tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post2110729039430982693..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: How To Win A WarComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger81125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-56965637692146821092013-10-20T08:37:36.836-07:002013-10-20T08:37:36.836-07:00Matt & GAB, this is probably a good point to l...Matt & GAB, this is probably a good point to let this discussion end. Everyone has made their points, no one is going to change anyone's mind, and further discussion will only become more personal. See you guys in the next post!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-48853793084526025632013-10-20T08:19:52.238-07:002013-10-20T08:19:52.238-07:00GAB,
Attitude? Perhaps read the comment string a...GAB,<br /><br />Attitude? Perhaps read the comment string again. I never once came at you the way you're trying to come at me. I’ve actually been fairly polite, where as you come off as a bit of a troll.<br /><br />I've described my thesis and overall point of contention to you once already, but I’m perfectly happy to do it again. The point is that boiling ‘war-winning’ capabilites down to an ordinal list (#1, #2, etc.) is incredibly misleading. We often need BOTH numbers and technology for success at the campaign-level, depending on the stage of the campaign and the threat. My argument is more with the analytic process than with the order of the list.<br /><br />An observation: You’ve continually steered the discussion largely numbers of troops required for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq. And that is perfectly understandable -- given your much-advertised background, and the COIN operations undertaken by US forces following 9/11/01.<br /><br />You may have read somewhere that COIN is not the only method of warfare. In fact, it strikes many defense analysts as fairly unlikely that the US will commit or even structure itself for long-term, manpower intensive COIN operations on the scale of OIF/OEF. Our NATO allies are even more reluctant to commit large numbers of troops or capabilites to COIN.<br /><br />The key concern among DOD planners appears to be preventing and prevailing in a maritime-focused, conventionally-oriented conflict in the Western Pacific. This concern is being addressed by the Navy and Air Force in Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept. ASB is even being embraced by the Army. <br /> <br />If one follows the ASB debate, the focus appear to be maintaining a capability (read technology) edge over an emergent near-peer competitor (read China!) employing anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. And given China’s huge population, lower costs of labor, and manufacturing capacity, fighting a numbers game against China in their backyard is an extremely bad idea. <br /><br />It’s not that I am completely discounting your comments. But I do wonder how your observation that we needed to “…place a fire-team on every street-corner” is really relevant or even helpful to defeating an enemy in naval war. Or to any debate on a naval-oriented blog. <br /><br />Matt<br /><br />PS – We’re are all a product of our background, education and experiences. The only thing I told you was that I was a P-3 driver. Feel free to make up the rest. I didn’t feel the need to elaborate, as I don't believe that repeatedly laying one's CV on the table is a prerequisite to a healthy debate. Nor are pointless ad- hominem attacks and supposition. Attack the ideas, not the man.<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-50628398657097454592013-10-19T10:57:23.940-07:002013-10-19T10:57:23.940-07:00Matt,
You are “a P-3 driver,” are probably a JO w...Matt,<br /><br />You are “a P-3 driver,” are probably a JO who has never been exposed to any operational campaign planning, or gone to a service war college. You may have overflown Iraq, but you clearly where never on the ground in a job that required you to get off a FOB and actually deal with “situations” on the ground. You are probably a smart guy, but you need to check your attitude, because your limited real world experience (including a complete lack of understanding of TACAIR naval, or USAF), as well as your limited historical knowledge, is leading you to make some outrageously silly assertions. <br /><br />The reason you don’t get it is because you are not listening. You are getting upset about “mis-quotes”, but you are not even following the discussion. <br /><br />A prime example is your statement: “A half-million troops would certainly have been decisive in Afghanistan …” My quote of General Shinsecki was about *IRAQ*. And the point was that to achieve victory, the Coalition and Iraqis ultimately had to place a fire team on every street corner. You can argue all you want about air-power or technology, Sadam Hussein was not the center of gravity in the war, the Iraqi people were. Trying to talk about how incredibly effective Coalition airpower was at chewing up the 2003 Iraqi Army is besides the point. <br /><br />You insist on arguing with me about weather in Iraq and its negative impact on air operations, even though I have 34 months in country (2007-2009, 2012), and I my