Carrier Operating Doctrine

We all grew up looking at pictures of carrier groups with a dozen or so ships spread over miles of ocean.  Quite impressive!  Are you curious what a modern strike group consists of?  Well, here is the most recent composition of the Bush strike group:

• George H.W. Bush, CVN-77
• Truxtun, DDG-103
• Roosevelt, DDG-80
• Philippine Sea, CG-58

That's it - three ships and the carrier with an air wing of around 39-40 effective Hornets.  Not exactly a mighty armada!  Not exactly what we grew up looking at.

Sure the group may be small but we’re not at war.  The group is big enough for peacetime activities and if war comes we’ll simply add more ships.  What’s the big deal?  Why is ComNavOps getting worked about this?

Let me ask you a question.  What should the Navy be doing during peacetime?  Come on, you know the answer.  Neglecting all the show-the-flag, enforce fishing regulations (yes, a carrier group actually did that), presence, and other garbage jobs, the Navy’s peacetime task is to prepare for war.  Peacetime is the time to study your enemies, develop tactics, ensure proper maintenance, and train, train, train for war.

Let’s set aside the fact that our non-deployed air wings are barely getting enough flight hours to stay flight certified let alone practicing tactical flying and honing combat skills.  Let’s set aside the fact that individual ship deployments and even group deployments have been cancelled.  Let’s set aside the fact that we’re down to two deployed carriers at a time with the rest sitting pierside.  Let’s set aside that we’re down to two amphibious groups deployed at a time.  Let’s set aside the fact that …  well, you get the idea.  I don’t need to continue with an endless list.

Let’s set all that aside and look specifically at the carriers and how they’ll be used in war.

Many commentators tend to look at the nine available carriers (nine is how many air wings we have so that’s the maximum number of carriers than can deploy – by the way, we’ll have 11 carriers when Ford joins the fleet and only 9 air wings – does that give you an idea about early retirement of another carrier?) and envision nine carrier groups rampaging through the Chinese A2/AD zone or wreaking havoc off N. Korea or Iran. 

Consider, though, the reality of today’s carrier combat power.  A carrier has 44 Hornets of which 39-40 are combat-available, at most.  You’ll recall that the air wing has no organic tanking and, therefore, several Hornets are always in use as tankers which removes them from combat availability.  With that in mind, what can a single carrier accomplish? 



Now Is The Time To Practice



The carrier would never be left undefended so half the Hornets would always remain with the carrier.  That leaves a max of around 19-20 for strike missions.  Now, unless you believe that a Hornet with two Sidewinders constitutes a self-escort capability (and if you do, match that up against fully air-to-air loaded Flankers, MiGs, or their Chinese counterparts), a serious strike against a defended target will need a dozen or so air-to-air (A2A) Hornets for escort.  That leaves 7-8 Hornets for strike.  Of course, the accompanying high value assets like Growlers and Hawkeyes need their own escort so subtract 4 more Hornets for that duty and now we’re down to 3-4 Hornets actually available for strike.  Of course, that assumes that every Hornet in the air wing is available in terms of maintenance and that’s never the case.  So, subtract another couple aircraft.  You see where this is going?

A modern carrier with an air wing of 44 Hornets is quite limited.  So, let’s consider how carriers would be tactically and operationally employed in war.

WWII saw carriers operated in pairs or more.  Cold War doctrine called for operating carriers in pairs.  In very simplistic, conceptual terms, one carrier could strike while the other defended.  Pairs allowed for useful massing of aircraft numbers (Are we saying numbers matter?!  Whoa, there’s an interesting concept for those F-35 fanboys who want to claim that a single aircraft can be a strike, fighter, recon, tanking, ASW, whatever, all in one aircraft) and allowed for compensation of combat attrition without having to immediately withdraw due to a few losses.

Consider the defenses inherent in the Chinese A2/AD scenario:  anti-ship ballistic missiles, supersonic cruise missiles, long range bombers, scores of fighters, submarines, surface ships, carrier aviation (sooner than we think!), mines, etc.  A single carrier with 39-40 Hornets isn’t going to be able to cope with that and conduct offensive operations.  Remember, it’s not enough for the carrier to just be able to defend itself – it has to be able to conduct offensive operations.  With that in mind, it’s instantly obvious that carriers will have to operate in pairs – or more.  In fact, given today’s small sized air wings I would suggest that carriers will have to operate in threes in order to amass sufficient numbers of aircraft to simultaneously defend and productively attack (Whoa!  There’s that numbers issue again.  Are we saying that a single aircraft can’t simultaneously stay at home to defend the group and go out and conduct strikes???  That a single aircraft can’t be in two places at once??  That’s got to give some modern aircraft apologists heartburn!).

All right, if we operate carriers in threes, how many carrier strike groups can we assemble?  Well, the math is pretty simple.  We have 9 available carriers which means we can assemble 3 carrier strike groups.  That’s not a lot.  Of course, that also assumes that all 9 carriers are available.  The reality is that half the carriers will always be in port for repairs and replenishment, even during war.  That means we’d be lucky to operate a single carrier strike group at any given moment and two groups would be a realistic maximum effort.

