tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post6439828800776042433..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: MEU/ARG Final AnalysisComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger70125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-19922578139694645542016-01-17T10:05:11.925-08:002016-01-17T10:05:11.925-08:00Marines test 3 artillery systems.......
http://ww...Marines test 3 artillery systems.......<br /><br />http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2016/01/16/marines-test-3-big-guns-week-long-artillery-experiment/78513802/Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-59690908408366534582016-01-17T06:07:35.692-08:002016-01-17T06:07:35.692-08:00Part 3 of 3.
The Leaders’ Dilemma
This conceptua...Part 3 of 3.<br /> <br />The Leaders’ Dilemma<br />This conceptual failure by too many USN-internal should-have-been-but-never-bothered-to-be ‘Connector’ -designers to seriously engage this plain old hardware-challenge - with many burning the midnight-oil on LCS likely… - then inevitably leads to top-level uniformed decision-makers, tacticians, and strategists to have to figure a way to <br />- a.) make any ‘Littoral’ presence in an A2/AD environment plausible, and <br />- b.) attempt to reestablish/retain (?) the institutional capability to plausibly conduct a sudden Amphibious Landing from well-offshore.<br /><br />Without adequate Connector concepts – except for LCU-F type capabilities – none of this is integratable into a coherent tactical and thus strategic whole, such as under the guidance of EF-21. <br /><br />It does not help to have here and there mid-level ‘Typhoid Maries’ living up gate-keeping impulses to structure the agenda to their personal liking which so far has proven too myopic to even bolster their own professional position. It is one thing to be cautious. It is quite another thing to structure the agenda in ways both expensive to tax-payers and ineffective and thus life-&-limb hazardous for actual in-the-line-of-fire uniformed professionals young and older. A rather ugly spectacle actually! And with reasonably clear-cut foot-prints of individual staffers’ roles for any board of inquiry, or at least historical analysis.<br /><br />What is now known as LCU-1610 was 50+ years ago a reasonably rigorous exercise along conservative lines to produce an 11kts 180-tons ‘Assault-Lighter’/’Beaching Combat-Ferry’/’Connector’. The effort to give her a decent shape and the steel-work required to sculpt that underbody is unarguable.<br />However to use a 30’-wide hull in a 50-foot wide well-deck was a conceptual stretch even then, since e.g. the LPD-4 class was on the drawing-boards then as well, already offering 50-foot wide well-deck… <br />When you look at the short LPD-17 Amphib type today and you happen to find an LCU-1610 in her shorty well-deck, sitting there braced with long 12x12” wooden timbers (!) you see the two key-elements of the ARG/MEU’s dark future – short well-decks for mega-bucks and 50s-era ‘best’ thinking…<br /><br />Between the absence of USN’s best-&-brightest designers from the challenge of designing 21st-century fast heavy-lift Connectors, and this void filled with the self-important shenanigans by mid-level ‘T-Maries’ (with usually zero-design momentum) and other Obstructionists ‘doing their thing’, are we then expecting Admirals and Generals to come up with advanced doctrinal concepts to assure USMC’s historical role as amphibious warriors, delivered and supported by a motivated Amphib-force – all to a plausible budget affordable by the American Tax-Payer ??<br /><br />Some serious institutional house-cleaning is in order to purge the ‘T-Maries’ and other Drones, to thus force a reset of analytic priorities, such as already reflected in the ambitious but realistic EF-21. <br />Building on what that Dec’15 PROCEEDINGS piece stated, whether we call them reactionaries, or ‘T-Maries’ and Drones, innovation-ambitions require getting the obstructionist deadwood out of the way.<br /><br />Advanced hardware allows advanced doctrine.<br />Innovation starts by design to sober plausible fleet- and budget-reality-based forward-looking priorities, to then open the door towards paradigmatic shifts in analytics, which should result in plausible guiding principles expressed in advanced 21.-century context-correct USMC and USN Joint Amphibious Doctrine.<br /><br />------------------------------------------ <br /><br />Trudy Schnabelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02049524622772323172noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-86262997134779865612016-01-17T06:04:09.956-08:002016-01-17T06:04:09.956-08:00Part 2 of 3
