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Wednesday, January 21, 2026

NSC Frigate Delusions

The degree of delusion and fantasy associated with this NSC frigate concept is already stunning and does not bode well for the program.  Let’s check out a few of the notable delusions and fantasies.
 
What is most important about the new frigate design?  We all know it is lethality in support of a focused Concept of Operations (CONOPS), presumably ASW-centric.  However, is that the most important thing about the NSC frigate in the Navy’s view?  Well, here’s their take on it.
 
The new frigate design will focus on American designs and American yards, [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle] Caudle said.
 
“Other countries will always prioritize their own fleets, not us, ships that depend on foreign industry,” he said. “That’s why this is an American design backed by American workers, American suppliers and an established logistics and maintenance network. So wherever the ship sails, when the American flag goes into port, it does so with American industry firmly behind it.”[1][emphasis added]

Wow!  Caudle’s last two sentences use the word, “American”, five times.  Apparently, as far as he’s concerned, the NSC frigate’s main and most important characteristic is not firepower, focused mission, CONOPS, cost, or anything else.  The most important characteristic is that it’s “American”!  Got burned by the foreign FREMM design, did ya there Adm. Caudle?  Not gonna make that mistake again, are ya, huh?  Everything about this is gonna be “American”, by God!  Nope, no overreaction, there!  Lurching from one extreme to another is definitely the way to go! 
 
Just out of curiosity, if this American approach doesn’t work out and we’ve already tried, and ruled out, foreign designs, what does that leave for the next attempt?  An extra-planetary Martian design?  But, I digress …
 
So, what is the guiding philosophy for the construction of this NSC-frigate?
 
… Jason Potter, who is performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition (RDA), said the service would base the new frigate on an existing design with minimal design changes.[1]

Wait a minute … Isn’t that word for word the guiding principal behind the Constellation’s parent design concept?  Yeah, and we saw how that worked out.  What’s the likelihood that the Navy learns a lesson and leaves the design alone and doesn’t make a host of changes?  This is pure delusion!
 
Where does an NSC-frigate fit into the Navy’s force structure?
 
“The design [with] little adaptation will meet the CNO’s requirements for a small surface combatant,” [Caudle] said. “The current [battle force] requirement is 73, of which we’re meeting less than a third.[1]

Whoa, there admiral.  You think we have around two dozen small surface combatants now?  Are you counting the LCS as a small surface combatant?  The operative word is combatant and the LCS has no useful combat capabilities so you’re deluding yourself.  If you have a requirement for 73 small surface combatants, you’re short 73.
 
What’s the situation on manning for this ship?
 
The design will have accommodations for about 140 sailors.[1]

Have we finally admitted that the LCS idea of a crew of six highly cross-trained sailors plus a parrot cross-trained as a dog isn’t sufficient?  As a point of reference, the Zumwalt is over 600 ft long and 16,000 tons with a crew of 147.  Now, we’re going to build a frigate that’s 400 ft long and 4,600 tons with a crew of 140??!  One of those two ships is incorrectly manned.  Can you figure out which one it is, admiral?
 
What will the NSC-frigate do for us?
 
… this platform would help take the load off of our destroyers so they could focus on some of the higher-end missions,” a second senior official told USNI News.[1]

There it is again.  The ever-present, mythical “free up ships for higher end missions” justification.  Of course, no one has yet come up with an example of what a higher end mission is that the Burkes would be freed up for.  But, I digress …
 
Well, there may be some problems already visible with this NSC-frigate concept but I am, at least, comforted by SecNav’s strongly implied assurance that change orders will come only over his dead body, as documented in the previous post.  Ominously, though, there’s this,
 
One of the few changes the Navy intends to make to the NSC design is to construct a platform above the open boat deck for containerized mission packages …[1]

A platform to hold containerized packages on the order of 40,000 lbs!  That’s a hefty platform! 
 
So, it’s not even a formal program yet and, despite SecNav’s proclamation, we’re already making changes – changes that will affect the ship’s designed weight margins, weight allowances, stability, total weight, sea keeping and handling, etc.  Inevitably, those changes will require other changes in propulsion, ballasting, fore/aft freeboard, internal structure, etc.  There’s no such thing as an isolated change in ship design.
 
Well, at least the change is to enable a modular mission package approach.  That worked so well on the LCS that even I can’t argue against it.  Modular is clearly the way to go. … right?
 
Those containers could do a host of missions. That’s a core element of the future force design.[1]

That is some Class A delusion, there!
 
Well, at least the entire modular modification will be the only change, right?
 
Based on the FREMM design in service with the French and Italian navies, the Constellation class design required modifications to meet U.S. Navy survivability standards.[1]

Uh … say, there SecNav … are you aware that the NSC design does NOT fully meet Navy standards?  So, either we build a sub-standard vessel for Navy service or we make more changes to the Constellation NSC-frigate to meet Navy standards. 
 
Will the NSC-frigate be armed similar to the Constellation?
 
The initial FF(X) hull will be largely unmodified from the systems found on the NSC, officials told USNI News.[1]

The NSC’s entire weapons fit is 1x 57 mm gun and a CIWS.  That’s it.  That’s all.  If the NSC-frigate is going to be “largely unmodified from the systems found on the NSC”, that will be one extremely lightly armed ship, bordering on unarmed.  If we add VLS, torpedoes, anti-ship missile racks, RAM/SeaRAM, etc., that will necessitate extensive … um … what are those called when you change the design? … oh, yeah … change orders.  You know, the things SecNav implied would not happen and that he would have to personally approve.  I’m guessing he’s going to be doing a LOT of approving despite his little sound bite.  Added weapons will require internal structural changes, expanded magazines, ammo hoists, modified power and utility runs, etc.  Hmm … weight, weight margins, stability …
 
Fortunately, industry sees no problems.
 
… Chris Kastner, HII’s president and CEO, said in a statement. “Speed matters, and the NSC ship design is stable and producible and will lead to predictable schedules.[1]

I guess Mr. Kastner is unaware of all the changes the Navy is already planning to make to the NSC.  Can you say, “goodbye cost, goodbye schedule”?
 
Well, there you have it – a broad assortment of fantasy and delusion before the program has even gotten off the ground.  I can’t foresee any problems, whatsoever.
 
 
 
_______________________________
 
[1]USNI News website, “SECNAV: New Frigate will be Based on National Security Cutter, First FF(X) to be Built at Ingalls”, Sam LaGrone, 19-Dec-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls

82 comments:

  1. First, level set on the manning. NSC has accommodation for 148 and crews with 113. LCS Manning has been upped to 112. Seems like there might be a lesson there. Finally, Zumwalt has landed on 217 crew.

    There is some debate as to whether hull one will just finish as an NSC, but I don't think that's what they are saying per the slide from the SNA briefing. The aft deck would be prepped for 16 NSM or 48 Hellfire out the gate. If you look at the 2 boats and 3 cranes back there its probably about 60,000 pounds to play with along with any additional savings from removing the boat launch. The 16 NSM would be about 34,400.