Now, let’s briefly check the carrier group size.  Does anyone think three escorts are going to be sufficient to deal with the multitude of threats we just listed?  A carrier group is going to need a dozen or more escorts spread over a vast area.  Of course, one instantly asks where all these additional escorts are going to come from given that the combat fleet is shrinking quickly and being replaced by LCS’s and JHSV’s and MLP’s but that’s a topic for another post.

Now, let’s consider carrier group tactics.

• How far apart should the carriers be to be mutually supporting yet not so tightly grouped as to simplify enemy targeting and strike efforts?
• When conducting simultaneous offensive and defensive operations, how should the aircraft be allocated (all strike from a single carrier or strike elements from each?)?
• What is the best defensive formation against incoming missiles?  Against submarines?  Against surface ships?  Against simultaneous threats?
• What is the optimum emissions state to balance stealth against situational awareness?
• Where should Hawkeyes and Growlers be placed to maximize situational awareness across three carriers?  How many are needed to accomplish that?
• How many escorts are needed?  What types?  Arranged how?
• And a hundred other tactical questions …

Let’s recall two points of information from earlier:  first, peacetime is the time to develop and practice tactics and operating doctrine and, second, current carrier groups consist of a single carrier and very few escorts.  Do you see a disconnect, there?

If a wartime carrier strike group consists of three carriers and dozens of escorts but our peacetime carrier groups consist of a single carrier and three escorts, how are we developing and practicing our wartime carrier doctrine and tactics?   When war comes, where will we get the Admirals and Captains who are well versed in multi-carrier operations and tactics?  Are we developing the answers to the previous tactical questions and practicing them so that every ship and sailor knows what to do?  Sadly, the answer is no.

Have you read a single article about tactical and doctrinal operation of carriers in the A2/AD scenario?  Have you ever heard of a single multi-carrier tactical exercise?  Carriers are one of our major asymmetric advantages over our enemies and we’re failing to take advantage of them by developing and practicing the necessary doctrine and tactics. 

Peacetime is our golden opportunity to prepare for war and we’re squandering it.

CNO's 2014 Position Report

CNO Greenert has issued his latest Position Report (1).  If you’re interested in reading it you can follow the link below.  I’m not going to critique it.  It’s largely a work of fiction and spin combined with a handful of trivial facts – not worth ComNavOps’ time to write about.  I simply offer the link as a courtesy to readers.

(1) http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/141104_positionreport.pdf

Bad Habits

Any coach will tell an athlete that practicing poorly is worse than not practicing.  The only thing worse for an athlete than not practicing is to practice incorrectly and develop bad habits.  Bad habits are worse than no habits.  It’s much easier to teach someone new habits than it is to try to unlearn bad habits.  Closely related is the mindset that develops from bad habits.  The athlete thinks they’re better than they are because they’ve been practicing but they don’t realize that all they’re doing is practicing the wrong things and getting good at the wrong things.  When the actual game comes, they fail and wonder why.

The job of the United States armed forces is to fight and win major wars.  You can throw in all the deterrence and peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and embassy protection and whatever other missions but those are just sidelights – necessary, to be sure, but not the real, overriding mission.  The way the armed forces prepare for their main mission is to practice (train).  Unfortunately, for the last couple of decades the armed forces have been engaged in a seemingly endless series of nation-building, police actions that have had the unintended consequence of developing bad habits in the military.  We’ve forgotten what major war is and we’ve certainly forgotten how to wage it.

We have high level unit commanders (battalion and above) who have never exercised their units as complete entities.  We have rank and file who think combat is a carefully scripted and highly regulated set of rules of engagement that are intended to prevent collateral damage.  We have Marines who have served an entire career without ever setting foot on a ship.  We have a Marine Corps that is shedding tanks and artillery to become lighter.  We have a Department of Defense that is more focused on women’s issues, gender integration, hair styles, number of pull-ups, diversity, and humanitarian assistance than trying to figure out how to kill as many enemy as possible in the most efficient manner possible.

We think war is going out on a patrol in the morning and coming back at night for a hot meal, some video game time, and a good sleep.

It’s not just that we’ve forgotten what war is, it’s that we’ve developed bad habits without knowing it and now we think we know what war is even though we’re not even remotely close.  Instead of developing new and more powerful tanks and artillery, we’re focused on developing better IED resistant HUMVEEs because we think that’s what combat is.  Instead of training how to apply a division’s worth of combat power in a coordinated and devastating fashion, we’re training how to talk to a villager while respecting their culture and sensitivities.  Instead of emphasizing area munitions that can kill anything in a wide range, we’re trying to develop non-lethal weapons.

Let me ask you a question.  How big is a carrier strike group today?  Answer, it’s four or five ships due to budget concerns.  When war comes, we’re going to attempt to operate multi-carrier strike groups (as we learned the hard way in WWII and the Cold War) and yet we’re only practicing with mini-single groups.  Our Admirals have no idea how to operate a multi-carrier group, tactically, because we aren’t practicing it.  Worse than not knowing how, is that we’ve developed bad habits and think we know how to operate a carrier group. 

War with China, Iran, N. Korea, or Russia will come as a rude awakening.

