Multi-Year Amphibious Ship Buy

As reported by Naval News website, the Navy has awarded a multi-year contract for the purchase of three San Antonio LPDs and one America LHA. 

The deal, which will fund three San Antonio-class LPDs and one America-class Flight II LHA, will save taxpayers an estimated $1 billion.[1]

I have a couple of problems with this contract award.
 
Savings – The supposed savings is estimated at $1B.  In the aggregate, that sounds impressive.  A billion dollars!  Wow!  However, across four ships that’s just $250M savings per ship.  That’s not nothing but it’s not a miraculous savings, by any means.  More importantly, you know those savings will never materialize.  With 100% certainty, the ships will come in over budget and behind schedule with a litany of excuses like supply chain disruptions, parts shortages, design modifications, and all the other usual suspects.  There won’t be any savings.  The absolute best case is that the ‘savings’ (let’s be optimistic and assume there will be actual savings) will slightly reduce the magnitude of the inevitable cost overruns.  Again, better than nothing but let’s not kid ourselves into thinking we’re actually going to save money.
 
Make no mistake, the Navy didn’t do this to save the taxpayers any money; they did it to lock down budget commitments.  The Navy doesn’t care what a ship costs.  It’s not their money.  Congress will always give them more money.  They did this to lock down budget share.
 
Doctrine – This is the real puzzler.  Neither the Navy nor the Marines have any intention of ever again doing an amphibious assault.  The Marines have publicly and explicitly stated that they are out of the assault business.  The Navy doesn’t care about amphibious assaults and, indeed, balked at procuring more amphibious ships when they instituted a ‘strategic pause’ in amphibious ship procurement. 
 
Similarly, the Navy’s total indifference to the Marine’s Light Amphibious Warfare ship is yet more evidence of their disdain for amphibious operations.
 
Further evidence is the Navy’s total abandonment of naval gun support for amphibious operations and the doctrinal decision to move amphibious ships 25-50 miles off shore – a distance at which it is impossible to conduct an amphibious assault with current technology. 
 
The Navy is never going to conduct another amphibious assault so why are we continuing to buy more amphibious ships?
 
Legality – By law, multi-year procurements can only be applied to a single design that is mature and stable.  While I’m not a lawyer, the mix of ship types and the inclusion of a single (not multi) LHA would appear to be illegal.  Of course, this would hardly be the first time the Navy has ignored the law.  Here’s the verbiage describing the main requirement for using a multi-year procurement. 

FAR17.105-1(b)(3) There is a stable design for the supplies to be acquired, and the technical risks associated with such supplies are not excessive [2]

This is intended to be applied to a single, stable design.  The Navy is most certainly violating the spirit and intent of the law, if not the actual verbiage.
 
 
 
Discussion
 
So, with no savings and no intention (Marines) or interest (Navy) in ever conducting an amphibious assault, tell me again, why are we continuing to procure any amphibious ships? 
 
It seems clear that the only viable reason for the Navy going down this path is the desire to lock in budget share.
 
Layer the potential illegalities on top of this highly questionable contract and it becomes even more clear that this is a budget machination, not a sincere attempt at saving the taxpayers money.
 
 
 
____________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy’s First Ever Multi-Year Amphibious Ship Contract Awarded”, Carter Johnston, 25-Sep-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/09/us-navy-finalizes-first-amphibious-multi-year-buy/
 
[2] https://www.acquisition.gov/far/subpart-17.1

The Electronic Battleship

One observation that has clearly come out of the Ukraine-Russia war is the prominent role of electronic warfare (EW).  We’ve seen GPS disruptions, weapon guidance disruption, intercepted communications, unit localization using signals intercepts, and probably many other aspects that are not yet common knowledge.  So, while the exact manifestations of EW’s prominence are not yet fully clear, the overall thrust is.  EW is a major factor/force on the battlefield and its influence is likely to continue to grow.
 