    The other mods from baseline are Phalanx swap for RAM and 2 x 30mm guns which I assume will be mk 38 mod IV although not stated as such. SLQ-32 is also upgraded to SEWIP Blk II V6 and radar swapped to Sea Giraffe with SPQ-9B deleted. It also looks like SRBOC is deleted with NULK retained. The front of the deckhouse is redesigned, displacement raised to 4750 ton. All fuel tankage retained.

    I suspect the gensets will be upgraded from CAT 3512B to 3512C with more power, but that might be after the first flight. Also notable is that they just have a box sitting where the Mk 20 EOSS is currently located.

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  2. If you're decking over the boat ramp aft, do it right and install a VDS and torpedo tubes so the damn thing can at least do some limited ASW missions. Total lack of CONOPS for this platform, it should be ASW centric from the beginning. The whole program will end up being FUBAR.

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    1. They have lready said ASW isn't in scope for Flt 1. Likely teaming with USVs for ASW and strike initially. Given the ship details provided show an extra 3 feet, my guess is it is all at the stern accounting for future needs. It could use it. The specs for the follow on LRI boat is only 34.5'.

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  3. Add to the change orders moving the diesels up a deck
    and raft and encapsulate them. Noisy frigate vs. Sub
    ain't a good CONOPS.

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  4. Do we think they're going to paint them grey or white? I vote white.

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  5. USN will never do this and CG will never have the budget BUT honestly, if it's just for low intensity, anti pirate, anti drugs, presence, show the flag, etc.....isn't the mission better served by the CG than by the USN anyways and just have CG buy more cutters?!?!?

    Isn't that really the basis of the issue here? USN needs a escort/ASW ship with decent combat capability BUT then it's not really a cheap low cost frigate like the original CG NSC. USN then should have stuck with the original Euro FREEM which could have been a decent small frigate but USN turned it into a mini DDG Burke which blew up on size, timeline and money in USN face. It's really trying to eat the cake, not pay for the cake, lose weight on the cake and please, cake has to taste good, that's not how reality works, you can't have it all and neither can USN.....

    This is already showing all the issues that came up with FREEM being transformed into Connie FFX and it's not the fault of the builder or ship design, it's USN that can't make up it's mind and be honest on what it needs for the mission....honestly, what is the real mission?!?

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    1. "BUT then it's not really a cheap low cost frigate"

      It most certainly COULD be! Think about it. What does a small ASW vessel need to perform its function? It's not a lot. A sonar, towed array, ASW torpedoes (maybe ASROC?), and quieting. That's a pretty austere, cheap vessel. The key is to add ONLY what's mandatory. You don't add Aegis type radar, area air defense, helos, hangars, flight decks, Tomahawks/VLS, etc. which is what the Navy inevitably does and which drives up cost and ruins schedules.

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  6. Frankly, I think the USN simply doesn't have time to muck around anymore, and chose an imperfect choice because the only other realistic choice was nothing at all. We all know the Legend class ship with SeaRam and 8 NSM isn't enough- it's simply what a functioning LCS would have been like 20 years ago.

    But the US squandered a 30 year lead with it's failed concurrency philosophy and eternal adding more and more to designs habit.

    So this is the only option they have. And SecNav indirectly admitted this. the LCS features are on block 1, they'll improve the design and features as it progresses. It's not a proper frigate in any sense of the word, but what can they do? They can't even ask Japan for help buying evolved Mogami's , following Australia's example, because Japan will have no excess capacity to build Mogami's for a third navy simultaneously (yes I know the US only builds within the US) and possibly lack the staff to help the US build it's own .

    My hope is- the Legend class ship is simply a stopgap, to put functioning hulls in the water. In the meantime, they will work on a genuine warship.

    Andrew

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    1. "stopgap, to put functioning hulls in the water"

      Be careful, here. If the only goal is functioning hulls, we can buy combat canoes. They function and they're a LOT cheaper! The goal, even in a stopgap scenario, is combat EFECTIVE functioning hulls. If they're not combat effective, it's just a waste of money that could be better spent on aircraft or missiles or logistics vessels or minesweepers or ...

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  7. And he spelled 'murica wrong. Every. Time.

    Lutefisk

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  8. Just Another OpinionJanuary 22, 2026 at 3:59 AM

    Are all the senior leaders for the Navy on the Chinese payroll? Or are the Chinese just this lucky?

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  9. Re the FFX has very limited AAW capability, the max range missile fitted is the RAM-116 2B and with zero ASW capability excepting its helicopter.

    An ASW frigate hull is designed in hydrodynamic tanks for minimal noise, double rafted diesels with electric motors eliminating noisy gearbox and quiet propellers to minimize cavitation. All the above built for minimal self noise so as not to degrade its sonar to be able to detect the new gen very quiet subs, all was built into the IT-FREMM and why it chosen as the Constitution but not the NSC. presuming one reason why HII bid was thrown out

    The conclusion as the Navy said the primary purpose of the FFG(X) was an ASW frigate and get them in the water ASAP, is to revert Constitution design back as bid/contracted for and throw out all the hundreds of never ending change orders from NAVSEA insisted on, adding near 1,000 tons and calling into question its stability etc. and fire all the NAVSEA hierarchy.

    PS Would note Zumwalt manning: the original KPP crew was for 95 and the latest seen in 2019 was 217 (helicopter detachment included), have seen no figures for current CPS variant. GAO reported 2019 " Since the software is not as capable and does not enable as much automation as originally planned among other things [assuming software referring to is the Raytheon Total Ship Computing Environment, TSCE,] the Navy has permanently added 31 sailors to the crew compared to initial estimates, increasing life-cycle costs."

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  10. You could make the argument for the Navy to restart the Perry Frigate program by adding a 20-30 foot section on the hull and repowering it. At least it would be armed and add a 32-40 VLS to the hull. I think that would be a better program than cutter but who am I to make suggestions.

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    1. Aside from every other reason not to, it already had an extreme length to beam ratio.

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    2. Assuming you envision an ASW focus for this Perry restart, why would it need 32+ VLS? That's not an ASW requirement.

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    3. Then the VLS requirement is a mistake in my suggestion.

      On a different note/potential add-on is there a drone that can be launched and retrieved that's able to drop sonobuoys?

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    4. "is there a drone that can be launched and retrieved that's able to drop sonobuoys?"

      Kind of and no. I'm not aware of an in-service USV that can lay sonobuoys although I've seen reports of various companies experimenting with things along that line so it probably wouldn't be too hard to develop something.

      That aside, there is only a very limited use for such a system. USVs are, generally, slow and have limited range. Thus, if you wanted to lay a pattern 20-50 miles away (if it's closer than that you can, presumably, use your ship's sonar), it would take a long time to accomplish - unacceptably long in combat - if it's even possible due to inherent range or comm limitations. Beyond that, who/what would collect the sonobuoy data and analyze it? I've yet to see a valid CONOPS for any ASW unmanned system.

      Any valid use scenarios for unmanned ASW would be very limited and highly specific. It would have to be a scenario which was not time critical, not too far away, and comm security was not an issue. Hard to imagine too many scenarios that fit those requirements.

      I don't understand the Navy's obsession with unmanned since there is no validated, effective CONOPS for any of it.

