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Sunday, May 17, 2026

USS Ford Deployment

USS Ford just returned from a post-Vietnam record deployment of 320 days.  ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that deployments are of no value and the fleet should be kept home, undergoing continuous, intensive training and maintenance.  The only exception is to perform specific missions and then immediately return.  So, what value (worthiness) did we get from Ford’s record setting deployment?  How much of the deployment was justified? 
 
To review, here’s a timeline of Ford’s deployment activities, as best I can reconstruct it.  As you scan it, ask yourself if the activities are worthwhile.
 
 
24-Jun-2025 began deployment to European Command area of responsibility.
 
19-Jul-2025 arrived Mediterranean
 
17-Aug-2025 North Sea for joint exercises in the Arctic Circle with the Royal Norwegian Navy's HNoMS Thor Heyerdahl (frigate) and HNoMS Maud (tanker), Germany's Hamburg (frigate), and France's Aquitaine (frigate) and Somme (tanker)
 
12-Sep-2025 Oslo, Norway port visit
 
22-26-Sep-2025 NATO Neptune Strike 25-3 exercise
 
24-Oct-2025 Caribbean
 
11-Dec-2025 assisted seizure of a tanker off the coast of Venezuela
 
3-Jan-2026 provided support for Operation Absolute Resolve off Venezuela
 
9-Jan-2026 provided support for Operation Southern Spear in Caribbean
 
27-Feb-2026 off coast of Israel
 
28-Feb-2026 began strikes as part of Operation Epic Fury
 
12-Mar-2026 laundry room fire
 
23-Mar-2026 Souda Bay, Greece, maintenance and repairs
 
28-Mar-2026 Split, Croatia for repairs
 
2-Apr-2026 left Croatia
 
 
 
Let’s analyze the worthiness (value) of Ford’s deployment.  There were two worthwhile activities that could be classified as justifiable missions:
 
  • Operation Southern Spear/Absolute Resolve in the Caribbean for the Venezuela confrontation (3 months)
  • Operating Epic Fury (Iran strikes) (2 weeks)
 
Even that’s misleading.  The only aspect of the Caribbean operations that was actually necessary as far as requiring a carrier was Operation Absolute Resolve, the capture of Maduro so the 3 month deployment to the area only required a carrier for one day.  Let’s be generous and say 3 weeks were required for the operation to account for transit times and a short period on station prior to the actual execution of the operation.
 
This gives us a maximum of 3.5 months of worthwhile, mission type activity out of an 11 month deployment and, more realistically, 5 weeks of worthwhile, mission type activity out of an 11 month deployment.
 
The rest was useless.
 
The rest was pointless.
 
The rest was a waste.
 
 
The 11 month deployment got us two worthwhile missions (5 weeks) and resulted in a carrier with significant burn damage and burned out sailors, a worn out air wing, and 11 months of deferred maintenance which will cause problems down the road.  Ford will now likely be unavailable for deployment for a year or more.  In contrast, with a home port model, Ford would be continuously mission ready, year round, less the occasional scheduled dry docking every few years.
 
How many of Ford’s sailors will re-up knowing another year long deployment could well be in their future?
 
Home porting (Norfolk) would have allowed the Ford to reach the Caribbean/Venezuela quickly and reached Israel for Epic Fury much quicker.  With constant home port training and maintenance, Ford would have been better prepared for both missions and, debatably, the laundry fire might not have occurred.   Perhaps the persistent toilet problems would also have been resolved although that one sounds like an idiotic design that is never going to work.
 
I don’t think the uselessness of deployments is even debatable, at this point.  Each deployment simply proves my contention.  Each carrier laid up for months or years suffering the effects of deferred maintenance simply proves my contention.  Let’s bring the fleet home and get it back into fighting shape.
 
Thank you, USS Ford, for demonstrating the uselessness of deployments.

3 comments:

  1. It's coherent with one of your previous post stating that exercises with allies were useless. One could deduct that allies are useless - and by extension NATO is useless. And it's exactly what the US government is thinking. Of course it's too bad for the hopeful allies, or the "clients" states, but then they don't hold the cards. Latest exemple is Taiwan.

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    Replies
    1. Just to clarify, I've not stated that all exercises with allies are useless ... just cross-training or integrated training where we (or they) fall under the other's command structure. Separate but cooperative exercises may have some benefit. For example, ASW training against an ally's diesel sub which we, inexplicably, don't have, would be quite beneficial.

      By no means do I believe that allies are useless. What I believe is that allies should be providing for their own defense and we should not be basing forces with them. NATO is the prime example of this. Europe can more than adequately defend itself and, as we've seen, our basing of forces in Europe is fraught with unreliability and is a waste of time.

      "Of course it's too bad for the hopeful allies"

      NO, No, no! This approach is for the GOOD of allies. Our allies have become dependent on us and this has weakened, rather than strengthened, them. It's the old, give a man a fish versus teach him how to fish scenario. Forcing our allies to provide 100% of their own defense makes them stronger which, in the long run, makes us and them stronger.

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  2. I suppose the obvious question is how many of the crew will decide the record is not worth it and call an end to their naval careers.

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