friend and former roommate was in charge of the entire air operations picture in Iraq in 2005-2006 (Fallujah), not to mention personal experiences where weather completely shut down all air operations in Iraq. <br /><br />“In Iraq, enemy troops were not the only adversaries that coalition forces faced. The weather threatened to derail the coalition military campaign on several harrowing occasions. …<br /><br />The ground war commenced on March 20, 2003, and the Third Infantry Division began its furious race through the desert toward Baghdad. …<br /><br />The largest sandstorm to hit southern Iraq in decades engulfed a 300-mile-wide area and blasted tremendous walls of dust into the atmosphere. The fierce storm shredded tents, clogged engines and weapons and burned soldiers' eyes and lungs. Meanwhile, the Saddam Fedayeen, the most fanatical enemy fighters, moved under the cover of the blinding storm to attack the stalled U.S. Army convoys. U.S. ground troops had to engage a seemingly invisible enemy hiding in the swirling clouds of dust. <br /><br />The same frontal system that pummeled troops in southern Iraq created a different set of weather challenges for U.S. military operations in northern Iraq. Sleet, snow, and heavy cloud cover over Bashur Airfield jeopardized the largest and most daring combat jump since World War Two.”<br /><br />http://www.afweather.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123030265<br /><br />Or<br /><br />26/27 March [2003]<br />“Sandstorms continued in Iraq, hindering fixed-wing and helicopter operations. According to media reports, Iraqi Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units used the cover of sandstorms to move units south from Baghdad.”<br /><br />The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, p78, by Anthony H. Cordesman<br /><br />GAB<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-64586535817086916562013-10-19T09:19:58.585-07:002013-10-19T09:19:58.585-07:00Matt, I'm left wondering what it is that you&#...Matt, I'm left wondering what it is that you're actually arguing about in response to the post. As best I can tell, your disagreement is with the fact that I've boiled all the myriad factors that go into winning a war down to a short list of four. Is that it? You just don't like the simplification? Let's assume that's it.<br /><br />Consider this analogy... I'm standing somewhere, anywhere, motionless but I want to walk a short ways to another spot. Doesn't matter why. Before I can safely take my next step I've got to do one of two things: either I have to ascertain and assess every possible risk factor there is (traffic, other people's movements, weather, the possiblity of freak lightening strikes, the likelihood of an earthquake, the tracks of all meteors in the solar system in case one is going to land where I want to step, the flight of birds so I don't get pooped on, and so on, or I simply take a quick glance, see no obvious threats and proceed. The first option provides absolute safety but would require the use of a supercomputer to collate all factors and would probably require years of careful study. The second option recognizes that certain factors, short range vision, in this case, are far more important and will with a certain amount of risk acceptance provide a simplified method that allows me to step with a high degree of confidence and, most importantly, in a short time frame.<br /><br />Similarly, there are thousands of factors that enter into "winning a war". If we insist on enumerating all of them we'll be paralyzed. We won't know where to concentrate our strategic efforts, force structure and sizing efforts, procurement focus, and so forth. We'll be paralyzed because there's a million factors that have to be analyzed and accounted for before we can move in any direction. <br /><br />Alternatively, brilliant people such as ComNavOps can see overall patterns that allow us to identify the major factors that exert the most influence on "winning wars" and we can then proceed to develop the strategies, procurement plans, and so forth that we need.<br /><br />Does that help you understand the purpose behind the post?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-78732439939683212642013-10-19T08:36:01.811-07:002013-10-19T08:36:01.811-07:00GAB,
My central thesis has *NEVER* been that numb...GAB,<br /><br />My central thesis has *NEVER* been that numbers do not matter. My thesis is that the author's approach of concocting an ordinal list in which one ranks numbers, maintenance, training, technology as “war-winning” is false. For one thing, it overlooks the fact that technology saves US lives – a key aim in the US way of war. See my discussions regarding final operations against Japan in WW2.<br /><br />The early phases of OIF and OEF were certainly about breaking things and killing enemy soldiers. You overlook the fact that without overwhelming technological superiority, coalition forces could not have even progressed into later stages of the campaign. Technology was necessary – if not sufficient.