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    5. You could put an MH-60R dipping sonar and MAD sensor on a CUSV. range 500-1000nm @ 10 3-7 day endurance. Stay on top of sub in the littorals at a stand off distance potentially. At least stay on top of a sub while the helo gets refueled.

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    6. There's an argument that every escort needs to at least be capable of self defense horizon AAW, which means VLS for ESSM. Add in VL ASROC and that starts adding up.

      That said, looking at the Japanese Asahi DDs, 16 VLS cells would probably be the bare minimum. This gives you 8 VLA and 8 quadpacked ESSM cells.

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    7. The original Navy RFI for the FFG(X) was for 16 VLS cells.

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    8. "The original Navy RFI for the FFG(X) was for 16 VLS cells."

      I wonder if 16 VLS cells is worth it?

      Could you accomplish that with box launchers or something similar?

      The VLS have some nice attributes; low profile, low CG, some flexibility.
      But they also require about 25' of vertical space in the hull.
      That requires a deep hull for a small ship.

      Possibly better to use deck space for launchers, which can also be trained in the direction of launch.

      Lutefisk

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    9. Actually the original RFI asked for input on VLS and didn't spec any. https://news.usni.org/2017/07/10/navy-releases-details-of-new-ffgx-guided-missile-frigate-program-in-request-to-industry

      Then RFP was no fewer than 32. https://news.usni.org/2019/06/20/navy-issues-final-rfp-for-ffgx-next-generation-frigate

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    10. While adding VLS seems like a likely "Flt II" possibility- it seems that there are box launchers that e ist or in development to carry ESSM. So even in its Flt I iteration, it seems possible to bolt down some launchers, and paired with TRS-4D , or the rotating SPY ( SPY-6V...), and COMBATSS-21, and have that self defense capability without needing to enlarge the hull and start doing a major redesign... which we know will create another Aegis/SPY/16in gunned/F-35 capable/nuclear hypersonic carrying/minimally manned monster... I mean, Constellation.

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    11. But having said that... since it's kind of a consensus that we need escorts ships... ASW focused ones... do they REALLY need ESSM?? Whether acting as escorts for auxilliaries or a carrier group... wouldn't they be operating under the umbrella of dedicated AAW ships anyway?? Shouldn't they just focus on being cheap ASW-centric ships?? Give them a couple CIWS, a SEWIP suite, chaff and decoys and call it good...

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    12. Radar selected is Sea giraffe, which is a change from NSC. Seems to be the one we've decided to like better as it was picked for OPC, CVN air control, and for the refit of the Hamilton cutters sent to Philippines.

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    13. Re number of VLS cells in original FFG(X) RFI (unable to find, presume now deleted) was 16. The original 2017 Austal frigate design reflects that number, developed from their LCS had 16 VLS, but in 2019 Austal had to extend length of their frigate design by 37' to 456' to be able to fit 32 VLS cells after Navy changed their specification to 32 VLS cells, the first major change/growth in the Navy specifications for the FFG(X) to make it a mini-Burke, the Navy was then planning a new FFG-62 Flight II with 48 VLS cells. The Navy 2025 30 year shipbuilding plan showed 24 FFG-62s and then then an additional 57 Flight IIs.

      https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61155#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20battle%20force,would%20need%20to%20increase%20significantly.

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    14. I am basing my comment on the actual FFGX program. That concept was prior to the program when the initial idea was a frigate version of the LCS only. Not sure they ever had an RFI or RFP for that?

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    15. "You could put an MH-60R dipping sonar and MAD sensor on a CUSV"

      How would the signals be analyzed? With no on board crew, data would have to transmitted to some host platform resulting in continuous, broadband communications - a good way to offer the enemy a pinpoint location on you.

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    16. "which means VLS for ESSM. Add in VL ASROC and that starts adding up."

      8 cells gives 32 ESSM which should be more than enough for a single, small ship's self-defense needs.

      ASROC is a very marginal weapon, as it currently exists. It is very short ranged which means that if there's a target within its range, it is almost certain that the ship has been sunk for some time already.

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    17. "The original Navy RFI for the FFG(X) was for 16 VLS cells."

      The Navy can ask for anything. That doesn't mean it's well thought out or useful.

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    18. "do they REALLY need ESSM?"

      Every ship needs a minimal self-defense capability. An 8-cell VLS provides 32 ESSM which seems adequate for the ship and the role.

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    19. "Radar selected is Sea giraffe,"

      This was also the radar selected for the Independence variant LCS ... not exactly a glowing endorsement but still ... I wonder what that says about the TRS-3D/4D of the Freedom variant LCS?

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    20. It might come down to one uses C-band and the other S-band. Looks like more of our current air search radars have gone with S-band.

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    21. "8 cells gives 32 ESSM which should be more than enough for a single, small ship's self-defense needs."

      Like I said, the Japanese choice of 16 cells for the Asahi is highly suggestive. That gives you 8 cells for ESSM (32 missiles) and 8 cells for VL ASROC. You're right that VLA is short ranged, but at least it's got better range than the matchbox ASROCs. Which is damning with faint praise, admittedly.

      If you want to engage submarines at a standoff, that's where the helo comes in, but the helo always incurs downtime, so you need to have some weapon for use when the helo is unavailable.

      I do think an ASW frigate should still carry a number of antiship missiles. Shooting other ships is a core foundational skillset of all naval ships, and the engagement process flow for an AShM shoot is significantly simpler than ASW: you either fire the missile on a target on your radar that you designate, or you fire it on a bearing only launch and let it seek independently.

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    22. "If you want to engage submarines at a standoff"

      The choice should not be a helo or a very short range ASROC. We should be able to easily develop a long range ASROC. If we can send a Tomahawk missile, roughly the same size and weight as a Mk 48 torpedo, a thousand miles, surely we can send a torpedo, say, 50 miles.

      "I do think an ASW frigate should still carry a number of antiship missiles. Shooting other ships is a core foundational skillset of all naval ships"

      You want to be very careful with this thought because it's very easy to fall down the rabbit hole. Shoot another ship? Sure! What ship? A patrol boat? That's easy and doesn't require many missiles. How about a corvette? Well, that's a bit tougher so we'll need more missiles. What about a frigate (mini-Burke)? That's way tougher! We'll need lots of missiles and sophisticated fire control. What about a Burke-like destroyer? We'll need saturation levels of missiles. You see where this leads without any qualifiers? So, what ship are you going to design your ship to shoot at? In WWII, a destroyer escort had guns but nothing remotely capable of taking on bigger ships. Is that your design philosophy? If so, a handful of Hellfires might be sufficient to take on a similar size ship. Give this some more thought and let me know what you're thinking.

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    23. I mean, if we look at WW2, destroyers and destroyer escorts both carried torpedoes. Fletcher DDs carried 10 tubes, Butler DEs had 3 tubes. The Battle off Samar had the DDs and DEs charging Center Force to magdump their torps.

      Carrying a modest amount of antiship missile canisters is not a tremendous sacrifice of deck space. 4 canisters fit in the same amount of space occupied by the ship's boat and its crane.

