tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-55799077566567760562024-03-19T01:48:42.091-07:00Navy MattersNaval analysis provided by ComNavOps, Commander - Naval OpinionsComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger1912125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-5448579912505206412024-03-18T09:51:00.000-07:002024-03-18T09:51:08.373-07:00Foreign Ships Are Magnificent<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Without a doubt, the US has shipbuilding problems with every
recent naval ship program coming in badly over budget, over schedule, riddled
with quality problems and non-functional equipment, delivered in only partially
complete condition, unfit for combat, and sometimes actually damaged and yet
the Navy has accepted and commissioned every ship. In contrast, it is almost an
article of faith among naval observers and commentators that foreign ships are
magnificent wonders of naval accomplishment, being cheap, quick to build, and
testaments to naval technology and quality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In fact, one of the most commonly proffered solutions to US naval
shipbuilding problems is to have our ships be built by foreign companies,
either in foreign countries or by having foreign builders come to the US and
establish facilities.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Are foreign ships and shipbuilders really miracles of modern
naval construction, as so many believe?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Let’s dig a bit deeper and see.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The first problem in trying to assess foreign ship
construction programs is that there is almost no information available.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The US publishes data on naval vessels in a
variety of government reports, public forums, blog postings, and general news
sources.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In contrast, there is almost no
publicly available information on foreign ship acquisition programs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That leaves us to reason out the situation
from the snippets of information we can find.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Let’s look at some examples of foreign ships and
shipbuilding problems and see if we can discern a pattern.<br /><o:p> </o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>HMS Prince of Wales</u> – The Royal Navy’s aircraft
carrier Prince of Wales, commissioned in Dec 2019, suffered a propulsion system
breakdown in Aug 2022 resulting in damage to the shaft, propeller, and
rudder.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Repairs sidelined the ship until
Jul 2023.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>HMS Queen Elizabeth</u> - <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Royal Navy’s aircraft carrier Queen
Elizabeth, commissioned in Dec 2017, suffered a propulsion system breakdown in
Jul 2019 and had to abandon a scheduled NATO exercise.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Helge Ingstad</u> – The Norwegian frigate suffered a
collision and subsequently sank due to faulty design and construction flaws
that allowed flooding to pass from compartment to compartment through shaft
seals.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>HMS Triumph</u> – In 1988 the Royal Navy Trafalgar class
submarine, then under construction, had a large section mistakenly welded into
position upside down.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Baden-Württemberg F125 Frigate</u> – In 2017, the German
frigate failed its trials and was rejected by the German Navy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Problems included a permanent list, faulty
radar, improper fireproof fuel tank coatings, excessive weight, subsystem interface
defects, and hardware/software integration<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>New Zealand/Canada ANZAC Frigate Upgrade</u> – The $375M
original cost has jumped to $639M.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Project planning began in 2006 with contracts being awarded in 2014 and
completion occurring in 2022/23.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That’s a
17 year upgrade project!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The work was
performed in Canada.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Type 45 Destroyer</u> - The Type 45’s advanced propulsion
system was found in 2010 to be unreliable, especially when operating in the
heat of the Persian Gulf.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>HMS Dauntless
was laid up in 2016 to undergo a major refit that would solve the propulsion
problems.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The project took twice as long
as estimated and was not completed until June 2022.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Digital
modelling was used to de-risk some of the issues but in practice, the work
proved more complex than expected.[2]<br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Soviet/Russian Ship Quality</u> – Construction quality
problems have been well documented by interior photos, tour observations,
post-Cold War reports, etc.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>For But Not With</u> – Foreign ship builds widely use the
‘for but not with’ method of construction which delivers ships without
necessary weapons and sensors but allows the builder/country to claim reduced
costs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Some foreign ships also are known
to reuse weapons from a retired ship – not necessarily a bad thing but, again,
it results in artificially low cost claims when compared to purely new
construction.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Austal</u> – The Australian shipbuilder, Austal, built a
facility in the US to manufacture the Independence variant LCS and that turned
out to be a disaster with cost overruns, schedule slippages, specifications not
met, and a host of design and quality issues.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>FREMM/Constellation</u> – The US Constellation class
frigate, based on the parent FREMM design, had to be extensively redesigned to
meet US survivability standards.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is
especially eye-opening given how lax and minimal US standards have become!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This suggests that a significant portion of
the supposed lower foreign costs may come from significantly reduced standards.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>French Frigate Misfire</u> – In 2018, a French frigate’s
attempted cruise missile strike on suspected Syrian chemical weapon sites
failed when the missile salvo failed to launch.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>A second frigate had to take the tasking.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>As noted, there is almost no information, good or bad, about
SKorean and Japanese naval ship quality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Unfortunately, SKorea and Japan are two of the commonly suggested
foreign shipbuilders that we should use/emulate.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Discussion/Conclusion<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>Any one of the above cited incidents could be explained away
as a one-of-a-kind occurrence but the overall pattern clearly demonstrates that
foreign shipbuilders suffer the same kinds of quality and design problems that
American ships and shipbuilders do.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>There is nothing magic about foreign ships or builders.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Claims of cost savings inevitably fail to account for
extensive subsidies, reuse of equipment, ‘for but not with’ practices, lower
standards, etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, foreign cost
savings claims are highly suspect, bordering on false.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The most interesting data point is the Austal manufacturing
effort.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A foreign shipbuilder came to
the US, supposedly bringing the many miracles of foreign shipbuilding, built a
facility and, contrary to what so many expected, suffered the exact same
problems that US builders do.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The main
thing that changed when they came to the US was the degree of public
scrutiny.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All their failures and
shortcomings were publicized.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, the
idea of bringing a foreign shipbuilder to the US to construct a facility is
almost guaranteed to produce no improvements.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>A foreign builder in the US would be subject to the same laws,
regulations, work force issues, and so forth that US builders are and those
issues would have the same negative impacts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br />
</span><o:p> <br /></o:p>The pattern of incidents also suggest that foreign builders
build to lower design standards than US builders which leads to impressions of
lower cost.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Given the steady lowering of
US standards, this is shocking that foreign navies/builders would have even
lower standards.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>In short, I would have no great objections to using a
foreign shipyard for US naval construction but I would expect no improvement in
quality, cost, or schedule issues.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There
is nothing magic about foreign shipyards other than their greatly reduced
public visibility.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>There is also the issue of security.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One would have to assume that any technology
or design specifications that were sent to a foreign builder would wind up in
China’s hands and that’s a concern.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of
course, it’s not as if our home-grown security has prevented the Chinese from
acquiring all the information they could want so maybe security isn’t that big
of an issue!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>A separate aspect of the consideration of foreign
shipbuilders is that of competition.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
number of US naval shipbuilders has steadily dwindled to a precious few which,
without a doubt, has led to non-competition and all its associated ills.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The use of foreign shipbuilders would, if
nothing else, provide a degree of competition that has been lacking.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s not even debatable that competition is a
positive that helps drive improvements and reduced costs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I find this to be the most persuasive
argument for foreign shipyards, by far.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>As with so many things in life, the grass is always greener
on the other side of the fence but, upon closer examination, it isn’t really.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>___________________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]IEEE Spectrum website, “New German Warship Fails Sea
Trials Due to Tech Woes”, Robert Charette, 7-Feb-2018,<br /><a href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/new-german-frigate-fails-tests">https://spectrum.ieee.org/new-german-frigate-fails-tests<br /></a><o:p> <br /></o:p>[2]<a href="https://www.navylookout.com/in-focus-the-power-improvement-project-for-the-royal-navys-type-45-destroyers/#:~:text=One%20of%20the%20many%20causes%20of%20problems%20was,inherent%20redundancy%20that%20MEs%20were%20accustomed%20to%20having">https://www.navylookout.com/in-focus-the-power-improvement-project-for-the-royal-navys-type-45-destroyers/#:~:text=One%20of%20the%20many%20causes%20of%20problems%20was,inherent%20redundancy%20that%20MEs%20were%20accustomed%20to%20having</a>.<br /><br /></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com13tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-16403594314166117582024-03-14T09:35:00.000-07:002024-03-17T08:24:44.319-07:00Preparing To Fight The Last War<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">In August of 2023, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced
a program to produce thousands of drones.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>…
Department of Defense (DoD) Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks
announced the Replicator initiative, … fielding attritable autonomous systems
in multiple thousands across multiple domains.[1]</blockquote></i>So, having seen what they believe to be the war-changing
impact of drones in the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the DoD is preparing to fight
China using the methodology of the Ukraine-Russia war.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This, despite all the warnings and signs that
the Ukraine-Russia war is highly unique and not applicable to future wars, in
general, and a war with China, in particular.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I’ve extensively covered the reasons why this war has little bearing on,
or lessons for, a China war so I won’t bother re-listing them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Suffice it to say that there are few
operational or tactical lessons to be had from this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It would be like a professional boxer trying to
draw lessons from a schoolyard fight between a couple of ten year old children.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>I’ve also extensively covered the extremely limited
suitability of most drones for combat operations.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Despite all that, it appears that we’re going to go ahead
and base our war with China on the actions of a couple of militaries notable
only for their stunning degree of ineptitude.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>This is the very definition of preparing to fight the last
war – one that has no relevance to a war with China. <br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>____________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Defense Innovation Unit, “Implementing the Department of
Defense Replicator Initiative to Accelerate All-Domain Attritable Autonomous
Systems To Warfighters at Speed and Scale”, 30-Nov-2023,<br /><a href="https://www.diu.mil/latest/implementing-the-department-of-defense-replicator-initiative-to-accelerate">https://www.diu.mil/latest/implementing-the-department-of-defense-replicator-initiative-to-accelerate<br /></a><br /></span></div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
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ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com18tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-30861090737954948062024-03-13T07:45:00.000-07:002024-03-13T07:45:50.149-07:00Duty, Honor, Country … Gone<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">West Point has eliminated the phrase, <b><u>‘Duty, Honor, Country’</u></b>
from its mission statement.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Is there anything more that needs to be said about where our
leadership is taking us?</span></div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-65022428606291745982024-03-12T01:00:00.000-07:002024-03-12T01:00:00.143-07:00 Surface Drone Detection<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">We’ve discussed the combat utility of unmanned surface
suicide drones (see, <span style="color: #2b00fe;"><a href="https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/02/surface-drone-swarm.html">“Surface Drone Swarm”</a></span>).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One of the conclusions was that drones are
easily spotted and defeated, assuming any degree of competence and preparedness
by the defender.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here’s some real world
data about drone detection from the recent Ukraine attack on the Russian patrol
boat.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Just prior to the attack, a Russian merchant ship, the Ella,
reported sighting four drones which, presumably, were the ones that wound up
attacking the patrol boat.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>Significantly
the crew reported that they could only see the drones when they came within 2
nautical miles (2.3 miles / 3.7 km) of the ship. Their radar could only extend
the detection range to 3 nautical miles (3.5 miles / 5.5 km).[1]</blockquote><br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p>Assuming that ‘see’ means visual observation, this
demonstrates that drones are easily detected even using simple visual
means.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is unlikely that a merchant
ship would have sophisticated EO/IR sensors so ‘see’ likely means a man with
binoculars.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Similarly, ‘radar’ undoubtedly means a basic navigation
radar rather than a high powered, optimized, military grade radar.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Thus, if a simple merchant ship could spot and track drones
at 2-3 nm, a warship should be able to, at least, do that and, likely, a good
deal more.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>An alert defender would have
more than enough time to destroy drones given a 2-3 nm ‘head start’.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, this assumes that the defender has
appropriate weapons which neither the Russians nor the US Navy has to any great
extent.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>This incident also suggests that the ‘swarm’ was just four
drones.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Destroying four drones with
detection and engagement beginning 3+ nm out should be an easy task.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Navy needs to begin working out the tactics
and weapons required to do this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As a
reminder, we’re operating within easy reach of land off Yemen so we’d better be
prepared.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p><br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>_______________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Naval News website, “Vital Russian Supply Lines In Black
Sea Cut By Ukrainian Drones”, H I Sutton, 10-Mar-2024,<br /><a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/vital-russian-supply-lines-in-black-sea-cut-by-ukrainian-drones/">https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/vital-russian-supply-lines-in-black-sea-cut-by-ukrainian-drones/<br /></a><br /></span></div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
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ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com24tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-42739247002021231382024-03-09T09:08:00.000-08:002024-03-09T11:47:44.191-08:00Gaza Aid Port<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Biden has announced plans to build a port, of sorts, to
enable ships to deliver aid to Gaza.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As
noted in an Axios article, the aid effort has been thwarted by the lack of
access to a deep water port.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"></i><blockquote><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Efforts
were already underway to coordinate shipments by sea but the biggest
complication was the lack of a deep-water port to enable big ships to dock and
off load aid.[1]<br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The
U.S. military will establish a temporary pier in the sea off the Gaza coast
with a causeway that will allow trucks to bring aid to shore … [1]<br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">…
it will be at least a few weeks before it's operational.[1]</i></blockquote><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Update: Pentagon spokesman, Gen. Pat Rider had this to say about the timing,</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><i><blockquote>Finally, in terms of timing, we're working to set this up as quickly as possible, but we expect that it will take several weeks to plan and execute.[2]</blockquote></i></span></div><div style="text-align: left;">Several weeks??? This should be a canned plan, sitting in a planning book. It's a basic operation, not even a combat operation. This should be about a week to set up. As an example, the American Mulberry was operational 12 days after D-Day and that was a much larger operation executed under combat conditions and in extremely unfavorable weather.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">This operation illustrates a couple of points relevant to our military
discussions:</div><o:p> <br /><ul style="text-align: left;"><li><span style="font-family: arial;">It is not possible to logistically support a military
operation of any size by air.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Support/supplies must come from ships.</span></li><li><span style="font-family: arial;">A readily accessible port is a mandatory requirement for any
overseas military operation and is often the purpose behind an amphibious
assault (Normandy D-Day, for example).</span></li></ul></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>This is as close to an actual combat amphibious assault
logistics operation as you can get in peacetime.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is going to be fascinating to see how the
