tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post1796372450060740340..comments2024-03-28T02:26:00.323-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: LCS ASWComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger70125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-47850133678357527582014-01-01T12:58:56.244-08:002014-01-01T12:58:56.244-08:00B.Smitty, as you suggested, I see the SSK in the d...B.Smitty, as you suggested, I see the SSK in the denial role more so than offensive. There will be an advantage to the side that can afford to wait patiently for the enemy to come to them or for the enemy to reveal themself in the course of their offensive attempts. Practicing denial in chokepoints or regions where the enemy can be reasonably anticipated to enter is a good use for the SSK. A valid offensive use would be things like mining and harbor strikes where the premium is on silence and avoidance rather than one-on-one combat.<br /><br />There's no doubt that one-on-one combat between relatively equally matched SSKs is a risky business!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-81074469459664396472014-01-01T10:47:34.062-08:002014-01-01T10:47:34.062-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-15617973448515523072013-12-31T17:00:01.230-08:002013-12-31T17:00:01.230-08:00Smitty,
I think the SSK debate should be limited ...Smitty,<br /><br />I think the SSK debate should be limited to modern boats, and I do not believe that any modern submarines are going to be particularly fast on the surface.<br /><br />The endurance/range issue for LCS remains, while the SSK, typified by the type 212, will still go from Hawaii to Guam (~4,000 nm) with 50% remaining fuel, while LCS will arrive on fumes. This also ignores two critical considerations: weather and replenishment capability. An SSK can dive to avoid the ravages of a typhoon, where LCS will have to fight them, and if the LCS is operating away from the combat logistics force she will have to fuel from ports.<br /><br />In short, an SSK will arrive pretty much ready to fight, but the prospects for LCS are less assured.<br /><br />I am not sure that any submarine is capable of the VBSS mission. <br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-89209597491007427352013-12-27T13:52:06.193-08:002013-12-27T13:52:06.193-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-42441174609190478452013-12-27T09:46:55.380-08:002013-12-27T09:46:55.380-08:00Smitty,
You bring up some great points, and I agr...Smitty,<br /><br />You bring up some great points, and I agree that SSKS cannot do all of the missions that LCS is supposed to do.<br /><br />That said, I not that SSKs can do the critical A2/AD missions far better than an LCS: ASW and launch MCM drones.<br /><br />For the counter small boat threat, apart from destroying boghammers at their piers (arguably the best way to deal with the threat), SSKs are of little use. That said, LCS is not an ideal counter boghammer or missile boat platform. The ideal way to deal with small boats and missile craft is with MPA armed with small cruise missiles (NSM is ideal for missile boats and corvettes), cluster weapons, and hellfire or griffin.<br /><br />Deployment speed is an issue for LCS, with the added concern of unrefueled range. A type 212 cruises at about the same speed as LCS (10 kts), but has an 8,000 mile range at that speed. LCS cannot really use its high speed without exhausting her fuel supply in shor order. The painful reality is that LCSs resorting to their most economical speeds cannot deploy faster than avenger class MCM vessels or SSKs, and only have a 4000 mile range or so.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-25112377243321792022013-12-26T06:39:18.570-08:002013-12-26T06:39:18.570-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-43128471816067969892013-12-24T13:34:20.840-08:002013-12-24T13:34:20.840-08:00Matt :“I will reiterate my point that if a ship is...Matt :“I will reiterate my point that if a ship is close enough to drop a depth charge, an enemy sub will long since have killed it.”<br /><br />xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx<br /><br />In a blue water scenario I strongly agree, but we are talking about littoral ASW where the enemy submarine is likely bottomed and assigned to a barrier patrol mission are we not?<br /><br />How effective are our ASW weapons against bottomed submarines? What is the minimum depth of water for an aerial delivered torpedo, or ASROC? How often have we tested them in this environment against a modern bottomed boat – say a type 212? What do the FOM numbers tell us about the probable detection ranges for surface ships versus an SSK in coastal shallows?