Adequate Numbers of Amphibs
- As the ...Part 2 of 3 <br />Adequate Numbers of Amphibs<br />- As the PROCEEDINGS of Dec’15 features in the Comment-&-Discussion section, for the cost of one shorty well-deck (190’ vs. 440’ on LSD-41) LPD-17 derivative LX(R), you could get TWO updated LSD-41/21 ! <br /><br />- This immediately allows a 4-ship ARG squadron w/ 1x LHD, 1x LPD-17, 2x LSD-41. <br /><br />- With therefore a 4-ship ARG, there would be 14x 200-tons cargo @19+kts LCU-F and 3x LCAC/SSC.<br /><br />- With the MEU distributed across 17 Connectors a FIRST WAVE throwing nearly-all of the GCE at the shore becomes a doable option for maximum surprise and impact.<br /><br />Once the GCE is on land and (Combat Support Element) CSE is following, LCU-Fs would connect ARG to transports arriving further offshore to boost the MEU with hardware and supplies, while extra troops come in by fast-sealift and airlift.<br /><br /><br />Why the current still prevalent and likely Tragic Confusion amongst highest-levels of Analysis ?<br />This is mostly related to inadequate attention to plausible Connector-design and thus adequate 21st-century high-speed heavy-lift capability organic to each ARG.<br /><br />- At NAVSEA/ONR mere LCUs/Connectors are not ‘serious’ ships to build a career around. <br />Professional aspirations appear to not be seen as starting until the FFG level. <br />That is why since WW-2 no advanced ‘Connectors’ came out of these circles, with the smarter folks tending to ‘serious’ ships. <br /><br />- Even LCAC was based on well-established British technology, with e.g. the commercial SR.N4 fully operational 10 years before LCAC was discussed. Without well-deck size-limitations SR.N4 hauled more, faster and did so in daily commercial traffic, and thus with good reliability across a wide range of weather and sea-states at times exceeding those of plausible well-deck operations. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SR.N4)<br /><br />- LCUs as defined in WW-2 saw thus no serious conceptual creative attention by the very-smart-&-disciplined naval-design establishment. <br /><br />- LCU-F therefore came from well outside of these circles, now no doubt aggravated by this high-performance result of a serious and well-balanced set of design-priorities – only possible if dozens and hundreds of designs have been developed before in order to establish the temperament central to any plausible set of design-priorities. <br /><br />- Central to LCU-F is the respect for both<br />a.) the needs of the Marines as the world’s foremost amphibious force, such as the capability to execute a FIRST WAVE with as much GCE as possible for sudden and effective impact,<br />and <br />b.) the needs of the Navy by leveraging the extant Amphib-fleet for maximum tactical results while protecting these ships if need be at OTH-200. <br /><br />Today in early 2016 (!) you still see no competitive Connector-concepts coming out of NAVSEA or ONR !<br />LCU-F has been with NAVSEA since 2005.<br />USMC did not see LCU-F until mid-2013.<br />ONR’s RFI to the industry dead-lined late 2014 has 14 months later yet to yield any Connectors superior to LCU-F.<br />And N-95 is thus stuck with conceptual ‘Retro’-Retread LCU-X ideas on offer akin to the equivalent of sporting new grills, advanced tailfins, and your choice of faux-carbon-look interior colors.<br /><br />Trudy Schnabelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02049524622772323172noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-40284645335790684802016-01-17T06:01:47.613-08:002016-01-17T06:01:47.613-08:00A Summary of options and likely capabilities on th...A Summary of options and likely capabilities on the table of discussion (part 1 of 3):<br /><br />21st-century Connectors: <br />- PROCEEDINGS of July’13 featured LCU-F (200 tons of cargo at 19+ knots on 2400HP diesel-power and 1500+nm of range) She offers over 100-feet of vehicle lane internally under cover, invisible, thus challenging the targeting-priorities of the defenders. <br /><br />- LCU-F was designed explicitly with LSD-41’s 440’ well-deck geometry in mind.<br /><br />- Each LSD-41 could carry 6x LCU-F. <br /><br />- With each LCU-F able to carry 3x M1A MBT (plus several dozens of walking infantry) in an extreme scenario e.g. 18 MBTs could be delivered at once, concurrently in 6 different locations if need be. Not a routine load but on certain occasions at solid capability to have on hand.