tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post6976852157018976601..comments2024-03-28T04:22:28.228-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Incapable of LearningComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger62125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-45967184771682246682016-08-23T15:01:43.759-07:002016-08-23T15:01:43.759-07:00The benefit of a stealth tanker is questionable. ...The benefit of a stealth tanker is questionable. The biggest benefit I see is that while the tanker is idly flying around waiting to do its thing, it may not be detected and destroyed. Given the very long range of modern aircraft and air-to-air missiles, a smart enemy would look for the tankers and kill them. Kill the tankers and the entire strike group splashes.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-2852309730567095092016-08-23T14:48:35.773-07:002016-08-23T14:48:35.773-07:00One question assuming a stealth tanker was designe...One question assuming a stealth tanker was designed, how exactly would this benefit the strike package versus a non stealth platform? I would assume for however many minutes it takes to line up, fly in formation, transfer fuel, etc., any benefits of stealth would be severely degraded to the point of being easily detectable for a peer type defensive area.<br /><br />If stealth is compromised during the actual refueling process, the operation would need to be completed for all aircraft prior to entering the A2/AD effective range (with the associated logistics problems based on tanker aircraft per strike aircraft and associated time delays). If so, what is the benefit of a stealth optimized tanker over a non-stealth?<br /><br />The only possible benefits I can think of are 1) stealth would allow the tanker to station closer (maybe within) the defended area and refuel for the return journey such that being detected on the return would be less critical to the mission, or 2) the requirements to make the tanker stealthy would also benefit the fueling capabilities in some way (such as a flying wing typically has less drag and more internal volume versus a similar wing and tube type fuselage).<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-24817471684624725872016-08-22T17:19:53.341-07:002016-08-22T17:19:53.341-07:00You should do a topic on oversight, I was not able...You should do a topic on oversight, I was not able to find one in the archives. I tried working thru multiple scenarios, and in my opinion, it ends the same. Im curious about yours and the community's thoughts on this matter.Andrew S.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-72972080124017119302016-08-22T15:07:02.794-07:002016-08-22T15:07:02.794-07:00One of the key advantages of a unified armed force...One of the key advantages of a unified armed forces is if it is legislated what the branches have to provide in the way of support to each other. <br /><br />One branch can't say well that isn't our mission because in reality its not glamorous or they don't understand it, or don't want to pay for it, or more likely they just don't care. <br /><br />For example, the hypothetical Air branch providing close air support for the Ground branch-currently the Air Force would rather get out of the close air support business because it is a capability provided to another service and they don't wan't to pay for it, in a unified system they can't back out because its legislated-(its the law, like the existence of the Marine Corps), also the Air branch chief proposing it would look insane/incompetent to the overall Commander who by the way wears the same uniform and presides over the one single service budget, it would be like if the current branch chief of Army aviation said well its not our mission to provide helicopter antitank fire support to the Infantry because I wan't pay for this really cool looking stealth transport helicopter or Marine Air doing the same thing, anyone saying it would be skidding down the road on their ear post haste.<br /><br />In the current system to Air Force might get away with it and wiggle out all the while not allowing the Army acquire its own fixed wing air support because fixed wing CAS is Air Force turf, they don't wan't do it but they don't wan't the Army to do it either because they think that the money for fixed wing is theirs -truly insane.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-84459211568506875872016-08-22T11:06:04.676-07:002016-08-22T11:06:04.676-07:00"First off, I would recommend centralization ..."First off, I would recommend centralization of all oversight under one governing body that is not under control of the Joint Chief of staffs."<br /><br />Whose control would they be under? You need to think this through.<br /><br />"Second, transparent financial records on all military projects."