<br /><br />The truth is that the USN has not faired well in exercises against modern, well-handled SSKs in blue water, and has even less experience against these SSKs in shallow water scenarios. Our Northern European allies - the ones who make our life miserable when we train against their SSKs, and the Russians still maintain ASW grenade, rocket launched depth charge, and so forth. Perhaps we should at least consider these weapons?<br /><br />I find it ironic that LCS was informed by the Streetfighter concept, which was based on the idea of a small combatant operating as part of a flotilla would present an enemy submarine (likely bottomed) with a tactical dilemma: expose itself to attack a low value ASW asset and be destroyed in retaliation by the surviving flotilla units, or remain hidden and be unable to prosecute an attack on a high value unit like a carrier, LHD, or cruiser.<br /><br />When LCS had a projected cost of ~$220 million dollars it was a reasonable concept. With the current cost growth of the LCS platform, any professional analysis has to consider the value of simply fielding SSKs rather than LCSs.<br /><br />A type 212 submarine costs on order of $525 million dollars, has a range in excess of 8,000 miles, a crew of ~30, and can carry everything from tomahawk missiles, to mines, drones, and of course heavy weight torpedoes. The SSK has advanced sonar, is extremely stealthy, and can operate independently.<br /><br />An LCS costs ~$500 million dollars (without most of its sensors and weapons which are contained in yet-to-be-fielded mission modules), has a range in excess of 4,000 miles, a crew (blue/gold) in excess of 100, and cannot carry heavy weapons like tomahawk, harpoon, ASROC... The LCS has add-on sonar confounded by lack of machinery isolation and is not stealthy, and requires support to operate against even modest threats.<br /><br />GAB <br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-39493823418375841392013-12-24T09:50:20.171-08:002013-12-24T09:50:20.171-08:00B.Smitty, your point about a common amphibious hul...B.Smitty, your point about a common amphibious hull is intuitively appealing, however, the historical attempts to produce common hulls (or airframes, for that matter) have been generally less than successful. Have you thought through the requirements of the various classes/types and do you believe all can be accomodated in a common hull? Do you think the resulting common hull would be so large (to accomodate all the requirements) that it would negate any potential cost savings from commonality? Yet another great topic crying out for a guest post from a knowledgeable outsider!<br /><br />Consider the LCS. In a sense, it's an attempt to use a common hull (ignore the fact that there's actually two hulls!) for MCM, ASW, and ASuW and it's a failure because, at least in part, the hull is not optimized for any of the functions. Is this a lesson about commonality for us or do you see this as a unique situation and, if so, what makes it unique?<br /><br />I'm with you in concept but dubious in practice.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-37847835158811446442013-12-24T09:40:02.028-08:002013-12-24T09:40:02.028-08:00Multiple inappropriate comments were removed. Thi...Multiple inappropriate comments were removed. This is getting tedious. If you can't keep the discussion impersonal and respectful, find another blog to frequent.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-4988243778877425022013-12-24T09:10:48.525-08:002013-12-24T09:10:48.525-08:00GAB,
Not attempting to "twist" anything...GAB,<br /><br />Not attempting to "twist" anything. Your comment was very open ended, so I attempted to fill in the blanks.<br /><br />I will reiterate my point that if a ship is close enough to drop a depth charge, an enemy sub will long since have killed it. <br /><br />The utility is quite limited.<br /><br />MattAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-92082285081991315612013-12-23T09:01:36.924-08:002013-12-23T09:01:36.924-08:00Smitty: "From that SCN budget book, if you ju...Smitty: "From that SCN budget book, if you just subtract the line item for AEGIS you'll still have remaining line items that total $1.3 billion or more per ship."<br />xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx<br /><br />As I stated earlier you cannot "just add up the numbers," in the SCN budget because you are dealing with multi-year procurement!