<br /><br />- LCU-F was designed in 2005 with an ARG stand-off distance of 200nm or OTH-200 in mind, to ‘future-proof’ the ARG/MEU against evolving shore-defenses. 19kts from OTH-200 = approx.. 12hrs dusk-to-dawn travel incl. well-deck departure, unfolding, accepting 1x AH/UH each, reversing-maneuver and beach-approach. Several options immediately emerge out of this boat’s capabilities, whether suddenly initiating an amphibious assault from OTH-200 with LCU-F of 1500nm of range for a straight-shot strike or approaching a adversary’s shore under the cover of islands etc. via all sorts of deceptive dog-legged maneuvering.<br /><br />- With 1500nm range @ 19+knots on standard fuel she can offer inter-theater transportation.<br /><br />- And e.g. instead of 200-tons of (Ground Combat Element) GCE-load she can carry 55,000 gals of fuel for instance, or 300 infantry or inshore MASH-capability whatever - all under hard hatch-cover, protected from recon, weather, saltwater, with plausible motion-vs. inner-ear ergonomics for retention of combat-effectiveness across OTH-200 or even 1500nm of transit..<br /><br /><br />IFS<br />- As barely touched on in that article, and discussed at some depth elsewhere subsequently, instead of tracked and wheel GCE-assets, with roll-in weapons-suites each standard LCU-F could also serve as Inshore Fire Support (IFS) for the landing and advancing GCE. LCU-F IFS would stay inshore just out of tank-gun and RPG-range while constantly maneuvering under her thrusters to frustrate reverse-battery.<br /><br />LCU-F could carry a twin M-110 203mm mount (approx.. 8” rounds) of ex-US Army artillery system. Limited with original 39-cal barrel and ammo to around 16-17nm of range on a fine day, modern 52-cal arti does over 30nm w/ 155mm. Therefore we should expect farther distances with a 52-cal barrel and guided ammo. As a tracked but otherwise open vehicle M-110 was kept around in NATO well into the ‘90s due to its nuclear capabilities…<br /><br />- With upgraded M-110 in her rear cargo-bay, the middle cargo-bay of LCU-F can carry M-270 12-tube MLRS, the ‘big brother’ of HIMARS. 12x9” tube-protectiles or 2x 24” N-ATACMS offers IFS up to well over 150nm (w/ option to 250nm) based on an expendable close-inshore 220 (light) -420-tons(loaded) platform highly maneuverable counter-battery resistant platform.<br /><br />- Both systems aboard offer about 400 203mm rounds and approximately 6x 12 9”missile reloads, or 14+ N-ATACMS.<br /><br />There is no such capability in the fleet and none is planned, since without a 21st-century heavy-lift Connector, none of this is possible. You sure will not see any DDG with IFS in mind anywhere close enough to shore where its guns could plausibly support the GCE. And missiles are finite in numbers.<br />The ‘Land-Attack Destroyer’ narrative was more of a hopeful vision than likely reality, since unless permanently attached to every ARG/MEU, they would never be where they’d do the most sudden good.<br /><br />And where would US Army big and small LCUs be ?<br />Smoking around the globe to get there from some base just in time at 12 knots ? <br /><br />Part 1 of 3 <br /><br /><br />Trudy Schnabelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02049524622772323172noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-12931228413702038642016-01-11T03:04:41.744-08:002016-01-11T03:04:41.744-08:00MEBs and MEUs are even less suited to high intensi...MEBs and MEUs are even less suited to high intensity warfare than MEUs - the Krulak board recommended some very sweeping changes in the wake of the First Gulf War, but the collapse of the Soviet Union effectively derailed reforms like the Combined Arms Regiment (CAR).<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-88021880624389566572016-01-10T18:51:08.143-08:002016-01-10T18:51:08.143-08:00Ztev, this comment earns my respect! Well said.Ztev, this comment earns my respect! Well said.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-4070366706135369512016-01-10T18:48:03.316-08:002016-01-10T18:48:03.316-08:00Do we know yet whether the MEU embarks HIMARS/MLRS...Do we know yet whether the MEU embarks HIMARS/MLRS? I still can't find any evidence of it.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-71212537802250790992016-01-10T17:23:35.470-08:002016-01-10T17:23:35.470-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-75262212085807841302016-01-10T16:17:04.766-08:002016-01-10T16:17:04.766-08:00Smitty,