This is a naval blog so what does the EW lesson mean for naval forces?  Obviously, all the same considerations apply to the maritime battlefield as the land battlefield.  Enemy forces and weapons detection, weapons guidance disruption, localization using signal intercepts, etc. are all vitally important for naval forces.
 
Naval forces (and for the rest of this post we’ll focus on US Navy forces unless otherwise explicitly stated) have had EW capabilities to varying degrees for many decades now so what’s the big deal?  The ‘deal’ is that naval EW has long been the forgotten stepchild of naval capabilities (along with armor, large caliber guns, survivability, robust steel construction, weapon density … boy, the Navy sure has a lot of forgotten stepchildren, don’t they?!).  EW has been an afterthought, at best.  It is only recently that the Navy has begun to belatedly, and even then only in a minor way, address EW with the SEWIP modernization program.
 
Currently, each ship has its own small SLQ-32/SEWIP EW unit and the units are constrained by space/volume/mounting requirements, power limitations, placement challenges, manning constraints, training deficiencies, etc.  In other words, each individual ship can, at best, take care of itself but is of little or no help to other ships in the area.
 
If EW is so important, doesn’t it make sense to have a ship that is a behemoth at electronic warfare?  An electronic battleship, so to speak?  Where is our EW ship that can electronically dominate the naval battlefield?  Where is the ship that can electronically ‘swat’ UAVs and missiles from the sky?  Where is our area EW as opposed to individual EW?  We wouldn’t dream of not having area air defenses so why don’t we have area EW?
 
Where is the EW battleship?
 
What’s wrong with individual ship EW, you may ask?  Nothing except that, by definition, it’s limited to just the host ship and it’s haphazardly implemented and suffers from being at the bottom of the ship’s training priorities because it’s not the main mission of the given ship.  This is the same problem the Burkes face with ASW.  They are theoretically capable of ASW but they rarely train for it and are, therefore, ineffective.  Anti-air is the Burke’s main mission so that’s what they train for on the rare occasions that they train for anything.
 
Consider this historical example:  the USS Stark incident was instructive as it illustrated problems with the SLQ-32 performance, interface, false alarms, and lack of training, as noted below. 

The electronic warfare technician at the SLQ-32 console heard the F-1’s Cyrano-IV again lock on to the Stark. The lock-on signal ceased after seven to ten seconds.
 
Neither of the two SLQ-32 operators saw a [ed. inbound] missile warning. The main operator at the console, however, had turned off the incoming missile audible signal warning. He claimed later that the alarm was typically set off too easily, and distracted him from performing other signal analysis.[1]

 
We need a ship whose main – indeed, only – mission is EW so that it gets the training that is required to achieve and maintain proficiency.  We need an electronic battleship.
 
More than that, we need a multi-ship, coordinated EW effort.  Currently, each ship is its own EW entity, separate and isolated from any other ship.  There is no integrated, multi-ship or group EW effort as there is with missile control and usage via Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA).  Navy air defense utilizes a central command and control function typically located aboard the Ticonderoga class cruisers.  Again, we need a group wide, area EW control that integrates the EW of all the ships in the group.  We need an EW CEC.
 
Further, we need the group’s chaff and decoy systems tied into the EW control system.
 
Having established the need for an EW battleship and the general concept of large scale, area EW let’s now look at the specifics of an EW battleship.
 
 
EW Battleship
 
Analogous to a conventional battleship, the three main categories and levels of ‘weapons’ for an EW battleship are:
 

• Main battery - electronic attack
• Secondary battery - electronic protection
• Tertiary battery - electronic support

 
More specifically, the EW battleship requirements are, in no particular order:
 

• radar warning
• targeting support
• countermeasures
• situational awareness
• threat warning
• signal collection / SigInt
• direction finding
• laser warning
• drone/missile communications jamming
• false signal injection
• enemy GPS (GLONASS, BeiDou) disruption at point of attack

 
With the specific requirements in mind, what kind of specific equipment (EW ‘weapons’) should an EW battleship have?  An examination of the myriad existing aircraft, vehicle, and ship EW systems provides a good candidate list while understanding that each system would be significantly scaled up in terms of power and antenna size (both sensing and emitting).  For example, a small EW pod on an aircraft might be functionally duplicated for use on a EW battleship but would have, for practical purposes, unlimited power and emitters/receivers many times larger.
 