<br /><br />We're already completely transparent. The line item budget is a matter of public record. We know where the money is going. <br /><br />The military plays spin games to try to make things look good. For example, quoting the cost of an F-35 without the engine or the cost of a ship without including GFE but for anyone who cares to dig, we know the costs. How does this help? It hasn't so far.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-91504921564422711942016-08-22T10:47:57.739-07:002016-08-22T10:47:57.739-07:00About 30 minutes after posting, I did some researc...About 30 minutes after posting, I did some research and realized my naivety on this. Thou from the various groups doing oversight, I repeatedly thought of the old saying: "To many chiefs, not enough indians."<br /><br />First off, I would recommend centralization of all oversight under one governing body that is not under control of the Joint Chief of staffs.<br /><br />Second, transparent financial records on all military projects.<br /><br />Past that, I don't have a comprehensive understanding of the bureaucratic mechanisms that is in place. Be honest thou, I doubt anyone truly dose.<br />Andrew S.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-72150652548083409682016-08-22T09:28:02.608-07:002016-08-22T09:28:02.608-07:00"I would recommend inter-service oversight.&q..."I would recommend inter-service oversight."<br /><br />I'm not belittling your suggestion but do have any idea how many groups, organizations, committees, and people already exist with theoretical oversight responsibilities over the military?<br /><br />SecDef is in charge of all the military and has all the authority he needs and yet the problems continue.<br /><br />There are several (dozens?) Congressional committees that have military oversight responsibility and yet the problems persist.<br /><br />There are various groups within the military that are supposedly exercising oversight.<br /><br />The Joint Chiefs have oversight responsibilities.<br /><br />I thought about it, I could list such groups almost endlessly - and yet nothing has changed. That's not true. Things have changed for the worse.<br /><br />What possible additional oversight would provide any benefit? I know you mean well but that's a very simplistic suggestion that fails to take into account realities, human nature, inertia, and bureaucracy. <br /><br />Now, I have nothing against unrealistic suggestions. I make them all the time. However, if you want to offer that suggestion then flesh it out. How would it be better than what we already have? Who would fill this position(s)? What authority would they have? What consequences would there be for failure of either the oversight group or the individual services? Who would fund this? Where would these people obtain technical advice? Who would fund that? And so on. <br /><br />Lift that fairy tale level suggestion up and make it something theoretical possible and effective. Otherwise, it's just a generic platitude. <br /><br />Comments on this blog need to be a cut above! Be part of that. Rise to the challenge!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-39664981604940318092016-08-22T08:54:36.257-07:002016-08-22T08:54:36.257-07:00I wouldn't go as far as unifying all the branc...I wouldn't go as far as unifying all the branches, maybe the marines into the army.<br /><br />I would recommend inter-service oversight. Lets put some of this service rivalry to work and weed out some waste.Andrew S.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-13399621964429021272016-08-22T08:13:46.158-07:002016-08-22T08:13:46.158-07:00"A unified armed forces-no separate services&..."A unified armed forces-no separate services"<br /><br />I'm not necessarily against this but how would it change things? Instead of service chiefs in their individual uniforms, we'd have "branch" chiefs wearing the same uniforms but still caught up in promoting "their" branch at the expense of the others. This exact scenario has played out in industry repeatedly.<br /><br />To make it work would require a very strong central command group that is devoid of service-specific leanings. Where would we get such men? If we had such men, we wouldn't need to reorganize. We could just put them in an overarching group called, oh, I don't know, say, joint chiefs or some such. Hmmm... I guess we already know how that would work out!<br /><br />We already have all the mechanisms we need to treat our military as a single, unified service. We just don't do it. Reorganizing would just be a paper exercise. Consider how many procurement reorganizations and reforms have been conducted and none have had any effect.<br /><br />All that said, if we don't at least try to offer better solutions than we've failed completely. So, I'm on board with your suggestion, conceptually, but with the same recognition of reality that you note.