Offset Strategy Follow Up

We just recently discussed the CSBA proposed offset strategy but it warrants a bit of a follow up.  It’s become clear in recent days that Hagel and Work are going to commit the US to exactly this offset path and that greatly worries me. 

Setting aside the asymmetric punishment aspect that is highly questionable and renders the entire strategy suspect, the execution of the strategy seems to be focused on information, networks, data, and surveillance at the expense of high explosives.  Consider where the armed forces are already heading. 

• The Marines are shedding tanks and artillery in favor of lighter weight, mobile vehicles.
• The AF wants to drop the A-10.
• The Navy has terminated production of Tomahawk missiles with no replacement.
• The mainstay of future aviation is a lightweight, short ranged surveillance and communications node rather than a kick-butt combat aircraft.
• The AF has only 19 B-2 bombers and 180 F-22 fighters.
• The Navy is prematurely retiring combat stores ships that are needed to support sustained combat operations.
• The Navy has dropped another air wing, down to 9 now.  That’s effectively dropping a carrier since a carrier is useless without an air wing.
• The Navy is retiring the SSGN submarines with no replacement.
• The Army is being gutted in terms of personnel.
• And so on …

The trend is clear.  The armed forces are getting lighter and moving their emphasis away from high explosives and towards information and mobility.  Don’t get me wrong, information is extremely valuable – critically so, in fact.  The problem is that at some point you still have to blow things up.  Taking the current trends to their logical conclusion, we’re running the risk of having a force that can observe with perfect awareness while the enemy crushes us because we don’t have enough armor and big enough explosives.

Now consider where the rest of the world is going.  Not a day goes by without reading about another country buying/developing main battle tanks, supersonic missiles, more and larger artillery, theatre ballistic missiles, long range bombers, highly capable frigate/destroyers, etc.  The rest of the world is gearing up for serious, high end combat.  We’re gearing down for information, mobility, crisis response, and humanitarian assistance.

Lastly, bear in mind that this offset strategy and implementation is being overseen by Hagel and Work.  I would be hard-pressed to name two less competent people.  Work, in particular, has demonstrated that he will ruthlessly crush any opposition.  As we proceed down the offset path and it becomes evident that there are flaws in the strategy and implementation, will we or the military leadership hear about them or will people in the military be so intimidated that they’ll meekly and quietly go along while our military capability goes down the drain?  This is exactly what happened with the LCS which was Work’s pet project.  He demonized opposition despite the overwhelming evidence that the program was badly flawed.  Is this the leadership we can depend on to take us down an already suspect path?

The risk in all of this is that we wind up with an entire military that’s essentially the LCS.  Remember all the things the networked, nodal, information-centric LCS was going to do?  It was going to dominate littoral combat for generations to come.  The reality is that it turned out to have no combat power, whatsoever.  Now, we’re looking to strip down our military combat power in favor of information, networks, and surveillance.  Do you see the parallel?

Let’s be fair, here.  The offset strategy is not an official program, yet, and even if it were there are no specific details published.  Perhaps I’m jumping the gun and worrying about nothing or worrying about things that aren’t going to happen the way I’ve laid out.  Perhaps we’ll talk about this for a year or two, not much will happen, and then new leaders will take over and things will go in a different direction.  On the other hand, what if I’m right?  Time will tell. 

Triton Sense and Avoid

From Janes website, an interesting tidbit about BAMS (1)  …

“The US Navy (USN) is revisiting the sense-and-avoid (SAA) capability of the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) after previous efforts have failed to produce a system that works to the service's satisfaction.

The navy's efforts to develop and field an SAA system for the MQ-4C have proven to be more challenging than was first anticipated.

This issue has proven to be so problematic that the navy issued a stop-work order to Exelis, which was developing the SAA sensors under contract to Northrop Grumman, while it evaluates alternatives.”

There’s nothing special about this.  Developmental challenges are to be expected but it does remind us that even the seemingly mundane features can prove difficult and that should give us pause as we leap into our assumptions about the ease of development of rail guns, lasers, anti-gravity, and telepathic networks. 

For all you fanboys of [fill in the blank], remember ComNavOps rule of thumb:  a program will be fortunate to achieve half its claimed capabilities at twice the cost.

(1) IHS Jane's Defence Weekly , “US Navy seeks new sense-and-avoid solution for Triton UAV”, Gareth Jennings, 5 November 2014,

http://www.janes.com/article/45431/us-navy-seeks-new-sense-and-avoid-solution-for-triton-uav

Who's Running the Military?

ComNavOps has a simple question to ask.

Who is running the military?

That should be simple to answer.  Let’s just check to see who has produced the influential documents that are guiding the military.

First up would have to be the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) concept that has driven so much of the military’s efforts for the last few years.  This concept has been the basis for the entire naval amphibious assault concept changes (stand-off distances, high speed connectors, modified amphibious assault vehicles, etc.), the Pivot to the Pacific, the focus on longer range aircraft and missiles, and the termination of the LCS, among other notable actions and trends.  The author of that concept was the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).