To give a feel for the types of equipment, here’s a partial list of existing EW equipment on various platforms:
 
 
Ship:
 

• AN/SLQ-32(V)2 – Initially the most common variant, the (V)2 expanded on the (V)1's capabilities with new receiving antennas for increased radio frequency coverage. It added the ability to detect high frequency targeting and fire-control radars, providing early warning against an imminent anti-ship missile attack.
• AN/SLQ-32(V)3 – The (V)3 added antennas with electronic attack capability, able to actively jam targeting radars and anti-ship missile terminal guidance radars.
• Sidekick – active jamming in a smaller package as an alternative to (V)3
• AN/SLQ-32(V)6 – Part of the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP). (V)6 provides enhanced electronic support capability through upgraded antennas and open combat system interface. It is made up of the SEWIP Block 1B2, SEWIP Block 1B3, and SEWIP Block 2, which provide specific emitter identification (SEI), high gain high sensitivity (HGHS), and electronic support (ES), respectively.
• SEWIP Block 1 provides enhanced EW capabilities to existing and new ship combat systems to improve anti-ship missile defense, counter targeting and counter surveillance capabilities. The upgrade addresses obsolescence mitigation through introduction of electronic surveillance enhancements (ESE) and Improved Control and Display (ICAD) as well as incorporation of adjunct receivers for special signal intercept including specific emitter ID (SEI) and high gain/high sensitivity (HGHS). The SEI and HGHS capability provides improved battlefield situational awareness.
• SEWIP Block 2 provides early detection, analysis, and threat warning from anti-ship missiles by providing enhanced Electronic Support (ES) capability via an upgraded ES antenna, ES receiver and an open combat system interface for the AN/SLQ-32. These upgrades are necessary in order to pace the threat and improve detection and accuracy capabilities of the AN/SLQ-32.
• SEWIP Block 3 (AN/SLQ-32(V)7) will provide electronic attack (EA) capability improvements.
• SEWIP Block 4 is a future planned upgrade that will provide advanced electro-optic and infrared capabilities to the AN/SLQ-32(V) system.
• COBLU Command and Control Coordination - Integrates area ship sensors and provides a common picture using passive sensors.

 
 
Aircraft:
 

• EA-18G Growler: ALQ-218 Detection Pod  -  passive Radar warning receiver for airborne situational awareness and signal intelligence gathering. The AN/ALQ-218 detects, identifies, locates and analyzes sources of radio frequency emission.
• EA-18G Growler: ALQ-99 High Band Jamming Pods  -  radar and comms jamming
• EA-18G Growler: ALQ-99 Low Band Jamming Pod  -  radar and comms jamming
• EC-130H / EC-37B Compass Call – electronic attack;  disrupts enemy command and control communications and secondary EA capability against early warning and acquisition radars.
• MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAV - Multifunctional Electronic Warfare (MFEW) Air Large is the Army’s first organic brigade electronic attack asset mounted on an MQ-1C Gray Eagle drone.  brigade-level airborne electronic attack asset and providing limited cyberattack capabilities
• RC-135V/W is the USAF's standard airborne SIGINT platform.
• RC-135S Cobra Ball is a measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) collector equipped with special electro-optical instruments such an All Weather Tracking Radar and Medium Wave Infrared Array (MIRA) designed to observe ballistic missile flights at long range.[24] The Cobra Ball monitors missile-associated signals and tracks missiles during boost and re-entry phases to provide reconnaissance for treaty verification and theater ballistic missile proliferation.

 
Vehicles:
 

• Stryker - Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) which combines cyberwarfare, signals intelligence and electronic attack.

 

The EW battleship combines all these functions, each in its own 'mount', on one ship.