      The primary role of the ASW escort is of course ASW, but there is value in carrying antiship missiles for self defense, retaliatory counter fire, and in supporting the rest of the formation's throw weight. You don't need all these sophisticated measures if you're just blindfiring a bearing only launch, attacking a target you yourself see, or are firing off the flotilla leader cruiser's direction.

      Again, it's worth looking at japan: they are an ASW navy, but all of their escorts carry antiahip missiles.

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    24. "If we can send a Tomahawk missile, roughly the same size and weight as a Mk 48 torpedo, a thousand miles, surely we can send a torpedo, say, 50 miles."

      This is where we run into the problem, as you've identified in the past, of weapons that significantly outrange their sensors. Thales claims that their CAPTAS towed array sonar can detect submarines at 37 miles, but we all know what to think about manufacturer's claims...

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  11. The navy needs to restart/restore their ship Building experts. At this pace China will field commercial ships armed to travel to Taiwan and strike it while we field ships armed with machine guns and hope

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  12. On the armament, it's important to remember that making changes to ship capability is harder than "just add this and that and remove the other." There's the associated combat systems equipment and integration, power/infrastructure requirements, storage requirements, not to mention crew training.

    For example, at first glance I see a fairly straightforward path to a ASW version of this hull type: add (1) a towed array (the stern would appear to accommodate, at expense of NSM or any other modular add) and (2) a pair of triple Mk46 launchers. That's it. Paired with an SH-60, this gives you a decent ASW capability. But...does this hull have room for a torpedo magazine? How about sonobuoy storage? Can the CIC accommodate sonar consoles, processers, TMA plots, etc.? I don't know, but I bet that getting there is harder than it looks. Because of that, I think any changes will be small/incremental in any future flights. In the near term, I think what you see if what you get.

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  13. Unrelated news:https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/01/16/world/asia/china-ships-fishing-militia-blockade

    This happened last week and in Dec where Chinese govt gave the order to all these fishing boats to make a "barrier"....I can't really think of a good reason or purpose for this. I can see this in some kind of low threat, very permissive environment before a war starts but have a hard time believing all these fishing boats will stick around once ASMs and guns are around.

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  14. I remain skeptical of the actual requirements for NSC/Frigate/FFG(X) or whatever this thing is to be called: it certainly does not have a clearly defined mission. While ASW sounds great, the original FFG-7 was actually intended as a convoy escort, and it largely failed in that role: it was not able to protect itself, let alone the re-flagged tankers during Earnest Will missions; and it was not really good at ASW platform when you if you look at its sustained effectiveness in heavy seas. There is a reason that the Spruance, Burkes, Takanami ships are much larger, and the ASW threat is significantly greater. Actual crew sizes during Earnest Will approached 260+ or more when you count all the Stinger team augmentees and dual helicopter det personnel, and extra bodies. Finally, I think a 32+ cell VLS is a minimum given wartime expenditures of ASROC during the Falkland Island campaign. The best aspect of a new FFG/NSC/whatever my to be to create shipyard capacity after all.
    GAB

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    1. FFG-7s fortunately never had to execute their primary ASW mission in a wartime environment, so I don’t see how the class can be called a failure. ASW is not anti-mine, which was the primary threat during Earnest Will. Stark took a missile due to operational failure by the command not lack of sufficient self defense armament. And mines can get anyone - the lack of sufficient US capability in this area is a recurring theme here, and it was no better in late 80s.

      I agree that long range ASW torps (ASROC) may have a place although i can make a good argument a helo gives a broader all around capacity. In the end, a good mix of ASW weapons across the fleet would moot the need to fit them all on a single ship type. Another theme on this site.

      Agree also that anything that juices the shipbuilding infrastructure is a positive no matter what else.

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    2. Mk 32 and even VLA really seem like last ditch ways to keep the subs head down because you already brought the ship too close or just discovered the sub was there. The helo is the attempt at offensive ASW from a modern surface combatant. We need another option. Tactical Tomahawk with MAD sensor and either some way to lay a spread of depth charges or drop a torpedo.

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    3. FFG-7s were 'low-end' 'general purpose' escort ships; and they definitely failed as escorts. The problem of mines during Ernest Will missions was solved by having FFG-7s follow the tankers – not appealing to the merchantmen!

      1. The FFG-7 low-cost EW, sensor, and weapon suites were incapable of providing meaningful air defense to a convoy (or TF).
      2. FFG-7s with the lack of a bow sonar, large diesels generating a lot of sonar self-noise that was not completely eliminated by towed array sonar were not a great ASW platform. Not many surface ships are effective at ASW above 25 knots. There is a reason that many of the CVSs, CV-66 America and CV-67 John F. Kennedy either had, or planned for, bow sonar domes installations. Submarines have had a decisive advantage in detection since the 1960s.
      3. Effective escorts must be able to maintain speed with the ships they escort. Forget the published top speed of ~30 knots, the FFG-7s were not able to maintain 20 knots in sea state 4-5 and fight effectively (operate sensors, weapons, conduct flight operations). This matters because modern merchant hulls like container ships are not only much larger than modern naval ships, most are capable of running at up to 25 knots (some at 30 knots+) and critically they are designed to maintain speed even in high wind and sea states, which FFG-7s simply could not do, especially in quartering seas. The Algol class T-AKRs, certainly critical ships and contemporaries of the FFG-7s, were twice as long, ~ 10x the displacement and rated at 33 knots. They could outrun FFG-7s outright, and certainly run faster in high sea states.
      4. Merchant hulls do not need to refuel in route, even at 25 knots; however, an FFG-7 at 25 knots needed to refuel (slow to 15 knots for an at least an hour+) every other day making the speed disparity with merchant hulls even more acute. Distance = rate x time the math does not work in favor of the escort.
      5. The forward Mark 26 GMLS on Virginia class CGNs and Kidd class DDGs had 24-round magazines: primarily for ASROC. The reality of 24/7 naval operations is that there will be days out of the month when you cannot operate helicopters due to weather, but still must be able to fight, even with an inferior weapon. Magazines were sized according to expected expenditure rates, look at the UK expenditure of ASW weapons in the Falklands for why!

      Finally, the Stark attack was not an 'operational failure' - there is a very lengthy classified assessment of the incident from attack to the rather heroic damage control efforts.

      GAB

      Delete
    4. "The helo is the attempt at offensive ASW from a modern surface combatant."

      I'll quibble just a bit and say that the helo is the budget conscious attempt to conduct ASW at stand off distances, avoiding risk to the host ship.

      Delete
    5. "they definitely failed as escorts."

      Yes and no. The answer depends on the Concept of Operations, as is almost always the case. As a general escort for relatively low threat scenarios, they were adequate. As an escort expected to fight off waves of a Soviet regimental bomber formations and hundreds of cruise missiles, they were woefully inadequate but that's why we developed Aegis ships.

      Certainly, they could have been more densely armed - a recurring theme on this blog and one that applies to every ship built post-WWII.

      "FFG-7s were not able to maintain 20 knots in sea state 4-5 and fight effectively ... This matters because modern merchant hulls like container ships are not only much larger than modern naval ships, most are capable of running at up to 25 knots"

      Bear in mind that the Perrys were NOT built to escort modern, mega, container ships and the like. They were built to escort the existing merchant ships of the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. Those are the ships that would have constituted resupply convoys against the Soviets.

