If you want to read a sales brochure that raves about the
magnificence of the Navy, check out the latest 30 year shipbuilding plan.
Here are some tidbits from the most recent five year plan
for the years 2027-2031 inclusive.[1]
Battleship (Qty=
3, $14.5B ea) – Setting aside the reality that these will never be built, the
plan is to have three built within the next five years while our high priority,
“must get hulls in the water” frigate will only complete four? There’s some serious delusion at work here.
Burke (Qty= 7, $3.61B
ea) – Sure, these ships are long since obsolete, non-stealthy, overloaded, have
no growth margins, lack close in weapons, and have sub-optimal radars but we’re
going to build seven of them anyway because it’s the only ship we know how to
build. Along those same lines, I’ve read
that the Navy is going to restart the F6F Hellcat production line because it
was successful and we know how to build them.
NSC-FF Frigate
(Qty= 4, $1.76B ea) – This is our most urgent shipbuilding project, according
to the Navy, and we can only get four in five years? Does this give a feel for our ability to
replace sunken ships during a war? Check
out that price! That’s a long ways from
the numbers the Navy was publicly tossing around! Remember when the Navy was claiming they
would build Constellations for around $800M ea?
Now, we’re building slightly upgunned NSC patrol boats for twice that
cost! Yikes!
Virginia SSN
(Qty= 10, $6.3B ea) – Setting aside the fact that we’ve been unable to maintain
a build rate of two subs per year and now we think we’ll build two plus an SSBN
each year, do you remember when the Navy proudly (and fraudulently!) claimed it
was building Virginia’s for $2B apiece?
Well, now the cost is up to $6.3B and, of course, that’s a lowball Navy
estimate.
Landing Ship Medium
LSM (Qty= 23, $298M ea) – I have yet to hear any viable Concept of
Operations for these sitting ducks and yet we’re going to build 23 of
them? I wouldn’t want to be a Marine in
the near future! Shipping on one of
those promises to be a one-way trip and a short one at that.
Unmanned – Paraphrasing
Star Wars, “The delusion is strong in this one.” From the Navy’s shipbuilding plan,
This statement is utterly false. We can easily match China’s shipbuilding but we choose not to for reasons that only an insane person could agree with. This is purely a self-inflicted disadvantage. We’ve discussed the many ways we could easily and hugely increase our shipbuilding so I won’t belabor it here.
The Navy’s solution?
Why, unmanned, of course!
False! The Navy’s unmanned vessels do NOT delivery warfighting capability. They are largely unarmed.
Retirements - What
about retirements? The five year plan
calls for 58 new ships and 46 retirements.
That’s a net gain of 12 ships. Take
that number at face value. It’s a gain of
12 ships over 5 years which is 2 ships per year. Compared to Chinese shipbuilding rates,
that’s embarrassingly pathetic. Still,
it’s an improvement. Or is it? When we start looking at what types of ships
will be added and lost, the picture is not good.
- 10 CG/DDG will be retired and 10 DDG added. That’s a net gain of 0 for our top of
the line surface combatants.
- Counting all combat
ships (carriers, surface ships, attack subs), we’ll gain 22 and lose 25 for a net
loss of 3.
The numerical gains will be in auxiliary ships, not combat
ships. Auxiliaries are vital but they
add no firepower to the fleet.
Summary
Though I’m sure they didn’t intend it as such, the 30 year
plan perfectly documents the Navy’s delusions, fantasies, runaway costs, and
schedule slippages. In that sense, it’s
quite informative and interesting. As far
as reality … well, that’s not included in the document.
____________________________
The United States faces a strategic inflection point where peer adversaries have achieved naval mass that the U.S. cannot match with traditional shipbuilding alone.[1]
This statement is utterly false. We can easily match China’s shipbuilding but we choose not to for reasons that only an insane person could agree with. This is purely a self-inflicted disadvantage. We’ve discussed the many ways we could easily and hugely increase our shipbuilding so I won’t belabor it here.
To counter this and deliver warfighting capability fast, the USV FoS strategy outlines a rapid, competitive path to deliver affordable, scalable, and adaptable unmanned surface capabilities … [1]
False! The Navy’s unmanned vessels do NOT delivery warfighting capability. They are largely unarmed.
Hey, I'll take a few hundred hellcats!
ReplyDeleteWhat type of pricing is this ?
ReplyDeletedid they add extra zero for some of them ?
Don't be fooled by the initial Navy fantasy cost estimates that get publicly thrown around. They're just that - the Navy's fantasy. The true costs show up when they have to start submitting budgets. Even then, those aren't the complete costs. The Navy buries around 30% extra costs in other account lines that are untraceable. Perhaps a forensic accountant could get the absolute true costs but none of us can. Extra costs include extended fitting out, construction completion costs since no ship is delivered complete anymore, some GFE items, immediate upgrades since some equipment becomes obsolete due to the lengthy construction times, repair/warranty costs because ship's do not come with warranties, and so on.
