This is Your Mine Countermeasures

The last Avenger class mine countermeasures (MCM) vessel, USS Devastator (MCM 6), has now been retired.[1]  Our surface MCM capability is now entirely in the hands of the Independence class LCS.  Yes, that LCS.  The ship and MCM module that has suffered years of delay, failure after failure, and no realistic operational testing.  That one.  That disaster.  No, this isn’t a Halloween horror story, although it should scare you to death.  This is our current naval MCM reality.
 
To briefly review, the LCS-MCM consists of a helo and an unmanned boat, each of which carry/tow various attachments as listed below.
 
MH-60S Seahawk mine warfare helicopters 

• AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) shallow water laser mine detection
• AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) suicide drones

 
Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV) tow boat 

• AN/AQS-20C forward/side scan mine detection sonar
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) acoustic and influence sweep

 
Now, how is that all working?  Go read the annual GAO and DOT&E weapon assessments and you’ll get the history and status of the LCS MCM module.  It’s not pretty.  In addition, Naval News website offers a fantastic summary of the Independence-MCM.  Here’s some excerpts. 

Embarked helicopters also operate with the AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), offering a safer method to counter-mine potential threats compared to traditional mechanical minesweeping with EOD divers.[1]

Safer?  Yes.
Effective?  No.
Efficient?  No.
Fast?  No. 

The sonars on the CUSVs are not a high enough resolution to identify specific threats. The lasers used on MH-60S helicopters require water that is not too turbid to operate in.[1]

So, the system only works in clear water and even then can’t reliably identify the threats?  Good … good. 

… when it comes to the unmanned systems used for mine countermeasures. Each mission takes roughly four hours of maintenance pre-mission followed by one-and-a-half hours of calibration of GPS and sonar to reach acceptable accuracy for MCM missions. The rough estimate is six hours of pre-mission preparation before mine countermeasures can begin. In real-world scenarios, that time may not exist.[1]

So, the equipment may not be effective but it’s slow.  Agonizingly slow.  That might be okay for clearing a fifty foot wide channel over the course of a month but that’s useless for combat operations. 

These concerns do not address the single points of failure in the LCS and MCM package, which make the package an extremely risk-prone platform for operations.
 
The platform lift on the LCS that moves equipment from the mission bay to the flight deck is a major operational point for equipping the MH-60S with ALMDS or AMNS. If the lift fails, the helicopter is combat ineffective. If the tow hook on a CUSV breaks, it is combat ineffective and must be towed back or recovered another way. If the Twin Boom Extensible Frame, used to lower CUSVs into the water, breaks, the entire MCM platform is inoperable and USVs cannot be launched for missions.[1]

As an example, 

One test of the MCM package on USS Tulsa (LCS 16), a ship that arrived in Bahrain in May for MCM operations, resulted in a runaway USV, according to one U.S. Navy official familiar with the testing. During that test, part of the tow bracket used to recover the mine countermeasures CUSV broke, leaving it unrecoverable.[1]

But wait, there’s more! 

The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.[2]
 
Due to these space constraints, modularity of this platform is no longer offered or being pursued by the U.S. Navy to switch between mission modules, a sharp turn from the original planning of the LCS.[2]
 
According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.[2]
 
Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites. The U.S. Navy is working on methods to extend the range of deployed CUSVs, including the use of Starshield, the U.S. military’s arm of the Starlink satellite internet platform.[2]

Conclusion
 
Really?  Isn’t the conclusion pretty obvious?
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Unproven Littoral Combat Ships are replacing retired MCM ships in Bahrain”, Carter Johnson, 26-Sep-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/09/combat-ineffective-littoral-combat-ships-are-replacing-mcm-ships-in-bahrain/
 
[2]Naval News website, “Update on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Mine Countermeasures Mission Package”, Carter Johnson, 4-Jan-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-mine-countermeasures-mission-package/

The Meeting, The Message

SecDef (SecWar?) Hegseth has delivered his speech to the assembled leadership of the US military and it was one of the best speeches I’ve heard/read in a very long time.  As reported and summarized by Redstate website[1], here are some excerpts on various topics:
 

Leadership
 

For too long we've promoted too many uniformed leaders for the wrong reasons. Based on their race, based on gender quotas, based on historic, so-called firsts. We've pretended that combat arms and non-combat arms are the same thing. … Promoting risk-adverse, go-along-to-get-along conformists instead. …  Foolish and reckless political leaders set the wrong compass heading and we lost our way. We became, The Woke Department …

Ideology
 

No more identity months, DEI offices, dudes in dresses. No more climate change worship. No more division, distraction or gender delusions. No more debris. As I have said before, and will say again, we are done with that sh*t.