      Regarding weather, ALL ships are negatively impacted by weather to varying degrees. That a small frigate would be negatively impacted is hardly surprising and does not constitute an inherent weakness. Similarly, the submarine weapons and sensors of the time were negatively impacted by weather to varying degrees.

      Delete
    6. "Stark attack was not an 'operational failure' - there is a very lengthy classified assessment of the incident"

      I've read every public report, book, and analysis that exists, I think. Obviously I have no access to classified assessments. However, the failure seems quite conclusive to me. The Stark was placed in an environment for which they lacked the proper training, higher command support, and combat mindset (this, in particular). The failure was not equipment but mindset. They simply were not prepared to believe that an attack could occur. Subsequent analysis shows they had sufficient early detection and warning to have taken effective action but ignored or misinterpreted the warming signs.

      The book, Missile Inbound, provides pretty thorough coverage of all aspects of the attack.

      If there's anything further you can share that is not common knowledge, please do!

      Delete
    7. @CNO: "Bear in mind that the Perrys were NOT built to escort modern, mega, container ships and the like."

      Container ships capable of 23 knots+ were laid down at least as early as 1969: SS Atlantic Conveyor (sunk off the Falklands) being one of them. There are also the aforementioned 33-knot Algol class T-AKRs: ships key to help move the Army’s III, V, and VII Corps to Europe in the case of war; and the 26 knot Sacramento class AOEs laid down in 1961.

      Why the Navy built the FFG-7 without the capability to escort its own fast combat support ships, or the war critical MSC Combat Logistics Force ships is frankly ridiculous. Clearly no one in the Navy was talking to industry, sister-services, looking at war requirements, and no one at the JCS or Unified Commands was paying attention either.

      I note that the USN is even less prepared to fight and win today, but you do a great job of driving that point home every post.

      GAB

      Delete
  15. FFG-7s were 'low-end' 'general purpose' escort ships; and they definitely failed as escorts. The problem of mines during Ernest Will missions was solved by having FFG-7s follow the tankers – not appealing to the merchantmen!

    1. The FFG-7 low-cost EW, sensor, and weapon suites were incapable of providing meaningful air defense to a convoy (or TF).

    2. FFG-7s with the lack of a bow sonar, large diesels generating a lot of sonar self-noise that was not completely eliminated by towed array sonar was not a great ASW platform. Not many surface ships are effective at ASW above 25 knots. There is a reason that many of the CVSs, CV-66 America and CV-67 John F. Kennedy either had, or planned for, bow sonar domes installations. Submarines have had a decisive advantage in detection since the 1960s.

    3. Effective escorts must be able to maintain speed with the ships they escort. Forget the published top speed of ~30 knots, the FFG-7s were not able to maintain 20 knots in sea state 4-5 and fight effectively (operate sensors, weapons, conduct flight operations). This matters because modern merchant hulls like container ships are not only much larger than modern naval ships, most are capable of running at up to 25 knots (some at 30 knots+) and critically they are designed to maintain speed even in high wind and sea states, which FFG-7s simply could not do, especially in quartering seas. The Algol class T-AKRs, certainly critical ships and contemporaries of the FFG-7s, were twice as long, ~ 10x the displacement and rated at 33 knots. They could outrun FFG-7s outright, and certainly run faster in high sea states.

    4. Merchant hulls do not need to refuel in route, even at 25 knots; however, an FFG-7 (or other warship) at 25 knots needed to refuel (slow to 15 knots for an hour) every other day making the speed disparity with merchant hulls even more acute. Distance = rate x time the math does not work for the escort.

    5. The forward Mark 26 GMLS on Virginia class CGNs and Kidd class DDGs had 24-round magazines: primarily for ASROC. The reality of 24/7 naval operations is that there will be days out of the month when you cannot operate helicopters due to weather, but still must be able to fight, even with an inferior weapon. Magazines were sized according to expected expenditure rates, look at the UK expenditure of ASW weapons in the Falklands for why!

    Finally, the Stark attack was not an 'operational failure' - there is a very lengthy classified assessment of the incident from attack to the rather heroic damage control efforts.

    GAB

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Not to prolong a point, but having served on a FFG-7 (and CG-47) I assure you the fig could easily keep up with a battle group with no more speed or refueling limits than anything else in the fleet (less the nuke carrier itself, obviously).

      Algols were pretty fast and but were obviously outliers. The conops there was that speed was their defense, as no escorts (DD, FF, FFG, CG) could count on keeping up.

      Delete
    2. In your FFG days did you ever transit at 20 knots plus in sea state 4 or above, with towed array sonar streamed for at least a week? I served on FFG-48 and I am skeptical. I also doubt that even a Spruance could conduct ASW at 25 knots in anything other than glass seas. I am not interested in testing weapons after a team of engineers groom a ship ahead of the shoot; I want to test weapons that have sat in a magazine for months, on a ship that has been on condition III steaming for a week, in bad weather, and from unexpected directions.

      GAB

      Delete
  16. Learn from China.

    They operate type 054/054A frigates but want an upgrade. First, they built two new type 054B (both launched in 2023, commissioned in early 2025). After 1 year of operations, only recently, we saw they started construction another type 054B:

    https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/sea/satellite-image-shows-chinas-third-type-054b-under-construction#:~:text=Nearby%2C%20scaffolding%20and%20modular%20components,Air%2023%20January%202026

    While type 054B was launched in 2023, many Chinese were disappointed as it was not a mini type 052D. Then, China's response was - if we wanted it to be like 052D, we would build 052D than a smaller version of it.

    So, first, understand that a frigate is not a Burke. Understand its mission and limitations. For instance, you cannot ask that it has ASW capabilities as a Burke as it would have only one helicopter. Towed sonar has limited capability on detecting nuclear submarines in deep water. Once designed, build two first, let Navy operate them and find points of improvement.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "cannot ask that it has ASW capabilities as a Burke"

      I would ask that a frigate have SUPERIOR ASW capabilities compared to a Burke! ASW capability is partly a function of equipment but far more so a function of training and practice, neither of which the Burke is proficient at nor makes any attempt to become proficient.

      ASW capability is also a function of doctrine and tactics, again something that the Burkes utterly lack. For example, a pair of highly trained ASW frigates would, one hopes, be far more effective than a Burke, even ignoring the helo or no-helo issue.