<br /><br />Good thought, good comment.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-47537968499094861132016-08-22T08:04:24.903-07:002016-08-22T08:04:24.903-07:00The suggestion was for a strike UAV. A UAV for IS...The suggestion was for a strike UAV. A UAV for ISR is a different issue. We need ISR and a purpose built ISR UAV might well be the preferred solution. That still leaves the question of a strike UAV versus cruise/ballistic missiles?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-53547626739974249832016-08-22T07:39:19.799-07:002016-08-22T07:39:19.799-07:00A UAV would provide ISR capabilities that you coul...A UAV would provide ISR capabilities that you could not get from a cruise missile. Complicating this analysis is the question of whether a UAV would be resilient in the face of the destruction of satellites and electromagnetic jamming than a cruise missile. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-32441946540687129772016-08-22T06:34:39.245-07:002016-08-22T06:34:39.245-07:00"What the Navy really wants is an unmanned ae..."What the Navy really wants is an unmanned aerial combat vehicle (the old UCAV) and they see a "tanker" as a way to get there without having to fight Congress. "<br /><br />Given the weight ability of the Stingray, I think you're exactly right. There isn't going to be a 1:1 tanker to fighter ratio, so its going to be doing overhead tanking with only 4500lbs of fuel. <br /><br />Its going to make a lousy tanker; and I think it would be easier, quicker, and cheaper to revivify the S3's as overhead tankers. We *know* they work in this role, and they already exist. <br /><br />Given they're there, and the shortcomings/development time to make a Stingray tanker, it sure seems like the Navy has something else up its sleeve. It seems like my son hiding his broccoli under his mashed potatoes and expecting us to buy it. <br /><br />What I don't get is the Navy's fixation on short ranged aircraft. The Hornet and SuperHornet are really low ranged. The F-35C has a better combat radius, supposedly 600NM. But its still 200nm off the A6 from what I've read. <br /><br />Getting back to the point of the post, I think the Navy could be far more effective in combat, and in cost, with dedicated role aircraft that eschewed some of the crazier things. <br /><br />With standoff weapons I don't think you need 360 degree stealth. When you're bringing you're airbase with you you do need to have enough range to allow it to move around and be flexible while avoiding detection. <br /><br />So make a long range attack aircraft that can carry standoff weapons. Give it reasonable front facing stealth. <br /><br />Make a long range fleet defense interceptor. <br /><br />Make a shorter range fighter for close in defense. <br /><br />Give them all enough range that you can get away with overhead tanking. <br /><br />Just my $0.02<br />JFWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16095723023404412328noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-82702299721672360532016-08-21T19:44:34.233-07:002016-08-21T19:44:34.233-07:00>>Navy leadership, not the idiosyncrasies of...>>Navy leadership, not the idiosyncrasies of procurement, have made a bad conceptual decision; one that has been proven disastrous repeatedly - hence, the inability to learn. <br /><br />The point that we're dancing around is that any adaptive institution has to have a truth function. Some mechanism by which competing assertions are weighed, and the survivors become facts and incorporated into the institutional body of knowledge. And thus form a reliable basis for changed (i.e. evolved) behavior.<br /><br />Science has reproducibility. <br /><br />Law has its hierarchy of judges.<br /><br />Navy doesn't have one anymore.<br /><br />Was Task Force Uniform a prospective and retrospective avoidable disaster? Dunno. I have no idea what the institutional view is.<br /><br />Is the LCS and the multicrew manning concept discredited? Dunno. We keep building and crewing them and defining standards down.<br /><br />Is the F-35C an example of acquisition malpractice? Dunno. I will say at $300mm per copy a single squadron is a national treasure.<br /><br />Is Mutiny bad? Dunno. Lot of verbiage exonerating the helmsman in that CRB investigation.<br /><br />Was having a Director of Naval Intelligence with a suspended clearance for 3 years bad? Apparently not.<br /><br />Is losing a helo overboard due to inept seamanship bad? Probably not as career limiting as you might think.<br /><br />Can't get iterative learning without a truth-function, and its gone<br /><br />Kicked out by a coalition of the willing as it were. <br /><br />I like etymology. This is probably wrong so don't rely on it, but the opposite of evolution isn't stagnation. <br /><br />Its more likely to be *involution*. An involution is a function that is its own negation. (not true) is false. (not (not true)) is true again. So the opposite of evolution isn't stagnation, but sort of a perpetual self-negating flopping around without any distance made good.