<br /><br />I also think you look at troop numbers as an independent variable - divorced from history and political dynamics. We’re not the Soviet Union (1941-45), in which leaders can simply ‘turn up the dial’ and throw hundreds of thousands of additional troops at a problem. <br /><br />A half-million troops would certainly have been decisive in Afghanistan - if there had been unflinching political support in US and NATO countries for a massive, multi-year stability / nation-building effort. And those would have been pretty hard sells in 2002 -- let alone 2013. <br /><br />No argument that the war in Afghanistan is going very badly and is perhaps unwinnable. We should have left quite a long time ago. The Taliban is not a central threat to US security, and AQ has long since moved on to North Africa and Southeast Asia.<br /><br />MattAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-12533913379016180522013-10-18T17:09:33.542-07:002013-10-18T17:09:33.542-07:00Matt,
Yes, U.S. airpower has been a key factor in...Matt,<br /><br />Yes, U.S. airpower has been a key factor in every war we have waged since WWII; but your own examples disprove your thesis. OIF and OEF were not simply about breaking things and killing people, they were about achieving U.S. national goals (winning the war). Winning the war is very much a numbers game.<br /><br />OIF removed Sadam Hussein's regime but failed miserably in achieving U.S. goals in Iraq. Iraq was a mess post 2003 invasion until the troop surge, coupled with the "Sons of Iraq (Sunni awakening movement) which added 100,000+ militia, *and* the massive production of IA and IP forces restored order. Then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinsecki called it right when he called for "something in the order of several hundred thousand soldiers" required for post war Iraq. <br /><br />Likewise, it meant very little to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan when we failed to have the troops, and artillery to destroy them. There were no strategic targets in Afghanistan after the first week of OEF – shift to the ground game, which failed. Tora Bora is a case study in lack of troops, bad intelligence, and lack of mass (primarily artillery). This allowed the enemy to escape, regroup and reconstitute a political and military threat in Afghanistan.<br /><br />The U.S. and its allies are failing, and will fail miserably in Afghanistan without massive numbers of troops to force the issue. Right now the number of IDP Afghans are about half a million: staggering for a country of that size. The Afghans are fleeing becasuse they know what is coming in 2014. The Afghans saw this when the Russians left.<br /><br />Yes, numbers do matter.<br /><br />GAB<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-66170427855468785962013-10-18T04:58:44.861-07:002013-10-18T04:58:44.861-07:00GAB,
It's a simple question: did US airpower ...GAB,<br /><br />It's a simple question: did US airpower have an impact on the US/Northern Alliance overthrow of the Taliban? Desert Storm? OIF-I?<br /><br />Once again you've picked out one word in my discussion and attempted to create a debate around it. All-weather was not the point. <br /><br />Of course weather can inhibit air operations. 'All-weather' is actually DOD/NATO term. The USAF frequently uses it to describe the F-15E -- while USN uses it to describe the capabilites of the F/A-18E.<br /><br />Clearly there is a gap between what the airdales and ground pounders consider 'all weather.' However - it's not as stark as you make it out. I can speak from experience as a P-3 driver that there weren't too many days or nights where we couldn't go flying over Afghanistan. <br /><br />I believe my overall point - before you went tearing off on a sidebar - remains valid. US airpower provides a decisive campaign effects on the battlefield. <br /><br />Matt<br /><br />PS - I don't claim or mean to infer I have any 'secret squirrel' knowledge. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-62569194144235156352013-10-17T12:33:04.982-07:002013-10-17T12:33:04.982-07:00Matt said: “Are you saying our overwhelming techno...Matt said: “Are you saying our overwhelming technological superiority in airpower had little to do with the fall of the Taliban regime? I know a couple dozen Special Forces troopers who might disagree with that…. <br />Matt<br /><br />No, I meant exactly what I said which is: “U.S. airstrikes were limited by weather in Iraq in 2007, 2008, and 2009 – they most certainly were limited by weather in the first Gulf War.”<br /><br />Anybody who has actually spent any time in Iraq (I have 34 months stretched over 2007-2009, and 2012) will testify to this fact.<br /><br />There is no such thing as “all weather” technology. The enemy certainly understands this, and uses it to advantage quite frequently.<br /><br />And BTW Matt, I know most of the SOF commanders – stop it with the secret squirrel hand shake routine. <br /><br />GAB<br /><br />Here is the original post/response:<br /><br /><br />Matt: “Contrast this to OEF, where our special forces troopers had F-14s and B-1s orbiting overhead, able to deliver dozens of 500 lb bombs to pinpoint accuracy, all weather, day/night.