Antenna Size
 
The key concept that makes the EW battleship work is the available size and power of the various emitter and receiver antennae. 
 
For example, passive sensing is a function of sensor size.  Inter-galactic frequency sensors are massive in order to collect the faint signals from distant stars and galaxies.  A man-portable - or even an aircraft mounted – sensor is limited in size.  A ship, on the other hand, could mount Aegis sized sensor arrays, thereby vastly increasing the sensitivity and effectiveness of the sensor.
 
Similarly, one of the problems with Army man-portable or even mobile electronic warfare (EW) systems is that they are small and inherently power-limited.  Ship size systems with, for practical purposes, unlimited power would eliminate this constraint.
 
 
Dispersion and Redundancy
 
One of the [many] limitations of small EW package systems is that each package must execute several different functions, switching between them as needed.  On a ship, each function can be its own ‘mount’ and, therefore, be continuously available with no need to switch or ‘ration’ power.  The functions can be dispersed as stand alone, complete units.
 
Ships also offer the ability to have more than one of any given function, just as a ship has (or used to have when we still designed WARships) redundant guns.  This allows for both damage resilience and the ability to engage multiple threats simultaneously.
 
 
 
Note:  I’ve not specified any size for this EW battleship.  The term ‘battleship’ refers to combat power, not size.  If everything needed can fit on a canoe, that’s great.  If it requires a ship the size of an Iowa class battleship, so be it.  My pure guess is that something the size of Burke would suffice but I’ll leave it to the engineers to determine that.
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988/may/stark-report

Paid in Full, Paid in Blood

The previous post about landing craft was informative and somewhat disappointing as far as the comments are concerned.  Too many people want to ignore the lessons that we paid in blood to learn in WWII.  People want to acquire large landing craft outfitted with all manner of sensors and weapons and then cram dozens/hundreds of troops and vehicles on the craft while completely ignoring the lessons of dispersal of risk, efficiency of unloading, procurement cost, and ease of production.
 
Similarly, many people are ignoring the lessons about how to conduct an amphibious assault.  What is the proper role of a carrier group?  What is the role of aircraft?  What is the job of the escorts?  What is the expenditure rate of munitions in an assault?  How much weight of munitions do we need for fire support and how can we delivery the required volume?  We’re also ignoring the history of helo survivability over a battlefield.  And so on.
 
All good discussions must begin with a consideration of history and its lessons.
 
Before we even begin to contemplate changing doctrine and tactics, we’d better be absolutely certain we understand why the doctrine and tactics exist instead of whatever it is we’re thinking about doing.  We learned our lessons in WWII and paid the blood bill for the learning.  That doesn’t mean we can never change anything but it does mean we’d better be awfully sure we’re making a change for the better and, again, that means thoroughly understanding what already exists and why.

 
We also need to keep the K.I.S.S. principle firmly in mind.  Murphy still roams the battlefield and offers no second chances.
 
Think about it.
 
Think hard about it.
 
Think very hard about it and then think again before you abandon established, proven doctrine and tactics.

Landing Craft

Problem
 
Amphibious assaults?  A moot concept since we have no landing craft.
 
Wait, what?  Of course we have landing craft!  We have the LCAC, LCU, and LCM.  Well, yes, we have those craft but none of them are initial wave assault craft.  They’re follow on craft for sustainment after the assault site has been secured.
 
The only initial wave landing craft we have is the Marine’s AAV/ACV which is not really a landing craft in the traditional sense of a small boat that can delivery troops to the beach and return to the host ship to get more troops for subsequent waves.  The AAV/ACV is a one-way, amphibious, light armored personnel carrier (APC).
 
Let’s do the math.  An AAV/ACV can carry around 15 combat equipped troops and a MEU (we’ll discuss a MEU but this scales up to whatever size and, yes, we recognize that a MEU, on its own, is not capable of conducting an opposed landing) has around a dozen AAV/ACV so that represents a landing capacity of around 180 troops that can be delivered to the beach.  The remainder of the MEU’s 2200 troops have to find some other way to get ashore.  That’s an initial assault capacity of around 8% of the MEU.
 