DeleteSo, no, they didn't add extra zeros; they just finally had to list actual budget costs and they're never anywhere near the initial cost estimates. You can't even call the initial figures "cost estimates" because an estimate implies a good faith effort at determining the actual cost and the Navy makes no such effort. The Navy knows full well that their initial costs are ridiculously low but they put those fraudulent (yes, it's fraud when you know it's not true but say it anyway) claims out there anyway. It's basically bait and switch for Congress.
This is why it's important to actually read the budgets and the various GAO and DOT&E reports that list that actual costs.
DeleteDoes Pentagon think it is China? Unfortunately, these days, people love military technologies need to look Chinese naval ships and submarines for excitements.
ReplyDeleteMy god. The NSC-FF is no longer cheaper than Constellation.
ReplyDeleteAs much as I malign the LCS, you could buy 4 of them and have quadruple the firepower of the FF, at the same cost.
"could buy 4 of them and have quadruple the firepower of the FF, at the same cost."
DeleteI understand your thinking but be cautious. The LCS true cost is somewhere in the vicinity of $500-$600M ea and the firepower is quite limited. I don't have the latest status but NSM is mounted on only a few ships as NSM production is quite limited and the Navy has ordered very few. Similarly, Hellfire has been mounted on few, if any, ships. Beyond that, LCS has a 57mm gun and a close in weapon and that's it.
The stock weapons fit of the FF isn't that much better than the basic LCS. We've got what, a 57mm gun, a 30mm gun, RAM, maybe eight NSMs.
DeleteLet's say that the true costs of LCS is 500 mil, and that the FF sticks to the 1.8 billion cost. That gets us 3x ASuW LCS, with the following weapons:
- 3x 57mm gun
- 6x 30mm Bushmaster II
- 12x NSM
- 3x RAM
So a 50% increase in missile throw weight, and 3 times the amount of firepower in all other weapons systems.
It really begs the question whether the costs of the FF are justified, because at 1.8 billion dollars I'm not seeing any cost savings versus Constellation, and at that price point if we throw in another few hundred million, we can get ourselves a Burke. And it's not even as if the FF has an amazingly expensive radar - it's been specced to use Sea Giraffe, which is one of the radar options for LCS, and has a niche as a solid, budget radar for ships that don't rate a full on AAW setup. (I should hasten to add that it's not as if Sea Giraffe is bad per se; it's more than capable of cueing SHORAD, point defenses and medium range SAMs. And quite frankly, an ASW escort doesn't need an AAW grade radar.)
While I applauded the killing ofhe Constellations, because mini-Burkes is the last thing I think we needed... the new plan isn't any better. The weapons density and capability is...well, lackluster is being generous. It seems like buying ships for the sake of buying ships. I suppose the NSM is an upgrade from Harpoon... but almost half a century ago we had 8 Harpoons and a 76mm gun on a ship( barely big enough to not be called a boat )that was under 150ft long and only weighed a few hundred tons. Sure it was niche but at least it punched in/above its weight class.
DeleteWhile at first the new shipbuilding plan seems good, again its showing how unserious and unfocused the Navy is on actual combat. As much as I struggle with the implications and complications... at this point Im with CNO- It's time for a moratorium on new construction until the Navy can 1) maintain what they have and 2) create some designs that are actually answers to unfulfilled needs/CONOPs ( like ASW ) and carry a proper amount of weapons for their size/price.
Im over this neverending foolishness, and the Navy is darn lucky Im not President/ SecDef/SecNav!! Heads would roll and the herd would be culled top-down mercilessly until I found some people with a sense of urgency and a drive to provide this country with a proper combat capable force that didn't squander taxpayer dollars like a teenager in the mall with daddy's credit card...
" squander taxpayer dollars like a teenager in the mall with daddy's credit card..."
DeleteColorful and apt. That's great writing!
"create some designs that are actually answers to unfulfilled needs"
You've got it! The Navy currently builds ships and hopes they fill a need instead of building to the need and KNOWING it will fill the need. The difficulty for the Navy is that needs come from operational plans which come from a military strategy which comes from a geopolitical strategy. Unfortunately, we lack a geopolitical strategy, a military strategy, and operation plans so the Navy has no guidepost to establish needs which they can then build to. This does NOT absolve the Navy of blame. Some needs are timeless and blindingly obvious (like ASW) and yet the Navy still ignores them.
It's when you get beyond the blindingly obvious that you MUST have op plans to establish needs? Do we need large caliber naval guns? Well, it depends on what our op plans are. Do we need *fill in the blank*? It depends ... And so on.