Next would be the current offset strategy that Hagel and Work seem to be committing the military to.  In simplest terms, the offset consists of using networks and unmanned platforms to compensate for lack of numbers.  The author of that concept was the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).

So, the answer to who is running the military would seem to be the CSBA. 

I have nothing against using outside consultants to assist the military in its various planning efforts but wouldn’t you think the bulk of the high level “strategic” analysis should come from the professional, uniformed ranks?  If not, what are we paying them for?

After the CSBA, there is a second level of reports that shape the military and they are provided by GAO, CRS, DOT&E, and others.  These reports are usually narrowly focused on specific topics and help shape the implementation of the higher level CSBA guidance.

Finally, there is a third level of reports.  The military cranks out regular documents but if you’ve read any of them you know that they’re worthless, generic platitudes that are neither useful in concept nor used in practice and which offer no specific guidance.

Throw in the DoD’s near total reliance on industry to tell the military what it needs and what capabilities it can have and you have a picture of near total abdication of the intellectual guidance of our armed forces.  [Rant :  You don’t ask industry what the next “LCS/Small Surface Combatant” will do, you tell them what you want based on your strategic, operational, and tactical needs.]

What are our Admirals and Generals doing all day?  Clearly, they’re not producing any significant strategic thinking.  When did the military give up its role as the architect of professional military analysis?

Maintenance Lessons

Navy Times website had an article about fleet maintenance that absolutely infuriated ComNavOps (1).  The article begins with a note about the Navy having to switch carrier deployments because one carrier is taking longer than expected to repair.  Here’s the relevant quotes.

"The problems that drove the carrier switch — extended maintenance after years of high deployment pace and smaller crews — also plague other carriers and ships. Two attack submarines are more than six months late in their yard work and two guided missile subs are more than a year late, officials said."

"The attack boats are ‘the lowest priority in the shipyard,’ said Vice Adm. William Hilarides, the head of Naval Sea Systems Command. ‘They are not doing well at all and are significantly late to their schedules.’ "

Hmm …  So, the submarines, arguably the most valuable warship in the Navy, have the lowest priority.  What’s wrong with this picture?

"The Navy often paints a rosy picture for overhaul schedules. But the fleet needs work, and the Navy’s top shipfixer says its time to ‘deal with the facts’ and set realistic goals for overhauls."

OK, that sounds like someone understands the problem but why is the rest of the Navy painting a rosy picture?

" ‘We started avails that were notionally six months long that we knew in our hearts were going to take nine or 10 months,’ Hilarides said in an Oct. 6 phone interview. He recalled telling fleet bosses that many 2014 overhauls were going to be late. They did not like the news ..."

"Navy officials estimate that 40 percent of preventative maintenance work is not getting done, or is not done right. Not following procedures is also a growing problem, especially in the surface Navy, and has caused more than $50 million in damages this year alone.”

So, the Navy knows what the problems are.  I wonder if they know why the problems occurred?

“Hilarides places much of the blame on the failed ‘optimal manning’ initiative, which the Navy moved to reverse by adding back ship billets in 2011 after years of cuts that hollowed crews. Personnel officials still estimate the fleet has 7,000 gapped jobs."

So, the Navy knows why the problems occurred.  I wonder if they’ve learned any lessons?

“‘If there is one thing I’ve learned, we shouldn’t take this apart again,’ Hilarides said. ‘We should rebuild it and keep it strong. This is part of the cost of running a world-class Navy.’ "

So, the Navy has learned their lessons.

Well, the entire multi-decade maintenance debacle has been painful and expensive but now we recognize the problems, the reasons, and we’ve learned our lessons.  OK, the history of the problem is discouraging but at least the Navy is moving forward with a newfound clarity of thought and understanding of what needs to be done.  We won’t see these problems crop up again.

And then, after all that, there’s this,

"Truman will begin a maintenance period at Norfolk Naval Shipyard in October to ensure the carrier is prepared for its expedited deployment. The availability will be about one-quarter of the 200,000 man-days originally planned, said Rear Adm. Richard Berkey, who heads fleet maintenance for FFC."

The availability will be one-quarter of what’s needed.

One-quarter of what’s needed.

One-quarter.

What happened to understanding the problem?  What happened to recognizing why the maintenance problems got to be so bad to begin with?  What happened to lessons learned?

Are you kidding me?  Are you serious?  Is Navy leadership really that stupid?  This is why I started this blog.  I saw a caste of leaders that were devoid of intelligence and integrity and were violating the trust of the sailors under their command and the trust of the American people.  This absolutely infuriates me.

CNO Greenert, where are you?  You are abdicating your responsibility.  Get out of my Navy.

(1)Navy Times, "Flattop flip-flop: Repair problems force schedule change-up", Oct. 18, 2014,

http://www.navytimes.com/article/20141018/NEWS/310180038/Flattop-flip-flop-Repair-problems-force-schedule-change-up

Bold Alligator 2014

The Marine Corps is returning to the sea, they tell us [why did we leave?  But, I digress …].  OK, let’s take a look at the premier amphibious exercise of the year, the annual Bold Alligator (BA) exercise.  It’s been conducted since 2011 although two of those years the exercise was mostly simulation.

