteIn future comments, please leave the personal politics out of it.
"do what's needed to win, including seizing bases in other countries"
DeleteWould you still be as supportive of that idea if another country seized a US base to pursue whatever war they were involved in? In other words, if the situation were reversed would you still have the same opinion?
Effort spent seizing and securing a base to use as a jump off point to attack another country is a little counterproductive, in my opinion. Sure, we can seize a base and take it over, but now we need to defend it from the host nation who is now mad that their sovreign territory that they own has now been seized by us to fulfill our own plans. In effect, we're now facing two adversaries:
Delete- Enemy A, who we are attacking.
- Host Nation B, whose base we seized to prosecute our attack on Enemy A.
We've basically turned Host Nation B into an ally and proxy for Enemy A.
@anon: "Sure, we can seize a base and take it over, but now we need to defend it from the host nation who is now mad that their sovreign territory that they own has now been seized by us..."
DeleteOr the Host Nation actually wants the USA to attack this third nation, but does not want to be seen supporting the attack. So the USA does its thing and the Host Nation protests loudly. Privately everyone is happy (except the attacked nation) and the Kabuki dance goes on.
GAB
@GAB: Sure, but that bit of kabuki theater is entirely different from seizing a base by force in a sovreign nation to use as a jumpoff point for our operations. That's the sort of thing that works because we have the permission of our ally, who has agreed to let us use that base, and is engaged in kabuki theater for their own purposes.
DeleteWhich means that you know, we needed to have had a relationship with the ally, we needed to have ties and a common ground for negotiation, we needed to have shared interests...
Again, that's a far cry from just taking a base by force wherever we please. Which kind of reinforces the point that we do need to work with our allies, that we do need to engage in excercises and diplomacy with them.
" but now we need to defend it from the host nation who is now mad that their sovreign territory that they own has now been seized by us to fulfill our own plans. In effect, we're now facing two adversaries:"
DeleteThat's not the correct way to look at it. We're talking about a war with China. If the US loses (or opts not to engage due to, say, lack of bases) then EVERY country in the Pacific region loses. China will annex them in one way or another. The best they can hope for is to become a vassal state of China. THAT is the reality that we need to present to these countries. They can aid us with basing or submit to China. The difference is that when the war is over the US will leave the countries and they'll be free to continue as before. China, if they win, will not leave.
Our task is to use diplomacy and some blunt truth to show these countries that assisting us in their best interest. Of course, it wouldn't hurt for us to offer some mutually beneficial trade arrangements and other such perks.
I would like to get an answer to such a question from the author of this highly specialized naval or maybe universal blog that discusses themes on various topics? What is common and interconnected between the Chief Naval Philosopher (Commander of Naval Opinions) and politics, the army, the air force, local wars in the world, commenting on military events, which goes against the main requirements that can be seen in the description of the author himself? The author claims to be a specialist who is interested in everything related to the Navy (strategy, doctrine, tactics, art, history, training, logistics, fleet composition, budget, equipment and similar topics). Because there was a feeling that the author resembled a destroyer of the Arleigh Burke type, which can do everything (air defense, air defense, missile defense), but does it somehow.
ReplyDeleteThis is another one of the blog's posts that cannot be intelligently responded to, given that politics are off-limits from discussion. The decision to put in ground troops would inevitably entail a mix of political considerations and military considerations, with perhaps more emphasis on the former. Please stick to military discussions.
ReplyDelete"Please stick to military discussions."
DeleteI'll discuss whatever I wish to discuss. If you feel you simply cannot comment without including politics then either go find a blog that discusses politics or wait until a post more to your liking comes along.
As far as being unable to address the post without including politics, you are incorrect and simply lack the vision and imagination to see all the purely military discussion-worthy aspects that present themselves. This one time only, I'll offer you some possible military aspects for your consideration:
-Is it better to conduct such a sweep in force (brigade) or with small units of special forces who spot and call in strikes, as was done in Afg?
-Are 5" gunned destroyers sufficient for this type of support or do we need larger caliber naval guns?
-Can flooding the area with drones provide the necessary detection and targeting such that we don't even need boots on the ground? Do we even have sufficient drones with sufficient capabilities?
-What are the military risks and drawbacks to a sweep? The benefits (which seem obvious!)?
-Are our vehicles capable of operating in open terrain, without paved roads? Are wheeled vehicles as effective as tracked or would wheeled vehicles get bogged down?
-How big a force do we need to conduct a sweep where we detect, destroy, and move on without attempting to hold any ground?
-Do we need to hold ground to control the strait or do we have sufficient air and strike capabilities to detect and destroy without ground forces and still control the strait?
-We have an entire Army mountain division. Would they be a better choice for such a mission (probably depends on more detailed knowledge of the terrain than I have)?
And so on. So, contrary to your statement that this post "cannot be intelligently responded to" without politics, there is actually a great deal that can be discussed. That you could not see the possibilities does not mean they do not exist. It just means you can't see them. Look harder. Think longer. Or, wait for the next post.