<br /><br />Multi-year procurement means that the item(s) in question are paid for over multiple years and those costs are generally different for each year - ergo you must track the cost for each item over the procurement cycle, and this still does not address funding pots. You cannot make any assumptions about costs, you must read the contract!<br /><br />On the cost of a base DDG-51 hull: “The price per hull comes to $660 million for HII [Huntington Ingalls Industries] and $700 million for BIW [Bath Iron Works]. The cost for the hulls does not include so-called government furnished equipment like radars or combat weapon systems.”<br /><br />http://news.usni.org/2013/06/04/navy-awards-6-1-billion-in-nine-destroyer-deal<br /><br />I have seen better figures than this from GAO and CRS, but these are in the ball park.<br />I again note that commercial industry builds much bigger ships for far lower costs and arguably better quality. A good example is the Maersk B-class costs about $350 million for a 30-knot, 53,000 DWT 4,000 TEU containership. Again, a containership is not a DDG, but neither is LCS and it boggles the mind that a 3,000 ton LCS which is built to neither naval vessel rules, or commercial standards cost more than a 53,000 ton commercial hull which exceeds ABS and international classification standards.<br /><br />GAB<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-29163926821293897112013-12-22T08:14:21.143-08:002013-12-22T08:14:21.143-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-8486330363035258462013-12-22T06:13:09.259-08:002013-12-22T06:13:09.259-08:00A duplicate post was deleted.A duplicate post was deleted.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-80672881524391256442013-12-22T00:30:46.817-08:002013-12-22T00:30:46.817-08:00Time to put on my engineers hat.
Another fact to ...Time to put on my engineers hat.<br /><br />Another fact to remember about the cost of any modern control system, is that the installation is often more expensive than the cost of the hardware. I expect this is especially true on warships where space is limited, and wiring is costly. This explains why the hardware is far less than the priced pay for the ship.<br />G Lofnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-7572236450425407002013-12-21T21:37:06.612-08:002013-12-21T21:37:06.612-08:00Matt,
As ComNavOps noted, the WWII Santa Fe was e...Matt,<br /><br />As ComNavOps noted, the WWII Santa Fe was effectively operating as a surface ship landing commandoes; the only Argentine submarine in the Falkland Islands War was a type 209 boat (San Luis) and she was *never tracked* by the British.<br /><br />As Harper notes: “…the submarine San Luis was free to patrol and this caused the British task force to be on the defensive at all times. The British expended "most of their ordnance on suspected contacts - most of which were false contacts caused by the ocean's many anomalies.' 7 The British ships present to counter the Argentine submarine threat were: one carrier, eleven destroyers, five nuclear powered submarines, one diesel submarine, and over 25 helicopters. 8”<br /><br />But the key takeaway is summed up by Captain Wayne Hughes: "Over two hundred anti-submarine, often with expensive torpedoes, were made against … one Argentine submarine.”<br /><br />Your quip about losing an LCS or a DDG is invalid because an LCS with a container launched VDS or TACTASS is not a capable ASW platform.<br /><br />GABAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-55226079244610287042013-12-21T20:28:46.924-08:002013-12-21T20:28:46.924-08:00Smitty,
You are looking at multi-year procurement...Smitty,<br /><br />You are looking at multi-year procurement funding on long-lead items (Aegis).<br /><br />Without looking at the actual contracts (or GAO/CRS/CBO reports) you cannot break that price out looking at single year dollars.<br /><br />Nor does this account for funding type. In this case you are only looking at SCN funding, there are many other pots. For example, LCS 1 and LCS 2 were built with RDT&E funding - if you looked only at SCN procurement, you would miss their cost entirely.<br /><br />I will track the numbers down, but the base DDG-51 is *only* about $650 million on a $2.5 billion dollar hull. I say only, because a modern 30+ knot container ship like the Maersk B-class costs about $350 million. Apples to oranges (?): yes, but 90% of the cost of a modern warship is not in hull and machinery, but in sensors, communications and weapons.