“<br />XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX<br /><br />GAB: “Horse hockey. <br /><br />I can testify from first-hand knowledge that U.S. airstrikes were limited by weather in Iraq in 2007, 2008, and 2009 – they most certainly were limited by weather in the first Gulf War. The enemy recognized this limitation of airpower and made it a point to execute indirect fire attacks during sand storms, “mud rains,” and other periods of reduced (or zero) visibility. <br /><br />All weather is a relative term, and while bombing capability is significantly less impacted today by “conditions” today, there are still plenty of places on the globe where “all weather” is pure nonsense.”<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-15690994053740405972013-10-13T08:27:32.400-07:002013-10-13T08:27:32.400-07:00That's one of many problems with your analysis...That's one of many problems with your analysis. Not all victory outcomes are equal. A common benchmark for measuring victory is the amount of time and number of casualties taken.<br /><br />Historically, it cost the US approx. 110,000 dead and missing to defeat the Empire of Japan. The Japanese surrendered in August 1945 only because we successfully employed a piece of very high technology (an atomic bomb) on Hiroshima.<br /><br />Are you saying that a hypothetical war in which we did not drop the atomic bomb, had to spend an up to two years invading and occupying the Home Islands, lost an additional 400-800K US dead, and completely devastated Japan, would have been the same degree of victory? <br /><br />If so - that indicates a breathtaking misperception of US war aims. <br /><br />The US wanted to force the surrender of Japan in the shortest amount of time and with the least possible US and allied casualties. And ideally we’d like to do so without completely destroying the island of Japan – since we were almost certain to rebuild it.<br /><br />We COULD have thrown more numbers (men, ships, and aircraft) at the invasion problem. And even with equal technologies, we probably would have eventually forced a Japanese surrender. But in terms of US losses, it would have been equivalent to the ‘Flower of British Youth’ lost in 1914-18.<br /><br />We are not the Soviet Union (1941-45) or China (1951-53). They both displayed an almost willful disregard for friendly casualties. The US prefers to avoid seeing our young citizens dying in droves if we can avoid it. <br /><br />And breakthrough technologies like the atomic bomb and the B-29 are often key determinants between a 'good' victory (relatively low casualties) and a 'bad' victory (very high casualties). <br /><br />MattAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-84267509755460214452013-10-11T15:56:15.494-07:002013-10-11T15:56:15.494-07:00You disagree???? It's not an opinion. There&...You disagree???? It's not an opinion. There's nothing to agree or disagree about. <br /><br />The title of the post is "How To Win A War". So, by outcome I mean winning or losing, victory or defeat. Of course, the time required and number of casualties would have changed! On day one, the war was lost for Japan just due to sheer numbers. Japan had no hope of replacing the lost planes, ships, and soldiers/sailors/aviators in sufficient quantities to compete with the US. It was inevitable that the US would win through sheeer numbers regardless of any further technological development. Our industrial capacity, meaning numbers of planes, tanks, and ships, guaranteed the outcome. Our population numbers guaranteed overwhelming force regardless of technology. Technology only speeded the time frame and, to some extent reduced our casualties. That's the whole point of the post! Even Yamamoto knew this.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-3470551055503609752013-10-11T15:17:00.098-07:002013-10-11T15:17:00.098-07:00"Had we never developed the Hellcat, AA fuze,..."Had we never developed the Hellcat, AA fuze, radar, Essex class carriers or any other superior technology it wouldn't have mattered as far as the outcome."<br /><br />*****************************<br /><br />I disagree. But let me ask how your viewpoint change if one added the atomic bomb to that list? <br /><br />The War Office estimated that forcible invasion and occupation of Japan would cost between 2 and 4 million American casualties. Included in that total was 400-800,000 dead. <br /><br />The Pentagon quite literally ordered half a million Purple Hearts in the event that we had to go through with Operation Downfall. So - the 'outcome' would've certainly been different for a lot of US and allied servicemen. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-35297231815797447282013-10-11T12:53:36.361-07:002013-10-11T12:53:36.361-07:00I saw it before. ;) As I said, we held ALL the car...I saw it before. ;) As I said, we held ALL the cards in Desert Storm. Our deltas outweighed theirs across the board. <br /><br />I'm not saying they would've won. I'm saying we we wouldn't have had the cake walk we did. We very well could've taken prohibitive casualties. <br /><br />I'm also not implying they had our training or maintenance. Ground 70% of their aircraft due to parts and maintenance. But that 30% left are F-16s and F-15, not antiquated Mig-23s, Mig-25s and overhyped Mig-29s. So maybe they get a few more kills and add a persistent fighter threat to their IADS (something we squashed early in the war). <br /><br />But my main point is taking away OUR aircraft and technology advantages removes our ability to prosecute the air war with the same effectiveness. Even if they flew ZERO fighter sorties, we still have to contend with Patriot/IHawk/Stinger without our SEAD/DEAD/EW/Stealth advantages. Patriot is orders of magnitude more dangerous than SA-2/3/6. You can pretty much write off striking Baghdad. We wouldn't risk Tu-22s or Su-24s against Patriots. And nothing else in our inventory could reach that far.