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Monday, June 8, 2026

Lessons From Truk

How often have we seen comments stating that our carriers are hopelessly outmatched against China because a carrier has only around forty combat aircraft (160 in a 4-carrier group) and China has thousands of aircraft?  As good naval analysts always do, let’s turn to history to see what lessons we can learn that might be applicable.  A salient example is the US Navy’s WWII attack on Japan’s Truk island bases on 17–18 Feb-1944.
 
Truk was the major Japanese base in the South Pacific and was referred to as the "Japanese Pearl Harbor" and "the Gibraltar of the Pacific”.  It was believed to be heavily defended, fortified, and nearly impregnable with five airfields and a seaplane base and large numbers of warships.
 
It was feared that an attack on Truk would be quite costly and might well not succeed.  Despite this, an attack was ordered (Operation Hailstone) and conducted by three carrier task forces consisting of 5 fleet carriers  (Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, and Bunker Hill) and 4 light carriers (Belleau Wood, Cabot, Monterey, and Cowpens) along with seven battleships, including Iowa and New Jersey, and many cruisers and destroyers.
 
The US carriers employed their usual run in under cover of night and pre-dawn launches to begin the attacks and achieved total surprise.  The result was a completely lop-sided victory for the US and Truk was never again a significant threat.
 
As it turned out, the Japanese had already begun withdrawing major naval units from Truk prior to the attack but that does not lesson the courage and skill of the attackers.
 
What can we learn from this?
 
Surprise – Surprise has forever been a major contributor to success on the battlefield and there is no better instrument for achieving surprise on the naval battlefield than a carrier group (submariners might argue that!).  In WWII, carriers conducted high speed run ins to their target under cover of night.  Today, darkness offers less cover but the tactic is still valid.  A carrier at sea is generally “invisible” and can show up anywhere at any time.  An enemy’s superiority can be decisively overcome if surprise can be achieved.  The art and task of the military planner is to arrange matters so as to achieve surprise.
 
Localized Superiority – It doesn’t matter how many assets the enemy has in its total inventory.  What matters is how many are instantaneously available at the point and moment of attack – a concept that seems to elude many of today’s naval observers.  The Japanese had superior numbers of aircraft when the initial US fighter sweep arrived but the Japanese aircraft were largely caught on the ground (see, Surprise, above) thus enabling the US to establish and maintain local, effective superiority.  As long as the attacking force doesn’t hang around too long, local superiority can be achieved and maintained for the duration of an operation.  Thus, the oft claimed superiority of numbers of Chinese aircraft in their total inventory is meaningless.  What matters is how many they can put into the air at the moment of attack.  Even having superior numbers locally is meaningless if surprise is achieved and the aircraft are caught on the ground.
 
Firepower – In addition to the hundreds of attacking aircraft, the US utilized large caliber naval guns on its battleships and cruisers to bombard bases and facilities on the islands and sink several fleeing ships, thus effectively supplementing the carrier aircraft.  As devastating as the air attacks were, nothing compares to large caliber naval gunfire for effective, sustained, unstoppable (with air superiority established!) destruction.  This is a lesson the Navy has completely forgotten.  We have no surface firepower and will one day rue the absence.  Large caliber naval guns are a devastating weapon and it is the responsibility of the naval planner to recognize that and work to bring that firepower into play, as appropriate.
 
Another aspect of firepower is numbers of delivery platforms.  The attack on Truk succeeded due to the immense numbers of carrier aircraft involved (500 aircraft).  An aircraft can only deliver a very limited amount of firepower and has no ability to sustain that delivery without returning to its base/carrier to rearm which means aerial firepower can only be applied sporadically.  This limitation was overcome at Truk (and throughout the war) by applying huge numbers of aircraft.  Each individual aircraft carried an almost insignificant amount of firepower but numbers compensated.  Our carrier air wings, today, consist of only around thirty actual combat aircraft (subtracting out combat aircraft relegated to tanker duty because we idiotically gave up our tankers without replacement).  We’ve forgotten that quantity matters when it comes to delivering firepower.
 
Courage – Last but not least, Truk teaches us the importance of courage.  At the time, there was a great deal of trepidation about an attack on Truk but we went ahead anyway.  Today, we have far too many Chicken Littles who see nothing but doom and gloom and are unwilling to take the slightest risk. 
 
Who Dares, Wins
Fortune Favors the Bold
 
These are the mottos and philosophies we should be living by, not
 
What Will the Chinese Think?
We Can’t Risk Escalation
 
Look at all the people, including within the military, who are terrified by the mere thought of engaging Iran, a third rate military, at best, certain that we cannot win.
 
 
 
As with any battle throughout history, there are important lessons to be learned and, as with every battle throughout history, the Navy is deaf, dumb, and blind to the lessons history is screaming at us.

15 comments:

  1. Can we still achieve surprise anymore? I believe this blog has said before that the South China Sea is a Chinese lake, with them having complete information on our movements within the SCS, the Taiwan Strait, and the Chinese seas.

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    Replies
    1. If we attempt to sail straight into the South China Sea then, sure, we'll be detected. That would be stupid. As with the Japanese in WWII, we would roll back the defense and conduct strikes from OUTSIDE the forward edge of battle not, stupidly, inside. Strikes from outside, properly conducted, would achieve surprise almost assuredly.

      You're got to think operationally.

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  2. It should be noted that the 40-odd aircraft of an American air wing is roughly numerical parity with the average chinese coastal airbase, which usually houses a fighter wing.