<br /><br />GAB<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-62314120392722454282013-12-21T07:25:59.473-08:002013-12-21T07:25:59.473-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-30446883878540270262013-12-20T18:47:14.473-08:002013-12-20T18:47:14.473-08:00B.Smitty, you're correct that Congress acts in...B.Smitty, you're correct that Congress acts in such a way as to win the next election (though I'd like to think that some of them act on priciple to some extent!). That includes things like voting for weapons and systems that promote jobs, voting for "stuff" the military wants because they want to be seen supporting the military, and voting for "stuff" just for sake of looking busy and important. While strategy alone may mean little to them, strategy as a justification for weapons and systems is ideal, in their minds. Overwhelming justification, jobs, patriotism, etc. all combine to make a very supportable program if we can provide the strategic need and tie the program in question back to that strategy.<br /><br />I suppose that a case could be made for most weapons and systems supporting strategic goals (assuming we had any) to some degree, however slight. On a practical basis and, most importantly, on a monetary value basis, LCS does not significantly support any strategic goal I have in mind. Neither does JSF or half the ampibious ships or JHSV or AAV or MV-22 or ... well, you get the idea. Of course, it all depends on what your strategic goals are.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-33362220647123166302013-12-20T15:21:47.456-08:002013-12-20T15:21:47.456-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-11986480678339942302013-12-20T12:21:20.557-08:002013-12-20T12:21:20.557-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.B.Smittyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12650152449414871058noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-69761417113477757382013-12-20T12:00:00.410-08:002013-12-20T12:00:00.410-08:00Jim, you're very close now!
To rephrase you...Jim, you're very close now! <br /><br />To rephrase your statement, funding doesn't become part of our strategic thought, funding becomes part of our implementation. If we determine that we need 500 B-2 bombers to implement our strategy but we can only afford 100, then we need to find a way to afford 500 (defund programs that aren't critical to strategic goals, increase funding, etc.). The overall military budget is mammoth. We can fund whatever we truly need. What we can't fund is dozens of insanely expensive programs that only marginally contribute to our strategic goals (again, assuming we had any!).<br /><br />Given a clear statement of geopolitical strategy and a clear statement of military needs to achieve that strategy, Congress will gladly allocate the money. What they're hesitating to do is continue to fund questionable programs (LCS, JSF, EFV, etc.). If we dropped the questionable programs we wouldn't even have to ask Congress for more money - there would be plenty of money freed up and Congress would love us.<br /><br />Half the weapons, systems, and programs we have don't directly support our strategic goals (as I see them). What they support is budget justifications for the individual services.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-46481316531466894152013-12-20T10:21:46.736-08:002013-12-20T10:21:46.736-08:00I very much appreciate your input (or anyone elses...I very much appreciate your input (or anyone elses). I see what you mean. Instead of 'Here is the equipment to fit my assumptions' I need to step back and analyze the assumptions to see if they fit reality. This should be fun. <br /><br />As I've stated before, I've never been in the military. I've only read about it. And while to a certain extent I guess that makes me a fanboy, I do think its good for citizens to go through these thought processes because ultimately its us who help to decide to support what. <br /><br />Once I question those, and come up with a reason why we want to do something, I can think of the best ways to do that. And then I can decide how to shape the Navy to fit those missions. <br /><br />I have a question and a comment:<br /><br />One is... I agree with all of the above, but do wonder if we might be in a new state to a certain extent. The Navy can come up with a great plan that meets a national strategy. But I think its highly unlikely that Congress will increase funding no matter how cogent their argument. Sadly, I personally am afraid Congress will be more 'I don't want to spend more money and create political risk. So do all those cool things with your current funding...' If I am right, Doesn't the funding question then become part of the strategic thought? As a completely ad hoc example, Instead of 'China is a threat to our Maritime shipping due to this reason. We need to defeat China on the high seas because she threatens our Maritime trade, which is vital to our national interest' it becomes 'Within this fiscal environment we need to face China on the high seas...'