<br /><br />The unrefueled combat radius of a Mig-29 on an A2A sortie is something like 150nm. Draw a 150nm circle around King Khalid Air base and see how far that gets you. Less than half way to Baghdad. Mig-25s can go futher, but only subsonic. They would have to use all of their Mach 3.2 speed and high altitude to stay out of Patriot range. So their combat radius wouldn't look much better. <br /><br />A "bit closer"? Remember, our T-72s can't penetrate their M1A1HAs frontally at ANY useful combat range. We would have to get to the side or BEHIND them to get reliable kills. <br /><br />They could see our heat signatures from 3-4km away. We would have to get within 1km to see their dug in tanks. So it's not just a "bit closer". And the fire control system on the M1 is MUCH easier and faster to use, so less trained crews can actually get more out of it than a T-72. B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-70900771761232606492013-10-11T08:19:16.436-07:002013-10-11T08:19:16.436-07:00I've never once said the Soviets were savage, ...I've never once said the Soviets were savage, brutish, etc. Only that their method of warfare appears largely insensitive to losses in men and materiel.<br /><br />USSR suffered about 14 million military deaths during WWII. And minus losses taken fighting Japan in '39 and again in '45, almost all of them were incurred by Germany.<br /><br />Germany suffered about 5.5 million military deaths during WW2. About 3/4 of those were inflicting by the Soviets: 4 million dead. <br /><br />That's an exchange ratio of more than 3:1 in favor of the Germans. This does seem to indicate on a grand scale that the warfighting approaches taken by Germans and Soviets differed.<br /><br />From a practical standpoint, with a prewar population of 170 million the USSR had an overwhelming superiority in potential manpower over Germany - which had something like 70 million. A higher tolerance of casualties makes sense for the USSR.<br /><br />I would certainly agree with you by the end of the war there seems to be little difference in Soviet and German acceptance of casualties. The exchange ratios equaled out to near parity. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-12336194186941281782013-10-11T07:47:24.073-07:002013-10-11T07:47:24.073-07:00GAB,
OEF = Operation Enduring Freedom = Afghanist...GAB,<br /><br />OEF = Operation Enduring Freedom = Afghanistan. <br /><br />Are you saying our overwhelming technological superiority in airpower had little to do with the fall of the Taliban regime? I know a couple dozen Special Forces troopers who might disagree with that.<br /><br />Certainly there are periods when US airpower cannot be used. But when it is available it is devastatingly effective.<br /><br />Matt<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-60293798351939607592013-10-11T06:45:18.812-07:002013-10-11T06:45:18.812-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-65895969781261565902013-10-11T05:55:46.501-07:002013-10-11T05:55:46.501-07:00B.Smitty, you're kind of getting it but still ...B.Smitty, you're kind of getting it but still not quite. If you haven't, read some of the individual aerial encounters (the few that happened) and you'll see that the Iraqi pilots had absolutely no idea how fly tactically. It doesn't matter what technology plane you're flying if you don't know how to use it. There's no other way to put it - the Iraqis were totally incompetent as pilots and as a cohesive aerial force. Giving them F-15s/16s or whatever wouldn't change that. Plus, as post-war analysis showed, half their planes couldn't fly due to maintenance problems and acute parts shortages. Grounded F-15s are no more of a threat than grounded Sopwith Camels. <br /><br />You seem to want give the Iraqis our training and competance along with the tech swap. The premise is our tech with Iraqi total incompetance. <br /><br />You also want to give us Iraqi incompetance along with their tech swap. We'd have developed tactics and doctrine to take full advantage of the Iraqi/Soviet tech just as we did for our own tech.<br /><br />You also seem to visualize swarms of Iraqi F-15s and whatnot. We're swapping one-for-one. Look in other comments where I've laid out the actual air force numbers. They had very few aircraft and half of those were unflyable. They had no significant numbers. Numbers was my number one factor on the post list. Even if they were superbly trained pilots flying F-15s against us they would have been quickly attrited to uselessness, albeit with a less favorable exchange ratio. Instead, they would have few numbers of F-15s piloted by total incompetents.<br /><br />All of the above comments hold true for the land battles. They had no idea what they were doing. We would have had to approach them a bit closer in our T-72s but they still would have had no idea we were there until rounds started impacting their M1A1s and our Su-25s and Hinds starting hitting them.<br /><br />It wasn't the technology it was the huge delta-training and numbers. Remember your equation? If delta for any factor was too big? Well, the delta-training in Desert Storm and, to a bit lesser degree, the delta-numbers that would have overwhelmed the technology swap effect.<br /><br />Do you see it, now?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-49951618273565371942013-10-11T05:31:07.455-07:002013-10-11T05:31:07.455-07:00CNO,