So, with the renewed focus of the Corps on amphibious operations and the Pivot to the Pacific (read China, even though no one will say it) the 2014 exercise would, undoubtedly, have focused on major amphibious assault operations, you would think.  That makes sense.  If we’re going to kick in the Chinese A2/AD zone, or invade Iran or N. Korea, or launch assaults on Russia we need to be prepared to conduct major amphibious operations, right?

As a point of interest, the US contingent of the exercise included 14 USN ships:  6 amphibs, 1 CG, 3 DDG, 1 JHSV, 1 T-AKE, 1 T-AO, and 1 T-ATF.  Not exactly a major amphibious assault force, is it?  -no carriers -no bombardment group -no mine clearing task force.  Conspicuous by their absence is the LCS.  Wasn’t the LCS going to be the kick-the-littoral-door-down force that would secure the littoral region, remove the mine threat, neutralize the submarine threat, and spread democracy?  As best I can determine, the LCS has yet to participate in any of the BA exercises.  That’s odd considering that this is exactly the mission the LCS was designed for.

Anyway, as best I can piece together from numerous sources, the 2014 BA is a series of small, crisis response exercises.  Here are some of the pieces of the exercise.

• provide security for humanitarian assistance (HA) operations
• exercise a riverine team providing security for the HA ops
• raid on a terrorist camp
• embassy protection
• aerial assault
• Company size, unopposed landing
• JHSV loaded 16 Humvees

So, what are we practicing? A bunch of low end, small events. Heck it's based on a humanitarian assistance mission! It's not an exercise to practice getting divisions ashore and demolishing an enemy - it's a scripted series of crisis response, mobility exercises, from what I've read. We're wasting a premier event on peacetime and low end tasks. That's not what the Chinese are practicing!

Here’s an interesting statement from one of the articles.

"'Coming into this event, there was a substantial amount of repair, cleaning and preservation work done to get the ship ready,' said Bossert [Capt. David Bossert, commanding officer of Kearsarge, LHD-3]. 'There was an untold amount of work done by Sailors and Marines assigned to USS Kearsarge, and they have done a phenomenal job.'" (1)

The ship had to undergo extraordinary basic maintenance to be ready for this exercise???!  That says quite a bit about our level of readiness, doesn’t it?

One of the pieces of the exercise involved a Marine battalion providing rapid response embassy protection and security from protesters.  Consider this statement.

“Our biggest challenge was getting out of the combat mindset,” Rosales[Sgt. Richard Rosales, a squad leader with Company F, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines] said. “The Marines are new to embassy guarding, so we met up with the [personnel] at the embassy to learn about daily operations, and how they would normally utilize the Marines [at the embassy].” (2)

Wow!  The Chinese are gearing up for high end combat and we're working hard to get out of the combat mindset. 

Another piece involved having a Marine recon unit land and provide intel for a Company landing team to come ashore in an unopposed landing for the purpose of supporting the embassy protection mission.

We have the opportunity to conduct a major exercise and we opt to spend it on a minor, Company size UNOPPOSED landing whose purpose is to support an embassy security operation.  Way to maximize training opportunities!

This ties back to recent comments about the difference between the Chinese military preparations and our own.  As I’ve said, and as I’ll repeat,

The Chinese are preparing for war.  We are not.

What happens if we have to conduct a major amphibious operation tomorrow?  Are we prepared?  Not from this exercise, we aren’t!

Here’s the thing – if we want to be able to conduct a major, multi-division offensive spearheaded and enabled by an amphibious assault then we have to practice it.  We have to assemble a major task force and practice the operation.  If, on the other hand, we’re concluding that we aren’t going to ever need an amphibious assault on such a scale then why do we have 30 some major amphibious ships and an entire Marine Corps?  If all we’re going to do is embassy evacuations and humanitarian assistance ops and the like, we can make do with significantly fewer amphibious ships (they can be commercial vessels if we aren’t going to conduct opposed landings) and a much smaller Corps.  In fact, if we aren’t going to do amphibious assaults one can’t help but wonder why we even need the Marines.  The Army has Ranger and Airborne units that can do the security and evacuation and small scale raids and probably do them better.

We need to either get serious about amphibious operations or admit that we’re out of the business and turn the resources over to the Army and Air Force.  Bold Alligator 2014 was an embarrassment.  The Chinese have to be laughing about our military priorities.

(1) http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=84390

(2)http://www.marines.mil/News/NewsDisplay/tabid/3258/Article/554132/answering-crisis-call-marines-respond-during-bold-alligator-2014.aspx 

National Defense Sealift Fund

ComNavOps stumbled across an interesting ship construction funding mechanism that isn’t part of the normal Shipbuilding and Conversion budget process.  Here’s a good description of the fund from Breaking Defense website (1).

“The legislation at issue is the decades-old National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), an account outside the regular Pentagon budget that pays for unarmed naval auxiliaries such as transports, supply ships, and oilers. Precisely because the NDSF operates outside the normal budget and procurement rules, it has always had its critics on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon. Now that the Pentagon is striving to get its books straight enough to audit, the Navy has decided it needs to get rid of this particular complication, so its 2015 budget request would zero out the fund. Instead, the proposed T-AO(X) oiler and future support ships would be funded out of the regular Shipbuilding & Conversion, Navy (SCN) account that pays for warships.”