I am concerned with the training and equi...Smitty,<br /><br />I am concerned with the training and equipping of forces to deal with serious potential enemies; using a weapon like MLRS as a "sniper rifle" is a massive misuse of assets and runs counter to the proven concept of massing fires, which is vital against a peer competitor.<br /><br />I place little value in the idea of distributing platoon sized conventional units over wide areas to "do COIN."<br /><br />A conventional force should prevail against any attack from a bunch of goat herders riding around in Toyota Hilux pickups in with its organic weapons and not need TACAIR, or artillery (rocket or tube). If we cannot do this than we have fundamental problems in our training, leadership and TOE.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-25038420686316700492016-01-10T13:49:23.671-08:002016-01-10T13:49:23.671-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-15853921136374885102016-01-10T12:47:05.146-08:002016-01-10T12:47:05.146-08:00CNO, Smitty,
Not all multiple launch rocket syste...CNO, Smitty,<br /><br />Not all multiple launch rocket systems are the same.<br /><br />The M270 MLRS, HIMARS and similar systems are weapons in a completely different category; their dependence upon high level ISR assets, range, cost, limited availability, and the logistics support implications have traditionally made these division or corps level assets. <br /><br />MLRS was designed for counter-battery work, to hit division or corps HQs, FARPs, fuel or ammunition dumps, and to be used en mass against a decisive point (schwerpunkt). <br /><br />Assigning even a 122mm system like a BM-21 to an infantry battalion is an absolute waste. Sure you can do this fighting against inbreds and illiterates, but the PLA or Russians will demonstrate the lunacy of such an approach in short order.<br /><br />I could see the argument for equipping a MEU with a platoon of 4.5” (110mm) launcher fitted to a JLTV or MTVR.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-66837706336140330912016-01-10T12:13:46.108-08:002016-01-10T12:13:46.108-08:00So, is traditional towed artillery a relic of the ...So, is traditional towed artillery a relic of the battlefield now? <br /><br />You mentioned the Russian use in Ukraine. Of course, they aren't facing a sophisticated counter battery fire. Is the low level of Ukraine forces the only thing allowing Russian artillery to succeed?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-82531021949968398472016-01-10T11:54:31.824-08:002016-01-10T11:54:31.824-08:00CNO,
Towed guns are supremely vulnerable to counte...CNO,<br />Towed guns are supremely vulnerable to counter battery fire - the proliferation of fire finding radars makes it possible for the enemy to target a firing unit and return fire in <30 seconds; in some cases the enemy can deliver return fire before the rounds from the original firing unit impact.<br /><br />It is very difficult for any firing unit to survive if it cannot immediately displace after the 20-30 seconds after the first round is fired.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-20641340380181413862016-01-10T09:53:49.023-08:002016-01-10T09:53:49.023-08:00Reasonable and fair. The problem comes when WE pu...Reasonable and fair. The problem comes when WE put units in over their heads out of a misguided belief in non-existent capabilities. The Navy believes that the LCS will somehow contribute to high end combat through the magic of networking or some such garbage. I don't know how the Army views the Stryker units.<br /><br />To repeat, I'm troubled by the apparent emphasis on JLTV, Strykers, and "lightness" at the expense of heavy armor. I don't see an Army that's setting up a balanced force - I see an Army focused on lightness. Same with the Marines.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-43399098837345826932016-01-10T08:42:20.081-08:002016-01-10T08:42:20.081-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-51672126131932266122016-01-10T08:30:27.283-08:002016-01-10T08:30:27.283-08:00"When the MEU is operating alone, there is no..."When the MEU is operating alone, there is no "up the chain"."<br /><br />I haven't been able to find any evidence that HIMARS/MLRS is part of the MEU/ARG loadout. Have you seen anything indicating whether those are embarked?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-51752470501623641712016-01-10T08:26:07.792-08:002016-01-10T08:26:07.792-08:00"It's important to understand what Stryke..."It's important to understand what Stryker ..."<br /><br />Very nice discussion. I appreciate that. Sincerely.