There have been plenty of cases where number...CNO,<br /><br />There have been plenty of cases where numbers have been lopsided in favor of one side. <br /><br />The Gulf War is a clear case where technology was heavily lopsided, but as I said above, we held all the cards in that war. The war in Afghanistan is another case where we had superior training and technology but inferior numbers (augmented by local militias). <br /><br />One factor that you didn't put in your top 4 is quality of leadership. Good leaders can make a huge difference.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-69257533373065561592013-10-11T05:25:12.433-07:002013-10-11T05:25:12.433-07:00I don't think I'm looking at the problem t...I don't think I'm looking at the problem the wrong way. I think perhaps my ability to convey thoughts through blog comments is lacking. :) <br /><br />Obviously just swapping M1s for T-72s would not change the outcome of the war. But, IMHO, it would very likely result in many more casualties on the coalition side. Yes, there were a handful of M1s knocked out by T-72s, but weren't more knocked out by friendly fire than all enemy action combined?<br /><br />The Republican Guard certainly put up a fight, no myth there. But the lopsided nature of their defeat was in part due to the technology differences. M1A1s were plinking dug-in T-72s at 3-4000m. The T-72s couldn't even SEE the M1s at that range, let alone hit them. And the primary Iraqi APFSDS rounds couldn't penetrate the frontal armor of the M1A1HA at any useful combat range even if they could overcome the T-72s deficiencies in optics and fire control.<br /><br />Steve Zaloga has a useful book on the topic. I'm sure it's a copyright violation, but someone (not me) uploaded it to Scribd.<br /><br />http://www.scribd.com/doc/116110996/Zaloga-SJ-2009-M1-Abrams-vs-T-72-Ural-Operation-Desert-Storm-1991-Osprey-Publishing-Ltd<br /><br />What all of this ignores, however, is that the ground war wasn't fought in a vacuum. There were 38 days of continuous air bombardment that knocked out the majority of Iraqi C3I, logistics capabilities, IADS, and smashed their soldiers' will to fight. <br /><br />I don't see how we could replicate this air war without our technology advantages (e.g. AWACS, air refueling, ISR assets and systems, C3 infrastructure, SEAD/DEAD, PGMs). <br /><br />If we are swapping technology, our antiquated Soviet era strike aircraft (Su-24s, Su-25s, Tu-16/22) won't be flying against Vietnam-era SA-2/3/6s. They would have to penetrate targets protected by Patriot, Improved Hawk, and Avenger/Stinger batteries. All without the help of strategic and tactical EW/SEAD/DEAD aircraft and anti-radiation missiles. Patriot alone could make large swaths of land no-go areas for our airpower.<br /><br />So what happens if our air war is far less dominant? What happens if we can only hit units near the border from the air, that we have to find on the fly? We can only hit them with dumb ordinance. No GBU-12 plinking from 20kft, no Mavericks, and so on. And the front line units might be protected by Patriot/I-Hawk/Stinger batteries, F-15Cs, F-16s and F/A-18s. <br /><br />Our air force might be decimated in the process. <br /><br />What if we don't have a constant, 20/20 picture of Iraqi movements behind the border? We might have a handful of Mig-25RBs with their limited photo recon capability as our only aerial recon asset. But they would have to brave the modern IADS too.<br /><br />What if, instead of Scuds, the Iraqis fire precision TLAMs at our bases in Saudi Arabia and actually hit things, or manage to get F-111/F-15E with GBUs through our antiquated air defenses? Or A-10s and F-16s with Mavericks through to hit our land force staging areas? <br /><br />Sure, they would miss a lot, get shot down a lot, and ride a lot of tarmac because of shoddy maintenance, but swapping all of these technologies opens up the possibility of a much less lopsided air war. <br /><br />During the Gulf War, we held ALL the cards. We could've fought and won easily with HALF of the forces we had in theater. We were vastly better soldiers, we had better leaders, and our technology was at least one or two generations ahead of theirs across the board, if they even had an equivalent technology at all!