military goes about establishing this port.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In theory, this is exactly what the US military should be able to do in
their sleep.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Can the US build a
port/causeway in the time frame required?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Given our failure in recent logistic exercises and our failure to surge
amphibious ships when required, this is by no means certain.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjiX7Jd4JnSFi0PbaLkOgHSyrRYLr2PFA2mSa9gyiEBP19JlnwonXVEJm-sXz24bFaR8ECBVq8Snw_bGoxdNt-X_oXADYeXMPc9hioAIf-IrY8DpVbW57Fevg2LkBd2mVagKy-72-e9Afx0d6E7sHA5kK6pSough68oRJ44k7hJmm6fk2qlLWG-4KQJCq8/s504/Mulberry%20Causeway.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="379" data-original-width="504" height="301" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjiX7Jd4JnSFi0PbaLkOgHSyrRYLr2PFA2mSa9gyiEBP19JlnwonXVEJm-sXz24bFaR8ECBVq8Snw_bGoxdNt-X_oXADYeXMPc9hioAIf-IrY8DpVbW57Fevg2LkBd2mVagKy-72-e9Afx0d6E7sHA5kK6pSough68oRJ44k7hJmm6fk2qlLWG-4KQJCq8/w400-h301/Mulberry%20Causeway.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Mulberry Causeway at Normandy, WWII</span></td></tr></tbody></table><br /><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>On a related note, this places the US perilously close to becoming
involved in the Israeli-Hamas conflict.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I hope someone has thought through the ramifications.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This also showcases the highly vulnerable
state of a port in a combat action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Either
side, or a third party actor, could opt to launch an attack to disrupt the
operation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Will the US put any defensive
assets and policies in place and what will our response be to an attack?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Warning:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It should go without saying but I’ll say it
anyway:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>this is purely a military
analysis of the operation and does not indicate any political position, pro or
con, towards either side in this conflict.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>There will be no political comments allowed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Period.<br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>_________________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Axios website, “Biden to announce "emergency
mission" to build port in Gaza for aid shipments”, Barak Ravid,
7-Mar-2024,<br /><a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/03/07/biden-port-gaza-humanitarian-aid-state-union">https://www.axios.com/2024/03/07/biden-port-gaza-humanitarian-aid-state-union</a></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">[2]<a href="https://www.redstate.com/streiff/2024/03/09/a-man-a-plana-temporary-port-in-gaza-are-you-nuts-n2171143">https://www.redstate.com/streiff/2024/03/09/a-man-a-plana-temporary-port-in-gaza-are-you-nuts-n2171143</a></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com31tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-13781705540283565852024-03-07T09:54:00.000-08:002024-03-07T09:54:42.278-08:00Reality or Fantasy?<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Having largely failed to develop and field a new long range
anti-ship cruise missile (LRASM), the Navy is now asking industry to develop
yet another new missile with the capabilities of the LRASM for a small fraction
of the price.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>The
US Navy is seeking industry’s assistance to rapidly prototype and field a new
air-launched, stand-off weapon inexpensive enough to manufacture en masse and
perform on par with the service’s current anti-ship cruise missile.[1]</blockquote></i>The Navy solicitation notice to industry states that the new
missile <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">“should be “complimentary” to the
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile”.<br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p>In fact, the Navy’s notice suggests that the new missile
should be even better than the LRASM.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>…
the service posted a public notice earlier this month that it should have
“increased range at lower costs” and “integrated a high-maturity propulsion
system with proven payloads.”[1]</blockquote></i>Note that it is not unambiguously clear from the notice that
the ‘increased range’ refers to the LRASM although that is the Navy’s current
air-launched anti-ship missile.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>So, the Navy is asking for a better missile at a
substantially lower price.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>Possible
proposals from industry should aim for a cost no greater than $300,000 per
all-up-round with a production capacity of at least 500 rounds per year, the
notice states.[1]</blockquote></i>For comparison, the LRASM costs around $3M per missile.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, the Navy is asking for better
performance at 1/10th the cost.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Does
anything seem out of whack about this?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>ComNavOps has long been calling for cheaper weapons that can be mass
produced quickly and affordably but this goes well beyond the realm of
reasonable and deep, deep into the world of pure fantasy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even allowing for some degree of profiteering
by industry, if they had the technical capability to produce a missile with
better performance than the LRASM for 1/10<sup>th</sup> the cost, they’d
already be doing it.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>But wait … the fantasy grows!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Navy is looking to field this new missile in 2027.[1]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For comparison, the LRASM began development
in 2009 and production began eight years later in 2017.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even today, 15 years after beginning
development, we’ve only produced a grand total of 258 missiles, as shown in the
table below, and the Lot 4,5 missiles are not expected to be delivered until 2026.</span><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p><br /><br /></o:p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhxyVhfRxdPjJCAWFLoCehpIEjEDHqD7NaAuQCEm1YRzNXHuZJvijRwImFEfxu1f5v3xo9yKsyAOSwctfJgeLLcGSoy5vH4V8LEQCMFJCFUQTRMaDRXlYMlCzLfQI4Fo1iecff5bhVaqWCL99lnFpmK7coN_szB1Hka9LnTMqSWPbiBWiO_hI3W_gkMhGc/s329/Table.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="221" data-original-width="329" height="215" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhxyVhfRxdPjJCAWFLoCehpIEjEDHqD7NaAuQCEm1YRzNXHuZJvijRwImFEfxu1f5v3xo9yKsyAOSwctfJgeLLcGSoy5vH4V8LEQCMFJCFUQTRMaDRXlYMlCzLfQI4Fo1iecff5bhVaqWCL99lnFpmK7coN_szB1Hka9LnTMqSWPbiBWiO_hI3W_gkMhGc/s320/Table.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Let’s check the reality-fantasy ratio on this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ideally, you’d like a 100% reality to 0%
fantasy, right?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Common sense and history
tell us with absolute certainty that when you start subtracting from reality
and adding fantasy, you fail.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So …<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Navy wants a better LRASM at 1/10<sup>th</sup> the
price.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Does that seem like reality or
fantasy?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Navy wants the new weapon fielded by 2027.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even if you consider this year to be the
start of development (and no development contract has yet been issued), that
means the Navy is looking to field this weapon in just three years versus the
eight years it took to field the LRASM.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Does that seem like reality or fantasy?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Navy wants a production capacity of 500 missiles per
year compared to the LRASM demonstrated production rate of 258 missile in 7
years which is a production rate of 37 missiles per year!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Does that seem like reality or fantasy?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>We have to be a little bit fair, here, and note that the
Navy is just exploring the concept.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>“The
objective of this notice is to help the government determine if there are
existing sources with the capability and experience to rapidly prototype,
integrate, test and field a long-range, network-enabled weapon system capable
of launch from a F/A-18E/F and F-35A/C,” according to the notice.[1]</blockquote></i>They may find out that it’s utterly unrealistic and drop it
but the point is that the stated desire is so far from reality that someone is
wasting a lot of time and effort on something that should be patently obvious
is impossible.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Now, as stated earlier, ComNavOps has long called for
cheaper weapons.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, hand in hand
with that call is the call for simpler weapons … it’s the ‘simpler’ part that
makes the ‘cheaper’ part a reality.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Could the Navy develop a cheaper and simpler anti-ship cruise
missile?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Yes!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>How can we produce a simpler missile?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A good start would be to eliminate the
network capability and all the mid-course handoff, pass back and forth,
guidance by a Boy Scout in Utah capability that is total garbage and adds
nothing to the combat capability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Make a
missile that flies to a spot, opens its sensor ‘eye’, looks for a target, and
then attempts to fly into the target.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Eliminate the choosing a specific rivet to hit and just settle for a hit
anywhere.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Modern ships aren’t
armored.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A hit anywhere will be a
mission kill or sinking (ask the Russians!).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Eliminate all the sensor imaging garbage that only increases the
software complexity and cost and wrecks schedules.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You don’t need an image library on a
missile.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In war, just let it hit
anything that meets a few basic sensor criteria.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Anything you hit is going to hurt the enemy.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Let’s stick with reality and leave fantasy in the
laboratory.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>_______________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy seeking to rapidly prototype new
air-launched, stand-off missile”, Justin Katz, 27-Feb-2024,<br /><a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/navy-seeking-to-rapidly-prototype-new-air-launched-stand-off-missile/">https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/navy-seeking-to-rapidly-prototype-new-air-launched-stand-off-missile/</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com55tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-69238004559269914122024-03-04T01:00:00.000-08:002024-03-04T01:00:00.147-08:00We’re Going To Fight With What We Have<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">One of the characteristics of WWII, which made the defeat of
Germany and Japan a foregone conclusion, was the vast industrial capacity of
the US and the ability to convert that capacity to wartime production
needs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In contrast, today we lack the
sheer foundation of industry and, for a host of reasons, the ability to convert
what we do have to wartime needs and to scale up the capacity that we do have.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Why, you ask, can’t we scale up and convert the industry
that we do have to wartime needs?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As an
illustrative example, recall that in WWII, auto manufacturers were able to
convert from cars to tanks, aircraft, and other equipment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ford Motor Company, for example, produced
B-24 bombers and M-4 tanks, among other items.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Conversion to wartime production was possible, in large part, due to the
fact that civilian automobiles and military vehicles and aircraft used,
basically, the same equipment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>An M-4
tank wasn’t that different from an automobile.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Bombers and tanks used radial engines which were, themselves, just
automobile engines in a different shape than an in-line car engine.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And so on.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Now, consider a modern Abrams tank or a B-2/B-21 bomber as
compared to a typical automobile.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>There’s no comparison and little similarity!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Turbine engines have little in common with
car engines.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Advanced armors have little
in common with automobile sheet metal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Exotic materials like titanium, composites, etc. have little in common
with sheet metal and run of the mill steel and aluminum.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Forming, welding, and manipulating exotic
materials requires exotic skills.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Stealth coatings have nothing in common with automobile paint.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Micron tolerances have nothing in common with
automobile level tolerances.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And so on.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Yes, given years of time to retrain workers, revamp
factories, master advanced production techniques, and so forth, we could
convert but we aren’t going to have years of time in a war.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If we can’t convert quickly, we aren’t going
to convert at all.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Let’s consider some other factors that impair our ability to
convert industry to wartime needs.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Exotic Components</b>
– Much of military production incorporates and depends on exotic components
such as computer chips.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is almost
nothing the military uses that does not use computer chips.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unfortunately, our chip production capacity
is maxed out, right now, as evidenced by the recent, severe chip shortage.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even now, in peacetime, we desperately need
additional computer chip capacity but a new chip factory takes a minimum of $10
billion and five years to build, according to the research firm, International
Data Corporation (IDC).[1]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We have no
hope of commissioning new chip production facilities in a useful time frame
when war comes.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Exotic Materials</b>
– Many of our most advanced military components require exotic rare earths,
metals, alloys, and composites that we have insufficient supplies of or lack
entirely.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The bulk of our rare earth
supply comes from China!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I think it’s
safe to say China won’t be supplying us with rare earths during a war.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Factories</b> – Over
the last several decades, we’ve allowed (forced, through unwise legislation and
tax regulations) much of our manufacturing to move overseas.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even if we could convert existing factories,
we simply don’t have enough factories remaining to meet wartime demands.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’re currently trying to increase weapons
production and failing badly and that’s just while trying to satisfy the needs
of a minor, regional war between Ukraine and Russia.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How much worse will the weapon production
deficiency be in a war with China?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Work Force</b> – We
currently have a severe shortage of skilled labor.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Our shortsighted attempt to force every high
school student to go to college or be branded a failure has depleted our supply
of skilled trades workers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Once upon a
time, we could train new people fairly quickly on basic welding, pipefitting,
and electrical skills but the advanced nature of our technology now requires
advanced capabilities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now, it would
take years of training to produce a worker capable of producing our advanced
technology.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Conclusion<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>The conclusion is short, simple, and painfully obvious.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We have little industrial capacity for war,
at the moment, and even less potential to convert and scale up our industry for
war.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The implication of this is that
we’re going to have to fight a war with, essentially, what we have going into
it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We won’t be quickly converting and
gearing up production capabilities and capacities.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>This means that we need to rethink the type of weapons and
inventories we’re maintaining and developing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Complex weapon systems are the enemy of rapid production and, in war,
rapid production is one of the most important keys to victory.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We need to ask ourselves whether somewhat
simpler systems that can be rapidly produced is a better way to go than
bleeding edge technologies that require decades to develop and produce?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Are hundreds of thousands of dumb bombs
better than multi-million dollar precision guided missiles the inventory of
which will be depleted inside a month of war?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Remember, the enemy will be facing the same problem although China seems
to have a better industrial base to start with (courtesy, in large measure, of
us!).<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Solutions<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>What can we do to put ourselves in a better industrial
position?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Simplify</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We
need to simplify our overly complex technology.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Every weapon system we develop needs to pass through the filter of rapid
production.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It doesn’t matter how good a
weapon is if we can’t produce useful quantities in short time frames.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ask the Germans how the Tiger tank, Me-262,
and other wonder weapons worked out for them.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Reclaim Production</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>We need to bring production back to America by modifying our laws,
regulations, tariffs, and trade relations so as to make it more profitable to
produce at home than abroad.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If we do
that, industry will return of its own accord.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Skilled Trades</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>We need to vastly increase our reservoir of skilled trades workers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We need to end the college push and, instead,
push skilled trades as an honorable, rewarding, and lucrative career at the
high school level and re-establish high school vocational education
training.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Not everyone should go to
college.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Foreign Dependency</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>We need to eliminate our foreign dependency on raw materials.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, we have abundant rare earths but
our regulations discourage the mining and refining of them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We need to treat defense-critical raw
materials as a national imperative and establish a special category of
regulations that allow their production without undue concern about
environmental issues.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Note that ‘undue’