    However, the Chinese will never ve able to surge the full strengthnof their air wing becsuse they have to keep flying CAP patrols and standing ready 5 alert. This eats into aircraft uptime and forces them to be cycling their aircraft for maintennance, because if you try to keep all your aircraft up at the same tine, they'll all go down at the same time.

    Now, the same applies to us, but because we're the satacker, we get to choose when to strike. We know our schedules. We can work around them. We know just how much we have to push.

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  3. I'm missing something. This blog is about the lack of Conops, the stupidity (or worse) of admirals, the numerous ship design mistakes ... etc. And now you want to convince us that the Navy, possibly with some help from the Air Force, would be able to easily counter a China agression againts Taiwan, Guam, Japan ... etc ?

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    Replies
    1. Wow! You didn't grasp ANYTHING about the post. I can't even be bothered to set you straight. Have a good day!

      Delete
  4. Truk is an ISLAND, easily isolated from resupply and reinforcements via a naval blockade. You proposed attacking Chinese coastal cities- presumably on the Chinese MAINLAND- which are NOT easily isolated from reinforcements and resupply. (It would be another matter if you proposed attacking Chinese island bases in the South China Sea.)

    What happened to your STRATEGIC thinking?!

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Where did you see a proposal to attack the Chinese mainland????

      Delete
    2. The seat of decision is on land.

      Also, let's look at things strategically. The worthwhile targets to strike are on the mainland. Sure, China has the atoll airbases, but these are small potatoes and easily taken out. If we want to be forcing pauses to their industry, causing chaos in their forces, attriting their outgoing fires aimed at Taiwan, we're going to have to attack targets on the mainland.

      Delete
    3. "we're going to have to attack targets on the mainland."

      Of course, but not with carriers parked a hundred yards off shore. Stealth bombers, thousand mile cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles are the weapons of choice for that until defenses have been extensively rolled back.

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    4. The nice thing about strike fighters is that, in effect, they're a reusable first stage for cruise missiles.

      Using the F-35 and the JSM missile on a Hi-hi-lo flight path gives us a combat attack radius of 1000 miles, which is the same as Tomahawk, which does 1000 miles. Assuming 4 squadrons and the a modest load of 4 JSMs, that's a throw weight of 192 missiles, which is quite a respectable salvo to add to the DDGs, which would likely be able to throw up a salvo of some 180 missiles (assuming 6 DDGs in the CSG, carrying mixed general purpose loadouts).

      Now I dunno about y'all fellas above, but I'm just saying, 300 missiles is a hell of a salvo to defeat.

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    5. "reusable first stage for cruise missiles.

      Using the F-35 and the JSM missile on a Hi-hi-lo flight path gives us a combat attack radius of 1000 miles, which is the same as Tomahawk, which does 1000 miles. Assuming 4 squadrons and the a modest load of 4 JSMs, that's a throw weight of 192 missiles"

      You're somewhat correct. Bear in mind a few things.

      1. The Navy planned to reduce the F-35C squadrons to 10 aircraft instead of 12 and only plans on a single F-35 squadron per air wing.
      2. The F-35 can carry two JSM internally (4 externally) but as the loadout increases the stealth and range decrease.
      3. The current JSM inventory is somewhere in the vicinity of 100 missiles and production rates are very low.

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  5. I think we would be wise to assume that the Chinese know exactly where all of the six or so ‘at sea’ carriers are at any particular moment.
    A combination of old fashioned espionage, satellite imagery, sonobuoys, sub-sea listening cables, passive sonar, long range reconnaissance drones and reporting from their hundreds of thousands of fishing trawlers, would make it hard to hide a CSG, vast as the ocean is.

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    Replies
    1. "I think we would be wise to assume that the Chinese know exactly where all of the six or so ‘at sea’ carriers are at any particular moment."

      In peacetime, yes. In war, no. Setting aside the well known live experiment against the Soviets, in war we'd deplete Chinese satellites, sink all Chinese vessels on sight, eliminate long range patrol aircraft, destroy SOSUS type equipment, arrest Chinese agents in the US, etc.

      Delete
    2. Yes we’d likely try to do most or all of those things, but it seems statistically improbable that we’d be 100% successful.
      Sonobuoys for example are small, cheap and passive (until they transmit a triangulated fix) by which time it’s too late to take them out (obviously); maybe we already know where they all are, but I would doubt it. Fishing (or spy) boats ditto, and successively destroying them would give away both position and direction of travel. Maybe we could manage a clean sweep of all the Chinese spies in the country, but that also seems unlikely (sleeper agents etc.).
      So I still think we’d be wise to assume in our planning that even in wartime Chinese would have a good idea of the locations of our CSGs, and in peacetime are likely making this the number one priority in their own planning.

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    3. "seems statistically improbable that we’d be 100% successful."

      What would possibly lead you to either believe or expect 100% success in war?

      You seem to have some very unrealistic ideas about fishing vessels in war, sonobuoys, etc. There aren't that many deep sea fishing vessels and in a war they'll stick close to home or be sunk. We won't be encountering any fishing vessels in the middle of the Pacific and, if we do, they'll be instantly sunk (see the history of WWII naval warfare to see exactly how this plays out). Sonobuoys are not area sensors. They're short lived, very short ranged, pinpoint sensors used to pin down a submarine that's already been detected. You may be thinking about SOSUS like listening arrays but those are completely different. They're fixed and susceptible to being destroyed. And so on.

      Consider the real world example of the Malaysian airliner that vanished several years ago in the middle of one of the most heavily travelled and radar and satellite monitored regions of the world and no trace has ever been found.

      Detecting anything in the middle of the ocean is a challenging task.

      You have some very unrealistic ideas about detection.

      Delete

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