<br /><br />BTW, the Iraqi artillery advantage was also illusory. They had good systems, but their tactics and training were heavily biased towards a plodding infantry campaign, like those fought against the Iranians. They relied on pre-registered targets far too much, and couldn't handle the speed of advance of our forces. So this is certainly a case where their training and tactics made their artillery combat-ineffective against us.<br /><br />B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-61520942784863178742013-10-10T13:03:52.200-07:002013-10-10T13:03:52.200-07:00“I never said the Russians were 'primitive'...“I never said the Russians were 'primitive' - I said they were unmindful of casualties.”<br /> XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX<br /><br />Compared to what?<br /><br />Are you saying that the Russians did not take care of wounded red soldiers? Are you saying that the Russians did not go to heroic efforts to try to save their people in places like Leningrad or Stalingrad (to include driving supply convoys across partially frozen lakes in pitch dark - and without GPS!)? Can you cite any case where an allied general did anything like what Marshall Zukhov did to ensure wounded Soviet soldiers were evacuated from the front? <br /><br />Sure Stalin was the second largest mass murder in history behind Mao (and far ahead of number three Hitler), but the Germans were quite fearful of what the Russians might do to them in revenge – and they adopted the same brutal suppression of their soldiers as the Russians when their fortunes reversed. By the end of the war, there was very little difference between the Wermacht and the Red Army in “disregard for casualties”. Both sides were absolutely desperate. Hitler’s orders to hold the line at Moscow in the winter of 1941/42, or his expectation that the Sixth Army would fight to the death at Stalingrad are cases in point. The Germans and reds executed on the spot any poor soul that was suspect of shirking duty. Russian fury was fanned by the fact that that three out of every 100 Russian POWs survived captivity in Germany. Also the German decision to support its army entirely off the (Russian) land resulted in the starvation deaths of millions of Russian civilians. The Germans were justifiably afraid of red retribution. And before that, the Germans never had an issue with shooting a malingerer during basic training. Prussian discipline was in fact quite severe. Frontsoldaten by Stephen Fritz documents German “Landser” (soldier) training quite clearly.<br /><br />The West is always eager to describe eastern peoples as savage, brutal, blah, blah, blah. The reality is that even the “suicidal” Japanese loved and cared for their people. <br /><br />I could make the case that the U.S. was unmindful of casualties by ordering assaults into Iwo Jima and, Okinawa when Japan had been isolated and was effectively being starved into submission. Few medieval kings would waste troops in assaulting a castle that had been properly invested. Even Churchill was shocked at FDR's "Unconditional Surrender" policy.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-42758722594827247002013-10-10T12:26:36.034-07:002013-10-10T12:26:36.034-07:00B.Smitty, your model is quite correct in that a la...B.Smitty, your model is quite correct in that a large enough delta on one factor can overwhelm the others. Sopwith Camels, no matter how well trained, numerous, and well maintained, aren't going to beat F-16s.<br /><br />Generally wars are fought between reasonably equivalent forces. I'm trying to think of an example of a conflict where one or more of the factors was significantly out of whack. I can't come up with any off the top of my head. Any come to mind?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-35191972865404431292013-10-10T11:59:04.798-07:002013-10-10T11:59:04.798-07:00Smitty: “The Iraqi "monkey model" T-72s ...Smitty: “The Iraqi "monkey model" T-72s proved to be far less dangerous than they were made out to be in the press. They were closer to our M-60s than our M1A1s. We could see and engage them from much farther out than they could see or engage us. And the munitions they used weren't effective against our tanks.<br /><br />Reverse the tech and we would be driving blind into their dug-in positions, where their superior optics and fire control could offset their poor training. ”<br /><br />XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX<br /><br />The first point is that you are looking at the problem the wrong way.<br /><br />The point of operational maneuver is to *maneuver*. The whole point of the coalition flanking maneuver was to cut the enemy off from his lines of supply and communication, not to engage in an attrition fight with his tanks. Even when forced to fight, a maneuver commander fights in order to *maneuver*. Heinz Guderian’s point about the engine of a tank being equally as powerful as it's gun, or armor applies! <br /><br />The second point is that sure the M1 is superior to a T-72 – so what? The Iraqis cannot maintain M1s today with massive tech support from DSCA. Heck the Iraqis have trouble making M4 carbines run. Start an M1 engine wrong (fail to follow the manual to the letter) and you blow a $1.2 million dollar power pack – psssft! <br /><br />This is the point that COMNAVOPS is making about training and maintenance. U.S. crews in the First Gulf War were going to get every last once of performance out whatever track you give them. Giving the Iraqis M1s would have been doing the work for the coalition: most tanks would have be inoperative from operator error and failed maintenance before the first shot was fired.