does not mean ‘no’ concern.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We just
can’t regulate critical raw materials out of existence, as we’ve done.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>___________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]<a href="https://www.marketplace.org/2022/08/23/what-does-it-take-for-chip-manufacturers-to-get-a-new-plant-up-and-running/">https://www.marketplace.org/2022/08/23/what-does-it-take-for-chip-manufacturers-to-get-a-new-plant-up-and-running/</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com60tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-33587296113215704252024-03-01T16:20:00.000-08:002024-03-01T16:20:29.975-08:00P-8 Contract<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The Navy has awarded Boeing a $3.4 <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>billion</u></b> dollar contract to produce 17 P-8 Poseidon aircraft.[1]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That’s <u>$200M</u> each!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Yikes!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Hmm … What does that price tag do to the aircraft’s Concept
of Operations (CONOPS)?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is anyone really
going to risk a $200M airplane anywhere near the battlefield … you know, where
it would actually do some good?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Has the cost priced the P-8 out of the realm useful
contributions?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>Given the cost-risk, will we relegate the P-8 to peripheral
scouting, well away from any danger?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If
so, couldn’t we make do with a much cheaper aircraft?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>In a similar vein, does anyone really think we’ll risk a
$20B Ford (yeah, that’s a lot closer to the real cost than the Navy’s
fraudulent $12B cost cap claim) where it can be sunk?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Cost impacts operations and tactics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s unavoidable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>With $3B destroyers, $20B carriers, $177M F-35 unit costs[2],
$200M P-8, and $1.1B frigates, among other examples, are we pricing ourselves
out of viable combat operations and tactics?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Should a ‘combat-riskable’ cost point be a design criterion
for future ships and aircraft?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhX1rAXZEFDbaE9g_cDiTF4dQVoJuzGbJnXTV-sg-Okeq5KZ6EZu8OWKpHhkYZy9u46F94hzmIj9FTLduRZXe4DTS0EghnFuz1Bn6kHHKT8Y_0OWMXypSWPUnPe65WGZRBpELFfjQAWUGhnw9LQ9AzrIaipCLFR-xYQ92FK-wyfA5xphH0eicZf988s2kI/s3133/P-8%20Poseidon.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="2091" data-original-width="3133" height="268" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhX1rAXZEFDbaE9g_cDiTF4dQVoJuzGbJnXTV-sg-Okeq5KZ6EZu8OWKpHhkYZy9u46F94hzmIj9FTLduRZXe4DTS0EghnFuz1Bn6kHHKT8Y_0OWMXypSWPUnPe65WGZRBpELFfjQAWUGhnw9LQ9AzrIaipCLFR-xYQ92FK-wyfA5xphH0eicZf988s2kI/w400-h268/P-8%20Poseidon.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">$$$$$$$$</td></tr></tbody></table><br /> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>_______________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]<a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/boeing-awarded-3-4-billion-contract-for-17-p-8a-poseidon-aircraft/">https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/boeing-awarded-3-4-billion-contract-for-17-p-8a-poseidon-aircraft/<br /></a><o:p> <br /></o:p>[2]Per June 2023 GAO Weapon Systems Annual Assessment report,
p.207.</span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com60tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-77098935759068043152024-02-26T01:00:00.000-08:002024-02-26T01:00:00.131-08:00Abrams Tanks Being Sent To Russia<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> <br />Once in a great while, I take a peek at a non-naval issue
and today is such a case.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The US has sent 30 some M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine and
reports suggest they’ll be committed to some kind of spring offensive when the
ground dries enough to support heavy armored vehicles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That raises the probability that Russia will
eventually capture an Abrams tank.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Yes,
I know that some of the more sensitive gear has been stripped out of the tanks
for just that reason but what about the general characteristics of the tanks,
especially the armor.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’d be giving
Russia the opportunity to study the tanks’s armor scheme, material composition,
strengths, and vulnerabilities as well as other general characteristics and
capabilities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And, of course, anything
Russia gets or learns will make its way to China, one way or another.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Is this wise?</span></div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com84tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-46345010148314579932024-02-22T08:24:00.000-08:002024-02-22T08:24:04.294-08:00Second Unmanned Squadron<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The Navy plans to establish a second unmanned squadron this
May.[1]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Why not?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The first has demonstrated absolutely no
combat capability or enhancements to other asset’s combat capabilities so,
sure, let’s get more.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is a hot,
steaming platter of stupid served on fine china to make it look appealing
instead of putting it in the pile with the dog’s contribution to the lawn’s
fertilization.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Adm. Samuel Paparo made the announcement and then, rather
than describe any actual combat capabilities, immediately dropped into Secret
Squirrel mode, saying, <o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>“A
“principle element within warfare is the element of operational security. So,
our most exquisite capabilities, if I’m doing my job, you won’t [know] about
it.”[1]</blockquote></i>Exquisite capabilities???<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Someone’s been taking PowerPoint lessons for creative writers at their
local community college.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>Remember when the Navy trumpeted the increase in air wing
size which turned out to be one aircraft?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I’m betting these exquisite capabilities are on the same scale as that.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Paparo goes on to note that unmanned craft have participated
in Integrated Battle Problems (IBP).<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>…
IBPs have seen unmanned vessels log thousands of miles at sea over a period of
several months.”[1]</blockquote></i>That’s nice.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now,
have any of those miles accomplished any useful purpose or demonstrated any
actual useful combat capability?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Here’s more unmanned news:<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>Separately,
on Tuesday, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl told reporters his service
would soon test a new unmanned drone designed to stealthily carry two Naval
Strike Missiles to Marines ashore without attracting attention.[1]</blockquote></i>A drone that can transport two missiles?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That’ll bring the Chinese navy to its
knees!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The general neglected to describe
how this drone – or any drone – can get within sailing range of a Marine unit
deep inside enemy territory.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The host
ship will, apparently, be invisible and undetectable by Chinese sensors.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, that being the case, why do we
need drones?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The degree of fantasy being applied to unmanned operations
is staggering as is the corresponding absence of firepower.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>_________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Breaking Defense, “US Pacific Fleet to stand up second
unmanned surface vessel squadron this year”, Justin Katz, 14-Feb-2024,<br /><a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/us-pacific-fleet-to-stand-up-second-unmanned-surface-vessel-squadron-this-year/">https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/us-pacific-fleet-to-stand-up-second-unmanned-surface-vessel-squadron-this-year/</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com17tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-40024344649496960882024-02-19T17:25:00.000-08:002024-02-19T17:25:02.298-08:00Surface Drone Swarm<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Russia just lost another landing ship to a Ukrainian drone
swarm.[1]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The mind simply boggles at the
degree of ineptitude being exhibited by the Russians.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let’s use this incident to examine the use of
surface drone swarms.<br /><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /></span>Let’s start by looking at the drones Ukraine is using and
see how deadly they really are.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Magura V5<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>The commonly reported Ukrainian drone craft is the Magura
V5.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There have been different versions
produced so the specs vary, depending on the source and the referenced
variant.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The drone is a relatively small
craft (5.5 m long) with a low silhouette which would make them difficult to
spot visually, however, at speed they leave a very visible wake.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Their shape is not notably radar stealthy
although they are smooth and relatively free of protrusions so they may be
somewhat radar stealthy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Propulsion is
said to be an electric motor or hybrid (gas-electric?) of some sort.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Presumably, the craft are readily visible in
the infrared and should be easily detectable at the horizon, some 12 miles
distant or so, depending on the height of the EO/IR sensor.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Range is variously reported to be 250-500
miles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Control is via optical sensor and
satellite (Starlink?) communication.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Drone
weight is 1000 kg (2200 lb) with a payload variously reported as 300-400 lbs
explosive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Cruising speed is 20 mph with
a terminal burst speed about twice that.<br /><o:p> </o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtPr6TOkX601lqNgVx92b6qw9d4Rq30kaNaht4Eq6l470nk0_N408lKrVgWJNDOfOs9mFJZ6sQFwvwj61bP4wyRW0mvFiJjgepIbCM2EkNGpw9cxSgUoFYQksf_R1_W9HVDJgm_yrSciECrNIkN5LLq95E20EcPVq8yGvOirMXJfdEf5UfDP3c0Azr3i0/s840/Magura%20V5%20Drone.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="509" data-original-width="840" height="243" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtPr6TOkX601lqNgVx92b6qw9d4Rq30kaNaht4Eq6l470nk0_N408lKrVgWJNDOfOs9mFJZ6sQFwvwj61bP4wyRW0mvFiJjgepIbCM2EkNGpw9cxSgUoFYQksf_R1_W9HVDJgm_yrSciECrNIkN5LLq95E20EcPVq8yGvOirMXJfdEf5UfDP3c0Azr3i0/w400-h243/Magura%20V5%20Drone.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Magura V5 Drone</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTZsplXdSjhJ9kGidd1ci-sv65FUmkHo8OPMAG7z-V2eZEs_LbyB827jPS61h-16cAquUkSZoJpkHXyJ9_IDWeeeaBr8ACdo7q3hvoSzEEXuseb4Hoy8qU6ceqcPgsGYgPH322rVwgHzAYcmKTs6mHbkymKkhTluSJIHGT05-6va9DMpDgzd1geGUeVNU/s1280/Magura%20V5%20Drone%202.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="601" data-original-width="1280" height="188" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTZsplXdSjhJ9kGidd1ci-sv65FUmkHo8OPMAG7z-V2eZEs_LbyB827jPS61h-16cAquUkSZoJpkHXyJ9_IDWeeeaBr8ACdo7q3hvoSzEEXuseb4Hoy8qU6ceqcPgsGYgPH322rVwgHzAYcmKTs6mHbkymKkhTluSJIHGT05-6va9DMpDgzd1geGUeVNU/w400-h188/Magura%20V5%20Drone%202.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Magura V5 Drone</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Acoustically, an electric motor running at high speed and a
craft sailing at high speed should generate significant noise and be readily
detectable at 10-25 miles, using passive sonar.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I would imagine the sound would be similar to that of a torpedo at
speed.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>I would assume that, like all weapons with a range, the
reported range is much greater than the effective operational range.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, the operational range is likely 50-100
miles but that’s just informed speculation on my part.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It does, however, greatly impact the overall
effectiveness of the drone since it impacts the launch distance from the
target.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>This is a surface running torpedo, for all intents and
purposes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Like a torpedo, it can be
deadly if not treated appropriately.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Unlike a torpedo which can be decoyed but cannot be destroyed, these
drones are easily destroyed with appropriate weapons.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Now, let’s look at the Russian landing ship.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Ropuch Amphibious
Ship<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Ropucha class landing ship is a medium size (369 ft
long, 4080 tons displacement), lightly armed LST with either 2x 57mm dual guns
(Ropucha I) or 1x 76mm gun and 2x AK-630 30mm CIWS (Ropucha II).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Either way, that’s not a lot of armament!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The ship has multiple fire control, search, and navigation
radars.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I assume it has EO/IR sensors
but that’s speculation.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Crew size is around 90.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>Now, let’s consider some of the relevant operational
factors.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Operational
Factors<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Launch Site</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The drone can be launched from shore or from a host vessel.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Either way, the drones must be close enough
to the target to be within the range of the drone.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s not as if the drone can be safely
launched from a thousand miles away.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One
would think that a host vessel, meaning, potentially, any unidentified vessel
within 500 miles, would be easily spotted and sunk before it could launch the
drones.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Alternatively, if launched from shore, the launch operation
would require trucks and handling equipment given the overall drone weight of a
ton or more.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is not something that
one tucks into a backpack.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s a fairly
major operation to transport, handle, and launch the craft.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One would think that surveillance of the
likely launch areas and access roads would be effective in spotting and
preventing launches.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Detection</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As
noted, there are multiple modes of detection including visual, infrared,
acoustic, and radar.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A semi-alert
defender should have no trouble detecting the drones at a distance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The use of swarms of multiple drones further increases
the chance of detection.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Satellites</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Satellites (reportedly Starlink) are, apparently, being used to control
the drones.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I assume Russia is
attempting to disrupt the satellite communications although given the
demonstrated degree of incompetence, this may not be true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Satellite vulnerabilities include physical
destruction in space, local signal disruption, cyber attacks at various points
of the satellite system (ground control, master communications, local
receivers, etc.).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If Starlink
involvement is confirmed, Russia would be within their rights to conduct
physical sabotage of Starlink facilities even in the US.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>If Russia is attempting any of these actions, they appear to
be having little or no success.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Targeting</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Targeting
information is likely being gathered via satellites and UAVs, probably from
Ukrainian-allied countries like the US.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again,
if confirmed, Russia could conduct attacks on the targeting assets with minimal
risk of escalation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The last several
years have demonstrated that the US is highly unlikely to respond beyond
speeches and warnings that are never acted on.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Lethality</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
drones reportedly carry around three hundred pounds of explosive which is a
reasonably substantial amount of explosive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However, it should be noted that the explosive is a non-penetrating
effect as compared to a shell, bomb, or missile.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This lessons the extent of damage relative to
the nominal weight of explosive since a significant amount of the explosive
force is directed away from the ship.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A
similar phenomenon occurred in the attack on the USS Cole.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Proximity.</u><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
Ukrainian drones benefit greatly from the unique geography of this
situation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The operating area is a
fairly small, constrained area as opposed to the open ocean that the US Navy
would operate in during a war with China.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Of course, if the Navy opted to do something stupid, like operate near
land with inadequately armed and sensored ships, as the Russians are doing,
then the result could well be similar.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Damage Control</u>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The Russians appear to have had very little success in applying damage
control to ships that have been struck.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Obviously, hard data on this is difficult to come by.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Analysis<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>To sum up the preceding, the drones are potentially damaging
with a few hundred pounds of explosive but they are also small, highly
vulnerable to destruction, and easily detected.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>So, why are they having some success?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br />
</span><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Note:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We hear about the successes but we do not
hear about the failures, if any, and I assume there are many.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example, it could be that only one in a
hundred drones succeed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While that
wouldn’t change the overall end result, it would certainly change the
assessment of the efficiency of the drones.<br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p>There is simply no getting around the staggering degree of
Russian ineptitude.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They are sending
ill-equipped ships, unescorted, into known dangerous waters with, apparently,
no aviation surveillance support such as helos or UAVs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A handful of small, simple escorts with
suitable sensors and weapons would end the drone threat.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even submarines ought to be able to provide
detection of drones, interdiction of host ships, if any (most hints suggest
shore launches), and covert surveillance of possible shore launch sites..<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Russia supposedly has seven Kilo class subs
in the Black Sea and their sonars should be able to detect drones and provide