A MEU has around 16 transport helos/MV-22s, each of which can carry 15-20 combat loaded troops but, again, these are not initial assault assets.  Helos are not survivable over a battlefield.  They’re follow on transports. 
 
Are 180 troops per MEU really enough to conduct an opposed landing?  Of course not!  Thus, we have a problem.
 
 
Solution
 
So, what’s the solution?  I’ve heard many people recommend foreign “landing craft” such as the CB90, Jehu (Finnish), Raptor (Russian), etc be used as landing craft.  Claimed benefits include a [very small] degree of stealth, speed, armament, and the ability to fit six or so craft in the well deck of an amphibious ship.
 

CB90

Jehu - Note the narrow, restricted exit ramp and imagine
fifteen or so combat laden troops trying to rapidly
debark, one at a time, under fire.

Analysis

 
Let’s take a closer, analytical look at this type of boat in the landing craft role.
 
Troop Capacity – This size boat claims to be able to carry 15-20 or so troops, likely less when the troops are combat equipped.  Let’s be generous and use a figure of 20.  For 6 boats, that’s 120 troops per assault wave.  Is that an assault or a school board meeting?  By comparison, a WWII attack transport carried around 24 landing craft, each of which could carry around 30 troops for a wave of 720 troops.
 
Cargo Capacity – None.  These types of craft have no cargo capacity.  That’s all there is to say about that.  The troops would land with whatever they can carry on their person.
 
Debarkation – One of the constant characteristics across these types of boats are the requirement for the troops to debark via narrow passageways, single file, slowly.  While some claim to have restricted, emergency egress, it is, again, an exceedingly slow and cumbersome process.  Under fire, these boats are death traps for the troops.  Arguably, the most important characteristic of an effective landing craft is the ability to rapidly discharge the troops while under fire.  The WWII Higgins boat allowed the troops to egress, line abreast, several at a time, simultaneously, across the bow ramp.  In an emergency, dozens of troops could simultaneously egress over the open sides.
 
Cost -  This type of craft costs several million dollars apiece, or more, which is way too expensive for a niche craft that is likely to suffer high rates of attrition and needs to be procured in large numbers.
 
 
Conclusion
 
It is patently clear that these types of craft are not suitable for amphibious assaults.  They are suited (and this may even be overly optimistic) for the kind of tiny raid operations or patrol duties they were designed for.  We need to stop looking for foreign landing craft because there are none that are suited for the purpose.  If we want a landing craft, we need to go back to the drawing board and design a dirt-simple, modern, Higgins boat and be done with it. 
 
Of course, such a landing craft would require a radically re-designed amphibious ship to make use of it … you know, something like a WWII Attack Transport (APA) but that’s a separate, though intimately related, topic.
 
Given that ComNavOps sees very little strategic need for future amphibious assaults and given that the Marines have publicly stated that they are out of the assault business, this entire discussion is probably moot but at least we now know what won’t work and can stop bringing up these types of boats.
 

Satellite Surveillance Reality

People keep wanting to believe that satellites can track every ship on the ocean in real time, with the data being tied directly to the launch buttons of anti-ship weapons.  I keep refuting this idea but it persists.  Here’s some relevant information on the subject from our space force. 

By the early 2030s, the Space Force hopes to have satellites equipped with sensors to target aircraft in the hands of operators, according to the service’s second in command, Gen. Michael Guetlein.
 
Satellites equipped with Air Moving Target Indicators (AMTI), which would send precise tracking data to “shooters” on the ground, at sea and in the air, would be a new capability — joining the Space Force’s joint program with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to develop Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) satellites that track vehicles and ships.
 
“I would say you’re looking at probably early ’30s for some of that capability to start coming online, both for GMTI and for AMTI,” Guetlein told the annual Defense News conference today.[1][emphasis added]

 
These statements demonstrate that satellite tracking is something that does not yet exist but is being worked on and someone hopes to have it working in several years (which, of course, will stretch out to a decade or two, at best).
 