<br /><br />Third, no one has mentioned the great unused advantage of Iraqis: artillery. To date, modern western commander has fought a campaign without artillery superiority. By failing to take the strategic initiative before or after the coalition deployment, the Iraqis negated their ability to deliver absolutely crushing artillery raids upon the coalition.<br /><br />And BTW, in spite of claims to the opposite, the Iraqis were able to kill M1s with T-72s. There were plenty of Iraqis who put up a hell of a fight too. More myths exposed…<br /><br />GAB<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-58823252423068462262013-10-10T11:17:41.099-07:002013-10-10T11:17:41.099-07:00Matt: “Contrast this to OEF, where our special for...Matt: “Contrast this to OEF, where our special forces troopers had F-14s and B-1s orbiting overhead, able to deliver dozens of 500 lb bombs to pinpoint accuracy, all weather, day/night.“<br />XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX<br /><br />Horse hockey. <br /><br />I can testify from first-hand knowledge that U.S. airstrikes were limited by weather in Iraq in 2007, 2008, and 2009 – they most certainly were limited by weather in the first Gulf War. The enemy recognized this limitation of airpower and made it a point to execute indirect fire attacks during sand storms, “mud rains,” and other periods of reduced (or zero) visibility. <br /><br />All weather is a relative term, and while bombing capability is significantly less impacted today by “conditions” today, there are still plenty of places on the globe where “all weather” is pure nonsense.<br /><br />GAB<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-60846263552170574242013-10-09T15:39:02.833-07:002013-10-09T15:39:02.833-07:00Consider a relative advantage equation,
A = n * Δ...Consider a relative advantage equation,<br /><br />A = n * ΔN + tr * ΔTR + m * ΔM + te * ΔTE<br /><br />Where,<br /><br />A is the relative advantage one side has over the other <br /><br />ΔN is the difference in numbers <br />ΔTR is the difference in training <br />ΔM is the difference in maintenance <br />ΔTE is the difference in technology<br /><br />The coefficients n, tr, m, and te denote the importance of the term to the overall advantage.<br /><br />It may be that <br /><br /> n > tr > m > te<br /><br />But a large enough delta in any one of the terms can overwhelm the others. So it follows that a large enough ΔTE can change the result of A by itself. <br />B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-16208771088460232782013-10-09T13:57:16.017-07:002013-10-09T13:57:16.017-07:00Our ability to perform ISR starts at the strategic...Our ability to perform ISR starts at the strategic level with our recon sats, U-2s, JSTARs, SIGINT, and so on. Take away those advantages and we don't have a clear picture where the Iraqi army is or what they are doing.<br /><br />Try to fly Hind recon helos when we don't have air dominance will result in many casualties and minimal intel.<br /><br />Try to scout with old generation BRDMs into dug-in Bradley and M1 positions with Apaches roaming randomly and F-15Cs and F-16s overhead will produce nothing more than "flaming datum". <br /><br />Iraq may not've had first-class training, but the technology difference were uniformly massive. Add to that the fact that we had entire categories of technologies with no meaningful Iraqi equivalent (e.g. stealth, satellites, AWACS, PGMs, JSTARS, SIGINT, EW aircraft, SEAD/DEAD aircraft).<br />B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-46811881608332754242013-10-09T13:40:55.164-07:002013-10-09T13:40:55.164-07:00Please stop saying that I refuse to see "the ...Please stop saying that I refuse to see "the big picture", just because my views don't agree with your own. It's impolite and annoying.<br /><br />You are presenting your opinions and judgements as if they are facts. They simply aren't!<br /><br />As to WW2 in the Pacific:<br /><br />The ultimate outcome WAS certainly in doubt in '42, in terms of the manner in which the war would end. There was certainly confidence that the US would probably prevail, but it was going to be very costly. <br /><br />And we were going to need every bit of our numerical superiority for the landing and march on Tokyo.<br /><br />I don't think too many soldiers, sailors or Marines would've projected that Emperor Hirohito would ever surrender unconditionally in a little more than 3 years. <br /><br />You appear to think that 'victory is a victory' even if it took two more years and hundreds of thousands of additional US casualties. Not to mention a complete leveling of most of the Japanese home islands. <br /><br />And that is exactly what would have been required if we had not developed the B-29 and the atomic bomb. <br /><br />Technology ended the war early, saved US and Japanese lives and ultimately put the US in a better strategic position going into the Cold War.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com