early warning.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The operational stupidity is compounded by the lack of long
range interdiction of the launch points and ships/trucks that are used to
transport and launch the drones.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Russia
should have air, land, and sea patrols dedicated to finding and destroying the
transport/launch vehicles or ships.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>If we consider the kill chain concept, there are several
links in the chain where the Russians could take effective action to disrupt
the chain (production facilities, storage facilities, transport, launch event,
local detection, and local destruction).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Bafflingly, the Russians seem to be unwilling or unable to break the
chain at any of those points.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>In the hints we get from videos, the Russians appear unable
to kill many (any?) drones with the weapons they do have.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This speaks volumes about the overhyped
claims of Russian weapon performance (as we’ve seen throughout history and
covering ALL Russian weapon systems) and/or the woeful state of Russian
training.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Compounding all this is the Russian’s unwillingness to seek
out and destroy targeting platforms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
Russians could, simply, declare suitably large exclusion zones and then destroy
any foreign (US) aircraft in the area.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Similar actions could be taken against satellite surveillance if,
indeed, that is a source of targeting information.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>As with all other aspects of this war, Russia is conducting
the drone defense operations in the most inept manner imaginable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Ukraine success is due almost exclusively to Russian
ineptitude rather than any inherent capabilities of the drones which, as we’ve
discussed, are not particularly formidable on paper.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Conclusion<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>So many naval observers want to jump on the drone bandwagon
because of Ukraine’s handful of successful attacks but is this enthusiasm
justified?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>An objective analysis suggests that drones are not a threat
to an alert, suitably equipped defender who counters the threat with
intelligent operations, doctrine and tactics.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The ineptitude of the Russians cannot be ignored and, therefore, trying
to derive universal lessons from this is an exercise in futility if not
downright misleading.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Like any threat, if one fails to treat the threat with the
respect it deserves, it can be lethal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The US needs to be aware of drone threats and train and equip to counter
them but they are not, inherently, a serious threat.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>_______________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Redstate website, “Russia Loses Large Landing Ship to
Ukrainian Drone Swarm”, streiff, 14-Feb-2024,<br /><a href="https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/02/14/russia-loses-large-landing-ship-to-ukrainian-drone-swarm-n2170101">https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/02/14/russia-loses-large-landing-ship-to-ukrainian-drone-swarm-n2170101</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com43tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-8514829933263195852024-02-15T08:24:00.000-08:002024-02-15T20:01:46.348-08:00Quantity Revisited<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">We all know the old saying,<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>“Quantity has a quality all its own.”<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Unfortunately, our military has forgotten (or chosen to
ignore) that pearl of wisdom.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’ve made
the conscious decision to opt for exquisite quality and have ceded quantity to
the enemy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Worse, as it’s turned out, the
enemy’s quality is, arguably, as good or better than ours so that they now possess
both quantity <u>and</u> quality advantages over us.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>It is past time to revisit quantity.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Consider just a few examples of recent quantity limitations
which, contrary to our hopes and beliefs, were not offset by quality:<br /><o:p> <br /><ul style="text-align: left;"><li>Ukraine weapons/munitions supply has been woefully
insufficient to meet military needs and the quality of the weapons we’ve
provided has not compensated for the limited quantities.</li><li>The 2011 Libyan intervention saw weapons/munitions depletion
occur in a matter of weeks with no compensating success due to quality.</li><li>Air wings have been steadily downsized with no compensating
improvement in quality.</li><li>The LCAC is being replaced in smaller numbers despite the
landing craft being virtually identical to the original.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Smaller quantity and identical quality.</li><li>We currently have more VLS cells than missiles in our
inventory and our strike and anti-ship missiles are fading rapidly in quality
due to obsolescence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Our quantities are
limited and our quality is stagnant.</li></ul></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>Quality also comes with a penalty in terms of cost.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Quality is expensive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s a simple fact.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As we speak, the Navy is using multi-million
dollar missiles to shoot down thousand dollar Houthi drones.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What shipboard missile in the Navy inventory
costs less than $1M?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>The SPY-6 radar on our latest Burkes cost $180M according to
the 2024 Navy budget documentation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
TRS-3D radar costs around $10M.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Quality
is expensive.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Additionally, quality equals complexity and complexity
equals unreliability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Our exquisite
aircraft struggle to attain 50% full mission readiness rates.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Aegis is permanently degraded, fleet
wide.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>And so on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Dumb artillery shells, on the other hand, have
100% readiness.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sure, there may be an
occasional dud but when you’re firing thousands of shells, who cares?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We have hundreds of Aegis technicians
laboring daily to keep it running.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How
many artillery shell maintenance techs are there?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That’s right … none.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Conclusion<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>We’ve consciously ceded quantity to the enemy and have
failed to achieve any overarching quality advantage.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That leaves us at an overall disadvantage
compared to China.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We need to rethink
the role that quantity plays on the battlefield.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>Quality has to be pretty substantial to compensate for
quantity and our quality is not substantially superior to our enemy’s.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>If we can’t achieve a quality overmatch, that brings us full
circle back to quantity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Quantity is
easily achievable, affordable, easily mass produced during war, reliable, and
brutally effective.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What’s not to like?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Germany and Japan entered WWII with quality advantages and
were beaten by overwhelming quantity, especially as their quality advantages
faded as the war progressed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There’s a
lesson there for us.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>We need reasonable quality in overwhelming quantities.<br /><br /></span></div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
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ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com52tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-11932529108900039902024-02-12T16:59:00.000-08:002024-02-12T16:59:26.524-08:00Squandered Opportunities<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">History is replete with squandered opportunities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Consider a few examples:<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Pearl Harbor</u> – We knew, almost to the day, that an
attack was coming and squandered the opportunity to prevent it or effectively
defend against it.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Twin Towers/11-Sep-2001 Terrorist Attack</u> – We had all
the information required to anticipate the attack but squandered the
opportunity to put the pieces together.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Hitler</u> – The Allies had endless opportunities to forcefully
confront and halt Hitler in the run up to WWII but squandered the opportunity to
prevent or limit the scope of the war.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Russia</u> – After the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War, we had a chance to bring Russia into the international
community as, if not a friend, at least not an enemy but squandered the
opportunity to integrate them into the rest of the world.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>Now, some argue that those opportunities were evident only
in hindsight but that’s simply not true.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>We had all the information we needed to recognize each instance but we
failed to take advantage of the opportunity.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>This raises the question … what opportunities are we
squandering, right now, that some misguided idiot in the future is going to
attempt to claim were not evident right now?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Sticking with military related topics, here’s a few that are
glaringly obvious and yet we’re in the process of squandering the opportunities.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Weapons Production</u> – The Ukraine situation is bashing
us across the head with a 2”x4” warning that our weapon production capacity is
woefully insufficient to wage a war with China.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>If we can’t supply Ukraine, we certainly can’t supply a war with
China.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now, during whatever years we
have left before the war with China, we should be desperately ramping up
weapons production and yet we’re squandering the opportunity.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Fleet Size</u> – It is painfully evident that war with
China is inevitable (or, to pacify you optimists, it’s at least a very real
possibility, if not a sure thing) and we should be desperately building up our
fleet size.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Instead, we’re squandering
the opportunity and actually doing the exact opposite by retiring more ships
than we’re building with many of them being early retired.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’re also squandering the opportunity to
build a reserve fleet.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Raw Materials</u> – It is a fact that many of our
critical raw materials are outside our control.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For example, our supply of rare earths, critical for the manufacture of so
many weapons and sensors, comes from China!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>We should be desperately building mining, refining, and manufacturing
facilities to become self-sufficient in every strategically critical raw
material but we’re squandering the opportunity.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Nuclear Iran</u> – Iran is not even pretending to hide its
nuclear weapons production efforts.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Now
is the time to strike and strike hard to prevent this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Instead, unbelievably, we’re not only squandering
the opportunity to stop Iran, we’re actually shipping them money to finance
their nuclear ambitions!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Africa</u> – China and terrorists (is there a
difference?) are taking over Africa.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Now, before either are irrevocably established, is the time to prevent
this.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Instead, we’re but we’re
squandering the opportunity.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Containing China</u> – It’s obvious that China is on a collision
course with the US/West.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’ve had
endless opportunities to contain China but continue to squander the
opportunities.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Internal Terrorism</u> – With the unregulated southern
border admitting all manner of terrorists and unfriendly state actors, it’s
only a matter of when, not if, we’ll suffer an attack similar to the Hamas
attack on Israel.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’re blatantly squandering
the opportunity to seal the border and prevent a future attack.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>And the list goes on. History will not be kind to us, nor
should it, when the squandered opportunities are recognized and documented on
some tragic day in the future.<br /></span><br /></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com61tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-46770105695258946172024-02-08T15:00:00.000-08:002024-02-08T15:00:29.758-08:00Burke, Zumwalt, and Deck Space<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Let me ask you a question<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>…<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Where do you put weapons on a
ship?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s not a trick question.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The answer is simple and obvious:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>you put them on some open area of the
deck.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Guns, VLS, RAM/SeaRAM, triple
torpedo tube launchers, Mk141 (Harpoon) rack launchers, Naval Strike Missile
rack launchers<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>…<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>whatever.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>They’re all mounted on decks.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The concept also applies to most sensors, decoy launchers,
electronic warfare emitters, communications antennae, etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In some cases the deck space takes the form
of a sponson or platform jutting off the side of the superstructure but we
realize that the sponson/platform is simply a small section of horizontal deck
welded to the side of the superstructure.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Here’s another blindingly obvious question (though a seeming
mystery to the Navy!):<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>we want WARships
to have as many weapons (and sensors and …) as possible, right?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore, since weapons require deck space
to mount and we want as many weapons as possible, it logically follows that we
want as much open, available deck space as possible, right?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>A good WARship design should maximize deck space in order to
maximize its installed firepower and to allow for future weapon additions such
as inevitably happens during war when weapons that should have been installed
from the start are frantically retrofitted.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Those magnificent Burkes with their single CIWS are going to quickly
become loaded with additional CIWS/SeaRAM when war comes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>After all, you don’t want to protect a $2B
ship with a single CIWS with a limited field of fire that only covers half the
ship, right?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Where are those extra
CIWS/SeaRAM going to be mounted?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Any
open deck space, of course!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Further, the best deck space is the lower, main deck because
it minimizes top-heaviness and stability issues.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>So, a good WARship design should maximize deck space and, in
particular, lower/main deck space.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>We’ve covered this in a previous post where we noted that
ship superstructures have grown enormously since WWII and the ‘cost’ has been
usable deck space for weapon mounts (see, <a href="https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2017/07/ship-superstructures.html"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">“ShipSuperstructures”</span></a>).<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>So, having established that a good WARship design emphasizes
and maximizes open deck space, let’s take a look at two specific examples:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the Burke and the Zumwalt classes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>How much deck space do they have?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Burke<br /></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>Displacement = 9,700 tons<br />Nominal dimensions = 509 ft x 66 ft<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>For calculation purposes, let’s call the dimensions 509 ft x
60 ft to allow for narrowing at the bow and stern.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, Burke = <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">30,540</b> sq.ft. of deck space<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The flight deck which is around 92 ft x 60 ft = 5,520
sq.ft.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Subtracting this from the nominal
total deck space leaves <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">25,020</b> sq.ft
nominally available for weapons.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Zumwalt<br /></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>Displacement = 15,907 tons<br />Nominal dimensions = 610 ft x 80 ft<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The main deck section extends 325 ft from the stern to the forward
edge of superstructure where the deck begins to sharply angle in towards the
bow.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Allowing for the tumblehome of the
hull which narrows the available deck space, we have around 70 ft of width on
the deck.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus the main deck section is
approximately 325 ft x 70 ft = 22,750 sq.ft.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The forward, angled section is a triangular shape about 255
ft to the bow and 70 ft wide at the base of the triangular shape.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Using the formula for the area of a triangle
(1/2 x base x length) = 8,025 sq.ft.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Note that the extreme narrowing of the Zumwalt’s bow makes a
significant portion of that area useless for weapon installations.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I would estimate that 10% is too narrow to be
useful, making the effective forward deck area closer to 7,945 sq.ft.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Thus the nominal, usable total deck area = 22,750 sq.ft. + 7,945
sq.ft. = <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">30,695</b> sq.ft.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The flight deck which is around 141 ft x 70 ft = 9,870
sq.ft.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Subtracting this from the nominal
total deck space leaves <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">20,825</b> sq.ft
nominally available for weapons.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>Note that these calculations are for the apparent footprint
of the deck area.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In reality, some
portion of the apparent deck footprint consists of the slanted sides of the
superstructures so all the deck area calculations are overstated by, perhaps,
5%-10%.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, not wanting to be
bothered with that exact of a determination, we’ll ignore the slanted sides