Those aren't the questions the blog post raised. It specifically asked:
Delete"Where are the rroops?"
"The blindingly obvious question is why aren’t we striking these targets before they can be used against us since, clearly, we know where they are?"
"Why haven’t we put a brigade ashore to sweep, say, a 5-10 mile deep swath along the length of the strait?"
"Are we so afraid of casualties that we won’t risk soldiers? "
None of those can be reasonably discussed without involving the political dimension.
If you had posted a hypothetical "suppose you were CENTCOM commander and the leaders in Washington had given you full carte-blanche to take any military measures to ward off Iranian threats straits of Hormuz, which would be most effective?" blog post, then your follow-up questions would at least make sense.
I wish you well in your search for a blog more to your liking. Have a good day!
DeleteIf we put troops ashore it would be magnet for Iran drones and Missiles. Resupply would be hell. And the mission would either expand to push them back, or leave in a Afgan or fall of Saigon syle. It would 100% lead to casualties and a disgraceful exit.
Delete"it would be magnet for Iran drones and Missiles."
DeleteWhen did we become so frightened of combat against third rate nations whose military has already been decimated?
Wouldn't having the enemy show themselves be a good thing for us? We could more efficiently kill them. Wouldn't using up the few drones and missiles they have left (and are not replaceable!) be a good thing for us?
"Resupply would be hell. "
LOL! We have total control of air and sea. How does that make resupply "hell"?
When did we become so timid?
"And the mission would either expand to push them back, or leave in a Afgan or fall of Saigon syle."
DeleteIt doesn't have to. We need to change how we approach combat. We need to commit to goals, whatever they may be, like in this case, eliminating threats to seaborne traffic in the Strait. Committing means using overwhelming force, and killing/destroying the enemy and the threats. Without overly restrictive micromanaging ROEs that handicap our forces. There's no reason that, with all the combat power we have in the theater, we cant do this. If it takes putting Marines ashore and letting them eat- so be it. Potential civilian casualties and destroyed infrastructure, and international opinion be damned. We need to return to the WWII mentality... avoid war at all costs, BUT, if we cant, than we commit fully and use every capability to ruthlessly destroy the enemy without restraint, and them pack up and come home. Our past "failures" weren't military defeats, but a political failing to allow our forces to win.
I'm going to try and avoid politics - but isn't there a political component to the CONOPS for this? Arguably a political decision had to be made to maintain or take over control of the strait. Make that decision politically and then get out of the way of the Military as they execute that order. Then all of your list of what to consider comes into play and can be quarterbacked by all of us.
ReplyDeleteBut, we're hearing the strait is open, has been open, is mined, mines are cleared, ships are getting through, ships are blockaded, Iran's military is decimated, their military is mostly intact, etc. etc.
We're suffering from poor political decision making and leadership that is hampering a military that could otherwise make short order of solving this situation.
"We're suffering from poor political decision making and leadership that is hampering a military that could otherwise make short order of solving this situation."
DeleteWe don't know that to be true because we don't know what the geopolitical objectives are. Perhaps this is precisely the situation the administration wanted to achieve ... though I can't imagine why. It would be more accurate to state that we're suffering from poor communication between the administration and the people. The people don't know what the objectives are beyond the oft-stated goal to eliminate Iran's nuclear capabilities so we're left to speculate without definitive information.
Without a clear idea of our objectives, I don't know whether we have poor decision making and leadership or not. We certainly have poor communication.
Recall Roosevelt's fireside chats. He had a regular, scheduled communication forum (the fireside) in which he explained what we were doing in the war, why, and how things were going. I'm sure there was a substantial amount of public relations (propaganda) included but that's how you "sell" it to the public. The administration needs to do something along those lines. This war has been poorly "sold".
The problem with ground troops is largely political, but there are military problems as well.
ReplyDeleteThe war is already highly unpopular, with public support reminiscent of Vietnam in the late 1960s. A majority of the public does not understand why the war was necessary at all. Trump continues to tell the public that a deal is about to be reached. Landing thousands of U.S. troops effectively ends that narrative and likely commits the administration to a much longer conflict.
There is also a political clock ticking. The war is already increasing the likelihood of a Democratic victory in the midterms, and a Democratic Congress would be far less willing to continue funding or supporting an open-ended conflict. That creates pressure to achieve results quickly, which is not conducive to a ground campaign.
Secondly, I am not convinced that a brigade ashore actually solves the military problem.
First, a 5-10 mile coastal strip does not secure the Strait of Hormuz. Anti-ship missiles, drones, and ballistic missiles can be launched from dozens of miles inland. If Iranian launchers can operate 50 miles inland, occupying the coastline does not reopen the strait. At best it creates pressure for further escalation and a deeper advance inland.