      Delete
  17. Given the ongoing disaster around the Constellation and the NSC saga I wondered what it would take to design a <$400M frigate that’s easy to construct with current tech yet is optimized for the unfilled ASW role we desperately need. Using AI to prompt me through this thought exercise, I took the ComNavOps specs from the Fleet Structure page as a starting point and in under an hour of Q+A prompts, directives, and tradeoff decisions I had a 2400 ton, $385M, purpose-built ship design for the new Samuel B. Roberts-class ASW frigate. Not only the design specs but also rough production cost breakdowns by component, operational strategies for integration with the existing Burkes, cost/ benefits vs a Burke-only ASW strategy, a production plan to 80 ships with first hulls ready for trials in < 24 months, and flags of specific long-lead/ high-risk production items for which we need more industrial capacity. I encourage all readers to try something similar with the AI tool of your choice (I used Gemini, Grok, and Claude at various times). While there is no doubt that all of this output should be taken with a large grain of salt and cross-checked, it's also quite clear that if I can generate this in an hour as neither a Naval expert nor an AI-power-user then there are pitifully few real reasons the "professionals" can't be cutting steel in a month on a brand new design that works. I'd be happy to lay out my AI prompts and decisions in an article for critique or for others to try their own hands at this and other ship types.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "Using AI"

      That's a fascinating exercise you've conducted. As with all software, I'm sure the result depends on the assumptions that went into the input and I have no idea what those are so I can't assess the validity of the result but they are in line with what I've described throughout this blog.

      "if I can generate this in an hour "

      For me, this is the most worthwhile result of your exercise. It clearly demonstrates just how incompetent our so-called "professional" naval designers are.

      The next thing you need to try is putting a "face" on your concept and let us see what the vessel looks like! Shipbucket might be one option.

      Delete
    2. It should be in line with the blog, since that’s where it started!

      I make no claim to AI expertise and honestly am using this exercise as a learning/ training experience for me. Ultimately, it’s just software that’s only as good as the inputs, the models behind it, and the prompts you ask it to execute on, for sure. If you don’t have enough knowledge to guide the discussion then AI will give you something that sounds plausible but isn’t because 1) it made an assumption you didn’t catch, 2) pulled a data point that is incorrect/ inappropriate, or 3) just straight made something up to please you (ex, showing 10 Zumwalts in fleet mix).

      I treat AI right now like a smart intern. It works great given specific parameters and tasks (“Find me info about this”, “organize this random pile of data,”, “Compare this and that subjectively/ qualitatively”, “gather this data and run that analysis”, “create this thing for me given these parameters,”, What-If scenarios, etc) BUT you also have to tell it no (“stop doing that”, “that doesn’t make sense, recalculate”, “ignore source X”, “stop giving me suggestions when I asked for raw information”, etc.)

      I am a “real” architect (buildings, not software) so I’m familiar with the design and construction process for complex projects in the hundreds of millions of dollars. While every industry has their own nuance and technical aspects, most projects follow similar phases:

      Step 1: PreDesign/ Program Design = CONOPS.
      Step 2: Schematic Design
      Step 3: Design Development
      Step 4: Contract Documents
      Step 5: Bidding
      Step 6: Construction Administration

      AI in Steps 1 and 2 is exceptional to help with ideation and “what-if” modeling and firming up decision paths.
      Step 3 would be tool-dependent, to generate actual digital models. Renderings count, I guess!
      Steps 4 and 5 should be heavily (if not totally) totally automated with AI.
      Step 6 is all physical checks and follow-ups and clarifying Q, so until we have robots building and asking Q from the robots designing (or it’s the same robot) this is a people-focused step.

      Delete
    3. Extrapolation of Steps 1-2:
      This is a great place to use AI to guide discovery. Dump in thoughts, have it organize them, point out gaps and inconsistencies in logic or requirements, suggest questions you haven’t asked yet, etc. you can have some freewheeling conversations and then have the system consolidate all the topics back into summaries, etc. I actually went down a long rabbit hole in one tool to start, and then came back and consolidated my thoughts into a more defined prompt in another tool.

      AI Tool 1: With the first tool I started by asking where normalized construction costs would be found and how much a Perry-class frigate would cost in 2026. It told me $1.5-2.5B but a Constellation class is only $1.3-1.5B so I should buy those. I said no, that’s not reasonable b/c it has a lot of equipment I don’t need, so spec it like this [insert ConOps ASW frigate specs here]. The AI responded with concern about no VLS for SAMs and land attack and no redundancy for gun battery failure and also flagged that it thought I over-specified the sonar suite with 4 different types. Then it told me the cost was $980M-$1.38B! I argued that the hull cost shown of $400-500M was excessive for a 3000T steel hull with engines and crew accommodations and also to strip out the assumed “Govt Costs” of $120M for program management and T+E and it responded “You’re right - let me recalculate…” I kept going like this making it compare construction costs to Damen vessels, go with simpler electronics, etc. and got to about $500M option.

      AI Tool 2: I used this prompt: “You are an experienced naval architect and strategic thinker.

      Task: Design a warship optimized for Anti-Submarine Warfare for the US Navy. Predecessors include John C Butler, Perry, Garcia, Bronstein, Edsall classes of ship. Refer to the new ship design from here out as the Samuel B Roberts-class.

      Purpose: open ocean ASW escort to carrier, amphibious, surface action groups, and logistics convoys. Ship is optimized for ASW. No AAW except single CWIS or SeaRam for self-defense. No aviation component (no hanger, no landing pad, no berthing for aviators). Will operate in conjunction with carriers or Burke destroyers for aviation assets. Burke destroyers will provide fleet protection AAW coverage.

      Design guidelines: Diesel-electric engines mounted on rafts for quieting. Acoustically optimized. Size of No more than 3000 tons. Target 2500 tons. 25-30 knots speed. Build to Damen offshore patrol vessel standards. Design for 20 year lifespans

      Equipment outfit: 1x 76 mm Super Rapid STRALES/DART. 2x Mk32 Triple Torpedo Launchers. 2x RBU-6000 ASW rocket depth charges. ASROC trainable box launcher. VDS. Hull mounted multi-frequency sonar. SQR-20 Multi-function towed array. Wide aperture lightweight fiber optic sonar array, consisting of three flat panels mounted low along either side of the hull (Virginia class side arrays). Make radar systems something more basic than the TRS-4D. It just needs navigation and general search radar. Use basic battle management networking equipment. Do not specify new systems - all hardware must be in current use.

      Propose cost neutral or savings for eliminating RBUs and swapping for torpedo decoy/ countermeasures

      Detail how long it would take to build in US shipyards using current industrial techniques. Specifically, how long from contract to ship launch and how quickly can they be built.

      Compare groups of a) Burke/ Samual B Roberts escorts vs b) current Burke-only escorts for carrier, amphibious group, and convoy escort duty. In these comparisons include purchase cost, operating cost, manning headcount, and sensor count for each scenario for escorts only.

      Ask questions to clarify.”

      Delete
    4. (Cont’d) After this prompt ran I went through a series of development conversations:

      *Reminded AI to eliminate all aviation (it had kept a flight deck, evidenced by a prompt Q from it on refueling Burke helos)
      *No current RBU systems in current use by Navy so spec-ing one is difficult. AI proposed swapping it for a decoy and countermeasures system that does exist. I accepted the tradeoff.
      *Analyzed CWIS vs SeaRam (cost, weight, range) and selected SeaRam for range.
      *I know nothing about radars so I started with the high-spec TRS-4D one and gave the AI instructions to propose lower spec and price ones optimized for the ASW role with no concern for air battle management, etc.
      *Added bow thruster for $2M and more bow complexity for ease of holding station, tighter maneuvering
      *Added Mk16 mod 7 ASROC reload “matchbox” sim to Spruance and Knox for a deeper magazine for a primary ASW battery.
      *Reduced speed from 30 to 27 knots to maintain sound discipline, then moved from COLAD to pure electric diesel drive for $15M savings and quieter, in exchange for top speed max 25 knots
      *Maximized sensor capacity (rejected proposed reduction of 1 of 3 hull arrays, specified projecting arrays for sensitivity instead of set flush for higher speed)
      *Use “frozen” COMBaTSS-22 battle management software (nothing custom)
      *Rejected suggestion to drop 76mm gun to 57mm system
      *Rejected option of building hull and non-combat systems to ABS Naval Vessel Rules and kept at higher Navy combat standard.