Fitness
 

… either you are disciplined, fit, and trained, or you are out.  … each service will ensure that every requirement for every combat MOS, for every designated combat arms position, returns to the highest Male Standard only.
 
… it's completely unacceptable to see fat generals and admirals in the halls of the Pentagon and leading commands around the country and the world.
 
… if you do not meet the male level, physical standards for combat positions or cannot pass a PT test or don't want to shave and look professional, it's time for a new position. Or a new profession.

Appearance
 

… grooming standards. No more beards, long hair, superficial individual expression. We're going to cut our hair, shave our beards, and adhere to standards.

Toxic Leadership
 

Upholding and demanding high standards is not toxic. Enforcing high standards, [is] not toxic leadership. Leading war fighters toward the goals of high, gender neutral, and uncompromising standards in order to forge a cohesive, formidable, and lethal Deparatment of War is not toxic.  …  Real toxic leadership is endangering subordinates with low standards. Real toxic leadership is promoting people based on immutable characteristics, or quotas instead of based on merit. Real toxic leadership is promoting destructive ideologies.  …  The definition of toxic has been turned upside-down, and we're correcting that. That's why today, at my direction, we're undertaking a full review of the Department's definitions of so-called "toxic leadership," bullying, and hazing. To empower leaders to enforce standards without fear of retritibution or second-guessing.  …  words like "bullying" and "hazing" and "toxic" — they've been weaponized and bastardized inside our formations, undercutting commanders and NCOs.

Females
 

… when it comes to any job that requires physical power to perform in combat, those physical standards must be high and gender neutral. If women can make it, excellent. If not, it is what it is. If that means no women qualify for some combat jobs, so be it. That is not the intent, but it could be the result, so be it. It will also mean that weak men won't qualify, because we're not playing games.

Oversight and Legal Intimidation
 

We are overhauling an Inspector General process, the IG, that has been weaponized. Putting complainers, ideologues, and poor performers in the driver's seat. We're doing the same with the equal opportunity and military equal opportunity polices — the EO and MEO at our department. No more frivolous complaints. No more anonymous complaints, no more repeat complaintants, no more smearing reputations. No more endless waiting. No more legal limbo. No more sidetracking careers. No more walking on eggshells.

Firing
 

… if the words I'm speaking today are making your heart sink, then you should do the honorable thing and resign.  …  But, I suspect, I know, the overwhelming majority of you feel the opposite.

 
Discussion
 
There was only one thing in SecDef’s remarks that I disagree with and that is his rosy view of the viewpoints of those in attendance.  If he truly believes that the overwhelming majority of senior leadership really feels as he does then he is delusional.  We have seen for the last several years exactly how the majority of senior leadership feels and it is largely in line with the liberal agenda.  Those liberal leaning officers have been systematically selecting other liberal leaning officers for promotion resulting in a thoroughly infested officer corps.  They are not going to suddenly change their mindsets because of a single speech from an administration that is limited to a single term.  They may cover their tracks, now, but they’re going to resist at every opportunity.  Wholesale firing of the senior leadership is the only solution.
 
That aside, I agree with everything else.  However, this is only talk.  Hegseth has yet to demonstrate much in the way of concrete actions to back up the talk.  Indeed, his inactions have already repudiated much of what he says.  He has failed to engage in wholesale firings for all the infractions and failings he cites in his speech and which have been blatantly evident for years.  What is he waiting for?  He’s been in office for several months, now.  He’s had more than ample opportunity to actually implement the various points he discusses.  Talk but no walk.  At the end of this year will we still be waiting to see some evidence of action or will I be writing an apology post to SecDef?  I hope it’s the latter but color me skeptical.  We’ll see.
 
 
 
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[1] Redstate website, “Pete Hegseth Sets Directives and the New Direction for the Department of War”, Jennifer O’Connell, 30-Sep-2025,
https://redstate.com/jenniferoo/2025/09/30/war-secretary-pete-hegseth-sets-10-directives-and-a-new-direction-for-the-department-of-war-n2194564