reduction on the deck area and assume that it’s a wash across both ships.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>We see, then, that
the Zumwalt’s displacement is 64% (1.6 times larger) greater than the Burke
while the deck space is 17% less.<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>We built a cruiser size Zumwalt 64% larger than a Burke
with 17% less space for mounting weapons.<br /></u><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>When war comes and we start looking to install additional
weapons, we’re going to find that the Zumwalt was a poor design that could not
readily accept additional weapons … such as close in weapons of which the ship
currently has none.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>Just for fun, let’s take a look at a WWII ship with a
displacement similar to the Burke:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the
Northampton class cruiser at 9,200 tons versus the Burke at 9,700 tons.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Northampton is actually 500 tons lighter
but that’s close enough.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Northampton<br /></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>Displacement = 9,200 tons<br />Nominal dimensions = 600 ft x 66 ft<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>For calculation purposes, let’s call the dimensions 600 ft x
60 ft to allow for narrowing at the bow and stern.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, Northampton = <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">36,000</b> sq.ft. of deck space<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>We see, then, that the Northampton, while slightly lighter,
has 10,980 sq.ft. more deck space for weapons!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br />
</span><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>We’ve lost our way in WARship design.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Caveat:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>All of this ignores weight margins and
stability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Available deck space is
useless if the ship can’t support the added weight and remain stable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, when war comes, we’ll strip out
tons of crew comforts thus freeing up weight and stability for weapons.</i></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com70tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78361434035898435562024-02-05T01:00:00.000-08:002024-02-05T01:00:00.147-08:00A Second Life for Retiring Burkes?<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The Burke class will begin retiring soon.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The early Burkes were commissioned beginning
in 1991 and are now approaching 30+ years of service with a scheduled 35 year
service life.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Navy does not maintain
a reserve fleet so retiring Burkes will likely be scrapped or sold to foreign
countries.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>With the ever-shrinking size
of the fleet, one can’t help but wonder whether we could bestow a second life
on the Burkes when they reach the end of their front line service.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Let’s consider alternative, second life uses for the early
Flt I and II Burkes (lacking hangars) which will be the first to be retired.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>As a point of interest, we did a similar post for the LCS in
which we considered alternate uses for the vessel (see, <a href="https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2017/01/lcs-alternative-uses.html"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">“LCS Alternative Uses”</span></a>).<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Before we go any further, we need to address, and dispense
with, the belief that the ships will have reached the end of their life and
that no further service is even possible due to physical constraints.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Despite the Navy’s dismissive and foolish attitude towards
older ships, any ship, even one as poorly maintained as a Navy ship, can have
its service life substantially (indefinitely) extended.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Consider a few examples of extended ship service
lives that we’ve seen.<br /><o:p> <br /><ul style="text-align: left;"><li><span style="font-family: arial;">WWII LSTs are still in service around the world.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span></span></li><li><span style="font-family: arial;">The Perry class frigates, which the Navy claimed could not
be upgraded, have been upgraded and still serve in various foreign navies.</span></li><li><span style="font-family: arial;">The WWII cruiser USS Phoenix, launched in 1938, served as
the Argentine Belgrano until sunk in 1982.</span></li></ul></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p>We can renovate anything, if we wish.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Consider the example of the B-52 bomber which has been in
active service since the 1950’s, some 70 years or so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We can re-wing, re-instrument, re-fuselage,
re-anything.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Similarly, we can replace a
ship’s storage tanks, replace internal wiring and piping, replace corroded
sections of hull plating, replace engines, upgrade computers, install new
weapons and sensors, and so on and it’s still cheaper than building a brand new
ship.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>One valid concern regarding new construction is that we are
currently limited not only by new construction budget but also by new
construction shipyard capacity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Congress,
the Navy, and the submarine industry, for example, all want to increase
submarine production by one additional submarine per year but the shipyard
capacity simply doesn’t exist.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Upgrades
and renovations suffer from this same constraint but to a lesser extent in that
renovation/conversion work can be performed by more facilities than are
available for new construction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, through
renovation we can gain ‘new’ ships without having to tie up new construction
facilities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>The steady, reliable, additional work demand of constant
Burke conversions would also encourage industry to expand their facilities to
support substantial additional work.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Thus, we not only gain useful ships for a bargain price, we grow our
shipbuilding industry.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Win, win!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Of course, there’s always the challenge of developing a
sufficient skilled labor pool but we’ve already addressed how to accomplish
that.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>So, now that we understand and recognize that conversions
are possible and that there is no actual physical service life limit, what
specific alternate Burke uses could we imagine?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Here are a few possibilities:<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">ASW Helicopter Destroyer</b>
– The aft VLS could be eliminated and converted to a second flight deck with
dual hangars each side of the stack housing.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>With the existing, main level flight deck this would provide two flight
decks and two hangars giving the ship the ability to operate 4-6 SH-60 type
helos.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The forward 32-cell VLS could be
used for a combination of AAW defense and anti-submarine VL-ASROC (we ought to
develop a substantially longer range VL-ASROC!).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Adding Russian-style RBU or Hedgehog type
close-in anti-submarine weapons would further enhance the ASW capability.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEij9AY-pGcUL9Vmnwf7g-T5zL41KG1Lms-in6NWiLxrW47gGQl2TjGhH_WDwCE-e0YGW4LzFQA2WCCKkfVWyNwkHyNqTU-dgZll1hTTq3xcgb9LXrj6wstQD8FoFYq0dxGnnzb3mhrzXoHtZKc5OrsSBzMO8M4WKYEN_0mQlFwNqK5tnwciTfcSabFuBVg/s960/Burke%20Alternate%20-%20ASW%20Helo%20Destroyer.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="768" data-original-width="960" height="359" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEij9AY-pGcUL9Vmnwf7g-T5zL41KG1Lms-in6NWiLxrW47gGQl2TjGhH_WDwCE-e0YGW4LzFQA2WCCKkfVWyNwkHyNqTU-dgZll1hTTq3xcgb9LXrj6wstQD8FoFYq0dxGnnzb3mhrzXoHtZKc5OrsSBzMO8M4WKYEN_0mQlFwNqK5tnwciTfcSabFuBVg/w449-h359/Burke%20Alternate%20-%20ASW%20Helo%20Destroyer.jpg" width="449" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Concept Drawing of a Burke ASW Helo Destroyer - <br />Note the second, raised flight deck in place of the VLS<br /> and room for two hangars either side of the stack</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p><br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">UAV Carrier</b> – The
ship already has a flight deck.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Addition
of a half dozen or so small catapults and converting the VLS internal volume to
UAV storage/hangar space would allow the operation of substantial numbers of
small (Scan Eagle size) UAVs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Retaining
the forward VLS would allow the ship to contribute to AAW efforts and grant the
ship a very credible self-defense capability.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Fire Support</b> – The
aft 40% or so of the Burke’s length is purely dedicated to the flight deck and
one VLS cluster.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Eliminating the flight
deck and VLS would allow up to 3-4 additional 5” guns to be installed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Before anyone protests, recall that we
mounted five 5” guns on a 376 ft Fletcher destroyer and three aft guns were
sited within an 85 ft span!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Burke is
505 ft long and the aft 40% represents 202 ft. of usable space.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Electronic Warfare</b>
– Remove the aviation components and, possibly, the aft VLS cluster, and
install multiple, massive, high power EW emitters, signal collection sensors,
and task force EW command and control facilities and produce an EW equivalent
to the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) which coordinates task force
fire control.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Burke could be the
task force EW control vessel and main EW source with emitters sized to provide
truly powerful active electronic defense.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>One would hope this would also make for a very effective anti-drone
capability.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Fast Minelayer</b> –
A Burke could be converted to use the entire aft half of the ship to store and
lay mines.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>With its forward gun and VLS
intact, it would be well equipped to defend itself while minelaying.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Scout</b> – Strip a
Burke of every protruding piece of equipment to maximize stealth and then add
every piece of passive signal intelligence collecting equipment we have to make
a hard to detect, highly effective, independent, scout ship.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Once again, retaining the forward VLS would
allow for effective self-defense.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Summary<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>Debating every proposed alternative is not the point of this
post.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Some might not be effective but
I’ve got to believe that most or all could be.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The larger point is that the Navy will not lay these ships up in
reserve.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Instead, they’ll SINKEX or sell
them and get no further use out of them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In this time of declining fleet numbers and a looming war with China, it
would be foolish and irresponsible not to get more life out of every ship.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>My favorites are the ASW Helo Destroyer and the EW
version.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is noteworthy that most of
the options could easily retain their forward gun and VLS cluster which makes
the ships quite capable of self-defense and able to contribute to fleet area
defense, as well.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>For those who are going to attempt to argue that the
conversion costs would be too high, ask yourself what the cost of a brand new
class of ship for each of the alternatives would be?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’re talking billions of dollars!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even the hideously expensive Australian Perry
upgrade was still cheap compared to new construction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Conversions are a bargain!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>Let’s not throw usable Burkes away.<br /></span><br /></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com60tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-72566830782354279522024-02-02T16:43:00.000-08:002024-02-02T16:43:01.925-08:00US Strikes Iranian Proxies<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Here’s a semi-open post for comments related to the US
strikes on Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Note:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>US Central
Command reports that it struck 85 targets with 125+ precision munitions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, note the following from a Redstate
website report:<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>The
number of targets appears to be "aimpoints" rather than bases. Sky
News Arabia reports only three military bases were hit.[1]</blockquote></i>Thus, if true, the strikes were nowhere near as massive as
Central Command reporting would suggest.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>I’ll update if/when I can provide any worthwhile analysis.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>______________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Redstate website, “First Video From US Airstrikes in Iraq
and Syria Released As CENTCOM Confirms Attacks”, streiff, 2-Feb-2024,<br /><a href="https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/02/02/watch-first-video-from-us-airstrikes-in-iraq-and-syria-released-n2169572">https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/02/02/watch-first-video-from-us-airstrikes-in-iraq-and-syria-released-n2169572</a></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com24tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-77609911574360802024-02-01T01:00:00.000-08:002024-02-01T01:00:00.140-08:00Luck is Not a Strategy<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">It is being reported that a US Navy ship, the USS Gravely, a
Burke class destroyer, was forced to use its CIWS to down a sea-skimming
anti-ship missile.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If this continues,
there is only one possible outcome.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No
defense is perfect and the Houthis only need to win once whereas the Navy has
to be 100% perfect.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>This is an unsustainable, unwinnable situation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’ve got to either leave the area before we
lost a ship or we have to engage with total force.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is no middle ground.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The administration is hanging the Navy out to
dry.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">It is also disturbing that a (apparently single) missile could get that close. Something failed.</span></div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com50tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-37080850978329984562024-01-29T01:00:00.000-08:002024-01-29T01:00:00.134-08:00Stupidity Abounds!<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The Boeing KC-46 tanker woes and resultant financial
devastation should have been a cautionary tale for defense industries.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The lessons are myriad and obvious.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Now, we learn that Northrop Grumman (NG) has crafted its own
aircraft production debacle with the B-21 bomber.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Grumman has officially taken a $1.6B loss and
the production is just barely beginning!<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>For
several quarters, the defense contractor has disclosed in earnings reports that
due to a fixed-price contract for the B-21 Raider’s low-rate initial production
(LRIP) phase that was signed in 2015, a loss of up to $1.2 billion could be
possible amid high inflation and workforce disruptions. That loss is now
realized in a pre-tax charge of $1.56 billion, or $1.17 billion post taxes,
according to the company’s 2023 year-end earnings report.[1]</blockquote></i>Before you weep for Grumman and begin sending them
donations, note that the fixed price contract isn’t actually fixed.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>The
Pentagon so far has provided $60 million to offset some inflationary impacts
for the B-21 program … discussions are ongoing for more …[1]</blockquote></i>Sure, $60M is a drop compared to a $1.6B loss but I’m sure
this is only the beginning of the financial assistance from the government.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Can Northrop Grumman learn any lessons from this stupidity-birthed
disaster?<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"></i><blockquote><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">As
Northrop Grumman absorbs the losses associated with B-21, the aerospace giant
is heeding lessons learned by other contractors about the pitfalls of
fixed-price contracts. Since bidding on B-21 in 2015, “we certainly have
changed our view on <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>bidding of
contracts where we did not have a mature design at the point of bid and yet we
committed to fixed-price options into the future</u></b>,” Warden said. “And we
have, to my knowledge, not done that again.”<br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Northrop
Grumman has “passed on high-profile programs” due to its apprehension around
fixed-price contracts, according to Warden, and been more cautious in its bids.[1]
[emphasis added]</i></blockquote>So, by their own admission, NG knew what they were doing was
stupid and yet they did it anyway.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In
essence, they offered a fixed price bid on a fantasy wish list of a
product.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A junior high school student
would know not to offer a fixed price on an undefined product.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>At least they now seem to realize that fixed price bids on
immature product designs are stupid.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of
course, that’s closing the barn door after the $1.6B horse is out.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The military, of course, loves the idea of fixed price
contracts on ill-defined products!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What
they fail to realize is that, ultimately, they’re hurting themselves because it
causes companies to refrain from bidding or to bid exceedingly high to cover
anticipated cost overruns.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What the
military should be doing is finalizing product designs before requesting bids.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That way, the companies know exactly what
they’re bidding on and can make realistic cost estimates and bids.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the end, both the manufacturers and the
military win from that approach.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Unfortunately, that would require intelligence from the military and,
like so many shortages today, there seems to be a severe shortage of intelligence
in the military.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>__________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Breaking Defense, “Northrop Grumman logs billion-dollar
charge on B-21 stealth bomber”, Michael Marrow, 25-Jan-2023,<br /><a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/01/northrop-grumman-logs-billion-dollar-charge-on-b-21-stealth-bomber/">https://breakingdefense.com/2024/01/northrop-grumman-logs-billion-dollar-charge-on-b-21-stealth-bomber/</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com25tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-54111581519081519712024-01-25T08:00:00.000-08:002024-01-25T08:00:12.814-08:00True Multi-Domain War<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">‘Multi-domain’ is the current buzzword and fad of the month
in the US military although, in practice, it seems to just be gibberish-speak
for more computers and more unmanned assets.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That aside, the basic concept is that you wage war not just on the kinetic