No, I’m not suggesting that there’s anything nefarious about this.  It’s just one of those accounting oddities that abound throughout government acquisition.  I was curious, though, as to the size of the fund and how much it produced in the way of vessels.  A quick search of the Navy budget justification documents revealed that the fund averaged about $1B per year over the recent seven year period and funded T-AKE and MLP vessels among others.  Those are significant vessels and a billion dollars is a noteworthy amount.

The key point here is what happens if the Navy zeroes out this fund, as stated in the article.  If the funds are simply transferred to the regular SCN then this is a simple accounting exercise and worth no further attention.  On the other hand, with Congress enforcing sequestration and all manner of budget limitations, if the SCN is not increased to compensate for the loss of the NDSF then the Navy is faced with trying to fund additional ships with no more money or having to cut some currently planned ships to meet the budget.

Of course, there is another possibility whose contemplation requires a more cynical view of the Navy (and I’m just the guy for that!).  The funds may be transferred to the SCN but instead of using the money to buy auxiliary ships, as intended, the Navy may opt to stop building the support ships and use the “extra” money for the shiny new carriers and Flt III’s that the Navy so desperately prefers over the unsexy but absolutely vital supply ships.  You’ll recall some previous posts in which we pointed out that the Navy is already early retiring those very types of support ships.  Is this possibility really that far-fetched?

We’ll have to keep an eye on this.

(1) Breaking Defense, "Engine Maker ‘At Risk;’ Wants Navy Help", Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 14-Nov-2014,

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/11/domestic-diesel-builder-takes-on-navy-over-foreign-engines/

Chinese Fighters

ComNavOps is not an expert on Chinese fighter aircraft by any means (is anyone, really?).  Still, it’s hard not to be impressed and concerned by both the range of aircraft being developed and the rate of progress.  The J-20 and J-31, for example, appear to be on par or better than the F-22 and F-35, respectively, at least on paper.  Honestly, if I had to choose between the J-31 or the F-35 at this point, I’d opt for the J-31.  It’s likely to reach operational service sooner!

Of course, we can’t discuss this any further without recognizing that the Chinese aircraft capabilities are all manufacturer’s claims.  None have been demonstrated or proven publicly.  The capabilities may or may not be achievable.  Just because an aircraft looks stealthy and lethal doesn’t mean it is.  The LCS was going to win wars single-handed – on paper.  The JSF was going to be the world’s greatest aircraft in service a decade ago and yet we still haven’t achieved Initial Operation Capability after two decades of development.

Nonetheless, the Chinese appear to have recognized that the area of interest to them, the first island chain, requires operating over a thousand mile distance and they’re developing very long range aircraft and missiles to do so.  The US, on the other hand, is saddled with a short range F-35 as the cornerstone of its future air power and has been very slow to recognize the tyranny of distance and limited basing.

As we discuss BAMS and carriers and A2/AD and LCS and whatever else, it’s obvious that we’re still mired in a very nonchalant mindset.  Vague statements like, “We’ll just provide protection for our high value assets.” Illustrate the lack of critical thinking being exercised in our combat discussions.  Conversely, the Chinese are clearly gearing up for a high end war and have recognized that that combat will occur over vast ocean distances.  The winner of that war will be the one who has developed the ability to conduct long range combat.

This nonchalant mindset is not just limited to civilian commentators, such as us.  It infects our professional military as evidenced by the continued pursuit of an F-35 that is already outclassed, a new LCS that has inherent structural flaws that no amount of additional weapons can compensate for, shrinking fleets, shrinking air wings, etc.  It’s also evidenced by the weapon systems that we aren’t pursuing such as a conventional Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, a truly long range air superiority fighter, a supersonic long range cruise missile, a powerful cruiser replacement, a useful modern frigate, a connector to get Marines ashore, and dozens of other high end systems needed for the A2/AD fight. 

China is serious about war.  We are not.

There’s another interesting aspect at play here with regards to Chinese fighter development and that’s developmental-OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act).  You may recall that OODA is the theory developed by USAF Col. John Boyd that states that the winner of an air-to-air engagement is the one who can get “inside” the other’s decision making process, the OODA loop (I’ll leave it to you to investigate the OODA loop for yourself). 

The OODA concept has since been applied to tactics and strategy, in general.  Consider, now, though, that China is “inside” our OODA aircraft development loop.  They’re producing more advanced aircraft in a faster cycle than we are (again, with the caveat that we’re talking about paper claims).  Being inside our developmental loop is potentially quite troubling.  The implication is that we can’t maintain a technological edge because they can produce the same technology in a shorter time frame.

Do yourself a favor and do some research into the Chinese fighter program.  I guarantee it will alter your view of the value and worth of our own efforts – and not for the better.

On a related note, the ground combat side of things is just as troubling and maybe more so.  China is gearing up for high end, armored combat while we are gearing down for police actions, crisis response, humanitarian assistance, light infantry, and mobility.  If those two ground forces meet, I’d want to in the high end, heavy armor force.  Unfortunately, my passport says I’m on the other side.