The next quote demonstrates that data is not directly linked to anti-ship launch buttons: 

Space Force since 2021 has been pushing their case to fill part of the gap in ground tracking/targeting left by the Air Force’s retirement of the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. That campaign has run up against roles and missions related challenges — some of which have yet to be fully resolved — from both the NRO and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NRO owns and operates the nation’s spy satellites, while the NGA is responsible for disseminating space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) imagery and analysis to users across the US government.[1][emphasis added]

Difficulties abound: 

… the closer I can come to the target, the more resolution I get on the target. As I move to space, it becomes harder and harder to get that same level of resolution on a target … [1]
 
… one of the key challenges for tracking enemy aircraft from space is that airplanes and drones move much faster than tanks, trucks and ships. This is compounded by the fact that to be best able to take high-quality pictures or establish radar images of objects on the ground or in the air, satellites would have to be stationed in low Earth orbit where they themselves move around the Earth at about 7.8 kilometers per second (4.8 miles per second) … [1]

 

I see a ship.  Fire!

We see, then, that the common belief in omniscient satellites, tied directly into fire control circuits is pure fantasy.  The Space Farce wants to make that a thing but the military constantly wants things that never happen (how’s that rail gun and laser coming?).  We’re looking at a decade or more for even the rudiments of this king of capability to happen and that’s probably being ridiculously optimistic.
 
Once and for all, let’s give up the fantasy of the all-seeing eye-in-the-sky providing real time weapons launch control.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Space Force vice wants sats to track aircraft by early 2030s”, Theresa Hitchens, 4-Sep-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/space-force-vice-wants-sats-to-track-aircraft-by-early-2030s/

Does the Navy Want the F-35C?

The Navy has never appeared to be very enthused about the F-35.  They’ve gone deep into fantasy land to rave about the wonders of the LCS, the Ford, the Zumwalt, and many other programs but the F-35 praise has been very muted.  The actual procurement numbers of F-35s has been minimal, to put it mildly. 
 
Now, however, with a war with China looming on the horizon (by the Navy’s own public statements), has the Navy’s enthusiasm for the F-35 increased?  Is the Navy requesting more F-35s, possible on a crash basis to prepare for the coming war?  Let’s check the 2025 defense spending bill.
 
Congress is in the process of finalizing the 2025 defense spending bill.  Currently, there are various versions of the bill floating around as the various groups put forth their own versions and attempt to reconcile the various versions.  The various actors and their budget versions are shown below.[1]

• President’s budget: $849.8 billion for the Defense Department
• House NDAA: $849.8 billion for the Defense Department
• House defense appropriations: Includes $833 billion in defense spending
• Senate Armed Services Committee: $878.4 billion for the Defense Department
• Senate Appropriations Committee: $852.2 billion defense spending

That’s interesting but let’s look, specifically, at the F-35 requests in the budget.

F-35
 
The President’s budget calls for 9 F-35C for the Navy, 4 F-35C for the Marine Corps, and 13 F-35B for the Marine Corps.  The other actors have similar numbers.
 
The Navy plans to buy 82 F-35C across the five year FYDP, split between the Navy and Marines.  That’s around 9 F-35Cs per year for the Navy, depending on the exact Navy-Marine split.
 
That doesn’t seem like a great deal of enthusiasm for the F-35 on the Navy’s part.
 
 
Notes
 
Here’s some related notes.
 
As you know, despite having 11 aircraft carriers, the Navy has only 9 air wings.  Two carriers have no air wing.  This is slightly understandable as one carrier is always in a mid-life refueling and overhaul.  In recent years, a second carrier has been hard down due to intensive maintenance due to deferred maintenance racked up during too many deployments for too many months.  This is not normal and is an emergency condition.
 
The real problem with this is that 9 air wings leaves us two short in the event of war when we would surge every carrier. 
 