      And ended up with this result:

      315 ft length, 44 ft beam, 13 ft draft, 2350T displacement. Approx 95 crew (8 officers, 32 combat systems/25 engineering/ 20 deck/ 10 logistics enlisted). A "Low-Acoustic-Profile" hull with a notched transom to allow the VDS and MFTA to be deployed and recovered simultaneously without tangling. Combined "Command Hub" with a glass bridge interface vs separate bridge and CIC. Critical damage control, steering, and engine telegraphs feature 1970s-style physical toggle backups for high-stress reliability. Side arrays are mounted low on the turn of the bilge for maximum deep-water sensitivity, sacrificing some speed and drag efficiency for superior passive listening during transit. Ship can be constructed simultaneously in four main modules (Bow, Machinery, Mission/ Sensor, and Stern) that can be joined for final assembly.

      Equipment:
      *76mm OTO Melara STRALES/ DART
      *ASROC 8 + 8 reload
      *2x3 fixed triple torpedo tubes
      *SeaRAM
      *VDS, MFTA towed array, side fiber arrays fully integrated into frozen COMBATSS-21 CMS
      *Terma Scanter 6000/ Thales SMART S-Mk2

      Long lead order items flagged:
      *Sonar ceramics and fiber optic arrays
      *Main engines and rafted generators
      *76mm gun and ASROC launcher

      Flagged bottlenecks for high production volume:
      *Sonar fiber-optic array foundry capacity: US needs triple current capacity to meet 80-ship plan
      *Acoustic rafting: specialized rubber and polymer mounts.

      Cost Breakdown:
      Hull & Mil-Spec Structure: $110M
      Pure Diesel-Electric Propulsion: $55M
      Acoustic Sensor Suite (High Sensitivity): $115M
      Weapon Systems (Gun/ASROC/SeaRAM): $75M
      Command, Radar, & Integration: $25M
      Bow Thruster & Auxiliary Gear: $5M
      TOTAL: $385 Million

      The point of all this isn’t that I’m right, as I’m sure there are plenty of things to quibble about. The point is that tools exist that allow us to rapidly iterate design ideas and move quickly.

      This is just an AMATEUR with basic tools and public data.

      Delete
    5. Complete with inspiring nautical music (selected by AI). Approaching and quartering away are slightly different designs (as noted by the crane in the away shot) https://gemini.google.com/share/db2197a8c0a7

      Delete
    6. I see nothing of range, speed, endurance or manning. THis is missing 2 of the 3 parts of the holy trinity.

      Delete
    7. Endurance: 30 days on station
      Range: 6500 miles at 15 knots
      Seakeeping: operationally effective through Sea State 6. At 7+ retrieve sensors/ button down and ride out storm.

      Please reread the posts for the other info you may have missed on first pass.

      Delete
    8. Endurance: 30 days on station
      Range: 6500 miles at 15 knots
      Seakeeping: operationally effective through Sea State 6. At 7+ retrieve sensors/ button down and ride out storm.

      Please reread the posts for the other info you may have missed on first pass.

      Delete
  18. "I had a 2400 ton, $385M, purpose-built ship design for the new Samuel B. Roberts-class ASW frigate."

    Could you cross reference that size of a ship vs. the current shipbuilding yards to see what smaller yards, which currently do no naval (or minimal naval) work, could be pulled into the building mix?
    If congressmen from those districts see potential dollars they can obtain......

    Looking4NSFS

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. If you skip a helo, you are still very unlikely to build an effective, manned ASW ship at that weight. What can be built fast is being built fast, the MASC prototypes. Mostly aluminum <225 feet, optimally under 180.

      Delete
    2. "you are still very unlikely to build an effective, manned ASW ship at that weight"

      It all depends on what, exactly, you want the ship to be capable of which is another way of saying CONOPS! In WWII, Flower class corvettes were highly effective ASW vessels despite being small and lightly armed. We can certainly do that today. On the other hand, if we insist that our notional ASW vessel be capable of infinitely long voyages with 2-4 helos, VL-ASROC, the most powerful active/passive multi-frequency sonar we have, towed arrays, variable depth sonar, high sprint speed, etc. then you're correct that we can't build an effective, manned ASW ship at that weight.

      Delete
    3. Looking4NSFS-
      The AI thinks it’s small enough to build in 4 sections in a series of federated yards and then barge around and assemble in a dry dock.

      “If production is restricted to one primary yard (e.g., Austal USA or Bollinger), the cadence is limited by slipway availability and local workforce. Est 3 ships/ year post-lead ship for total time of 27 years to full delivery. Conclusion: This is insufficient for a peer-conflict deterrent. It mirrors the slow delivery of the Independence-class LCS.”

      Tier 1 yards (Can assemble, do final outfit)
      *Austal USA (builds OPC, TAGOS)
      *Bollinger (builds LSM, FRC)
      *Hanwha Philly (modular joining experience)
      *Marinette Marine Fincantieri (Freedom LCS, Constellation, high backlog noted)
      *General Dynaimcs NASSCO (built T-AO 205 oilers, ESB bases)
      *HII (builds Burkes and LPDs, has dedicated “Small Surface Combatant” area)

      Tier 2 yards (build main Bow, Machinery Rafts, Mid-section, Stern):
      *Vigor Marine Group (Portland/ Seattle)
      *Eastern Shipbuilding (Panama City)
      *North American Shipbuilding (Louisiana)
      *Gulf Ship (Gulfport)

      “Oil and Gas” Experience Gulf Hub (build Jones Act tankers, OSVs, ferries, Army watercraft).
      *Thoma-Sea Marina (Deepwater OSV, Arctic-class tugs, NOAA ships)
      *Metal Shark (steel ferries, Near Coastal Patrol Vessel)
      *Conrad Shipyard (LNG bunker barges, Jones Act ferries, Navy Yard Tug)
      *Main Iron Works (Tugboats, supply vessels)

      “Utility” Experience Hub Great Lakes and East Coast
      *Seneca Falls/ Lake
      *Bay Shipbuilding (Fincantieri subsidiary, large Jones Act bulk carriers, LNG barges, indoor fabrication bays for winter)
      *Chesapeake Shipbuilders (coastal cruise ships and tugs)

      “Expeditionary” Hub West Coast
      *Nichols Brothers (high speed ferries, landing craft, Jones Act tugs)
      *Dakota Creek Industries (AGOR Navy research vessels, commercial trawlers, ferries)

      I have no idea if these are good yards or not but somebody with experience would be able to quickly push back on the tool and get lots more value out of this production plan.