We can’t intelligently discuss our own weapons and systems without understanding our enemy’s.  I encourage everyone to take some time and do a bit of research.  You’ll find it a bit scary but necessary.

Relieved For Speaking Out?

Capt. James Fanell, the director of intelligence and information operations at U.S. Pacific Fleet has been relieved and reassigned (1).  Fanell, you may recall, publicly voiced concerns about Chinese military intentions.

"Fanell warned during a February public appearance that a recent Chinese amphibious exercise led naval intelligence to assess that China’s strategy was to be able to launch a 'short, sharp war' with Japan, an unusually frank assessment about a closely watched region."

"Fanell has also stated that China is at the center of virtually every maritime territorial dispute in the Asia-Pacific and that the Chinese were engaging in a blatant land-grab of islands that would enhance their exclusive economic rights to fishing and natural resources."

Notably, his comments did not match the we're-all-friends commentary being put forth by the Administration and CNO Greenert.  As the article stated, Fanell's comments,

"... ran counter to the Pentagon’s talking points on building ties to the increasingly assertive Chinese navy ..."

To be fair, the article makes it clear that the reason for Fanell’s relief has not been made public.  It is possible that the relief is for reasons unrelated to his comments.  I find that highly unlikely.  I’ll withhold final judgment pending more information but this has the stink of retribution about it.  We’ll keep a close eye on this one.

(1) Navy Times, "Senior Navy intel officer removed for controversial comments on China", David Larter, 10-Nov-2014,

http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20141110/NEWS/311100014/Senior-Navy-intel-officer-removed-controversial-comments-China

CSBA Offset Strategy

CSBA has published a new “offset” strategic vision for the US military (1).  Let’s take a look at it.

Before we go any further, I have to state up front that the CSBA study is widely reported to have been directed and orchestrated to some extent by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Work.  This is the man who assured us that the LCS was the greatest warship ever built and that the Navy got pretty much exactly the ship it wanted with the capabilities it wanted and at the price it wanted.  Not even the most ardent LCS supporter believes any of that.  Further, Mr. Work has made it his mission not just to “sell” the LCS but to demonize anyone who offered the slightest bit of criticism.  As regular readers of this blog know, ComNavOps considers Mr. Work to be totally incompetent and an active threat to the effectiveness of our military.  With that in mind, I will attempt to be as objective as I can in assessing this report but I can’t completely rule out the possibility of a negative bias.  Moving on …

The term "offset" refers to the mechanism needed to counter, or offset, an enemy's numerical advantage.  The US has opted to pursue quality rather than quantity in military procurement and force structure, and technology has been the means to ensure a qualitative advantage.

The report claims that for us to try to counter enemy threats on a "missile for missile", "fighter for fighter" basis is "impractical and unaffordable".  Really?  Why?  How do we know that to be true?  In fact, history suggests the opposite conclusion.  The Soviet Union imploded in large measure due to its failed attempt to match or overmatch the US numerically.  North Korea’s attempts to match its military to ours (and South Korea’s) has rendered that country bankrupt and on the verge of collapse.  Does China, in this modern instance, possess some inherent ability that ensures that it can sustain and win a "missile for missile" arms race with us?  Is it not equally, or even more plausible that China is the one that would be at a disadvantage in such a race over time?

In addition, the problem with consciously declining to match numbers is that the quality advantage must be overwhelming in order to compensate.  Such has been the case when fighting in Iraq, Serbia/Bosnia, Afghanistan, and the like.  The problem comes when contemplating combat with China which not only has superior numbers but is nearly on par in terms of quality.  Parity means combat attrition on a one-for-one basis and then numbers become the arbiter of victory.  While we still maintain an overall technological edge over China, the gap is closing quickly.  Indeed, in several key areas China has a significant edge on the US such as mine warfare, long range missiles, and conventional ballistic missiles.  Other areas such as ground forces, amphibious forces, and aircraft are nearly on par.

The document suggests that the US should adopt a new strategy based not on direct response but on asymmetric denial and punishment whereby enemy high value targets would be struck anywhere in the world.  Thus, we would not seek to directly reclaim captured land but would seek to punish the enemy and make the cost so high that the enemy would, presumably, voluntarily give back the captured lands or, ideally, never engage in the capture to begin with due to the fear of punishment and cost.  While this might sound plausible on paper, a study of history demonstrates a strong tendency for the US to avoid striking enemy targets that are not directly threatening US forces.  For example, consider the US refusal to enter Laos or bomb Hanoi during the Viet Nam conflict.  The likelihood that the US will attack targets outside the immediately threatened area or even outside the enemy country's borders is remote, at best.  The political ramifications and world wide public relations aspects of such actions all but rule out their execution.  As a result, adopting such a strategy would only encourage bolder enemy actions with the feeling that the US will not carry through on its strategy (Line in the Sand, anyone?).

Put another way, the document suggests that the US needs to focus on a strategy designed to make the enemy believe that the cost of their victory is too high and, therefore, the attempt is never made.  In addition to the problem noted above, a second problem is that our enemies seem to consistently ignore our “strength” and their own resulting cost. 