level but on additional levels such as the electromagnetic, public relations,
Internet, space, and so on.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Unfortunately, one of the major domains that has the most potential
impact is also the most overlooked and ignored and that is the financial domain.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Consider the current Houthi conflict.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>We’re trading shots back and forth with the Houthis and,
clearly, not deterring them in the least.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>This is yet another in an endless list of demonstrable failures of
deterrence for those of you who believe deterrence is effective but, I digress …<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The point is that our minimal attacks are having little or
no effect.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is quite similar to the
ISIS truck-plinking that we engaged in some years ago and which had zero
impact.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>If we were serious about ending the Houthi actions, we’d
focus as much on the financial domain as the kinetic and it would likely
produce far better results.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Houthis
must finance their operations, weapon acquisitions, weapon component
acquisitions, shipping and transport costs, ‘soldier pay’, etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That financial mechanism is not just a local,
village level network.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They’re engaged
in global financial dealings with suppliers, Iran, and others.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That financial network represents a major center
of gravity and extreme vulnerability for the Houthis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We have the means to completely shut down
their financial network, halt bank transfers, seize assets, freeze and seize
bank accounts, etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’m not a financial
expert so these are just the conceptual, top level ideas that I’m aware
of.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’m sure our government accountants
and financial experts could devise much more extensive and effective
methods.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We should also be tracking and
covertly eliminating links in the Houthi financial chains … you know, CIA type
work.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Waging war is not cheap and the Houthis are not above the
financial requirements.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In fact, being a
smaller operation, relative to the US, they are more vulnerable to financial
disruptions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, it would help if
we would stop giving billions of dollars to Iran![1]<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>I know that the administration will claim to be applying
some sanctions against the Houthis but we are a universe away from bringing the
full weight of our financial combat capability to bear.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Just as our occasional strikes accomplish
nothing, a few minor sanctions also accomplish nothing.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>We need to either bring our full military and financial
might to bear on the Houthis in a true multi-domain fight or we need to leave
the area.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What we’re doing is
accomplishing nothing and risking everything.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>One lucky hit on a warship and the Houthis win on the global stage.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>As with so many things, our military and government (largely
one and the same!) pay lip service to concepts but refuse to actually carry
them out to the maximum extent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We talk
about multi-domain combat but largely refuse to engage in financial combat
which has, arguably, the most potential to produce the desired results.<br /><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p>____________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p><i>Note: The same considerations apply to our dealings with
China.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We are at war with China, right
now, even if the current administration refuses to acknowledge it, and we’re
making almost no effort to win or even engage.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>If we were to fully engage in financial combat with China we’d win
overwhelmingly.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Yes, there would be some
short term pain for us but also some incredible long term gains.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, that’s a topic for another post.</i><br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>____________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Guardian website, “US agrees to release $6bn in Iran
funds as part of deal to free detained Americans”, Julian Borger, 11-Sep-2023,<br /><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/11/us-iran-sanctions-waiver-americans-detained-iran">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/11/us-iran-sanctions-waiver-americans-detained-iran</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com17tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-2773064155819258682024-01-22T01:00:00.000-08:002024-01-22T01:00:00.137-08:00LUSV Arsenal Ship<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The Navy appears to be designing the Large Unmanned Surface
Vessel (LUSV) to be a poor man’s arsenal ship.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Is this concept valid?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let’s
examine the idea.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Recall that the Navy envisions the following roles for the
large (LUSV) and medium (MUSV) unmanned vessels as:<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p></span></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><u>LUSV</u> – missile shooter;<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>16-32 VLS</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><u>MUSV</u> – sensing (ISR)</span></div></blockquote><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> </o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgN8J65WlsUpDGVgPsvBLZ60-JbaZ6q8h8ov38y4ZotxzKE8LB8tJPOhsghFv5W7dP6zSDsD2wohDtMeobbME1BKYTFbT79n_k-E1BXm9Zi0mk3LCVPfD2nvyT3yrv6QDTvMNLNkD2xrwnHaAH8WbOMmgZyngiDDtNtOkerX-JnyNu9oxJg8S6-wYgu_cw/s811/LUSV%20Concept.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="431" data-original-width="811" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgN8J65WlsUpDGVgPsvBLZ60-JbaZ6q8h8ov38y4ZotxzKE8LB8tJPOhsghFv5W7dP6zSDsD2wohDtMeobbME1BKYTFbT79n_k-E1BXm9Zi0mk3LCVPfD2nvyT3yrv6QDTvMNLNkD2xrwnHaAH8WbOMmgZyngiDDtNtOkerX-JnyNu9oxJg8S6-wYgu_cw/w400-h213/LUSV%20Concept.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">LUSV Concept Image</td></tr></tbody></table><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">As a reminder, while the word ‘large’ appears in the label,
the LUSV is actually a very small vessel with a very limited vertical launch
capacity.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>The
Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full
load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000 tons, which would make them the size
of a corvette (i.e., a ship larger than a patrol craft and smaller than a
frigate). The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable
ships with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—particularly
anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principally anti-ship
and land-attack missiles. Each LUSV could be equipped with a vertical launch
system (VLS) with 16 to 32 missile-launching tubes.[1]</blockquote></i>The ships will have little or nothing in the way of sensors
or defensive weapons other than what might be loaded in a VLS cell, such as the
ESSM missile.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Similarly, the original arsenal ship concept envisioned a
barge-like vessel with no function other than carrying and launching missiles –
a missile barge, in essence.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The missile
capacity has been suggested as being anywhere from a hundred to a few thousand
VLS cells, depending on whose specific design one looks at.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>At first glance, there would seem to be nothing wrong with
the LUSV concept and much to like.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A
small vessel – low cost, one presumes, thanks to its small size – with a significant supply of extra
missiles allowing other ships, such as the Burke, to stay in a fight longer
(assuming the LUSV cells contain anti-air missiles) or allowing for massive
land attack strikes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Further, with no
crew, the operating costs should be very low and the vessels can be used in
high risk situations and missions since they’re unmanned.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>What’s not to like?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Well, before we celebrate the Navy’s brilliant vision, let’s
just take a few moments to move beyond the sales brochure claims and examine
the concept in slightly more detail.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Missile Capacity</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A Burke has 96 VLS cells so the additional
16-32 cells represent a 17%-33% additional capacity compared to the Burke.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That’s nice but is it tactically significant?<br />
<o:p> <br /></o:p>In the anti-air (AAW) role, we’ve already noted that a task
force with, say, one to three dozen escorts (in war, no task force will put to
sea with anything less!) already has 1,152-3,456 VLS cells with, realistically,
2,300-6,700 anti-air missiles, depending on the mix of Standards and
quad-packed ESSM.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Will an additional
16-32 cells offer any significant contribution to that firepower?<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>If a task force has already expended three to several
thousand AAW missiles, it’s mission has long since been over and the ships are likely
at the bottom of the sea.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, no
enemy could possibly muster three to several thousand attacking missiles that
would require that staggering expenditure of defensive missiles.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>So, it would seem that an LUSV has nothing significant to
offer to the AAW function.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>What about land attack?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>We’ve seen that the US used some 60+ missiles to conduct a <u>very
limited</u> strike on an <u>undefended</u> Syrian air base (see, <span style="color: #2b00fe;"><a href="https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2017/04/syrian-tomahawk-strike.html ">“Syrian Tomahawk Strike”</a></span>).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Logic suggests that a full strike on a
defended base would require something on the order of a few hundred or more
missiles to ensure success.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For sake of
discussion, let’s assume a strike of 300 cruise missiles is required.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A single LUSV could contribute 5%-11% of the
required missiles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In other words, it
would take 10-19 LUSVs to conduct such an attack.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Missile Inventory</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Closely related to missile capacity is the
issue of the Navy’s missile inventory.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Best estimates are that we already have several times more VLS cells in
the fleet than we have missiles to fill them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That being the case, why would we want to build more cells?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>What will we fill them with?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If every cell in the fleet was filled and we
have several thousand missiles left over then, maybe, you’ve got the slimmest
of justification for building a small, unmanned missile barge but we are a
universe away from that situation.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Cost</b>. One of the LUSV claims is that it is a low cost way to bring
additional firepower.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, according
to Navy budget documents, the LUSV will cost around $250M-$300M and that’s the
Navy’s estimate.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Every Navy cost
estimate is significantly understated.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The true cost will likely be closer to $500M.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>The
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission programs the procurement of production LUSVs
through the Navy’s shipbuilding account, with the first LUSV to be procured in FY2025
at a cost of $315.0 million, the next two in FY2026 at a combined cost of
$522.5 million (i.e., an average of about $261.3 million each), the next three
in FY2027 at a combined cost of $722.7 million (i.e., an average of $240.9
million each), and another three in FY2028 at a combined cost of $737.2 million
(i.e., an average of about $245.7 million each).[1]</blockquote></i><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">On Station</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is not a technical consideration but it
warrants a discussion because I hear it so frequently.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There’s a school of thought that likes the
idea of an arsenal ship (or LUSV) because its missiles will allow other ships
to ‘stay on station’ longer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course,
this is idiotic and reveals an utter lack of understanding about how navies
fight.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ships in combat don’t ‘stay on
station’.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They don’t sit in one piece
and slug it out, day after day, with the enemy, fighting to ‘stay on
station’.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Staying in one place is how
you get found, attacked, and die.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Ships
sortie, execute a specific and relatively brief mission, and then return to base.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is no station to stay on!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Security</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Despite being an unmanned vessel, the LUSV,
when armed with multi-million dollar missiles, would have to be guarded 24/7 by
other military forces.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’ve already
seen multiple examples of other countries seizing (or attempting to seize) our
unmanned assets with no repercussions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Now, we may be willing to lose a UAV or small underwater glider but I
would hope we draw the line at conceding the seizure of a missile armed
asset.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore, the LUSV will require
constant guarding by manned units.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That
being the case, is the unit really unmanned if it requires a constant manned
presence hovering over it?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b>Operation</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The LUSV
will require near constant communications and telemetry.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In war, constant communications offers the
enemy a simple location fix.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Even
supposedly secure line of sight comms are nowhere near as secure as is commonly
assumed, according to military communications personnel I’ve talked to.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>There’s also the issue of maintenance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No machinery – and any ship is<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>just a collection of machinery – is
maintenance free.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Normally, the routine
maintenance would be conducted by the crew and emergent repairs would be
handled by the crew.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Who conducts the
maintenance and repair of the LUSV?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If
we don’t provide regular, routine maintenance then logic would suggest that the
vessels will have to be frequently returned to a base or tender for repairs
that the non-existent crew did not perform.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>That makes the LUSV availability poor.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In peacetime, that’s an annoyance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>In war, that’s leaving a task force partially crippled especially if the
Navy comes to depend on them … which they will.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>You know the Navy won’t simply – and correctly – use the LUSV as an <u>augment</u>
to regular ships but will, instead, begin to use them as <u>replacements</u>
for regular ships out of pure institutional stupidity and mental laziness.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is analogous to GPS which was not used
to augment manual navigation but, instead, replaced manual navigation skills
which led to our current vulnerability and loss of skills.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Conclusion<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>What we’ve just discussed is, essentially, the
considerations that would go into a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) if the Navy
were to ever do one … which they have not and will not.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You know … just build it and get it in the
hands of the sailors and they’ll figure out what to do with it.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That’s what passes for a CONOPS in the Navy,
today.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>What these considerations suggest regarding a CONOPS is that
there is no viable, combat-useful role for the LUSV.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The weapons load of 16-32 VLS cells is
tactically insignificant, the Navy lacks the missile inventory to fill the
cells, the communications requirement is a detection vulnerability, the
maintenance and logistical support requirements are problematic, and the cost
is excessive for the marginal combat value of the vessel.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is simply no combat value to be had
from the LUSV.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Interestingly, although we did not discuss it, there might
be some combat value to the MUSV although the communications requirements
remain problematic in the extreme for a sensor platform.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Navy is fixated on unmanned vessels for reasons
unfathomable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If I had to guess, I
suspect the Navy’s fixation stems purely from the desire to eliminate crew
costs which is a peacetime accounting consideration and is the last and worst
justification for a combat platform.<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>The Navy would be much better served by focusing on single
function, manned ships (AAW or strike, for example) that can act independently
under EMCON conditions which is how a war will be fought.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>_____________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Large Unmanned
Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald
O’Rourke, R45757, 20-Dec-2023<br /><br /></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com36tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-59438950240277608942024-01-17T12:54:00.000-08:002024-01-17T12:54:28.037-08:00Do You Believe? – Follow Up<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">You may recall that we recently noted and expressed
disbelief about a Navy announcement related to the Large Unmanned Surface
Vessel (LUSV).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Supposedly, the
manufacturer/Navy completed a 30 day, uninterrupted run of the diesel engines
as a demonstration of reliability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>ComNavOps
expressed doubt.[1]<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Well, here’s a bit of related news from Captain Scot
Searles, the program manager of the Unmanned Maritime Systems Program Office,
which starts the process of backtracking and qualifying the previous
announcement:<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>“It
[the test engine] doesn’t have to be on for 30 days. It can start and stop, but
nobody can touch it”[2]</blockquote></i>My interpretation of that statement is that the vendor
failed the test and the Navy opted for verbal gymnastics to turn it into a
success.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>As it turns out, potential engine vendors don’t actually
have to be tested by the Navy.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>…
vendors don’t necessarily have to stick to equipment tested by the government.