The current administration has been better than previous administrations about establishing some sort of geopolitical strategy (call it, America First or whatever you want) so I give them a small amount of credit but it's nowhere near a comprehensive geopolitical strategy. Of course, the fact that we change administrations every four years does nothing to help us establish consistent geopolitical strategies but that's an inherent weakness in a democracy with frequent elections. It would be nice if we could establish the basics of an on-going geopolitical strategy (like isolating China and cutting our dependence on Chinese products and raw materials) that both parties could agree with but that's apparently too much to hope for in these ultra-politicized times. Anyway, that's enough about the political end of things. We'll leave those discussions to other blogs.
Its been noticed that that the DD(X) Burke replacement has vanished. The 'battleship' most likely killed it. Since the BB will get canceled itself at the first viable moment we're stuck with nothing.
ReplyDeleteThe most distressing thing about the shipbuilding plan is the effect he BB idea is having on the CG(X) and DDG(X) concepts.
DeleteThe BBN(X) project will likely eat every other new idea for the next decade atleast.
After all this time I am still rather uncertain as to the role of the multiple frigates that's been considered, cancelled and yet to be built. What exactly are they meant to do? What is their purpose? It is.not immediately and entirely clear to me.
ReplyDelete- Loc
There are two broad answers to your question:
Delete1. The Navy doesn't do CONOPS so, of course, no one knows what the role is.
2. "Frigate" has no meaning. For some countries, it's the biggest "capital" ship they can afford and is intended to do everything. For other countries, it's a low end "cheap" (but not really) supplement to higher end ships and the only purpose is to inflate numbers of ships. For still other countries, such as the US, its only purpose is to secure governmental funding for the navy.
The days when "frigate" had a meaning and a role are long gone so your confusion is not only understandable, it's inevitable.
All that aside, what SHOULD a frigate be/do for the US Navy? The glaring gap (well, one of the gaps, anyway) is ASW. We desperately need a small, "cheap", expendable, dedicated ASW vessel to deal with the proliferation of diesel subs in the world. That would be a good role for a "frigate" in the US Navy. Unfortunately, ASW does not seem to be on the Navy's "want" list. The Navy want's only Burkes or, if they can't have an endless stream of Burkes (no matter how obsolete) then they'll settle for mini-Burkes. As the Navy says, "We don't need no stinkin' ASW ship".
I would disagree with this claim on Burkes ""obsolete, non-stealthy, overloaded, have no growth margins, lack close in weapons"" while some of that is a reasonable opinion the no growth margins claim is not based on fact.
ReplyDeleteThe head of NavSea a few years back described in detail how for F3 version they restored the margins by changing the hull shape below the waterline. The primary hydrostatic change involved broadening the underwater cross-section toward the rear of the ship, specifically thickening the hull lines and widening the fantail.
Naturally thats not done in isolation .Altering the underwater shape and packing more concentrated weight into the machinery spaces fundamentally changed how bending forces (hogging and sagging) act on the hull as it rides waves. To support the newly shaped sections and prevent structural flexing, NAVSEA fundamentally redesigned the ship's internal architecture. Thickened steel scantlings, heavier longitudinal girders, and reinforced transverse bulkheads were integrated directly into the bottom of the hull.
"described in detail how for F3 version they restored the margins by changing the hull shape below the waterline."
DeleteI'm aware of several design studies intended to address various Burke weight issues but I'm not aware that any have been implemented. Please provide some references.
That aside, the proof is that the Burkes were unable to accommodate the radar size that the Navy determined was required. The issue was weight margins and utilities. There are numerous reports detailing the Burke's weight issues.
That aside, of the five characteristics I listed (obsolete, non-stealthy, overloaded, have no growth margins, lack close in weapons), you've disputed [incorrectly] one. Thus, the point that the Burkes are well past their prime remains entirely valid.
Weight margins (and stability) have been further negatively impacted by the hideous EW warts attached port and starboard which also negatively impact the Burke's remaining stealth.
I look forward to your reference about a reshaped hull.
"while some of that is a reasonable opinion"
DeleteNone of that is opinion. It is simple fact.
ReplyDeleteIt would be of interest to know how much ballast Burkes fitted with the new EW had to fit to counter the extra top weight.
The old Burke design are fitted with four gas guzzling GTs and when image of the original DDG(X) appeared several years ago it highlighted 50% greater range and 120% greater time on station with 25% reduction in fuel usage over the Burkes and now for the BBG(X) Navy pushing for the massively more expensive nuclear power and time in build options to gain extra range and time on station reflecting current Navy adverse opinion of Burkes limitations which can only be heavily reinforced by the current Operation Epic Fury.
Nick