Second, a brigade can defeat any Iranian force willing to stand and fight. The problem is that the enemy is unlikely to cooperate. Iran will continue to fight asymmetrically as it has so far done. Four thousand troops spread across a long stretch of coastline cannot eliminate every sniper team, FPV drone operator, mortar crew, or missile detachment. The challenge is not destroying Iranian units but locating them.
The United States enjoys overwhelming advantages in airpower and intelligence, but those advantages do not make it easy to find two men with a sniper rifle, an FPV drone, or a missile launcher moving through mountainous terrain at night. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated this repeatedly.
As a result, the administration would likely face a steady stream of casualties without having fully solved the problem it set out to address. At that point the choice becomes familiar: commit more forces and expand the war, or withdraw and accept a visible climbdown. Like the decision to go to war itself, putting troops ashore risks creating a commitment trap in which every setback generates pressure for further escalation.
On top of this, the United States has already expended a considerable quantity of precision munitions in the conflict. Defending U.S. ground forces, protecting regional allies from Iranian reprisals, and sustaining ongoing strike operations would continue to draw down missile inventories. Even if those inventories remain sufficient for the present conflict, they are not infinite, and every missile spent in the Persian Gulf is one that cannot be spent in the Indo-Pacific.
Stepping back, the United States only has two truly vital interests in this conflict: preserving freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and preventing further nuclear proliferation.
DeleteThe United States could absolutely win a total war against Iran. However, since regime change by airpower has clearly failed, achieving that objective would now require a massive ground campaign. For the reasons already discussed, that option is not realistically on the table.
Massive attacks on civilian infrastructure might eventually place enough pressure on Iran to force concessions, but there is no guarantee of success. More importantly, deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure is morally wrong and would almost certainly destroy American soft power and diplomatic credibility for a generation.
Unfortunately, this leaves bargaining. And bargaining means giving Iran at least some of what it wants.
Iran's position is stronger than many Americans would like to admit. Anything short of total war leaves Tehran with meaningful leverage. We have also made diplomacy more difficult through our own actions. The collapse of previous agreements damaged American credibility, and the killing of Khamenei would likely create a successor who must demonstrate strength rather than compromise, narrowing the space for a negotiated settlement.
The outline of a realistic deal is therefore unlikely to be attractive to either side. Iran would have to accept robust international controls over its nuclear program and permanently abandon interference with commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. In return, the United States would likely have to end sanctions, provide some form of economic compensation or reconstruction assistance, and gradually reduce its military footprint in the Persian Gulf.
Many Americans would view such an agreement as humiliating. Strategically, however, it may be beneficial. Iran is not capable of dominating the Middle East. It is constrained by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Egypt, and Israel. Reducing our military commitment in the Gulf would free resources for the Indo-Pacific, where China represents a far more capable long-term geopolitical competitor.
Most importantly, such an agreement would secure the two objectives that actually matter: freedom of navigation and limits on nuclear proliferation.
The obvious objection is that this would leave much of Iran's missile arsenal and proxy network intact. However, there is no plausible deal in which Iran agrees to completely dismantle those capabilities while Israel retains its own strategic deterrent and regional military advantages. Demanding such terms is effectively demanding Iranian surrender, and if surrender were available, we would not be discussing negotiations in the first place.
It is clear that you are simply anti-war as a life philosophy. If a minor action against a third rate, decimated military has you this frightened, it's clear you would have been against Normandy, the Pacific island assaults, and the entire WWII had you been living then. Most of what you said in your comments is wrong but given your outlook, I won't bother refuting anything. Have a good day!
DeleteWe won't do it because we no longer have warships that can go into harm's way to support them. This is where we need heavy cruisers and battleships with modern defenses that can stay on the line to provide gunfire and missile support. Honestly modern versions of the Boston-class conversions of Baltimores (CAG-1 Boston and CAG-2 Canberra) would be damn handy ships to have on station right now.
ReplyDeleteWhile your comment is valid in the general sense, it is not relevant in this specific case as there is no serious threat to naval ships. And, yes, we've often discussed the value of gun-cruisers!
DeleteNo need for big guns battleships nor troops on the ground, the deal last night brings the situation back to what it was a few months ago, minus a few iranian leaders and many billions dollars of ammunitions.
ReplyDeleteAnd minus the immediate threat of a nuclear armed Iran and minus Iran's first line of true zealot leadership and minus Iran's navy, and minus most of Iran's military production facilities and minus most of Iran's ability to export terrorism and minus Iran's air force and minum much of Iran's economic infrastructure and ...
DeleteI don't care what your personal opinion is about anything but I absolutely insist that you deal in facts. Refusing to acknowledge what's been accomplished because you don't want the US or the administration to get any credit will not be allowed.
I agree with you CNO; some people’s antipathy towards the current administration makes me wonder whose side they’re on.
DeleteThe same unfortunately applies to our allies whose leaders seem unable to think clearly because of personal grudges and animosities.
"makes me wonder whose side they’re on."
DeleteI don't wonder.