<br /><br />I'll say it more clearly, there is no basis for institutional evolution b/c there's no reliable basis anymore for institutional truth.<br /><br />That's the future. Risk shifting, involution and more institutional failure.<br /><br />As William Gibson wrote, the future is already here, its just unevenly distributed.<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-19670167987783755972016-08-21T18:48:41.389-07:002016-08-21T18:48:41.389-07:00I can see two reasons for using fighters as tanker...I can see two reasons for using fighters as tankers. First, the buddy stores system is easy to develop and field. Second, there are more fighters than any other type of aircraft in a carrier wing so you're not diverting other aircraft from their primary purpose.<br /><br />As for the Navy secretly developing an UCAV, I think you're giving the Navy more credit than they deserve. I suspect it has more to do with the range limitation of the F-35C. <br /><br />The F-35C has a published range of 630 nm on 19,642 lbs of internal fuel. Roughly speaking (very!), refueling an F-35C with another 5,000 lbs of fuel would extend its range roughly 160 nm allowing it to penetrate further into enemy air space.Fighting Irishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03062665701910071556noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-69847820406730161622016-08-21T18:28:38.257-07:002016-08-21T18:28:38.257-07:00A unified armed forces-no separate services, one s...A unified armed forces-no separate services, one service with a naval branch, ground branch and air branch. I only wrote the above because it is a root cause, fix that and many procurement problems go away. I believe a unified armed forces would cure a lot of root cause issues in our military, i.e.. redundancy/waste, inter service rivalry/protectionism, etc... Again, I know its probably not reality and could only be implemented after a national debacle of biblical proportions which probably won't happen, its just a fun what if.sgtfaehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06017941461994064785noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-40435413963192411052016-08-21T16:29:26.162-07:002016-08-21T16:29:26.162-07:00The Navy needs to build single role aircraft. You ...The Navy needs to build single role aircraft. You cannot build a Swiss Army knife of aircraft. At least a Swiss Army knife can be somewhat useful once you get the individual tools out. <br /><br />Build an aircraft that can do one job well first. Don't try to build something good at everything. It will never work. Jack of all trades is the master of none.AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-34585857192842063192016-08-21T16:21:19.184-07:002016-08-21T16:21:19.184-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-10530636107167145602016-08-21T16:19:55.777-07:002016-08-21T16:19:55.777-07:00The F-35 is already close to its weight margins. ...The F-35 is already close to its weight margins. The DOT&E reports say that they are barely meeting their weight goals, and that was with significant compromises to survivability. <br /><br />The PAO shutoff is a good example:<br />https://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/f-35-jsf-dote-fy12-annual-report.pdf<br /><br />There simply isn't much room in weight for additional fuel. <br /><br />Using the Hornet to refuel other Hornets is also going to limit the amount of fuel, because both aircraft are quite thirsty. I don't think that this will work better with F-35s.AltandMainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01014823246265859953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-12693132816756138432016-08-21T16:18:16.302-07:002016-08-21T16:18:16.302-07:00"The underlying procurement model ..."
..."The underlying procurement model ..."<br /><br />You've approached this from the procurement side of things. All well and good. However, I'm addressing the issue before it even gets to procurement. This specific issue (combining functions) is a conceptual failing, not a procurement failing. I understand that procurement considerations may make themselves felt but the Navy had, by all appearances, a clean path to a basic unmanned tanker and yet chose to try to combine functions, thereby starting yet another program down a flawed path - long before procurement started.<br /><br />Navy leadership, not the idiosyncrasies of procurement, have made a bad conceptual decision; one that has been proven disastrous repeatedly - hence, the inability to learn. These Navy leaders are not dumb (at least as measured by academic standards) and yet they make one dumb decision after another in defiance of all common sense.