The Navy is statutorily required to maintain 10 air wings.  Congress, as they so often do, neutered their own requirement by granting the Navy a waiver. 

The 2024 NDAA granted the Navy relief from the Title 10 requirement to stand up a 10th CVW by October 1, 2025 pending SECNAV submission of a report to congress analyzing potential approaches to the manning, operation, and deployment of a 10th CVW.[2]

Thus, Congress is complicit in the Navy’s air wing and aircraft shortfall.
 
The Navy, as they so often do, is dealing with this not by acquiring more aircraft and air wings but by playing an aircraft accounting game. 

By 2025, the Navy will have solved its strike fighter shortfall in part by changing how it will field the F-35C Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter. Instead of two squadrons per air wing with 10 tails, the Navy will now field a single squadron with 14 tails, Rear Adm. Andrew Loiselle, director of the Air Warfare Division (OPNAV/N98), told the House Armed Services subcommittee on tactical air and land forces on Tuesday. testified it was reducing F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fight from two to one squadron per air wing.[3]

How reducing two 10-aircraft squadrons with 20 total aircraft to one squadron with 14 total aircraft alleviates the shortfall is an arithmetic miracle beyond understanding.  Nevertheless, it’s what the Navy is doing.  This further demonstrates the Navy’s lukewarm view of the value of the F-35.

 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “F-35s, frigates and FRA woes: Here are the issues facing Congress in upcoming FY25 budget process”, Valerie Insinna, 6-Sep-2024,
http://breakingdefense.com/2024/09/f-35s-frigates-and-fra-woes-here-are-the-issues-facing-congress-in-upcoming-fy25-budget-process/
 
[2]https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/117134/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS25-Wstate-GeringB-20240416.pdf
 
[3]USNI News website, “Navy Adjusts F-35C Squadron Size to End Fighter Shortfall by 2025”, John Grady, 14-Jul-2021,
https://news.usni.org/2021/07/14/navy-adjusts-f-35c-squadron-size-to-end-fighter-shortfall-by-2025

Protecting the Sea Lanes?

The Navy is out there, every day, protecting the sea lanes.  That’s why we do deployments, right?  So, how’s that sea lane protection working out?  According to shipping giant, Maersk,
 

Attacks in the Red Sea by Iran-aligned Houthi militants have disrupted a route vital to east-west trade, with prolonged rerouting of shipments, pushing freight rates higher and causing congestion in Asian and European ports.
 
Maersk said recent data showed that the number of ships crossing through the canal has fallen 66% since carriers began diverting their vessels around Africa.
 
Maersk in July said disruption to its container shipping via the Red Sea had extended beyond trade routes between the Far East and Europe to its entire global network, and warned of a "cascading impact" causing congestion.[1]

 
So, what is the mightiest navy in the world doing about this threat to the sea lanes?  Well, we’ve shot down a few drones and missiles and bombed some suspected launch sites … to no effect.  Attacks on shipping continue and ships continue to get hit.
 
Similarly, Iran continues to harass shipping, attacking, seizing, and mining passing ships while our navy stands by and does nothing.
 
 
Conclusion
 
I know I’ve criticized our endless deployments but if we weren’t out there protecting the sea lanes, bad actors might attack shipping with drones and missiles so thank goodness we’re out there, continuously deployed.
 
Our presence is deterring nothing.  We’re clearly not effectively protecting the sea lanes.  Tell me again, why are we doing deployments?
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Maersk: Impact From Red Sea Attacks Intensifying”, 5-Sep-2024,
https://www.newsmax.com/finance/streettalk/maersk-red-sea/2024/09/05/id/1179157/

MEU vs. Army/Air Force Rapid Response

MEUs (Marine Expeditionary Units) currently deploy without tanks, artillery, or heavy mortars.  Thus, they are no different than light, air mobile infantry in terms of firepower and, barring dumb luck that a crisis just happens to break out right next to them, are much slower to respond to a global crisis, requiring days or weeks to reach the area of concern.
 