<br /><br />The statement is: <br /><br />"Should we invest in B-2s or Burkes?" Burkes! Duh! I'm a Navy Nerd! ;-)<br /><br />JFWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16095723023404412328noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-28452319723685864642013-12-20T09:05:22.683-08:002013-12-20T09:05:22.683-08:00Jim, you're getting closer but you're stil...Jim, you're getting closer but you're still missing the link to strategic goals. For example, you state, "... the Navy can focus primarily on one of those missions ..." Why? Why would the Navy want to focus on any of those missions? What strategic goal would any of those missions support? Answer that and you'll be able to easily decide which mission(s) the Navy should focus on.<br /><br />More specifically, you state we want a Navy whose focus is large scale anti-surface warfare and you offer reasons A-D as rationale. Look at the individual reasons you offer. For example, <br /><br />A. - Why do we care if China builds a blue water fleet? What strategic goal of ours dictates that we have to counter a Chinese fleet or conduct extensive anti-surface warfare? What if we opted to conduct a purely long range aviation campaign (B-2 bombers) supported by SSGN Tomahawk strikes? There would be no need to engage in extensive anti-surface warfare. I'm not saying this would be the preferred operational plan but without strategic goals why would think that anti-surface warfare would get us where we want to go? It might. It might not.<br /><br />You get the idea? Depending on our strategic goals we might or might not need to fight Chinese fleets. We might or might not need X number of carriers. And so on ...<br /><br />What you're defining is operational and tactical level decisions that are isolated from strategic needs. Granted, some of your decisions would probably be applicable regardless of overall strategy but many depend on strategic guidance. We have limited money. Should we invest in B-2s or Burkes? Should we increase the size of ground forces to garrison the outlying islands around China or should we decrease the size of ground forces in anticipation of a largely naval and air campaign? And so on ...<br /><br />Your "givens" are backwards. You're letting factors dictate strategy. Strategy comes first and then factors influence the means to accomplish that strategy. For example, you say it's a given that fleet size will decrease and that says we can't engage close to the Chinese coast. If our strategy calls for close engagement then we MUST have a larger fleet and it only remains for us to decide how to achieve that. On the other hand, if our strategy calls for only a long distance blockade then we don't need much of a fleet and probably not one with the force structure we currently have. So, which is it? Or something else?<br /><br />You're talking operations and tactics without a link to strategy. You're getting closer but not quite there yet.<br /><br />Ponder this, since you seem focused on the Chinese fleet: How is the Chinese fleet (even a future, bigger, more modern one) a threat to the US? They can't reach the US. Their capabilities are going to remain limited for quite a while, yet. We have no real land mass within their range that they can threaten. We can sail subs under them with relative impunity and launch missiles over them. Why is the Chinese fleet a threat? Answer that and you'll know to what degree, if any, you should counter them. Given our strategic goals (of which we don't have any!) maybe we can let them sail around accomplishing nothing. Or maybe not.<br /><br />I offer these thoughts not as criticism but as a guide for your thought process since you seem open to input. : )<br /><br />Have fun with this!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-66535924117810493672013-12-20T07:35:59.135-08:002013-12-20T07:35:59.135-08:00Yes, it makes perfect sense. Its frustrating that ...Yes, it makes perfect sense. Its frustrating that our Navy seems unable to articulate it.<br /><br />"Without a coherent strategy, the Navy has no guiding blueprint to design against. Do we want a Navy whose mission is long range, inland strike? Do we want a Navy whose mission is large scale anti-surface warfare? Do we want a Navy whose mission is stand-off blockade?"<br /><br />My personal opinion, feel free to blow it up, is that I think the Navy can focus primarily on one of those missions, but that those capabilities would 'bleed over' into other areas, if to a lesser degree. <br /><br />I.E, my personal thought would be that we want a Navy whose mission is large scale anti-surface warfare.