Consider Sadaam’s invasion of Kuwait.  Sadaam had to have been well aware of US strengths but opted to initiate hostilities anyway.  Japan made the same mistaken calculation in initiating WWII despite overwhelming evidence of an inability to defeat the US.  North Viet Nam and North Korea were both unimpressed by overwhelming US military strength.  The Serbia/Bosnia conflict occurred in the face of overwhelming US military strength.  More recently, Russia has opted to invade multiple countries in the face of US military strength.

With that kind of history of hostilities initiated in the face of US strength, why would we believe that a strategy based on exactly that flawed premise will now work?  Those who will not learn from history are doomed to repeat it – and I’m talking about the US, now, not our enemies.  If we’re going to attempt to build a deterrent strategy on a premise that has been repeatedly proven false, we’re just encouraging war rather than deterring it and setting ourselves up for combat failure.

The document sums up its strategic implementation premise with this statement.

“The centerpiece of that strategy is the development and fielding of a [Global Surveillance and Strike - GSS] network for projecting US military power rapidly, in multiple locations, and with dramatically reduced reliance on vulnerable forward bases and significantly increased reliance on unmanned systems that promise significant life-cycle cost savings.”

Consider a couple of key phrases from that quote. 

Reduced dependence on close-in theatre land and sea bases is a great idea – the report recognizes the severe lack of area bases and the vulnerability of those that do exist.  It also recognizes the political difficulties inherent in attempting to improve the basing situation to any appreciable extent.  All that is good.  What the report fails to clearly lay out is how to operate without such bases.

Shifting the focus of combat to areas where the US holds an advantage, such as undersea warfare, is, again, a great idea.  One can’t help but wonder, though, what happens if the enemy opts to shift the focus to their advantages such as land combat.  For example, the physical occupation of Taiwan or other land areas would require us to engage in ground combat if we wished to reclaim the land.  Simply saying we’ll shift the focus and expect the enemy to blindly follow us into those advantageous realms is wishful thinking unbacked by any degree of realism.  Now, that’s not to say that we shouldn’t emphasize areas of advantage but we have to do so while also recognizing that the enemy is going to attempt to shift the focus to their advantage and we may have little choice but to go along.  Thus, we had better be able to fight in their realm while we attempt to shift the focus into ours.

Unmanned systems that promise significant cost savings is a concept that is totally without supporting evidence.  In fact, just the opposite has proven true so far.  The MQ-4 Triton costs around $193M each.  Where’s the savings?  The minimally manned LCS has runaway operating costs, as we previously documented.  And so on …

The report goes on to list a variety of observations and needs that support the GSS concept. 

• recognizes the likelihood of loss of space based assets and space-derived capabilities like GPS
• recognizes the growing imbalance between “cheap” attacking missiles and “expensive” defensive systems and identifies this as a dead end road – yet fails to recognize the enemy’s targeting challenges
• develop counter-space capabilities
• expand the use of UUVs
• develop a a submarine-launched, conventional ballistic/boost-glide missile, whatever that is
• expand the use of undersea networks
• develop and modernize mines
• develop an unspecified long range ASW weapon
• emphasize rail guns and lasers as economical alternatives to AAW missiles
• develop counter-sensor weapons
• develop an automated aerial refueling capability
• develop and expand the procurement of a Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B)
• develop a penetrating surveillance UAV
• develop a strike UCAS
• develop expeditionary, land based A2/AD systems
• develop an array of new networks, communications, and battle management systems
• develop a towed, undersea missile pod that can lie dormant for years until activated

To pay for these new systems, many existing weapons and systems would be eliminated or scaled back including,

• non-stealthy ISR aircraft
• short range strike fighters
• heavy mechanized ground forces
• Burkes
• one aircraft carrier
• reduced Army Brigade Combat Teams
• cancellation of the amphibious combat vehicle

Scanning through the list, there are some items that are sorely needed and some observations that are quite insightful.  On the other hand, there are some idiotic items and some observations that demonstrate a complete lack of a solid grasp of reality.  I’m not going to attempt to analyze every single item due to a lack of space in the post and the fact that we’ve covered most of them in previous posts.

On the plus side, the report offers a lot of ideas that ComNavOps completely agrees with.  On the minus side, the underlying strategic premise of punishment leading to the enemy’s recognition of the cost of misbehavior is illogical and contradicted by most of history.  Further, the means of implementing that strategy, the GSS, relies heavily on unproven and, probably, unachievable technology.  It’s the LCS writ large.  Given the fundamentally flawed premise, it’s amazing that the report got as much right as it did – and it did get a lot of individual items and observations right. 

This report would have us give up a great deal of heavy combat power in exchange for a currently non-existent and probably non-achievable global system designed to influence enemy behavior but without the combat power to dispute the enemy’s actions.  That’s a mammoth size gamble that history has clearly shown will fail and if it does fail we’ll be left without the combat power to recover from that failure.

To put it as succinctly as possible, the data points in the report are generally right but the conclusions are wrong.

(1) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "Toward A New Offset Strategy", Robert Martinage, Oct 2014