<br /><br />Any thoughts on this aspect?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-19821777303827317162016-08-21T16:12:02.429-07:002016-08-21T16:12:02.429-07:00"However, I think pointing out this risk-shif..."However, I think pointing out this risk-shifting is a useful use of time as its going to dominate all aspects of procurement."<br /><br />I'm not so naive as to believe that the kinds of changes I'm advocating can actually occur. However, it's the responsibility of those of us who see problems to at least try to do something about them. I'm doing what I can. This blog is read by many active servicemembers and perhaps this can prompt at least small changes from time to time.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-15357041792883588562016-08-21T16:07:07.531-07:002016-08-21T16:07:07.531-07:00"Likely describes in one form or another all ..."Likely describes in one form or another all 750 of your archived posts."<br /><br />Too true!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-65217166268036712742016-08-21T16:00:06.049-07:002016-08-21T16:00:06.049-07:00Apologies, I was responding to the hostility of th...Apologies, I was responding to the hostility of the original commenter. <br /><br />The hidden agenda? I didn't spend any time in acquisition so this is just low-value speculation.<br /><br />From a distance:<br /><br />The underlying procurement model seems very sensitive to (even dominated by) the number of projected units acquired and very insensitive to the resulting risk of unbounded increases in R&D & Test cost, and decreases in performance. <br /><br />And the model doesn't appear capable of reweighing its factors in light of actual experience (as you put it, incapable of learning)<br /><br />Small production runs of single function, specialized weapons score miserably on whatever desdirata the acquisition system uses to rate projects.<br /><br />What I see is strong incentives to reduce per unit-cost coupled with non-existent disincentives (i.e. clawbacks) for piling on project and performance risk.<br /><br />Its a form of risk-shifting. Reward occurs up front, large tail-risk is stuffed into the out years (and onto the citizenry). Describes LCS, F-35, Ford class (etc. etc.) perfectly. <br /><br />Likely describes in one form or another all 750 of your archived posts.<br /> <br />If you want the system (broadly defined) to learn, you need contractual clawbacks which expose the vendors (and PEOs) to the actual risks being underwritten.<br /><br />As I see no chance of this happening, I agree with others that the system will not engage in self-reform.<br /><br />However, I think pointing out this risk-shifting is a useful use of time as its going to dominate all aspects of procurement.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-8422907155841976182016-08-21T15:06:18.175-07:002016-08-21T15:06:18.175-07:00"The F-35 tanker probably isn't that good..."The F-35 tanker probably isn't that good of an idea."<br /><br />Fair enough. So, what is? FYI, I've got a post coming on this exact topic and it has a completely different proposed solution.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-54656325578290826502016-08-21T15:03:16.446-07:002016-08-21T15:03:16.446-07:00"Instead of trying to make the F-35 work for ..."Instead of trying to make the F-35 work for long range ops, we should create a purpose built unmanned strike UAV for A2AD penetration."<br /><br />Okay, you've worked your way around to this point. Some would say we already have a purpose built, unmanned, A2/AD deep penetration strike UAV - the Tomahawk missile! It only costs around $1-$2M, is relatively quickly produced, is highly expendable, has 1000 mile range, has a degree of stealth due to its small size and low altitude approach, and packs a punch. Do we still need an actual UAV that returns (maybe) from the mission? At $2M each, we can afford a LOT of one-way trips!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-21425312039091630302016-08-21T13:45:28.585-07:002016-08-21T13:45:28.585-07:00Just evaluating the f-35 tanker you could change t...Just evaluating the f-35 tanker you could change the following to increase the fuel capacity.<br /><br />-replace internal weapons bay<br />-replace cockpit instruments, ejection seat and pilot support features<br />- replace some sensors<br /><br />You could also change the engines to give up high end combat maneuverability for a engine that is ligher/smaller/more fuel efficient.<br /><br />Thinking optimistically maybe you could double or triple the fuel capacity and make the aircraft more fuel efficient. The F-35 tanker probably isn't that good of an idea.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com