They can also do their own 30-day testing on various pieces of equipment.
However they must inform the program office ahead of testing and coordinate the
testing with them.[2]</blockquote></i>So, a manufacturer can test their own equipment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I can’t see anything suspicious about
that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In fact, I’m going to make a
daring and bold prediction (don’t try this at home;<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I’m a trained analyst and predictor).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Every piece of manufacturer tested equipment
will …<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>…<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>…<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>wait for it … … PASS!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>So, to sum up, the engines don’t actually have to run
non-stop for 30 days and manufacturers can test their own equipment.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Hmm …</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /><o:p> </o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEge-wN7Z5PjYSlc39HB3wamwFOG0uelsDFpoqIUxHINYP7H2rn3PM-9E4_920qiI8hOJXnf6GOMSyggaQDjq-aoCJADHHRaeD3TaY4enRD2fviOwfz72xAB-YtxXyt6BzJ8k5TIDzm0B3TXfClmioZtTpUyi2hqxrIfCXvo6FTouE0DR8V9trVj4NoxJXY/s811/LUSV%20Concept.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="431" data-original-width="811" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEge-wN7Z5PjYSlc39HB3wamwFOG0uelsDFpoqIUxHINYP7H2rn3PM-9E4_920qiI8hOJXnf6GOMSyggaQDjq-aoCJADHHRaeD3TaY4enRD2fviOwfz72xAB-YtxXyt6BzJ8k5TIDzm0B3TXfClmioZtTpUyi2hqxrIfCXvo6FTouE0DR8V9trVj4NoxJXY/w400-h213/LUSV%20Concept.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">LUSV Concept Image</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">It is telling that the Navy’s history of being
veracity-challenged is so severe that my default position is disbelief about
anything they say.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Sad, but that’s the
position the Navy has earned for itself.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>___________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]<a href="https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2023/12/do-you-believe-navy.html">https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2023/12/do-you-believe-navy.html<br /></a><o:p> <br /></o:p>[2]Naval News website, “Second Vendor Clears U.S. Navy LUSV
Milestone”, Zach Abdi, 16-Jan-2024,<br /><a href="https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sna-2024/2024/01/second-vendor-clears-u-s-navy-lusv-milestone/">https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sna-2024/2024/01/second-vendor-clears-u-s-navy-lusv-milestone/</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com35tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-25724555980080383822024-01-15T08:48:00.000-08:002024-01-15T08:48:27.696-08:00Constellation Fraud<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The Navy assured us that the Constellation class frigate would
be a zero risk, on-time, on-cost, romp through the park to build since it was,
essentially, a copy of an existing Fincantieri FREMM design.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There would be only minor, inconsequential
changes – the color of the paint, perhaps, or an extra bulkhead or two for
greater compartmentalization – that would have no impact on the design or
production of the ship.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Of course, when the concept drawings were released, it
turned out that the ship had been heavily modified and actually bore little
resemblance to the parent FREMM design.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The Navy had lied to Congress and the public by presenting the frigate
as a minor variation of an existing design when, in reality, it was a nearly
brand new design with little in common with the so-called parent.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I won’t bother reciting the litany of changes
from the parent design as those are readily available on line.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>So, how’s all that working out?<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>USNI News website reports that the ship construction and
delivery is going to be delayed at least a year.[1]<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Construction began in Aug 2022 and the Navy
is now hoping for delivery in 2027.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Far
more likely is a 2028-9 delivery.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That’s
a five to seven year delivery for what the Navy claims is a minor tweak of an
existing design!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>This babbling, incoherent, pointless statement from Andy
Bosak (deputy manager for the frigate program) tells you everything you need to
know about the state of the program.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
Navy has no idea what’s happening, no idea how to fix it, and no idea when the
ship will be delivered.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>We
are doing our analysis, as the Navy does, of doing deep dives of causes and
effects and various different levers of which we can pull within that
shipyard,” he added. “And we need to, as a program, work with our leadership,
kind of figure out what we want to do. And from that, we will make that
assessment as to what the actual schedule impact is of where we are. And that
effort is ongoing.[1]</blockquote></i>The builder, Fincantieri, blames much of the delay on labor
shortages, welders, in particular.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No
doubt this is a factor but I suspect there are other, far more impactful
problems.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example,<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>…
Fincantieri … wrestled with Americanizing the FREMM design for two and half
years before it hit the 80 percent design completion and could begin
fabrication on Constellation in 2022.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The modification of the design altered almost every drawing of the FREMM
and required review from NAVSEA … [1]</blockquote></i>The labor situation was well known before Fincantieri
submitted a bid and the before the Navy awarded them a contract so that should
have already been factored into the schedule.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>What wasn’t factored in was the extent to which the Navy would modify
the design.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The modifications sent
ripple waves of disruption spreading throughout the program, culminating in the
major schedule slippage we learn about now.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Undoubtedly, the schedule will slip even further.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’re likely looking at closer to a two year
schedule delay for a ship that was supposedly a knock off of an existing
design.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Navy knew all this and understood what deviating from
the parent design would mean.<o:p> </o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p><span style="font-style: italic;"><blockquote>"[The
Navy] and the shipbuilder agreed that design maturity was probably the single
biggest factor we could do to reduce the risk of production,” former program
executive officer for unmanned and small combatants Rear Adm. Casey Moton said
in August of 2022.[1]</blockquote></span></o:p>So, knowing full well what a modified (immature) design
would do to the production schedule, the Navy went ahead and completely
redesigned the ship anyway.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Not only is
the Navy complicit in the current problems, they are the proximate cause of the
problems!<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>Here’s yet another example of the ‘minor, insignificant’
changes the Navy made:<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"></i><blockquote><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">…
testing at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock found that the modified
design did not meet service standards for operating in heavy seas,
necessitating design changes that ate into the schedule margin … [1]<br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">“We
were already into the functional and detail design when that report came from
Carderock – something of a surprise because the parent design didn’t really
have that,” Vandroff (Mark Vandroff, Fincantieri Marinette Marine’s chief
executive officer) said.[1]</i></blockquote>That was a surprise to you, Mr. Vandroff?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Seriously?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>You completely changed the design to the point that it is a brand new,
never before produced design and were surprised to find that created new
problems?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>You’re not an engineer, I’m
assuming?<br /><o:p> </o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEglllitEG14Y1GQc9MhNSm9T-1_hcDsXx9R1YNcLkU4V7THcQeD-XoIJjw5ihoUC5-LYxp_gCqMWuLyMVqqtxYRRBtfIYKauE-Q6BDE6DxJdgyKg128cHz1swlIKfImzGDcRL_hWr6RmhrX4faR3gYQ9W8ckopZ_2mRA3gCEYa0tryvCTjHRlv9OZ-1L_I/s657/Constellation%20Class%20Frigate%20-%20Design%20Changes.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="555" data-original-width="657" height="338" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEglllitEG14Y1GQc9MhNSm9T-1_hcDsXx9R1YNcLkU4V7THcQeD-XoIJjw5ihoUC5-LYxp_gCqMWuLyMVqqtxYRRBtfIYKauE-Q6BDE6DxJdgyKg128cHz1swlIKfImzGDcRL_hWr6RmhrX4faR3gYQ9W8ckopZ_2mRA3gCEYa0tryvCTjHRlv9OZ-1L_I/w400-h338/Constellation%20Class%20Frigate%20-%20Design%20Changes.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><o:p><br /></o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p><br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Conclusion<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>This program has been nothing but fraud and deception piled
on fraud and deception from the very beginning and now it’s coming home to
roost.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Navy tried to hide a
completely new ship inside the shadow – and lies – of an existing ship and now
they’re acting surprised that the fraud is impacting the production schedule.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>We need to also keep cost in mind.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Schedule slippages of this magnitude don’t
come free.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The cost is going to
skyrocket and the Navy will, again, act surprised and attempt to blame the
builder.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>By the way, do you recall that the Navy claimed that the
follow on ships (2-20) would cost less than $800M?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Yeah, they said that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Here’s the quote from RAdm. John Neagley:<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">“The
follow-on objective cost for FFG(X) is $800 million. We think we can get below
that.”[2]<br /></i><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), on the other hand,
estimated an average cost of $1.2B per ship.[3]<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>As it turns out, the actual budgeted costs are around
$1.1B-$1.2B, and that’s before the inevitable cost overruns, costs associated
with schedule slippages, deferred completion costs for incomplete delivery,
etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The true cost will be somewhere in the
$1.5B+ range.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p><br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>______________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]USNI News website, “First Constellation Frigate Delayed
At Least a Year, Schedule Assessment ‘Ongoing’”, Mallory Shelbourne and Sam
LaGrone, 11-Jan-2024,<br /><a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/01/11/first-constellation-frigate-delayed-at-least-a-year-schedule-assessment-ongoing#:~:text=The%20service%20has%20briefed%20Congress%20that%20the%20future,legislative%20source%20confirmed%20to%20USNI%20News%20this%20week">https://news.usni.org/2024/01/11/first-constellation-frigate-delayed-at-least-a-year-schedule-assessment-ongoing#:~:text=The%20service%20has%20briefed%20Congress%20that%20the%20future,legislative%20source%20confirmed%20to%20USNI%20News%20this%20week</a>.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>[2]Breaking Defense website, “Navy Says It Can Buy Frigate
For Under $800M: Acquisition Reform Testbed”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 12-Jan-2018,<br /><a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/navy-says-it-can-buy-frigate-for-under-800m-acquisition-reform-testbed/">https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/navy-says-it-can-buy-frigate-for-under-800m-acquisition-reform-testbed/<br /></a><o:p> <br /></o:p>[3]CBO website, “The Cost of the Navy’s New Frigate”,
Oct-2020,<br /><a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56675">https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56675</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com34tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-85445564593622232592024-01-12T17:25:00.000-08:002024-01-13T13:19:40.507-08:00Houthis and the Marines – Same Mission?<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">Reader ‘Robtze’ just thoroughly embarrassed me in a <span style="color: #2b00fe;"><a href="https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/01/houthi-attack-lessons.html?showComment=1705103478231#c7175258167781743002">comment </a></span>with an incredibly astute observation that I
completely missed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He observed/asked
whether the Houthis were executing the same mission <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>the Marine Corps envisions with their
island/coastal missile shooter concept.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>To address his comment, yes, this is almost exactly the
mission set.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let’s take advantage of
this remarkable similarity and examine how the coastal ‘missile sniping’
concept is working out.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Weapons</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One probable difference is the weapons.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While we have no definitive information on the
missiles the Houthis are using, it’s likely that they’re smaller and shorter
ranged than the missiles the Marines envision using.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Targeting</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>From day one, this has been one of the
unaddressed, major mysteries about the missile shooting concept.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Marines have no ability to target beyond
the horizon and, if they did, the size and scope of that effort would totally
negate the ‘hidden’ and ‘small’ characteristics of the concept (using medium to
large UAVs, for example).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We see that
many of the Houthi missiles appear to be blind fired, being described by US
spokesmen as having indeterminate targets.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br />
</span><o:p> <br /></o:p>From this, we can infer that the targeting issue is a valid
one that is not easily solved and will, indeed, be problematic for the Marines.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Logistics</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One difference is that the logistic
(resupply) issue isn't present for the Houthis since this isn't an isolated
island.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They can obtain supplies
overland.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course, even in this case,
the supply routes and methods present a vulnerability that could be targeted
and disrupted by US forces.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It seems
patently obvious that this logistic vulnerability will exist many times over
for Marines on an isolated island in Chinese controlled waters.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>One of the characteristics of the Houthi attacks is the
scarcity of attacking weapons.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It would
have been reasonable to expect that they would launch swarms of drones or
saturation levels of missiles to try to increase the odds of getting a hit on a
Navy warship.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That has not happened
which leads one to wonder if their weapon inventories are significantly
limited.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>If so, this would, again, raise
the logistic issue with resupply of missiles, despite being overland, being a
weakness.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, this illustrates the
difficulty (impossibility) of the Marines getting resupplies under their
concept.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Survivability</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The US and UK have finally executed a
counter-strike.<o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><blockquote>The
US and UK launched some 72 strikes against 60 targets in 16 locations.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Pentagon described its targets as radar
systems, drone storage and launch sites, missile storage and launch facilities
and Houthi command and control nodes.[1]</blockquote><br /></i>This suggests that an isolated Houthi force, with no
significant air defense or counter-air capability cannot prevent the enemy from
locating and destroying them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
Marines, of course, with no significant air defense or counter-air capability, believe
that they’ll be able to operate undetected on tiny islands a miniscule fraction
of the size of Yemen.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This incident
would seem to suggest that the Marine concept is heavy on wishful thinking and
light on reality.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Effectiveness</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The ultimate measure of the worth of anything
is in the results.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Houthis, due to
targeting difficulties and, apparently, logistic (missile inventory)