<br /><br />My concern with any light unit (LCS, in the Navy, for example) is what can it contribute to high end combat? Sometimes, the answer is little or nothing. It may serve a purpose during peacetime and have to stand on the sidelines during combat. That's fine and I've advocated for exactly that in a peace/war two-tier force structure. The problem arises when we begin to inappropriately and unwisely count of the lighter forces to function in heavy combat. When a third of our combat fleet is LCS (notwithstanding the very recent changes), we've got a problem. Similarly, will the Stryker be pushed into situations that are over its head? The Army seems to be focusing too much on Strykers and JLTVs at the expense of heavy armor. I don't follow Army matters closely enough so I could be wrong but that's my impression of the trend in the Army. In fact, the trend throughout the military seems to be lightness while our potential enemies are emphasizing heaviness. When the two meet, all else being equal, heavy will win.<br /><br />I have nothing against Strykers as long as we aren't counting on them to do something they can't. I know you'll say we won't but that's exactly what the Navy is doing with the LCS.<br /><br />Again, thanks!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-3707250233684107692016-01-10T08:09:25.132-08:002016-01-10T08:09:25.132-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-15266497070012271792016-01-10T08:01:47.322-08:002016-01-10T08:01:47.322-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-59462812845822130832016-01-10T07:42:09.352-08:002016-01-10T07:42:09.352-08:00Smitty, in light of GAB's comment, why do you ...Smitty, in light of GAB's comment, why do you suggest pushing MLRS-ish fires down the chain? Not arguing - just trying to learn!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-29756023830632865332016-01-10T07:41:32.045-08:002016-01-10T07:41:32.045-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-80407089495161770942016-01-10T07:40:12.151-08:002016-01-10T07:40:12.151-08:00"The towed 155mm of a MEU (assuming they actu..."The towed 155mm of a MEU (assuming they actually get them) are dead meat in a serious fight."<br /><br />Do you mean because of counter fire and their lack of mobiity? Again, exposing my ignorance, here!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-43195371428451304052016-01-10T07:39:04.007-08:002016-01-10T07:39:04.007-08:00GAB, thanks for the explanation. I always appreci...GAB, thanks for the explanation. I always appreciate education and assistance about ground combat, given my lack of expertise!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-90252139582909264352016-01-09T19:28:59.414-08:002016-01-09T19:28:59.414-08:00CNO,
A battalion (particularly an infantry battal...CNO,<br /><br />A battalion (particularly an infantry battalion) is too far down in the food chain to effectively control the fires of MLRS and HIMARS. <br /><br />The Russians have attached self propelled 122mm howitzers (2S1) to maneuver battalions (tank and mech infantry), but that makes sense given their operations and inventory of systems.<br /><br />The towed 155mm of a MEU (assuming they actually get them) are dead meat in a serious fight.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-18210384274812402412016-01-09T19:17:21.636-08:002016-01-09T19:17:21.636-08:00Smitty - wrt the Ukraine conflict:
1. Russian us...Smitty - wrt the Ukraine conflict:<br /> <br />1. Russian use of sub munitions and specialized projectiles (e.g. EW) is of much greater importance than the role of multiple launch rocket systems – the West is destroying its stocks of sub munitions to comply with the international convention, but the Russians have surpassed the west technically, and are absolutely committed to using cargo munitions.<br /><br />2. Russian use of rocket launcher systems has increased, but it has *not* surpassed tube artillery - the use of tube artillery has nearly doubled in terms of rounds per gun and is responsible for ~85% of battlefield casualties. <br /><br />3. The latest Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA), Active Defense Systems, and Electronic Warfare have made for a very effective armor counter revolution in defensive technology vs ATGMs. <br /><br />4. The Russians have deployed modern MBTS to include the T‐72B3s; T-90s have been deployed in company strength (with zero losses).<br /><br />5. In light of the issues with ATGMs, the 122mm howitzer mains a potent close in killer of tanks on both sides – even hits that do not penetrate have sometimes knocked off turrets!<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com