      Follow-on thought would be to use AI to build out the ConOps Fleet Structure with a production schedule and compare that to current Navy production schedules and capacity to see feasibility and cost to have X ships in Y year.

      Delete
    4. Thankyou for the follow up!

      So if the production run is just large enough to stress the current production capability, it could encourage expansion of the entire base. Though that relies on industry believing the contracts won't be canceled... which isn't exactly the current naval history. Except for the Burkes.

      Delete
    5. This again misses a lot. Metal Shark is an Aluminum yard, as one example.

      Delete
    6. " if we insist that our notional ASW vessel be capable of infinitely long voyages with 2-4 helos, VL-ASROC, the most powerful active/passive multi-frequency sonar we have, towed arrays, variable depth sonar, high sprint speed, etc. then you're correct that we can't build an effective, manned ASW ship at that weight."

      First, thank you to everyone. This is an interesting discussion.

      We had 21-inch torpedoes on many surface ships in WWII. More recently, the USS Talbot (FFG-4) was tested with Mk 48 torpedoes, which have a relatively long range. Wouldn't this weapon make a less expensive ASW ship more effective?

      This isn't an original idea (I think credit goes to Lutefisk and others), but a small destroyer or a fast (i.e., fast enough to keep up with a Burke) frigate with good ASW sensors could be paired with a Burke. This ship would provide full-time protection against enemy subs. The ship would have the Phalanx and SeaRAM for point defense, but the Burke would provide heavy AAW protection, VL-ASROC, and helicopters.

      Delete
    7. "Metal Shark is an Aluminum yard, as one example."

      They appear to do aluminum construction and also steel. From one description:

      "The shipyard is located close to the Intracoastal Waterway with direct access to the Gulf of Mexico and fronting a dredged deepwater inlet. It includes five steel buildings for fully self-contained fabrication and construction work, with over 1,700 feet of waterfront, a 660-ton Travelift, multiple cranes, and all required equipment for the construction of steel and aluminum vessels up to 1,500 tons launch weight."

      Delete
    8. "but a small destroyer or a fast (i.e., fast enough to keep up with a Burke) frigate with good ASW sensors could be paired with a Burke."

      Do you see what you're doing?! You're defining a set of operational constraints ... a CONOPS! That's exactly what you need to do with any hypothetical ship design. How will it operate? Under what constraints? With what assistance? And so on. In a very cursory fashion, you've done exactly that! Outstanding. Now your question/proposal can be assessed and answered intelligently.

      Do you also recognize that once you have what you've just described, you can also begin to ask whether it's worth having an expensive, high powered sonar on the Burke? And so on. Everything is interrelated and that's something the Navy just doesn't get.

      Well done!

      Delete
    9. Thank you.

      "you can also begin to ask whether it's worth having an expensive, high powered sonar on the Burke?"

      A frigate might not be able to handle as big a bow sonar as the SQS-53C used in the Burkes. But considering that the crew of an AAW ship like a Burke doesn't get trained to detect submarines often enough, that might not make a practical difference in effectiveness. It seems likely the crew of a dedicated ASW frigate will be much more effective at the ASW mission than part timers, even if the part timers' bow sonar has a longer range.

      A lot of Burkes will remain in service for quite some time. As the old ones start to get phased out they can be replaced by dedicated AAW destroyers and a 21st century counterpart to the Spruance class. Perhaps there would be a high-low mix of ASW ships. Exactly how we do this, and how the new ASW fleet is equipped would be influenced by the results of operating Burkes with this hypothetical ASW frigate.

      Delete
    10. "Tier 1 yards (Can assemble, do final outfit)"

      Here's a "could", not necessarily a "should", for an additional Tier 1 yard to join sections together.

      Note that the Huntington Ingalls Newport News yard (where they build nuclear carriers and submarines) has drydock 12 where carriers are constructed. Drydock 12 is much longer than actually needed to build a carrier, and the front half can be flooded separately from the back half (to allow two carriers to be worked on simultaneously). If we decided that two carriers simultaneously is less important than these ASW escorts, we could probably build 4 of them at once in the front half of the dock while working on a carrier in the back half. Of course the timing would have to be careful to clear the front half when the carrier has to be floated.

      Delete
    11. "Metal Shark is an Aluminum yard, as one example."

      Exactly the point! Size isn't necessary right now, just potential and the ability to keep the industrial knowledge alive for expansion.

      The Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, the direct descendent of the Army Industrial Collage, has the template for how to seek out these industries that can be converted to wartime use.

      Some current steps along the industry front: The Forge and Foundry efforts and the Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), originally called the Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRCs) during World War Two.

      Looking4NSFS

      Delete
    12. NNS labor cost will make a conventional combatant relatively prohibitive. Although you could practically build the ship out of the dock and have the Gantry just drop it in. Probably 2-4 modules and its ready to float.

      Delete
    13. "NNS labor cost will make a conventional combatant relatively prohibitive"

      I don't recognize the abbreviation, NNS. Newport News Shipbuilding? Regardless, labor costs are an interesting topic. Too many people think they are a fixed cost but that's not true. Yes, the $/hr rate is fixed by labor contracts but a ship's labor cost is NOT fixed. It is a variable which is dependent on ... that's right, the number of hours! Elementary and yet we too often lose sight of that. How many hours does it take to build, say, a Burke? We know the figure currently is but that doesn't mean it's fixed. If the next Burke were to, say, have no helo, hangar, flight deck, sonar, towed array, helo torpedo magazine, etc. (and become the pure AAW cruiser that it essentially already is) the number of hours required to build it would drop drastically and, hence, the total labor cost would drop drastically. We're not going to negotiate labor rates down but we can certainly reduce the number of hours by intelligently designing our ships with a primary, FOCUSED function which uses the MINIMUM equipment necessary for the function instead of making every ship a single-handed, war-winning vessel unto itself.

      Delete
    14. "even if the part timers' bow sonar has a longer range."

      How do you compensate for having somewhat less sonar range? That's right! You move the ASW ship further out, away from the high value units (and, you get more aircraft on the search but that's a separate topic).

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  19. I don't see how ASROC helps very much. Based on wiki submarine launched torps far out range it. Without a way to air launch a torpedo at more than 50k you'll lose a ASW frigates.

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    Replies
    1. Submarines shoot missiles too, not just torpedoes. Ships sometimes have to fight in conditions where operating helicopters is not possible. ASROC is a limited option, but it is at least an option.

      GAB

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    2. Is there a reason that we can't improve the range of ASROC?

      Lutefisk

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    3. "Is there a reason that we can't improve the range of ASROC?"

      None that I can think of. As I said, if we can send a Tomahawk cruise missile a thousand miles, surely we can send a Mk48 torpedo, say, fifty miles.

      Delete
  20. The 2019 Navy briefing slide for FFG(X) ASW capabilities listed a "Mk 41 VLA supports VLA for all-wx stand-off ASW weapon (future)" . Presuming a new longer range replacement for the short range 12m range 80s ASROC, but never appears to have been funded by Navy.

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