One of the limitations of a MEU is that, contrary to popular impressions, a MEU cannot conduct an opposed landing although, presumably, they could deal with minor resistance.
 
Now, consider the Army’s global crisis response units which are supported by Air Force transports and can deposit troops anywhere in the world in 24 hours. 
 
A common objection to the Army as the global crisis response force is that they must have a secure airfield to land and that is not a sure thing and might even be considered unlikely.  However, it should be noted that the airfield requirements are pretty minimal with dirt strips being adequate.  From the AF fact sheet about the C-17, for example, 

The design of the aircraft (high-lift wing, slats, and externally blown flaps) allows it to operate through small, austere airfields. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as 3,500 feet (1,064 meters) and only 90 feet wide (27.4 meters).

 
In addition, the Army does have the capability to seize an airfield.  The 2^nd Ranger battalion, 75^th Ranger regiment is specifically tasked with airfield seizure.  Of course, an airfield is not even absolutely necessary as troops can be parachuted in.
 

In fact, once upon a time, the Army had some fairly significant airborne armor support with the ability to air-unload M551 Sheridan tanks using the LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System) method (an impressive operation readily viewable on Youtube!) or medium altitude multi-parachute drops.  Similarly, I’m aware that the Army conducted Stryker air drops, at one time.  I don’t know whether the Army still maintains such a capability, or not.
 

LAPES - Sheridan Air Drop

Stryker Parachute Drop

 Up until around 2014, airborne forces also included artillery.  From Wiki, 

1st Battalion (Airborne), 321st Field Artillery Regiment maintained a full capacity to provide 155mm howitzer fires anywhere in the world within 18 hours in support of the 82d Airborne Division and while supporting other global responsibilities. The unit had the unique ability to employ 155mm howitzer platforms through a "Howitzer Heavy Drop Package" capability which essentially allowed for the weapon system to be dropped from an aircraft while its paratroopers would then place the weapon into action.

Again, I don’t know whether the Army still maintains airborne artillery capability.
 

Air Dropped 105 mm Howitzer

The following units are considered to be rapidly deployable.  I don’t follow Army matters that closely so there may be others.
 
- XVIII Airborne Corps 

• 3rd Infantry Division
• 10th Mountain Division
• 82nd Airborne Division
• 101st Airborne Division

- 75th Ranger Regiment - Can deploy can deploy one Ranger battalion within eighteen hours of alert notification.[1]
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Army/AF can provide firepower and numbers equal to, or greater than, a MEU and with much quicker response times.  Given the Marine’s elimination of tanks and a great deal of artillery and mortars, one can’t help but wonder why we don’t eliminate the MEUs and use Army units as our crisis response force.
 
One of the key aspects of this discussion is armor.  At one time, the MEU deployed with tanks which offered a justification for the use of MEUs.  Unfortunately, the Marines eliminated their tanks several years ago – along with heavy mortars and much of their artillery - and that justification has now vanished.
 
In light of the Marine’s ill-advised move away from being a medium weight combat force and toward being a light infantry force, we need to re-evaluate the rationale for MEUs.  Add to that the cost of acquiring, maintaining, and operating a fleet of amphibious ships to give the MEUs something to ride around on and the rationale looks very suspect.
 
 
 
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Note:  I’m trying to assemble a current list of the combat equipment of a deployed MEU.  As best I can tell, this is the current list: 
 
7 to 16  Light Armored Vehicle  
15         Assault Amphibious Vehicle      
6          155mm howitzer: M777 
8          M252 81mm mortar       
63         Humvee           
 
That’s not much in the way of firepower.  Anyone have any modifications to the list?  In particular, I’m very unsure that MEUs deploy with any artillery, today.  Anyone know?
 
 
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[1]Special Operations Forces Reference Manual (Fourth ed.). MacDill AFB, Florida: Joint Special Operations University. June 2015. pp. 78–82. ISBN 9781933749914. Archived from the original on 28 March 2017. Retrieved 27 March 2017.