<br /><br />The reason for this, to me, is that <br />A) The Chinese are increasingly building a Blue water fleet<br />B) The CHinese are using said fleet to help intimidate neighbors, who are our allies<br />C) One of the primary missions of our Navy, as a maritime power, is to control the sea in order to control the sea lines of communication and shipping. Most of our more valuable sea lines are now in the Pacific<br />D) even in the days of sail, having ships attack forts was possible, but risky as hell. We enjoyed a period where we could attack with impunity because AShM's weren't as advanced, and no one had much of a blue water capability. That has changed. So parking a Carrier off the Chinese shore isn't feasible anymore. Even if ABM technology works flawlessly you can only carry so many ABM's in your magazine when you don't have much room to manuever. <br /><br />To get to that end, I would: <br /><br />A) Cancel the F-35 and retrofit/buy the Advanced superhornet<br />B) Cancel the LCS. Look at cost effective solutions for a replacement. National Security Cutter? I dont' know. But look for something that is very ASW focused, because I believe subs are a major blue water threat. SLEP the remaining FFG's. Maybe have SURTASS ships in the Pacific. Work, if we don't have one, on a SOSUS line around the South China Sea. <br />C) Fix the Virginias (their coating issues) and try to increase production if possible. <br />D) Cancel the Fords. I don't see a compelling need to go beyond the Nimitz class with efficiency improvements. Especially not worth the cash. <br />E) Keep the 'Burkes for the time being. Soon they are going to be our only Anti-air.<br />D) Mothball the Tico's when the time comes. <br />E) Drop the number of carriers down to 9. 1 group of three for the Atlantic, the rest for the Pacific. Mothball the rest. <br />F) Find a way to improve tanking, and aerial ASW. Maybe bring back the Vikings. Or use the Osprey's for that role. Something. <br />G) Get a new AShM into the fleet. Either Harpoon Blk III, a Taiwanese model that's supersonic, or LRASM. But do it quickly as possible. And put it on all of the decks you can. <br /><br />My theory is this: <br /><br />Given: We aren't going to be able to keep our fleet the same size. We have to cut it down to what we can do, and do well. Deciding to move our fleet into close contact with the Chinese Coast close to the center of their naval power is a great way to wreck our fleet. <br /><br />Given: We can't have our fleet deploying all over the world independantly anymore. We don't have the ships, or the money for the wear and tear that would entail. <br /><br />Given: Ballistic and 'normal' AShM's make it very difficult to move close in in a hot environment. <br /><br />What can we do? Get an advanced SuperHornet for a reasonable price, and with proper tanking it gives us a great anti ship platform. Improve the ASW on our fleet because right now it seems to be really bad. Have our fleet control the blue water, where China can't easily extend. Make it a constant threat to Chinese shipping. 'You can go to war with us. But we can stop your commerce.' can rely on allies to help us in/around Japan the China sea. We can use submarines to get close and make the strikes we need. <br /><br />This still allows for land attack ability. This still allows for humanitarian missions in peace time. Just not as good. <br /><br />Let me know what you think. JFWhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16095723023404412328noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-50087959143393204332013-12-19T15:09:26.808-08:002013-12-19T15:09:26.808-08:00Matt: ”It strike me that you are trying to make th...Matt: ”It strike me that you are trying to make the argument that an LCS is not as good an ASW platform as a DDG. Am I correct? <br /><br />If so, I'd tend to agree. You get what you pay for -- and a DDG costs more than twice what an LCS costs.”<br />xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx<br /><br />A DDG 51 cost well in excess of $2 billion, but most of the cost is in Aegis. The base hull DDG 51 without Aegis costs $650 million.<br /><br />A base hull LCS cost $500 million. See where this is going?<br /><br />So yes, I would take a DDG 51 without Aegis, over an LCS and be quite happy paying the $150 million dollar difference for a platform that brings a hull mounted sonar, towed array, 96 VLS cells, a 5” gun; not to mention a proven, reliable, and durable hull with the appropriate machinery isolation to do ASW. <br /><br />GAB<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com