challenges, have been remarkably ineffective.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Some four dozen or more attacks have generated no sunk ships, no hits on
a warship, and only minor damage to several ships.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>The Marines, of course, can expect even less success.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Chinese ships merely have to remain beyond
the 12 mile or so horizon and thus achieve total safety due to the lack of
targeting.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In addition, there won’t be
any Chinese merchant shipping in an active war zone so the Marines would be
shooting at warships, not commercial vessels and the Houthi experience demonstrates
that warships are, thus far, immune to damage from limited attacks by low end
weapons and drones.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Conclusion<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>This Houthi scenario is offering us a rare opportunity to
observe the Marine missile shooting concept in action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Marines were quick to jump on – and badly
misinterpret – the Ukraine experience to justify their vision.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Will they be as quick to jump on this
scenario which is a near perfect duplicate of their concept and is failing
badly?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I suspect you know the answer.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>____________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Redstate website, “A 'Morning After' Look At the Strike
on Yemen and What It Is Likely to Mean”, streiff, 12-Jan-2024<br /><a href="https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/01/12/a-morning-after-look-at-the-strike-on-yemen-and-what-it-is-likely-to-mean-n2168651">https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/01/12/a-morning-after-look-at-the-strike-on-yemen-and-what-it-is-likely-to-mean-n2168651</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com15tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-21897061062764687462024-01-11T18:31:00.000-08:002024-01-11T18:31:09.733-08:00Houthi Attack Lessons<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The ongoing drone and missile attacks by the Houthis against
shipping in the Red Sea ought to offer many lessons.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, unfortunately, we have almost no detailed
information about the attacks and defensive efforts which makes lessons and
conclusions difficult.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>To summarize, as best we can glean, the Houthis are using
very low end aerial drones and cruise/ballistic missiles to target commercial
and naval vessels.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It appears that some four
dozen or so drones and missiles have been fired at various targets with a
couple of hits reported on commercial vessels.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The US Navy claims one or two dozen shoot downs.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>That’s all the information we have.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Will that stop us from applying some analysis
and drawing some conclusions?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course
not!<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Let’s see what we can learn.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Strategy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b>You cannot win a defensive war/battle.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Only offense wins wars.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The attacker only needs an occasional success
whereas the defense needs to be 100% successful and, long term, that’s
impossible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is even more true when
the disparity between the attacker and defender is so great.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Despite dozens of failures, a single Houthi
hit on a US warship makes their entire effort an overwhelming success.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>By opting for a purely defensive posture, we’re putting
ourselves in a no-win position where failure is assured.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It’s only a matter of when, not if.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Military Cost Curve.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b>All indications are that we are using
Standard missiles to shoot down very low end drones and missiles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That puts us on the wrong side of the cost
curve.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Depending on the specific variant,
Standard missiles cost $4M-$5M each.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Low
end attacking drones and missiles cost on the order of thousands or tens of
thousands of dollars.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>While it is perfectly valid to say that we’re spending $5M
Standards to protect $3B warships, that kind of economic exchange rate can’t be
sustained.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We’re winning the battle and
losing the economic war.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>There are some vague hints that a CIWS may have engaged a
target(s).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>While that would be much more
economical, it would also be very disturbing news: <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>that a low end attacking weapon could close to
CIWS range against Aegis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Note, this is
far from verified.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Ill-equipped Ships.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b>Our ships are simply not suited for
fighting a very low end war.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They’re equipped
for high end combat (and not well, either, but that’s a separate topic) and
lack effective, low end weapons.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Targeting.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></b>The Houthi attacks are, presumably,
directed towards specific targets although some of the descriptions of attacks strongly
suggest that some portion are being nearly blind fired toward general
areas.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Regardless, one of the often
overlooked aspects of combat is counter-targeting.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The enemy can’t target what they can’t detect.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is vital to understand how the enemy conducts
their detection and targeting and then deny them that process.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is no indication that the US is
applying any counter-targeting effort.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Drone Effectiveness</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Despite the desire of the Western military
world to jump on the unmanned fadwagon, the reality, as evidenced by these
attacks, demonstrates that drones are, essentially, totally ineffective against
a prepared and capable defender.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This
should come as no surprise as we’ve repeatedly documented and discussed the
lack of effectiveness of drones in combat situations in the pages of this blog.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Summary<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>It is clear that the US is approaching this situation
unwisely by opting to adopt a defensive, appeasement stance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is delusional to believe that we can
maintain a 100% success rate no matter how unsophisticated the attacking
weapons are.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We must either leave the
area to avoid the inevitable defensive failure or shift to an offensive posture
and eliminate the threat.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>It is also clear that our ships are ill-equipped to deal
with low end threats in an economical but effective manner.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We need lower end vessels such as frigates,
corvettes, or patrol vessels<br /> <o:p> <br /></o:p>Perhaps the major lesson from these attacks is that drones
are not the all-powerful, invincible threat that so many make them out to
be.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This mini-conflict is the perfect
counter to the perceived (but incorrect) success of drones in Ukraine.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is a warning to us not to make drones a
major element of our force structure.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Caution:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As stated at the beginning, we have almost no
detailed information about these attacks and defenses so be very cautious
drawing lessons and conclusions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The
points I’ve made are general, based on the situation, rather than specific,
based on details.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I would very much like
to believe that the Navy actually recognizes these points and is taking
appropriate action and just not making it public but there is no reason to
believe that is the case.<br /></i><br /></span></div><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></p>
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ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com37tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-21957623554621626702024-01-08T08:38:00.000-08:002024-01-08T08:38:41.164-08:00Unmanned and Analytical Rigor<div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">The degree of intellectual rigor being applied to unmanned
systems is nearly non-existent.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p>For example, here’s an article about the first exercise
involving a Turkish ULAQ 11 m unmanned surface craft.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The article lists claimed benefits of
unmanned and joint manned-unmanned assets (they refer to the combined
manned-unmanned operations as MUM-T, for some unfathomable reason).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Along with the claims, I’ve added the most
cursory of intellectual and analytical rigor, in red, to examine the
claim.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> <br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p>Here’s the exact quotes and claims<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Increased Operational Efficiency</u>: MUM-T allows for
the simultaneous operation of manned and unmanned vessels, enabling a more
comprehensive and efficient coverage of a given area. Autonomous or remotely
operated USVs can handle routine or monotonous tasks, freeing up human
operators to focus on more complex decision-making.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><span style="color: red;">There is no evidence that teaming an
unmanned boat and a manned asset allows for more comprehensive and efficient
coverage of a given area.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In fact, most
unmanned assets are small and decidedly underpowered compared to equivalent
manned assets and, therefore, have reduced sensor coverage compared to purely
manned assets.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Further, human operators
are not freed up for more complex decision making;<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>they’re merely transferred from one tedious
job to another: in this case, from direct sensor observations and
interpretation to indirect sensor observations and interpretation<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>…<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>same
exact job, just using second hand data instead of direct observations.<br /></span><span style="color: red;"><o:p> <br /></o:p></span><span style="color: red;">Further, most unmanned sensors,
being mounted on smaller unmanned platforms, have a significantly smaller field
of view compared to a similar manned platform and are, therefore, less
efficient in their coverage than purely manned platforms.<br /></span><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Risk Reduction</u>: MUM-T can be used to mitigate risks
associated with certain tasks. Unmanned vessels can be deployed for missions in
hazardous or high-threat environments, minimizing the exposure of human
operators to potential dangers.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><span style="color: red;">This is partially true on a limited
basis, depending on what capabilities the unmanned asset has.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Typically, the unmanned asset is far less
capable than the equivalent manned asset and the manned asset must still be put
at risk.<br /></span><span style="color: red;"><o:p> <br /></o:p></span><span style="color: red;">A closely related consideration is
that if the risky task requires any degree of sophisticated capability, the
unmanned platform will be correspondingly expensive and while the unmanned
asset reduces (note:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>does not eliminate)
the human risk, the monetary risk is equal to, or greater than, the manned
asset.<br /></span><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Extended Endurance and Range</u>: Unmanned surface
vessels can be designed for longer endurance and extended range. This is
particularly beneficial for tasks such as persistent surveillance,
reconnaissance, or data collection in remote or challenging environments.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><span style="color: red;">Manned assets can equally be
designed for longer endurance and extended range.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is nothing inherently superior about
unmanned asset range and endurance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Further, longer endurance and extended range comes with a concomitant
decrease in capabilities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For example,
an aircraft, manned or unmanned, can achieve longer range/endurance by reducing
the weight of the payload.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course,
reduced payload equates to reduced capabilities.<br /></span><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Flexibility and Scalability</u>: MUM-T provides a
flexible and scalable approach to maritime operations. Depending on the mission
requirements, the combination of manned and unmanned assets can be adjusted to
achieve optimal results.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><span style="color: red;">This is ridiculous buzzword bingo.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Manned systems are equally flexible and
scalable and can be adjusted to achieve optimal results.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unmanned assets have absolutely no inherent
benefits in this regard.<br /></span><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Sensor Fusion and Information Sharing</u>: MUM-T
facilitates the integration of various sensors and data sources from both
manned and unmanned platforms. This enables enhanced situational awareness and
information sharing, leading to better-informed decision-making.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><span style="color: red;">As the quote correctly notes, ‘integration’
of sensors and data is not an inherent characteristic of unmanned assets and
applies equally to manned assets.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Unmanned assets offer no ‘enhanced situational awareness’.<br /></span><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Coordinated Missions</u>: Manned and unmanned vessels can
operate in a coordinated manner to execute complex missions. This collaboration
allows for a synergistic approach, combining the strengths of human intuition
and adaptability with the precision and endurance of unmanned systems.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><span style="color: red;">More marketing bilgewater.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Manned assets can, and do, ‘operate in a
coordinated manner to execute complex missions’.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Again, there is zero inherent superiority in coordinating
unmanned assets and, indeed, some significant drawbacks in that manned assets
can act independently and with intelligence as situations change whereas
unmanned assets cannot.<br /></span><o:p> <br /></o:p><u>Training and Skill Development</u>: MUM-T scenarios
provide opportunities for training human operators in controlling and
interacting with unmanned systems. This helps in developing the necessary
skills for seamless collaboration between manned and unmanned assets.<br /><o:p> <br /></o:p><span style="color: red;">This is the ultimate in self-licking
ice cream cone logic.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Of course operating
unmanned assets develops skill in operating unmanned assets.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>So what?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Operating elephants develops skill in operating elephants but that doesn’t
help warfighting and neither do unmanned assets.<br /></span><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u>Conclusion<br /></u></b><o:p> <br /></o:p>This article was a marketing blurb, pure and simple.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Its only value was in clearly illustrating the
lack of analytical rigor being applied to unmanned systems.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The West has made the leap directly from concept
to implementation of unmanned systems without bothering to stop at the analysis
step.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">The article reads like a Turkish arm sales marketing brochure and should be an embarrassment to the Naval News website.<br /> </span><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p> <br /></o:p><o:p>_________________________</o:p></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><o:p> <br /></o:p>[1]Naval News website, “ULAQ Combat USV Proves Efficiency On
The Field”, staff, 29-Dec-2023,<br /><a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/ulaq-combat-usv-proves-efficiency-on-the-field/">https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/ulaq-combat-usv-proves-efficiency-on-the-field/</a></span></div>ComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.com24